diff mbox series

[v6,3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data

Message ID 20201119232611.30114-4-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com (mailing list archive)
State New
Headers show
Series IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data | expand

Commit Message

Tushar Sugandhi Nov. 19, 2020, 11:26 p.m. UTC
IMA provides capabilities to measure file data, and in-memory buffer
data. However, currently, IMA does not provide a generic function for
kernel subsystems to measure the integrity critical data. Kernel
integrity critical data can be defined as the in-memory kernel data which
if accidentally or maliciously altered, can compromise the integrity of
the system. Examples of critical data would be kernel in-memory r/o
structures, hash of the memory structures, or data that represents a
linux kernel subsystem state change.

Define a new IMA hook named ima_measure_critical_data to measure kernel
integrity critical data. 

Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy |  2 +-
 include/linux/ima.h                  |  6 +++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h         |  1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c     |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c    | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c  |  2 ++
 6 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index e35263f97fc1..6ec7daa87cba 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@  Description:
 			func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK]MODULE_CHECK]
 			        [FIRMWARE_CHECK]
 				[KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK]
-				[KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK]
+				[KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] [CRITICAL_DATA]
 			mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
 			       [[^]MAY_EXEC]
 			fsmagic:= hex value
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 8fa7bcfb2da2..9911a6e496b6 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@  extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
 extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size);
+extern void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name,
+				      const void *buf, int buf_len,
+				      bool measure_buf_hash);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
 extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image);
@@ -116,6 +119,9 @@  static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
 }
 
 static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) {}
+static inline void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name,
+					     const void *buf, int buf_len,
+					     bool measure_buf_hash) {}
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index fa3044a7539f..7d9deda6a8b3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -201,6 +201,7 @@  static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
 	hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy)			\
 	hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline)		\
 	hook(KEY_CHECK, key)				\
+	hook(CRITICAL_DATA, critical_data)		\
 	hook(MAX_CHECK, none)
 
 #define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str)	ENUM,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index af218babd198..9917e1730cb6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@  void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
  *		subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
  *	subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
  *	func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
- *	| KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK
+ *	| KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK | CRITICAL_DATA
  *	mask: contains the permission mask
  *	fsmagic: hex value
  *
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index f3501bdd1035..7661f09569f3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -922,6 +922,42 @@  void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
 	fdput(f);
 }
 
+/**
+ * ima_measure_critical_data - measure kernel integrity critical data
+ * @event_name: event name to be used for the buffer entry
+ * @buf: pointer to buffer containing data to measure
+ * @buf_len: length of buffer(in bytes)
+ * @measure_buf_hash: measure buffer hash
+ *
+ * Measure the kernel subsystem data, critical to the integrity of the kernel,
+ * into the IMA log and extend the @pcr.
+ *
+ * Use @event_name to describe the state/buffer data change.
+ * Examples of critical data (buf) could be kernel in-memory r/o structures,
+ * hash of the memory structures, or data that represents subsystem state
+ * change.
+ *
+ * If @measure_buf_hash is set to true - measure hash of the buffer data,
+ * else measure the buffer data itself.
+ * measure_buf_hash can be used to save space, if the data being measured
+ * is too large.
+ *
+ * The data (buf) can only be measured, not appraised.
+ */
+void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name,
+			       const void *buf, int buf_len,
+			       bool measure_buf_hash)
+{
+	if (!event_name || !buf || !buf_len) {
+		pr_err("Invalid arguments passed to %s().\n", __func__);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	process_buffer_measurement(NULL, buf, buf_len, event_name,
+				   CRITICAL_DATA, 0, NULL,
+				   measure_buf_hash);
+}
+
 static int __init init_ima(void)
 {
 	int error;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 25419c7ff50b..2a0c0603626e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -1251,6 +1251,8 @@  static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) &&
 				 strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0)
 				entry->func = KEY_CHECK;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "CRITICAL_DATA") == 0)
+				entry->func = CRITICAL_DATA;
 			else
 				result = -EINVAL;
 			if (!result)