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Hallyn" Cc: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= , Al Viro , Jann Horn , John Johansen , Kees Cook , Konstantin Meskhidze , Paul Moore , Shuah Khan , Tetsuo Handa , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 05/12] landlock: Move filesystem helpers and add a new one Date: Fri, 6 May 2022 18:10:55 +0200 Message-Id: <20220506161102.525323-6-mic@digikod.net> In-Reply-To: <20220506161102.525323-1-mic@digikod.net> References: <20220506161102.525323-1-mic@digikod.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: Move the SB_NOUSER and IS_PRIVATE dentry check to a standalone is_nouser_or_private() helper. This will be useful for a following commit. Move get_mode_access() and maybe_remove() to make them usable by new code provided by a following commit. Reviewed-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-6-mic@digikod.net --- Changes since v2: * Format with clang-format and rebase. Changes since v1: * Move is_nouser_or_private() explanation up to a function header comment block as suggested by Paul Moore. * Add Reviewed-by: Paul Moore. --- security/landlock/fs.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c index c5749301b37d..7b7860039a08 100644 --- a/security/landlock/fs.c +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c @@ -261,6 +261,18 @@ unmask_layers(const struct landlock_rule *const rule, return false; } +/* + * Allows access to pseudo filesystems that will never be mountable (e.g. + * sockfs, pipefs), but can still be reachable through + * /proc//fd/ + */ +static inline bool is_nouser_or_private(const struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return (dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) || + (d_is_positive(dentry) && + unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))); +} + static int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, const struct path *const path, const access_mask_t access_request) @@ -274,14 +286,7 @@ static int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, return 0; if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain || !path)) return 0; - /* - * Allows access to pseudo filesystems that will never be mountable - * (e.g. sockfs, pipefs), but can still be reachable through - * /proc//fd/ . - */ - if ((path->dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) || - (d_is_positive(path->dentry) && - unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))) + if (is_nouser_or_private(path->dentry)) return 0; if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1)) return -EACCES; @@ -360,6 +365,39 @@ static inline int current_check_access_path(const struct path *const path, return check_access_path(dom, path, access_request); } +static inline access_mask_t get_mode_access(const umode_t mode) +{ + switch (mode & S_IFMT) { + case S_IFLNK: + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM; + case 0: + /* A zero mode translates to S_IFREG. */ + case S_IFREG: + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG; + case S_IFDIR: + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR; + case S_IFCHR: + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR; + case S_IFBLK: + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK; + case S_IFIFO: + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO; + case S_IFSOCK: + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK; + default: + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + return 0; + } +} + +static inline access_mask_t maybe_remove(const struct dentry *const dentry) +{ + if (d_is_negative(dentry)) + return 0; + return d_is_dir(dentry) ? LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR : + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE; +} + /* Inode hooks */ static void hook_inode_free_security(struct inode *const inode) @@ -553,31 +591,6 @@ static int hook_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *const old_path, /* Path hooks */ -static inline access_mask_t get_mode_access(const umode_t mode) -{ - switch (mode & S_IFMT) { - case S_IFLNK: - return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM; - case 0: - /* A zero mode translates to S_IFREG. */ - case S_IFREG: - return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG; - case S_IFDIR: - return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR; - case S_IFCHR: - return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR; - case S_IFBLK: - return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK; - case S_IFIFO: - return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO; - case S_IFSOCK: - return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK; - default: - WARN_ON_ONCE(1); - return 0; - } -} - /* * Creating multiple links or renaming may lead to privilege escalations if not * handled properly. Indeed, we must be sure that the source doesn't gain more @@ -606,14 +619,6 @@ static int hook_path_link(struct dentry *const old_dentry, get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode)); } -static inline access_mask_t maybe_remove(const struct dentry *const dentry) -{ - if (d_is_negative(dentry)) - return 0; - return d_is_dir(dentry) ? LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR : - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE; -} - static int hook_path_rename(const struct path *const old_dir, struct dentry *const old_dentry, const struct path *const new_dir,