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Wed, 20 Apr 2022 14:06:40 +0000 (GMT) From: Stefan Berger To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, serge@hallyn.com, christian.brauner@ubuntu.com, containers@lists.linux.dev, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com, mpeters@redhat.com, lhinds@redhat.com, lsturman@redhat.com, puiterwi@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, jamjoom@us.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, rgb@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, jpenumak@redhat.com, Stefan Berger , Christian Brauner Subject: [PATCH v12 03/26] ima: Define ima_namespace struct and start moving variables into it Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2022 10:06:10 -0400 Message-Id: <20220420140633.753772-4-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.35.1 In-Reply-To: <20220420140633.753772-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> References: <20220420140633.753772-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-GUID: btpLXhCn4C9aTKS2IQN8E9K65fI3L0eX X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: AHdBrjXdWsWbtRDuu-gva9DDrLntZdaR X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.205,Aquarius:18.0.858,Hydra:6.0.486,FMLib:17.11.64.514 definitions=2022-04-20_03,2022-04-20_01,2022-02-23_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 clxscore=1015 impostorscore=0 mlxscore=0 priorityscore=1501 phishscore=0 malwarescore=0 mlxlogscore=999 lowpriorityscore=0 spamscore=0 adultscore=0 bulkscore=0 suspectscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2202240000 definitions=main-2204200081 Precedence: bulk List-ID: Define the ima_namespace structure and the ima_namespace variable init_ima_ns for the host's IMA namespace. Implement the basic functions ima_ns_init() and ima_init_namespace() for namespacing support. Move variables related to the IMA policy into the ima_namespace. This way the IMA policy of an IMA namespace can be set and displayed using a front-end like securityfs. In preparation for IMA namespacing, update the existing functions to pass the ima_namespace struct. For now, use &init_ima_ns as the current ima_namespace when a function that is related to a policy rule is called. Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger Acked-by: Christian Brauner Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar --- v11: - Updated commit text - Added comments to some fields in the ima_namespace struct v9: - squashed patched 2 and 3 of v8 - ima_post_read_file: only access ima_appraise in case of init_ima_ns --- security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 53 ++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 8 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 28 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 4 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 16 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 12 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c | 29 ++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 88 +++++++----- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 142 ++++++++++--------- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 11 +- 11 files changed, 248 insertions(+), 145 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile index 2499f2485c04..f8a5e5f3975d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \ - ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o + ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o ima_init_ima_ns.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) += ima_modsig.o ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index be965a8715e4..9bcde1a24e74 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include "../integrity.h" @@ -43,9 +44,6 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8, TPM_PCR10 = 10 }; #define NR_BANKS(chip) ((chip != NULL) ? chip->nr_allocated_banks : 0) -/* current content of the policy */ -extern int ima_policy_flag; - /* bitset of digests algorithms allowed in the setxattr hook */ extern atomic_t ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms; @@ -119,6 +117,17 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr { u64 count; }; +struct ima_namespace { + /* policy rules */ + struct list_head ima_default_rules; /* Kconfig, builtin & arch rules */ + struct list_head ima_policy_rules; /* arch & custom rules */ + struct list_head ima_temp_rules; + + struct list_head __rcu *ima_rules; /* Pointer to the current policy */ + int ima_policy_flag; +} __randomize_layout; +extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns; + extern const int read_idmap[]; #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC @@ -136,6 +145,7 @@ extern bool ima_canonical_fmt; /* Internal IMA function definitions */ int ima_init(void); int ima_fs_init(void); +int ima_ns_init(void); int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, const char *op, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename); @@ -243,18 +253,19 @@ void ima_init_key_queue(void); bool ima_should_queue_key(void); bool ima_queue_key(struct key *keyring, const void *payload, size_t payload_len); -void ima_process_queued_keys(void); +void ima_process_queued_keys(struct ima_namespace *ns); #else static inline void ima_init_key_queue(void) {} static inline bool ima_should_queue_key(void) { return false; } static inline bool ima_queue_key(struct key *keyring, const void *payload, size_t payload_len) { return false; } -static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {} +static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(struct ima_namespace *ns) {} #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS */ /* LIM API function definitions */ -int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, +int ima_get_action(struct ima_namespace *ns, + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, @@ -268,7 +279,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc); -int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, +int process_buffer_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns, + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, int pcr, const char *func_data, @@ -285,17 +297,18 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry); const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename); /* IMA policy related functions */ -int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, +int ima_match_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns, + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos); -void ima_init_policy(void); -void ima_update_policy(void); -void ima_update_policy_flags(void); -ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *); -void ima_delete_rules(void); -int ima_check_policy(void); +void ima_init_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns); +void ima_update_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns); +void ima_update_policy_flags(struct ima_namespace *ns); +ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(struct ima_namespace *ns, char *rule); +void ima_delete_rules(struct ima_namespace *ns); +int ima_check_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns); void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos); void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos); void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v); @@ -311,14 +324,16 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v); #define IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC 0x40 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE -int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +int ima_check_blacklist(struct ima_namespace *ns, + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr); int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig); -int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, +int ima_must_appraise(struct ima_namespace *ns, + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file); enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, @@ -329,7 +344,8 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value); #else -static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct ima_namespace *ns, + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr) { return 0; @@ -346,7 +362,8 @@ static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } -static inline int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, +static inline int ima_must_appraise(struct ima_namespace *ns, + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) { diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index c6805af46211..90ef246a9f43 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, /** * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy. + * @ns: IMA namespace that has the policy * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from * @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate @@ -185,7 +186,8 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask. * */ -int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, +int ima_get_action(struct ima_namespace *ns, + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, @@ -193,9 +195,9 @@ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, { int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH; - flags &= ima_policy_flag; + flags &= ns->ima_policy_flag; - return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, cred, secid, func, mask, + return ima_match_policy(ns, mnt_userns, inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr, template_desc, func_data, allowed_algos); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 17232bbfb9f9..f1b99b895c68 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -68,7 +68,8 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) * * Return 1 to appraise or hash */ -int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, +int ima_must_appraise(struct ima_namespace *ns, + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) { u32 secid; @@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, return 0; security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid, + return ima_match_policy(ns, mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); } @@ -341,7 +342,8 @@ static int modsig_verify(enum ima_hooks func, const struct modsig *modsig, * * Returns -EPERM if the hash is blacklisted. */ -int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +int ima_check_blacklist(struct ima_namespace *ns, + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr) { enum hash_algo hash_algo; @@ -357,7 +359,8 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, rc = is_binary_blacklisted(digest, digestsize); if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE)) - process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, digest, digestsize, + process_buffer_measurement(ns, &init_user_ns, NULL, + digest, digestsize, "blacklisted-hash", NONE, pcr, NULL, false, NULL, 0); } @@ -527,14 +530,16 @@ void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; int action; - if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) + if (!(ns->ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) return; - action = ima_must_appraise(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR); + action = ima_must_appraise(ns, mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS, + POST_SETATTR); iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); if (iint) { set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); @@ -559,11 +564,12 @@ static int ima_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, return 0; } -static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig) +static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct ima_namespace *ns, + struct inode *inode, int digsig) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; - if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + if (!(ns->ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return; iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); @@ -641,6 +647,7 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xvalue = xattr_value; + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; int digsig = 0; int result; @@ -658,18 +665,19 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (result) return result; - ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig); + ima_reset_appraise_flags(ns, d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig); } return result; } int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; int result; result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) { - ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0); + ima_reset_appraise_flags(ns, d_backing_inode(dentry), 0); if (result == 1) result = 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c index f6aa0b47a772..70d87df26068 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, const void *payload, size_t payload_len, unsigned long flags, bool create) { + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; bool queued = false; /* Only asymmetric keys are handled by this hook. */ @@ -60,7 +61,8 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, * if the IMA policy is configured to measure a key linked * to the given keyring. */ - process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, payload, payload_len, + process_buffer_measurement(ns, &init_user_ns, NULL, + payload, payload_len, keyring->description, KEY_CHECK, 0, keyring->description, false, NULL, 0); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index cd1683dad3bf..f7ad93a56982 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = { .release = seq_release, }; -static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path) +static ssize_t ima_read_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns, char *path) { void *data = NULL; char *datap; @@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path) datap = data; while (size > 0 && (p = strsep(&datap, "\n"))) { pr_debug("rule: %s\n", p); - rc = ima_parse_add_rule(p); + rc = ima_parse_add_rule(ns, p); if (rc < 0) break; size -= rc; @@ -314,6 +314,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path) static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos) { + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; char *data; ssize_t result; @@ -336,7 +337,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, goto out_free; if (data[0] == '/') { - result = ima_read_policy(data); + result = ima_read_policy(ns, data); } else if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY) { pr_err("signed policy file (specified as an absolute pathname) required\n"); integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL, @@ -344,7 +345,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, 1, 0); result = -EACCES; } else { - result = ima_parse_add_rule(data); + result = ima_parse_add_rule(ns, data); } mutex_unlock(&ima_write_mutex); out_free: @@ -410,11 +411,12 @@ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { const char *cause = valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed"; + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) return seq_release(inode, file); - if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy() < 0) { + if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy(ns) < 0) { cause = "failed"; valid_policy = 0; } @@ -424,13 +426,13 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) "policy_update", cause, !valid_policy, 0); if (!valid_policy) { - ima_delete_rules(); + ima_delete_rules(ns); valid_policy = 1; clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); return 0; } - ima_update_policy(); + ima_update_policy(ns); #if !defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) && !defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY) securityfs_remove(ima_policy); ima_policy = NULL; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 63979aefc95f..7e5b4187035d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -101,15 +101,15 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void) #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509 void __init ima_load_x509(void) { - int unset_flags = ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE; + int unset_flags = init_ima_ns.ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE; - ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags; + init_ima_ns.ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags; integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH); /* load also EVM key to avoid appraisal */ evm_load_x509(); - ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags; + init_ima_ns.ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags; } #endif @@ -117,6 +117,10 @@ int __init ima_init(void) { int rc; + rc = ima_ns_init(); + if (rc) + return rc; + ima_tpm_chip = tpm_default_chip(); if (!ima_tpm_chip) pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n"); @@ -142,7 +146,7 @@ int __init ima_init(void) if (rc != 0) return rc; - ima_init_policy(); + ima_init_policy(&init_ima_ns); rc = ima_fs_init(); if (rc != 0) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c919a456b525 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (C) 2016-2022 IBM Corporation + * Author: + * Yuqiong Sun + * Stefan Berger + */ + +#include "ima.h" + +static int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns) +{ + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->ima_default_rules); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->ima_policy_rules); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->ima_temp_rules); + ns->ima_rules = (struct list_head __rcu *)(&ns->ima_default_rules); + ns->ima_policy_flag = 0; + + return 0; +} + +int __init ima_ns_init(void) +{ + return ima_init_namespace(&init_ima_ns); +} + +struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns = { +}; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_ima_ns); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 3d3f8c5c502b..400865c521dd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -185,10 +185,11 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, */ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) { + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; - if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + if (!ns->ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return; iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); @@ -198,7 +199,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file); } -static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, +static int process_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns, + struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) { @@ -217,18 +219,18 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, enum hash_algo hash_algo; unsigned int allowed_algos = 0; - if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + if (!ns->ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return 0; /* Return an IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT action * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy. * Included is the appraise submask. */ - action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(file), inode, cred, secid, + action = ima_get_action(ns, file_mnt_user_ns(file), inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL, &allowed_algos); violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) && - (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE)); + (ns->ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE)); if (!action && !violation_check) return 0; @@ -346,7 +348,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr, template_desc); if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) { - rc = ima_check_blacklist(iint, modsig, pcr); + rc = ima_check_blacklist(ns, iint, modsig, pcr); if (rc != -EPERM) { inode_lock(inode); rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, @@ -405,12 +407,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, */ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) { + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; u32 secid; if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, - 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); + return process_measurement(ns, file, current_cred(), secid, + NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); } return 0; @@ -431,6 +434,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) */ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) { + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL; struct file *file = vma->vm_file; char filename[NAME_MAX]; @@ -443,13 +447,13 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) int pcr; /* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */ - if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !vma->vm_file || + if (!(ns->ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !vma->vm_file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) return 0; security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file); - action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode, + action = ima_get_action(ns, file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode, current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL); @@ -485,17 +489,18 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) */ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; int ret; u32 secid; security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, - MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); + ret = process_measurement(ns, bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, + 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); if (ret) return ret; security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid); - return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0, + return process_measurement(ns, bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK); } @@ -511,22 +516,23 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) */ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; u32 secid; security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, + return process_measurement(ns, file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); -static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf, - size_t buf_size) +static int __ima_inode_hash(struct ima_namespace *ns, struct inode *inode, + struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL, tmp_iint; int rc, hash_algo; - if (ima_policy_flag) { + if (ns->ima_policy_flag) { iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); if (iint) mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); @@ -595,10 +601,12 @@ static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf, */ int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) { + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + if (!file) return -EINVAL; - return __ima_inode_hash(file_inode(file), file, buf, buf_size); + return __ima_inode_hash(ns, file_inode(file), file, buf, buf_size); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_hash); @@ -622,10 +630,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_hash); */ int ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size) { + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + if (!inode) return -EINVAL; - return __ima_inode_hash(inode, NULL, buf, buf_size); + return __ima_inode_hash(ns, inode, NULL, buf, buf_size); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_inode_hash); @@ -641,13 +651,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_inode_hash); void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode) { + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; int must_appraise; - if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + if (!ns->ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return; - must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS, + must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(ns, mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK); if (!must_appraise) return; @@ -673,14 +684,15 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, void ima_post_path_mknod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry) { + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; int must_appraise; - if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + if (!ns->ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return; - must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS, + must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(ns, mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK); if (!must_appraise) return; @@ -709,6 +721,7 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, bool contents) { + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; enum ima_hooks func; u32 secid; @@ -731,7 +744,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, /* Read entire file for all partial reads. */ func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, + return process_measurement(ns, file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, MAY_READ, func); } @@ -759,6 +772,7 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; enum ima_hooks func; u32 secid; @@ -767,14 +781,15 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, return 0; if (!file || !buf || size == 0) { /* should never happen */ - if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) + if (ns == &init_ima_ns && + (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) return -EACCES; return 0; } func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size, + return process_measurement(ns, file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size, MAY_READ, func); } @@ -862,6 +877,7 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, /** * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer or the buffer data hash + * @ns: IMA namespace that has the policy * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from * @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK) * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log. @@ -880,7 +896,8 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, * has been written to the passed location but not added to a measurement entry, * a negative value otherwise. */ -int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, +int process_buffer_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns, + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, int pcr, const char *func_data, @@ -905,7 +922,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len) return -EINVAL; - if (!ima_policy_flag && !digest) + if (!ns->ima_policy_flag && !digest) return -ENOENT; template = ima_template_desc_buf(); @@ -924,7 +941,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, */ if (func) { security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), + action = ima_get_action(ns, mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template, func_data, NULL); if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest) @@ -961,7 +978,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, if (digest) memcpy(digest, iint.ima_hash->digest, digest_hash_len); - if (!ima_policy_flag || (func && !(action & IMA_MEASURE))) + if (!ns->ima_policy_flag || (func && !(action & IMA_MEASURE))) return 1; ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template); @@ -995,6 +1012,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, */ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) { + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; struct fd f; if (!buf || !size) @@ -1004,7 +1022,8 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) if (!f.file) return; - process_buffer_measurement(file_mnt_user_ns(f.file), file_inode(f.file), + process_buffer_measurement(ns, + file_mnt_user_ns(f.file), file_inode(f.file), buf, size, "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL, false, NULL, 0); fdput(f); @@ -1034,10 +1053,12 @@ int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label, const void *buf, size_t buf_len, bool hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len) { + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + if (!event_name || !event_label || !buf || !buf_len) return -ENOPARAM; - return process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, buf, buf_len, + return process_buffer_measurement(ns, &init_user_ns, NULL, buf, buf_len, event_name, CRITICAL_DATA, 0, event_label, hash, digest, digest_len); @@ -1046,6 +1067,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data); static int __init init_ima(void) { + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; int error; ima_appraise_parse_cmdline(); @@ -1070,7 +1092,7 @@ static int __init init_ima(void) pr_warn("Couldn't register LSM notifier, error %d\n", error); if (!error) - ima_update_policy_flags(); + ima_update_policy_flags(ns); return error; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index eea6e92500b8..69b19f4d5fee 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ #define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \ (a) >= (sizeof_field(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8)) -int ima_policy_flag; static int temp_ima_appraise; static int build_ima_appraise __ro_after_init; @@ -232,11 +231,6 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry critical_data_rules[] __ro_after_init = { /* An array of architecture specific rules */ static struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry __ro_after_init; -static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules); -static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules); -static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules); -static struct list_head __rcu *ima_rules = (struct list_head __rcu *)(&ima_default_rules); - static int ima_policy __initdata; static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str) @@ -453,12 +447,12 @@ static bool ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) * to the old, stale LSM policy. Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect * the reloaded LSM policy. */ -static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void) +static void ima_lsm_update_rules(struct ima_namespace *ns) { struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *e; int result; - list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, e, &ima_policy_rules, list) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, e, &ns->ima_policy_rules, list) { if (!ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry)) continue; @@ -473,10 +467,12 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void) int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event, void *lsm_data) { + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + if (event != LSM_POLICY_CHANGE) return NOTIFY_DONE; - ima_lsm_update_rules(); + ima_lsm_update_rules(ns); return NOTIFY_OK; } @@ -668,6 +664,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) /** * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions + * @ns: IMA namespace that has the policy * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is @@ -687,7 +684,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) * list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate. */ -int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, +int ima_match_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns, + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, @@ -701,7 +699,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current(); rcu_read_lock(); - ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ima_rules); + ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ns->ima_rules); list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) { if (!(entry->action & actmask)) @@ -745,8 +743,8 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, } /** - * ima_update_policy_flags() - Update global IMA variables - * + * ima_update_policy_flags() - Update namespaced IMA variables + * @ns: IMA namespace that has the policy * Update ima_policy_flag and ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms * based on the currently loaded policy. * @@ -759,14 +757,14 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, * * Context: called after a policy update and at system initialization. */ -void ima_update_policy_flags(void) +void ima_update_policy_flags(struct ima_namespace *ns) { struct ima_rule_entry *entry; int new_policy_flag = 0; struct list_head *ima_rules_tmp; rcu_read_lock(); - ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ima_rules); + ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ns->ima_rules); list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) { /* * SETXATTR_CHECK rules do not implement a full policy check @@ -796,7 +794,7 @@ void ima_update_policy_flags(void) if (!ima_appraise) new_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE; - ima_policy_flag = new_policy_flag; + ns->ima_policy_flag = new_policy_flag; } static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func) @@ -812,7 +810,8 @@ static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func) return 0; } -static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, +static void add_rules(struct ima_namespace *ns, + struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, enum policy_rule_list policy_rule) { int i = 0; @@ -821,7 +820,7 @@ static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, struct ima_rule_entry *entry; if (policy_rule & IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY) - list_add_tail(&entries[i].list, &ima_default_rules); + list_add_tail(&entries[i].list, &ns->ima_default_rules); if (policy_rule & IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY) { entry = kmemdup(&entries[i], sizeof(*entry), @@ -829,7 +828,7 @@ static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, if (!entry) continue; - list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules); + list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ns->ima_policy_rules); } if (entries[i].action == APPRAISE) { if (entries != build_appraise_rules) @@ -842,9 +841,10 @@ static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, } } -static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry); +static int ima_parse_rule(struct ima_namespace *ns, + char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry); -static int __init ima_init_arch_policy(void) +static int __init ima_init_arch_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns) { const char * const *arch_rules; const char * const *rules; @@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ static int __init ima_init_arch_policy(void) result = strscpy(rule, *rules, sizeof(rule)); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&arch_policy_entry[i].list); - result = ima_parse_rule(rule, &arch_policy_entry[i]); + result = ima_parse_rule(ns, rule, &arch_policy_entry[i]); if (result) { pr_warn("Skipping unknown architecture policy rule: %s\n", rule); @@ -887,26 +887,27 @@ static int __init ima_init_arch_policy(void) /** * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules. - * + * @ns: IMA namespace to which the policy belongs to * ima_rules points to either the ima_default_rules or the new ima_policy_rules. */ -void __init ima_init_policy(void) +void __init ima_init_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns) { int build_appraise_entries, arch_entries; /* if !ima_policy, we load NO default rules */ if (ima_policy) - add_rules(dont_measure_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules), + add_rules(ns, dont_measure_rules, + ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); switch (ima_policy) { case ORIGINAL_TCB: - add_rules(original_measurement_rules, + add_rules(ns, original_measurement_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); break; case DEFAULT_TCB: - add_rules(default_measurement_rules, + add_rules(ns, default_measurement_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); break; @@ -920,11 +921,11 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) * and custom policies, prior to other appraise rules. * (Highest priority) */ - arch_entries = ima_init_arch_policy(); + arch_entries = ima_init_arch_policy(ns); if (!arch_entries) pr_info("No architecture policies found\n"); else - add_rules(arch_policy_entry, arch_entries, + add_rules(ns, arch_policy_entry, arch_entries, IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY); /* @@ -932,7 +933,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) * signatures, prior to other appraise rules. */ if (ima_use_secure_boot) - add_rules(secure_boot_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules), + add_rules(ns, secure_boot_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); /* @@ -944,39 +945,41 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) build_appraise_entries = ARRAY_SIZE(build_appraise_rules); if (build_appraise_entries) { if (ima_use_secure_boot) - add_rules(build_appraise_rules, build_appraise_entries, + add_rules(ns, build_appraise_rules, + build_appraise_entries, IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY); else - add_rules(build_appraise_rules, build_appraise_entries, + add_rules(ns, build_appraise_rules, + build_appraise_entries, IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY); } if (ima_use_appraise_tcb) - add_rules(default_appraise_rules, + add_rules(ns, default_appraise_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); if (ima_use_critical_data) - add_rules(critical_data_rules, + add_rules(ns, critical_data_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(critical_data_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); atomic_set(&ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms, 0); - ima_update_policy_flags(); + ima_update_policy_flags(ns); } /* Make sure we have a valid policy, at least containing some rules. */ -int ima_check_policy(void) +int ima_check_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns) { - if (list_empty(&ima_temp_rules)) + if (list_empty(&ns->ima_temp_rules)) return -EINVAL; return 0; } /** * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules - * + * @ns: IMA namespace that has the policy * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new * policy. What we do here is to splice ima_policy_rules and ima_temp_rules so * they make a queue. The policy may be updated multiple times and this is the @@ -985,16 +988,17 @@ int ima_check_policy(void) * Policy rules are never deleted so ima_policy_flag gets zeroed only once when * we switch from the default policy to user defined. */ -void ima_update_policy(void) +void ima_update_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns) { - struct list_head *policy = &ima_policy_rules; + struct list_head *policy = &ns->ima_policy_rules; - list_splice_tail_init_rcu(&ima_temp_rules, policy, synchronize_rcu); + list_splice_tail_init_rcu(&ns->ima_temp_rules, policy, + synchronize_rcu); - if (ima_rules != (struct list_head __rcu *)policy) { - ima_policy_flag = 0; + if (ns->ima_rules != (struct list_head __rcu *)policy) { + ns->ima_policy_flag = 0; - rcu_assign_pointer(ima_rules, policy); + rcu_assign_pointer(ns->ima_rules, policy); /* * IMA architecture specific policy rules are specified * as strings and converted to an array of ima_entry_rules @@ -1003,10 +1007,10 @@ void ima_update_policy(void) */ kfree(arch_policy_entry); } - ima_update_policy_flags(); + ima_update_policy_flags(ns); /* Custom IMA policy has been loaded */ - ima_process_queued_keys(); + ima_process_queued_keys(ns); } /* Keep the enumeration in sync with the policy_tokens! */ @@ -1076,7 +1080,8 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_err, NULL} }; -static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, +static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_namespace *ns, + struct ima_rule_entry *entry, substring_t *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type) { int result; @@ -1096,7 +1101,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n", entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p); - if (ima_rules == (struct list_head __rcu *)(&ima_default_rules)) { + if (ns->ima_rules == + (struct list_head __rcu *)&ns->ima_default_rules) { kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p); entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = NULL; result = -EINVAL; @@ -1323,7 +1329,8 @@ static unsigned int ima_parse_appraise_algos(char *arg) return res; } -static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) +static int ima_parse_rule(struct ima_namespace *ns, + char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) { struct audit_buffer *ab; char *from; @@ -1673,37 +1680,37 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) break; case Opt_obj_user: ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from); - result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args, + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(ns, entry, args, LSM_OBJ_USER, AUDIT_OBJ_USER); break; case Opt_obj_role: ima_log_string(ab, "obj_role", args[0].from); - result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args, + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(ns, entry, args, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE); break; case Opt_obj_type: ima_log_string(ab, "obj_type", args[0].from); - result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args, + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(ns, entry, args, LSM_OBJ_TYPE, AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE); break; case Opt_subj_user: ima_log_string(ab, "subj_user", args[0].from); - result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args, + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(ns, entry, args, LSM_SUBJ_USER, AUDIT_SUBJ_USER); break; case Opt_subj_role: ima_log_string(ab, "subj_role", args[0].from); - result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args, + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(ns, entry, args, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE); break; case Opt_subj_type: ima_log_string(ab, "subj_type", args[0].from); - result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args, + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(ns, entry, args, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE, AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE); break; @@ -1804,12 +1811,13 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) /** * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules + * @ns: IMA namespace that has the policy * @rule - ima measurement policy rule * * Avoid locking by allowing just one writer at a time in ima_write_policy() * Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure */ -ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) +ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(struct ima_namespace *ns, char *rule) { static const char op[] = "update_policy"; char *p; @@ -1833,7 +1841,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list); - result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry); + result = ima_parse_rule(ns, p, entry); if (result) { ima_free_rule(entry); integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, @@ -1842,23 +1850,24 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) return result; } - list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_temp_rules); + list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ns->ima_temp_rules); return len; } /** - * ima_delete_rules() called to cleanup invalid in-flight policy. + * ima_delete_rules - called to cleanup invalid in-flight policy. + * @ns: IMA namespace that has the policy * We don't need locking as we operate on the temp list, which is * different from the active one. There is also only one user of * ima_delete_rules() at a time. */ -void ima_delete_rules(void) +void ima_delete_rules(struct ima_namespace *ns) { struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp; temp_ima_appraise = 0; - list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_temp_rules, list) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ns->ima_temp_rules, list) { list_del(&entry->list); ima_free_rule(entry); } @@ -1884,12 +1893,13 @@ static const char *const mask_tokens[] = { void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) { + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; loff_t l = *pos; struct ima_rule_entry *entry; struct list_head *ima_rules_tmp; rcu_read_lock(); - ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ima_rules); + ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ns->ima_rules); list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) { if (!l--) { rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -1902,6 +1912,7 @@ void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos) { + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v; rcu_read_lock(); @@ -1909,8 +1920,8 @@ void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos) rcu_read_unlock(); (*pos)++; - return (&entry->list == &ima_default_rules || - &entry->list == &ima_policy_rules) ? NULL : entry; + return (&entry->list == &ns->ima_default_rules || + &entry->list == &ns->ima_policy_rules) ? NULL : entry; } void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v) @@ -2173,6 +2184,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) */ bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id) { + struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; struct ima_rule_entry *entry; bool found = false; enum ima_hooks func; @@ -2184,7 +2196,7 @@ bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id) func = read_idmap[id] ?: FILE_CHECK; rcu_read_lock(); - ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ima_rules); + ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ns->ima_rules); list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) { if (entry->action != APPRAISE) continue; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c index 93056c03bf5a..e366a21dd8be 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include "ima.h" @@ -42,7 +43,7 @@ static bool timer_expired; static void ima_keys_handler(struct work_struct *work) { timer_expired = true; - ima_process_queued_keys(); + ima_process_queued_keys(&init_ima_ns); } /* @@ -130,11 +131,15 @@ bool ima_queue_key(struct key *keyring, const void *payload, * This function sets ima_process_keys to true and processes queued keys. * From here on keys will be processed right away (not queued). */ -void ima_process_queued_keys(void) +void ima_process_queued_keys(struct ima_namespace *ns) { struct ima_key_entry *entry, *tmp; bool process = false; + /* only applies to init_ima_ns */ + if (ns != &init_ima_ns) + return; + if (ima_process_keys) return; @@ -159,7 +164,7 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void) list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_keys, list) { if (!timer_expired) - process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, + process_buffer_measurement(ns, &init_user_ns, NULL, entry->payload, entry->payload_len, entry->keyring_name,