diff mbox series

[v24,04/25] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs

Message ID 20210126164108.1958-5-casey@schaufler-ca.com (mailing list archive)
State New
Headers show
Series [v24,01/25] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security | expand

Commit Message

Casey Schaufler Jan. 26, 2021, 4:40 p.m. UTC
Integrity measurement may filter on security module information
and needs to be clear in the case of multiple active security
modules which applies. Provide a boot option ima_rules_lsm= to
allow the user to specify an active securty module to apply
filters to. If not specified, use the first registered module
that supports the audit_rule_match() LSM hook. Allow the user
to specify in the IMA policy an lsm= option to specify the
security module to use for a particular rule.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy |  8 +++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c  | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++------
 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

Comments

Mimi Zohar Feb. 14, 2021, 6:21 p.m. UTC | #1
Hi Casey,

On Tue, 2021-01-26 at 08:40 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Integrity measurement may filter on security module information
> and needs to be clear in the case of multiple active security
> modules which applies. Provide a boot option ima_rules_lsm= to
> allow the user to specify an active securty module to apply
> filters to. If not specified, use the first registered module
> that supports the audit_rule_match() LSM hook. Allow the user
> to specify in the IMA policy an lsm= option to specify the
> security module to use for a particular rule.

Thanks, Casey.

(This patch description line length seems short.)

> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
> ---
>  Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy |  8 +++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c  | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++------
>  2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> index e35263f97fc1..a7943d40466f 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Description:
>  			base:	[[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [uid=]
>  				[euid=] [fowner=] [fsname=]]
>  			lsm:	[[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
> -				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
> +				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=] [lsm=]]

"[lsm=]" either requires all LSM rules types (e.g. {subj/obj}_user,
role, type) to be exactly the same for multiple LSMs or all of the LSM
rule types are applicable to only a single LSM.  Supporting multiple
LSMs with exactly the same LSM labels doesn't seem worth the effort.  
Keep it simple - a single rule, containing any LSM rule types, is
applicable to a single LSM.

>  			option:	[[appraise_type=]] [template=] [permit_directio]
>  				[appraise_flag=] [keyrings=]
>  		  base:
> @@ -114,6 +114,12 @@ Description:
> 
>  			measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
> 
> +		It is possible to explicitly specify which security
> +		module a rule applies to using lsm=.  If the security
> +		modules specified is not active on the system the rule
> +		will be rejected.  If lsm= is not specified the first
> +		security module registered on the system will be assumed.
> +
>  		Example of measure rules using alternate PCRs::
> 
>  			measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 8002683003e6..de72b719c90c 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
>  		void *rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES]; /* LSM file metadata specific */
>  		char *args_p;	/* audit value */
>  		int type;	/* audit type */
> +		int which_lsm; /* which of the rules to use */
>  	} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];

Even if we wanted to support multiple LSMs within the same rule having
both "rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES]" and "which_lsm" shouldn't be necessary.  
The LSMBLOB_ENTRIES should already identify the LSM.

To support a single LSM per policy rule, "which_lsm" should be defined
outside of lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES].  This will simplify the rest of the code
(e.g. matching/freeing rules).

	int which_lsm;          /* which of the rules to use */
	struct {
                void *rule;        /* LSM file metadata specific */
                char *args_p;   /* audit value */
                int type;       /* audit type */
        } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];


>  	char *fsname;
>  	struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */
> @@ -90,17 +91,15 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
> 
>  /**
>   * ima_lsm_isset - Is a rule set for any of the active security modules
> - * @rules: The set of IMA rules to check
> + * @entry: the rule entry to examine
> + * @lsm_rule: the specific rule type in question
>   *
> - * If a rule is set for any LSM return true, otherwise return false.
> + * If a rule is set return true, otherwise return false.
>   */
> -static inline bool ima_lsm_isset(void *rules[])
> +static inline bool ima_lsm_isset(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, int lsm_rule)
>  {
> -	int i;
> -
> -	for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
> -		if (rules[i])
> -			return true;
> +	if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules[entry->lsm[lsm_rule].which_lsm])
> +		return true;

If each IMA policy rule is limited to a specific LSM, then the test
would be "entry->which_lsm".

>  	return false;
>  }
> 
> @@ -273,6 +272,20 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
>  }
>  __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
> 
> +static int ima_rule_lsm __ro_after_init;
> +
> +static int __init ima_rule_lsm_init(char *str)
> +{
> +	ima_rule_lsm = lsm_name_to_slot(str);
> +	if (ima_rule_lsm < 0) {
> +		ima_rule_lsm = 0;
> +		pr_err("rule lsm \"%s\" not registered", str);
> +	}
> +
> +	return 1;
> +}
> +__setup("ima_rule_lsm=", ima_rule_lsm_init);

The patch description refers to "ima_rules_lsm=".  Please update one or
the other.

thanks,

Mimi
Casey Schaufler Feb. 16, 2021, 3:26 p.m. UTC | #2
On 2/14/2021 10:21 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Hi Casey,
>
> On Tue, 2021-01-26 at 08:40 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> Integrity measurement may filter on security module information
>> and needs to be clear in the case of multiple active security
>> modules which applies. Provide a boot option ima_rules_lsm= to
>> allow the user to specify an active securty module to apply
>> filters to. If not specified, use the first registered module
>> that supports the audit_rule_match() LSM hook. Allow the user
>> to specify in the IMA policy an lsm= option to specify the
>> security module to use for a particular rule.
> Thanks, Casey.
>
> (This patch description line length seems short.)
>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>> To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
>> To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
>> ---
>>  Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy |  8 +++-
>>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c  | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++------
>>  2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
>> index e35263f97fc1..a7943d40466f 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
>> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
>> @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Description:
>>  			base:	[[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [uid=]
>>  				[euid=] [fowner=] [fsname=]]
>>  			lsm:	[[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
>> -				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
>> +				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=] [lsm=]]
> "[lsm=]" either requires all LSM rules types (e.g. {subj/obj}_user,
> role, type) to be exactly the same for multiple LSMs or all of the LSM
> rule types are applicable to only a single LSM.  Supporting multiple
> LSMs with exactly the same LSM labels doesn't seem worth the effort.  
> Keep it simple - a single rule, containing any LSM rule types, is
> applicable to a single LSM.

Thank you. I will add this.

>
>>  			option:	[[appraise_type=]] [template=] [permit_directio]
>>  				[appraise_flag=] [keyrings=]
>>  		  base:
>> @@ -114,6 +114,12 @@ Description:
>>
>>  			measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
>>
>> +		It is possible to explicitly specify which security
>> +		module a rule applies to using lsm=.  If the security
>> +		modules specified is not active on the system the rule
>> +		will be rejected.  If lsm= is not specified the first
>> +		security module registered on the system will be assumed.
>> +
>>  		Example of measure rules using alternate PCRs::
>>
>>  			measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> index 8002683003e6..de72b719c90c 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> @@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
>>  		void *rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES]; /* LSM file metadata specific */
>>  		char *args_p;	/* audit value */
>>  		int type;	/* audit type */
>> +		int which_lsm; /* which of the rules to use */
>>  	} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
> Even if we wanted to support multiple LSMs within the same rule having
> both "rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES]" and "which_lsm" shouldn't be necessary.  
> The LSMBLOB_ENTRIES should already identify the LSM.
>
> To support a single LSM per policy rule, "which_lsm" should be defined
> outside of lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES].  This will simplify the rest of the code
> (e.g. matching/freeing rules).
>
> 	int which_lsm;          /* which of the rules to use */
> 	struct {
>                 void *rule;        /* LSM file metadata specific */
>                 char *args_p;   /* audit value */
>                 int type;       /* audit type */
>         } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];

You're right, that is better. I'll incorporate the change.

>
>
>>  	char *fsname;
>>  	struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */
>> @@ -90,17 +91,15 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
>>
>>  /**
>>   * ima_lsm_isset - Is a rule set for any of the active security modules
>> - * @rules: The set of IMA rules to check
>> + * @entry: the rule entry to examine
>> + * @lsm_rule: the specific rule type in question
>>   *
>> - * If a rule is set for any LSM return true, otherwise return false.
>> + * If a rule is set return true, otherwise return false.
>>   */
>> -static inline bool ima_lsm_isset(void *rules[])
>> +static inline bool ima_lsm_isset(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, int lsm_rule)
>>  {
>> -	int i;
>> -
>> -	for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
>> -		if (rules[i])
>> -			return true;
>> +	if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules[entry->lsm[lsm_rule].which_lsm])
>> +		return true;
> If each IMA policy rule is limited to a specific LSM, then the test
> would be "entry->which_lsm".

Which would be an improvement.

>
>>  	return false;
>>  }
>>
>> @@ -273,6 +272,20 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
>>  }
>>  __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
>>
>> +static int ima_rule_lsm __ro_after_init;
>> +
>> +static int __init ima_rule_lsm_init(char *str)
>> +{
>> +	ima_rule_lsm = lsm_name_to_slot(str);
>> +	if (ima_rule_lsm < 0) {
>> +		ima_rule_lsm = 0;
>> +		pr_err("rule lsm \"%s\" not registered", str);
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	return 1;
>> +}
>> +__setup("ima_rule_lsm=", ima_rule_lsm_init);
> The patch description refers to "ima_rules_lsm=".  Please update one or
> the other.

ima_rules_lsm seem to be more accurate. I'll fix it.

>
> thanks,
>
> Mimi

Thanks for the review and recommendations.
Casey Schaufler Feb. 22, 2021, 11:45 p.m. UTC | #3
On 2/14/2021 10:21 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Hi Casey,
>
> On Tue, 2021-01-26 at 08:40 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> Integrity measurement may filter on security module information
>> and needs to be clear in the case of multiple active security
>> modules which applies. Provide a boot option ima_rules_lsm= to
>> allow the user to specify an active securty module to apply
>> filters to. If not specified, use the first registered module
>> that supports the audit_rule_match() LSM hook. Allow the user
>> to specify in the IMA policy an lsm= option to specify the
>> security module to use for a particular rule.
> Thanks, Casey.
>
> (This patch description line length seems short.)
>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>> To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
>> To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
>> ---
>>  Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy |  8 +++-
>>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c  | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++------
>>  2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
>> index e35263f97fc1..a7943d40466f 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
>> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
>> @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Description:
>>  			base:	[[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [uid=]
>>  				[euid=] [fowner=] [fsname=]]
>>  			lsm:	[[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
>> -				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
>> +				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=] [lsm=]]
> "[lsm=]" either requires all LSM rules types (e.g. {subj/obj}_user,
> role, type) to be exactly the same for multiple LSMs or all of the LSM
> rule types are applicable to only a single LSM.  Supporting multiple
> LSMs with exactly the same LSM labels doesn't seem worth the effort.  
> Keep it simple - a single rule, containing any LSM rule types, is
> applicable to a single LSM.
>
>>  			option:	[[appraise_type=]] [template=] [permit_directio]
>>  				[appraise_flag=] [keyrings=]
>>  		  base:
>> @@ -114,6 +114,12 @@ Description:
>>
>>  			measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
>>
>> +		It is possible to explicitly specify which security
>> +		module a rule applies to using lsm=.  If the security
>> +		modules specified is not active on the system the rule
>> +		will be rejected.  If lsm= is not specified the first
>> +		security module registered on the system will be assumed.
>> +
>>  		Example of measure rules using alternate PCRs::
>>
>>  			measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> index 8002683003e6..de72b719c90c 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> @@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
>>  		void *rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES]; /* LSM file metadata specific */
>>  		char *args_p;	/* audit value */
>>  		int type;	/* audit type */
>> +		int which_lsm; /* which of the rules to use */
>>  	} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
> Even if we wanted to support multiple LSMs within the same rule having
> both "rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES]" and "which_lsm" shouldn't be necessary.  
> The LSMBLOB_ENTRIES should already identify the LSM.
>
> To support a single LSM per policy rule, "which_lsm" should be defined
> outside of lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES].  This will simplify the rest of the code
> (e.g. matching/freeing rules).
>
> 	int which_lsm;          /* which of the rules to use */
> 	struct {
>                 void *rule;        /* LSM file metadata specific */
>                 char *args_p;   /* audit value */
>                 int type;       /* audit type */
>         } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
>
>
>>  	char *fsname;
>>  	struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */
>> @@ -90,17 +91,15 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
>>
>>  /**
>>   * ima_lsm_isset - Is a rule set for any of the active security modules
>> - * @rules: The set of IMA rules to check
>> + * @entry: the rule entry to examine
>> + * @lsm_rule: the specific rule type in question
>>   *
>> - * If a rule is set for any LSM return true, otherwise return false.
>> + * If a rule is set return true, otherwise return false.
>>   */
>> -static inline bool ima_lsm_isset(void *rules[])
>> +static inline bool ima_lsm_isset(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, int lsm_rule)
>>  {
>> -	int i;
>> -
>> -	for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
>> -		if (rules[i])
>> -			return true;
>> +	if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules[entry->lsm[lsm_rule].which_lsm])
>> +		return true;
> If each IMA policy rule is limited to a specific LSM, then the test
> would be "entry->which_lsm".
>
>>  	return false;
>>  }
>>
>> @@ -273,6 +272,20 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
>>  }
>>  __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
>>
>> +static int ima_rule_lsm __ro_after_init;
>> +
>> +static int __init ima_rule_lsm_init(char *str)
>> +{
>> +	ima_rule_lsm = lsm_name_to_slot(str);
>> +	if (ima_rule_lsm < 0) {
>> +		ima_rule_lsm = 0;
>> +		pr_err("rule lsm \"%s\" not registered", str);
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	return 1;
>> +}
>> +__setup("ima_rule_lsm=", ima_rule_lsm_init);
> The patch description refers to "ima_rules_lsm=".  Please update one or
> the other.
>
> thanks,
>
> Mimi

Would these changes match your suggestion?

 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 9ac673472781..e80956548243 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -78,11 +78,11 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
 	bool (*uid_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t);    /* Handlers for operators       */
 	bool (*fowner_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* uid_eq(), uid_gt(), uid_lt() */
 	int pcr;
+	int which_lsm; /* which of the rules to use */
 	struct {
 		void *rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES]; /* LSM file metadata specific */
 		char *args_p;	/* audit value */
 		int type;	/* audit type */
-		int which_lsm; /* which of the rules to use */
 	} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
 	char *fsname;
 	struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
  */
 static inline bool ima_lsm_isset(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, int lsm_rule)
 {
-	if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules[entry->lsm[lsm_rule].which_lsm])
+	if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules[entry->which_lsm])
 		return true;
 	return false;
 }
@@ -272,19 +272,19 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
 }
 __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
 
-static int ima_rule_lsm __ro_after_init;
+static int ima_rules_lsm __ro_after_init;
 
-static int __init ima_rule_lsm_init(char *str)
+static int __init ima_rules_lsm_init(char *str)
 {
-	ima_rule_lsm = lsm_name_to_slot(str);
-	if (ima_rule_lsm < 0) {
-		ima_rule_lsm = 0;
+	ima_rules_lsm = lsm_name_to_slot(str);
+	if (ima_rules_lsm < 0) {
+		ima_rules_lsm = 0;
 		pr_err("rule lsm \"%s\" not registered", str);
 	}
 
 	return 1;
 }
-__setup("ima_rule_lsm=", ima_rule_lsm_init);
+__setup("ima_rules_lsm=", ima_rules_lsm_init);
 
 static struct ima_rule_opt_list *ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(const substring_t *src)
 {
@@ -1515,7 +1515,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 				result = -EINVAL;
 				break;
 			}
-			entry->lsm->which_lsm = result;
+			entry->which_lsm = result;
 			result = 0;
 			break;
 		case Opt_err:
@@ -1573,7 +1573,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
-		entry->lsm[i].which_lsm = ima_rule_lsm;
+		entry->which_lsm = ima_rules_lsm;
 
 	result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
 	if (result) {
@@ -1827,9 +1827,9 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 		seq_puts(m, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist ");
 	if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
 		seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
-	if (entry->lsm->which_lsm >= 0)
+	if (entry->which_lsm >= 0)
 		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_lsm),
-			   lsm_slot_to_name(entry->lsm->which_lsm));
+			   lsm_slot_to_name(entry->which_lsm));
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	seq_puts(m, "\n");
 	return 0;
Mimi Zohar Feb. 23, 2021, 12:27 a.m. UTC | #4
On Mon, 2021-02-22 at 15:45 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 2/14/2021 10:21 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> 
> Would these changes match your suggestion?
> 
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------
>  1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 9ac673472781..e80956548243 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -78,11 +78,11 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
>  	bool (*uid_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t);    /* Handlers for operators       */
>  	bool (*fowner_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* uid_eq(), uid_gt(), uid_lt() */
>  	int pcr;
> +	int which_lsm; /* which of the rules to use */
>  	struct {
>  		void *rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES]; /* LSM file metadata specific */

If each IMA policy rule may only contain a single LSM specific
LSM_OBJ_{USER | ROLE | TYPE} and LSM_SUBJ_{USER | ROLE | TYPE}, then
there is no need for rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES].  Leave it as "*rule".

Otherwise it looks good.

Mimi

>  		char *args_p;	/* audit value */
>  		int type;	/* audit type */
> -		int which_lsm; /* which of the rules to use */
>  	} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
>  	char *fsname;
>  	struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index e35263f97fc1..a7943d40466f 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@  Description:
 			base:	[[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [uid=]
 				[euid=] [fowner=] [fsname=]]
 			lsm:	[[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
-				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
+				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=] [lsm=]]
 			option:	[[appraise_type=]] [template=] [permit_directio]
 				[appraise_flag=] [keyrings=]
 		  base:
@@ -114,6 +114,12 @@  Description:
 
 			measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
 
+		It is possible to explicitly specify which security
+		module a rule applies to using lsm=.  If the security
+		modules specified is not active on the system the rule
+		will be rejected.  If lsm= is not specified the first
+		security module registered on the system will be assumed.
+
 		Example of measure rules using alternate PCRs::
 
 			measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 8002683003e6..de72b719c90c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@  struct ima_rule_entry {
 		void *rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES]; /* LSM file metadata specific */
 		char *args_p;	/* audit value */
 		int type;	/* audit type */
+		int which_lsm; /* which of the rules to use */
 	} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
 	char *fsname;
 	struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */
@@ -90,17 +91,15 @@  struct ima_rule_entry {
 
 /**
  * ima_lsm_isset - Is a rule set for any of the active security modules
- * @rules: The set of IMA rules to check
+ * @entry: the rule entry to examine
+ * @lsm_rule: the specific rule type in question
  *
- * If a rule is set for any LSM return true, otherwise return false.
+ * If a rule is set return true, otherwise return false.
  */
-static inline bool ima_lsm_isset(void *rules[])
+static inline bool ima_lsm_isset(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, int lsm_rule)
 {
-	int i;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
-		if (rules[i])
-			return true;
+	if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules[entry->lsm[lsm_rule].which_lsm])
+		return true;
 	return false;
 }
 
@@ -273,6 +272,20 @@  static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
 }
 __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
 
+static int ima_rule_lsm __ro_after_init;
+
+static int __init ima_rule_lsm_init(char *str)
+{
+	ima_rule_lsm = lsm_name_to_slot(str);
+	if (ima_rule_lsm < 0) {
+		ima_rule_lsm = 0;
+		pr_err("rule lsm \"%s\" not registered", str);
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_rule_lsm=", ima_rule_lsm_init);
+
 static struct ima_rule_opt_list *ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(const substring_t *src)
 {
 	struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list;
@@ -346,7 +359,8 @@  static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
 		for (r = 0; r < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; r++)
-			ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rules[r]);
+			if (entry->lsm[i].rules[r])
+				ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rules[r]);
 		kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
 	}
 }
@@ -398,7 +412,7 @@  static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 		ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
 				     nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
 				     &nentry->lsm[i].rules[0]);
-		if (!ima_lsm_isset(nentry->lsm[i].rules))
+		if (!ima_lsm_isset(nentry, i))
 			pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
 				nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
 	}
@@ -563,7 +577,7 @@  static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 		int rc = 0;
 		u32 osid;
 
-		if (!ima_lsm_isset(rule->lsm[i].rules)) {
+		if (!ima_lsm_isset(rule, i)) {
 			if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p)
 				continue;
 			else
@@ -925,6 +939,7 @@  enum {
 	Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt,
 	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag,
 	Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
+	Opt_lsm,
 	Opt_err
 };
 
@@ -962,6 +977,7 @@  static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
 	{Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
 	{Opt_template, "template=%s"},
 	{Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
+	{Opt_lsm, "lsm=%s"},
 	{Opt_err, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -970,7 +986,7 @@  static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
 {
 	int result;
 
-	if (ima_lsm_isset(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules))
+	if (ima_lsm_isset(entry, lsm_rule))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = match_strdup(args);
@@ -981,7 +997,7 @@  static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
 	result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
 				      entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
 				      &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules[0]);
-	if (!ima_lsm_isset(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules)) {
+	if (!ima_lsm_isset(entry, lsm_rule)) {
 		pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
 			entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
 
@@ -1488,6 +1504,19 @@  static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 						 &(template_desc->num_fields));
 			entry->template = template_desc;
 			break;
+		case Opt_lsm:
+			result = lsm_name_to_slot(args[0].from);
+			if (result == LSMBLOB_INVALID) {
+				int i;
+
+				for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+					entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+			entry->lsm->which_lsm = result;
+			result = 0;
+			break;
 		case Opt_err:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
 			result = -EINVAL;
@@ -1524,6 +1553,7 @@  ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
 	ssize_t result, len;
 	int audit_info = 0;
+	int i;
 
 	p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
 	len = strlen(p) + 1;
@@ -1541,6 +1571,9 @@  ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
 
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+		entry->lsm[i].which_lsm = ima_rule_lsm;
+
 	result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
 	if (result) {
 		ima_free_rule(entry);
@@ -1751,7 +1784,7 @@  int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
-		if (ima_lsm_isset(entry->lsm[i].rules)) {
+		if (ima_lsm_isset(entry, i)) {
 			switch (i) {
 			case LSM_OBJ_USER:
 				seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_user),
@@ -1793,6 +1826,9 @@  int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 		seq_puts(m, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist ");
 	if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
 		seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
+	if (entry->lsm->which_lsm >= 0)
+		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_lsm),
+			   lsm_slot_to_name(entry->lsm->which_lsm));
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	seq_puts(m, "\n");
 	return 0;