diff mbox series

[v10,4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure critical data

Message ID 20210108040708.8389-5-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data | expand

Commit Message

Tushar Sugandhi Jan. 8, 2021, 4:07 a.m. UTC 
A new IMA policy rule is needed for the IMA hook
ima_measure_critical_data() and the corresponding func CRITICAL_DATA for
measuring the input buffer.  The policy rule should ensure the buffer
would get measured only when the policy rule allows the action.  The
policy rule should also support the necessary constraints (flags etc.)
for integrity critical buffer data measurements.

Add policy rule support for measuring integrity critical data.

Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c  | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index e35263f97fc1..6ec7daa87cba 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@  Description:
 			func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK]MODULE_CHECK]
 			        [FIRMWARE_CHECK]
 				[KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK]
-				[KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK]
+				[KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] [CRITICAL_DATA]
 			mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
 			       [[^]MAY_EXEC]
 			fsmagic:= hex value
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index b93966034368..96ba4273c4d0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -478,6 +478,8 @@  static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 
 		opt_list = rule->keyrings;
 		break;
+	case CRITICAL_DATA:
+		return true;
 	default:
 		return false;
 	}
@@ -514,13 +516,19 @@  static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 {
 	int i;
 
-	if (func == KEY_CHECK) {
-		return (rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func) &&
-			ima_match_rule_data(rule, func_data, cred);
-	}
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
 	    (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
 		return false;
+
+	switch (func) {
+	case KEY_CHECK:
+	case CRITICAL_DATA:
+		return ((rule->func == func) &&
+			ima_match_rule_data(rule, func_data, cred));
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) &&
 	    (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR))
 		return false;
@@ -1115,6 +1123,17 @@  static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 		if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
 			return false;
 
+		break;
+	case CRITICAL_DATA:
+		if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
+			return false;
+
+		if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR))
+			return false;
+
+		if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
+			return false;
+
 		break;
 	default:
 		return false;
@@ -1247,6 +1266,8 @@  static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) &&
 				 strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0)
 				entry->func = KEY_CHECK;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "CRITICAL_DATA") == 0)
+				entry->func = CRITICAL_DATA;
 			else
 				result = -EINVAL;
 			if (!result)