@@ -145,6 +145,12 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_getxattr, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_listxattr, struct dentry *dentry)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_removexattr, struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_set_acl, struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_get_acl, struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_remove_acl, struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_need_killpriv, struct dentry *dentry)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_killpriv, struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct dentry *dentry)
@@ -435,6 +435,18 @@
* Check permission before removing the extended attribute
* identified by @name for @dentry.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_set_acl:
+ * Check permission before setting posix acls
+ * The posix acls in @kacl are identified by @acl_name.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_get_acl:
+ * Check permission before getting osix acls
+ * The posix acls are identified by @acl_name.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_remove_acl:
+ * Check permission before removing posix acls
+ * The posix acls are identified by @acl_name.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @inode_getsecurity:
* Retrieve a copy of the extended attribute representation of the
* security label associated with @name for @inode via @buffer. Note that
@@ -359,6 +359,13 @@ int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path);
int security_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
+int security_inode_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
+ struct posix_acl *kacl);
+int security_inode_get_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name);
+int security_inode_remove_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name);
void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
@@ -869,6 +876,28 @@ static inline int security_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
return cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
}
+static inline int security_inode_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *acl_name,
+ struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_get_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *acl_name)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_remove_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *acl_name)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{ }
@@ -1370,6 +1370,31 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
return evm_inode_setxattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name, value, size);
}
+int security_inode_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
+ struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, mnt_userns, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
+}
+
+int security_inode_get_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(inode_get_acl, 0, mnt_userns, dentry, acl_name);
+}
+
+int security_inode_remove_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, mnt_userns, dentry, acl_name);
+}
+
void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. So far posix acls were passed as a void blob to the security and integrity modules. Some of them like evm then proceed to interpret the void pointer and convert it into the kernel internal struct posix acl representation to perform their integrity checking magic. This is obviously pretty problematic as that requires knowledge that only the vfs is guaranteed to have and has lead to various bugs. Add a proper security hook for setting posix acls and pass down the posix acls in their appropriate vfs format instead of hacking it through a void pointer stored in the uapi format. In the next patches we implement the hooks for the few security modules that do actually have restrictions on posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> --- Notes: /* v2 */ unchanged /* v3 */ Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>: - Add get, and remove acl hook /* v4 */ unchanged include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 6 ++++++ include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 ++++++++++++ include/linux/security.h | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 72 insertions(+)