| Message ID | 20201212180251.9943-3-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data | expand |
On Sat, 2020-12-12 at 10:02 -0800, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: > The original IMA buffer data measurement sizes were small (e.g. boot > command line), but the new buffer data measurement use cases have data > sizes that are a lot larger. Just as IMA measures the file data hash, > not the file data, IMA should similarly support the option for measuring > the hash of the buffer data. > > Measuring in-memory buffer-data/buffer-data-hash is different than > measuring file-data/file-data-hash. For the file, IMA stores the > measurements in both measurement log and the file's extended attribute - > which can later be used for appraisal as well. For buffer, the > measurements are only stored in the IMA log, since the buffer has no > extended attributes associated with it. By definition, buffer data is only measured. Nothing new is added by the above paragraph. Please remove it. > > Introduce a boolean parameter measure_buf_hash to support measuring > hash of a buffer, which would be much smaller, instead of the buffer > itself. Like the patch Subject line use "the buffer data hash" instead of the "hash of a buffer". There's no need to include the boolean parameter name "measure_buf_hash". Please remove it. > > Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> > Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> > --- > security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 3 +- > security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +- > security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 2 +- > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++--- > security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 3 +- > 5 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > index e5622ce8cbb1..fa3044a7539f 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > @@ -268,7 +268,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, > struct ima_template_desc *template_desc); > void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, > const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, > - int pcr, const char *func_data); > + int pcr, const char *func_data, > + bool measure_buf_hash); Please abbreviate the boolean name to "hash". The test would then be "if (hash == true)" or "if (hash)". > void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, > const unsigned char *filename); > int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data, > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > index 8361941ee0a1..46ffa38bab12 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > @@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, > if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE)) > process_buffer_measurement(NULL, digest, digestsize, > "blacklisted-hash", NONE, > - pcr, NULL); > + pcr, NULL, false); > } > > return rc; > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c > index 1c68c500c26f..a74095793936 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c > @@ -60,5 +60,5 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, > */ > process_buffer_measurement(NULL, payload, payload_len, > keyring->description, KEY_CHECK, 0, > - keyring->description); > + keyring->description, false); > } > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > index e76ef4bfd0f4..0f8409d77602 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > @@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, > } > > /* > - * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log. > + * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer or the buffer data hash > * @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK) > * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log. > * @size: size of buffer(in bytes). > @@ -787,12 +787,23 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, > * @func: IMA hook > * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement > * @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. > + * @measure_buf_hash: measure buffer hash ^@hash: measure buffer data hash > * > - * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log. > + * Measure the buffer into the IMA log, and extend the @pcr. IMA always measures/appraises files and measures buffer data based on policy. The above sentence succintly summarizes what process_buffer_measurement() does. This patch adds support for measuring the "buffer data hash". The following would be an appropriate change. * Based on policy, either the buffer data or buffer data hash is measured > + * > + * Determine what buffers are allowed to be measured, based on the policy rules > + * and the IMA hook passed using @func. > + * > + * Use @func_data, if provided, to match against the measurement policy rule > + * data for @func. > + * > + * If @measure_buf_hash is set to true - measure hash of the buffer data, > + * else measure the buffer data itself. This patch should be limited to adding "buffer data hash" support. These changes don't belong in this patch. Please remove. > */ > void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, > const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, > - int pcr, const char *func_data) > + int pcr, const char *func_data, > + bool measure_buf_hash) > { > int ret = 0; > const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; > @@ -807,6 +818,8 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, > struct ima_digest_data hdr; > char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; > } hash = {}; > + char buf_hash[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; > + int buf_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo]; > int violation = 0; > int action = 0; > u32 secid; > @@ -849,13 +862,27 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, > goto out; > } > > + if (measure_buf_hash) { ^ if (hash) { > + memcpy(buf_hash, hash.hdr.digest, buf_hash_len); > + > + ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf_hash, buf_hash_len, > + iint.ima_hash); > + if (ret < 0) { > + audit_cause = "measure_buf_hash_error"; I don't see a good no reason for defining a new audit cause. Use the existing "hashing_error". thanks, Mimi > + goto out; > + } > + > + event_data.buf = buf_hash; > + event_data.buf_len = buf_hash_len; > + } > + > ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template); > if (ret < 0) { > audit_cause = "alloc_entry"; > goto out; > } > > - ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr); > + ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, event_data.buf, pcr); > if (ret < 0) { > audit_cause = "store_entry"; > ima_free_template_entry(entry); > @@ -890,7 +917,8 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) > return; > > process_buffer_measurement(file_inode(f.file), buf, size, > - "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL); > + "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL, > + false); > fdput(f); > } > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c > index 69a8626a35c0..c2f2ad34f9b7 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c > @@ -162,7 +162,8 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void) > entry->payload_len, > entry->keyring_name, > KEY_CHECK, 0, > - entry->keyring_name); > + entry->keyring_name, > + false); > list_del(&entry->list); > ima_free_key_entry(entry); > }
On 2020-12-23 4:03 p.m., Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Sat, 2020-12-12 at 10:02 -0800, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: >> The original IMA buffer data measurement sizes were small (e.g. boot >> command line), but the new buffer data measurement use cases have data >> sizes that are a lot larger. Just as IMA measures the file data hash, >> not the file data, IMA should similarly support the option for measuring >> the hash of the buffer data. >> >> Measuring in-memory buffer-data/buffer-data-hash is different than >> measuring file-data/file-data-hash. For the file, IMA stores the >> measurements in both measurement log and the file's extended attribute - >> which can later be used for appraisal as well. For buffer, the >> measurements are only stored in the IMA log, since the buffer has no >> extended attributes associated with it. > > By definition, buffer data is only measured. Nothing new is added by > the above paragraph. Please remove it. > Sure. Will remove. >> >> Introduce a boolean parameter measure_buf_hash to support measuring >> hash of a buffer, which would be much smaller, instead of the buffer >> itself. > > Like the patch Subject line use "the buffer data hash" instead of the > "hash of a buffer". > Will do. > There's no need to include the boolean parameter name > "measure_buf_hash". Please remove it. > Will do. >> >> Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> >> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> >> --- >> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 3 +- >> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +- >> security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 2 +- >> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++--- >> security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 3 +- >> 5 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h >> index e5622ce8cbb1..fa3044a7539f 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h >> @@ -268,7 +268,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, >> struct ima_template_desc *template_desc); >> void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, >> const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, >> - int pcr, const char *func_data); >> + int pcr, const char *func_data, >> + bool measure_buf_hash); > > Please abbreviate the boolean name to "hash". The test would then be > "if (hash == true)" or "if (hash)". > Will do. >> void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, >> const unsigned char *filename); >> int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data, >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c >> index 8361941ee0a1..46ffa38bab12 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c >> @@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, >> if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE)) >> process_buffer_measurement(NULL, digest, digestsize, >> "blacklisted-hash", NONE, >> - pcr, NULL); >> + pcr, NULL, false); >> } >> >> return rc; >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c >> index 1c68c500c26f..a74095793936 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c >> @@ -60,5 +60,5 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, >> */ >> process_buffer_measurement(NULL, payload, payload_len, >> keyring->description, KEY_CHECK, 0, >> - keyring->description); >> + keyring->description, false); >> } >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >> index e76ef4bfd0f4..0f8409d77602 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >> @@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, >> } >> >> /* >> - * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log. >> + * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer or the buffer data hash >> * @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK) >> * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log. >> * @size: size of buffer(in bytes). >> @@ -787,12 +787,23 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, >> * @func: IMA hook >> * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement >> * @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. >> + * @measure_buf_hash: measure buffer hash > > ^@hash: measure buffer data hash > Agreed. Will fix. >> * >> - * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log. >> + * Measure the buffer into the IMA log, and extend the @pcr. > > IMA always measures/appraises files and measures buffer data based on > policy. The above sentence succintly summarizes what > process_buffer_measurement() does. This patch adds support for > measuring the "buffer data hash". The following would be an > appropriate change. > > * Based on policy, either the buffer data or buffer data hash is > measured > Sounds good. Will update. >> + * >> + * Determine what buffers are allowed to be measured, based on the policy rules >> + * and the IMA hook passed using @func. >> + * >> + * Use @func_data, if provided, to match against the measurement policy rule >> + * data for @func. >> + * >> + * If @measure_buf_hash is set to true - measure hash of the buffer data, >> + * else measure the buffer data itself. > > This patch should be limited to adding "buffer data hash" support. > These changes don't belong in this patch. Please remove. > Agreed. Will remove. >> */ >> void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, >> const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, >> - int pcr, const char *func_data) >> + int pcr, const char *func_data, >> + bool measure_buf_hash) >> { >> int ret = 0; >> const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; >> @@ -807,6 +818,8 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, >> struct ima_digest_data hdr; >> char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; >> } hash = {}; >> + char buf_hash[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; >> + int buf_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo]; >> int violation = 0; >> int action = 0; >> u32 secid; >> @@ -849,13 +862,27 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, >> goto out; >> } >> >> + if (measure_buf_hash) { > > ^ if (hash) { Yes. >> + memcpy(buf_hash, hash.hdr.digest, buf_hash_len); >> + >> + ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf_hash, buf_hash_len, >> + iint.ima_hash); >> + if (ret < 0) { >> + audit_cause = "measure_buf_hash_error"; > > I don't see a good no reason for defining a new audit cause. Use the > existing "hashing_error". > > thanks, > > Mimi > Thanks, Tushar >> + goto out; >> + } >> + >> + event_data.buf = buf_hash; >> + event_data.buf_len = buf_hash_len; >> + } >> + >> ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template); >> if (ret < 0) { >> audit_cause = "alloc_entry"; >> goto out; >> } >> >> - ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr); >> + ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, event_data.buf, pcr); >> if (ret < 0) { >> audit_cause = "store_entry"; >> ima_free_template_entry(entry); >> @@ -890,7 +917,8 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) >> return; >> >> process_buffer_measurement(file_inode(f.file), buf, size, >> - "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL); >> + "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL, >> + false); >> fdput(f); >> } >> >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c >> index 69a8626a35c0..c2f2ad34f9b7 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c >> @@ -162,7 +162,8 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void) >> entry->payload_len, >> entry->keyring_name, >> KEY_CHECK, 0, >> - entry->keyring_name); >> + entry->keyring_name, >> + false); >> list_del(&entry->list); >> ima_free_key_entry(entry); >> } >
<snip> >>> void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void >>> *buf, int size, >>> const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, >>> - int pcr, const char *func_data); >>> + int pcr, const char *func_data, >>> + bool measure_buf_hash); >> >> Please abbreviate the boolean name to "hash". The test would then be >> "if (hash == true)" or "if (hash)". >> > Will do. <snip> >>> - * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log. >>> + * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer or the buffer >>> data hash >>> * @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL >>> for KEY_CHECK) >>> * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log. >>> * @size: size of buffer(in bytes). >>> @@ -787,12 +787,23 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, >>> * @func: IMA hook >>> * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement >>> * @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. >>> + * @measure_buf_hash: measure buffer hash >> >> ^@hash: measure buffer data hash >> > Agreed. Will fix. <snip> >>> void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void >>> *buf, int size, >>> const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, >>> - int pcr, const char *func_data) >>> + int pcr, const char *func_data, >>> + bool measure_buf_hash) >>> { >>> int ret = 0; >>> const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; >>> @@ -807,6 +818,8 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode >>> *inode, const void *buf, int size, >>> struct ima_digest_data hdr; >>> char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; >>> } hash = {}; >>> + char buf_hash[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; >>> + int buf_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo]; >>> int violation = 0; >>> int action = 0; >>> u32 secid; >>> @@ -849,13 +862,27 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode >>> *inode, const void *buf, int size, >>> goto out; >>> } >>> + if (measure_buf_hash) { >> >> ^ if (hash) { > Yes. >>> + memcpy(buf_hash, hash.hdr.digest, buf_hash_len); >>> + >>> + ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf_hash, buf_hash_len, >>> + iint.ima_hash); >>> + if (ret < 0) { >>> + audit_cause = "measure_buf_hash_error"; Hi Mimi, There already exist a local struct variable named "hash" in p_b_m(). I was thinking of using "buf_hash", but that one is taken too. Maybe I should use "buf_hash" for the input bool, and rename the existing "buf_hash" local variable to "digest_hash"? Does it sound ok? Thanks, Tushar <snip>
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index e5622ce8cbb1..fa3044a7539f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -268,7 +268,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc); void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, - int pcr, const char *func_data); + int pcr, const char *func_data, + bool measure_buf_hash); void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, const unsigned char *filename); int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 8361941ee0a1..46ffa38bab12 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE)) process_buffer_measurement(NULL, digest, digestsize, "blacklisted-hash", NONE, - pcr, NULL); + pcr, NULL, false); } return rc; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c index 1c68c500c26f..a74095793936 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c @@ -60,5 +60,5 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, */ process_buffer_measurement(NULL, payload, payload_len, keyring->description, KEY_CHECK, 0, - keyring->description); + keyring->description, false); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index e76ef4bfd0f4..0f8409d77602 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, } /* - * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log. + * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer or the buffer data hash * @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK) * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log. * @size: size of buffer(in bytes). @@ -787,12 +787,23 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, * @func: IMA hook * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement * @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. + * @measure_buf_hash: measure buffer hash * - * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log. + * Measure the buffer into the IMA log, and extend the @pcr. + * + * Determine what buffers are allowed to be measured, based on the policy rules + * and the IMA hook passed using @func. + * + * Use @func_data, if provided, to match against the measurement policy rule + * data for @func. + * + * If @measure_buf_hash is set to true - measure hash of the buffer data, + * else measure the buffer data itself. */ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, - int pcr, const char *func_data) + int pcr, const char *func_data, + bool measure_buf_hash) { int ret = 0; const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; @@ -807,6 +818,8 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, struct ima_digest_data hdr; char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; } hash = {}; + char buf_hash[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; + int buf_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo]; int violation = 0; int action = 0; u32 secid; @@ -849,13 +862,27 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, goto out; } + if (measure_buf_hash) { + memcpy(buf_hash, hash.hdr.digest, buf_hash_len); + + ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf_hash, buf_hash_len, + iint.ima_hash); + if (ret < 0) { + audit_cause = "measure_buf_hash_error"; + goto out; + } + + event_data.buf = buf_hash; + event_data.buf_len = buf_hash_len; + } + ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template); if (ret < 0) { audit_cause = "alloc_entry"; goto out; } - ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr); + ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, event_data.buf, pcr); if (ret < 0) { audit_cause = "store_entry"; ima_free_template_entry(entry); @@ -890,7 +917,8 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) return; process_buffer_measurement(file_inode(f.file), buf, size, - "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL); + "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL, + false); fdput(f); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c index 69a8626a35c0..c2f2ad34f9b7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c @@ -162,7 +162,8 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void) entry->payload_len, entry->keyring_name, KEY_CHECK, 0, - entry->keyring_name); + entry->keyring_name, + false); list_del(&entry->list); ima_free_key_entry(entry); }