From patchwork Thu Jan 12 13:54:26 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg Kroah-Hartman X-Patchwork-Id: 13098139 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7EE42C61DB3 for ; Thu, 12 Jan 2023 14:38:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239292AbjALOiQ (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Jan 2023 09:38:16 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:59572 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237476AbjALOhn (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Jan 2023 09:37:43 -0500 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CA0D81E3CB; Thu, 12 Jan 2023 06:27:39 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 63EFA60A69; Thu, 12 Jan 2023 14:27:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 6C420C433EF; Thu, 12 Jan 2023 14:27:38 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1673533658; bh=aUQxVDz3y30kaWOk7AXpRHyrMOSjZ8DJ+ldZR2Fp/4A=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=offWMctgTgIzVvDnee89yAdvOxxbzPr1vRa/bS51DS3Al/BaH2g0oDT7jf6sNQ+L7 nW6ICyWKE90jLeQ+9N1aN8ID46Zeu9AJTxI4f2aAUg7Krxzg1eLdTe+Jy+lWgVkBpb MkFRCZXSwNSAUVau16Dzl26StMiD76gMJO6xWe2o= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Kees Cook , Ping-Ke Shih , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.10 550/783] LoadPin: Ignore the "contents" argument of the LSM hooks Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2023 14:54:26 +0100 Message-Id: <20230112135549.714910796@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.0 In-Reply-To: <20230112135524.143670746@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20230112135524.143670746@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Kees Cook [ Upstream commit 1a17e5b513ceebf21100027745b8731b4728edf7 ] LoadPin only enforces the read-only origin of kernel file reads. Whether or not it was a partial read isn't important. Remove the overly conservative checks so that things like partial firmware reads will succeed (i.e. reading a firmware header). Fixes: 2039bda1fa8d ("LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook") Cc: Paul Moore Cc: James Morris Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Tested-by: Ping-Ke Shih Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209195453.never.494-kees@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c index b12f7d986b1e..5fce105a372d 100644 --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c @@ -118,21 +118,11 @@ static void loadpin_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb) } } -static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, - bool contents) +static int loadpin_check(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) { struct super_block *load_root; const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id); - /* - * If we will not know that we'll be seeing the full contents - * then we cannot trust a load will be complete and unchanged - * off disk. Treat all contents=false hooks as if there were - * no associated file struct. - */ - if (!contents) - file = NULL; - /* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */ if ((unsigned int)id < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) && ignore_read_file_id[id]) { @@ -187,9 +177,25 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, return 0; } +static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, + bool contents) +{ + /* + * LoadPin only cares about the _origin_ of a file, not its + * contents, so we can ignore the "are full contents available" + * argument here. + */ + return loadpin_check(file, id); +} + static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) { - return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id, contents); + /* + * LoadPin only cares about the _origin_ of a file, not its + * contents, so a NULL file is passed, and we can ignore the + * state of "contents". + */ + return loadpin_check(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id); } static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {