| Message ID | 20240507012541.796421-1-guozihua@huawei.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Accepted |
| Delegated to: | Paul Moore |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [v3] ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical section | expand |
Hi Scott, On Tue, 2024-05-07 at 01:25 +0000, GUO Zihua wrote: > A panic happens in ima_match_policy: > > BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 > PGD 42f873067 P4D 0 > Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI > CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 > RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450 > Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f > RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207 > RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200 > RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000 > RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739 > R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970 > R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001 > FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0 > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > Call Trace: > ima_get_action+0x22/0x30 > process_measurement+0xb0/0x830 > ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170 > ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0 > ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140 > ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0 > ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0 > ima_file_check+0x64/0x90 > path_openat+0x571/0x1720 > do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 > ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0 > ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60 > ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250 > ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 > do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 > do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca > > Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by > ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a > RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL. > This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side > critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems. I would move the problem description before the traceback. > > Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause > synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a > UAF to happen. > > The root cause of this issue could be described as follows: > > Thread A | Thread B | > > |ima_match_policy | > > | rcu_read_lock | > > ima_lsm_update_rule | | > > synchronize_rcu | | > > | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)| > > | sleep | > ==> synchronize_rcu returns early > > kfree(entry) | | > > | entry = entry->next| > ==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything). > > | entry->action | > ==> Accessing entry might cause panic. > > To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within > RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC. > > Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> thanks, Mimi
On 5/6/2024 6:25 PM, GUO Zihua wrote: > A panic happens in ima_match_policy: > > BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 > PGD 42f873067 P4D 0 > Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI > CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 > RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450 > Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f > RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207 > RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200 > RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000 > RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739 > R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970 > R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001 > FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0 > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > Call Trace: > ima_get_action+0x22/0x30 > process_measurement+0xb0/0x830 > ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170 > ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0 > ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140 > ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0 > ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0 > ima_file_check+0x64/0x90 > path_openat+0x571/0x1720 > do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 > ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0 > ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60 > ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250 > ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 > do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 > do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca > > Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by > ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a > RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL. > This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side > critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems. > > Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause > synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a > UAF to happen. > > The root cause of this issue could be described as follows: > | Thread A | Thread B | > | |ima_match_policy | > | | rcu_read_lock | > |ima_lsm_update_rule | | > | synchronize_rcu | | > | | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)| > | | sleep | > ==> synchronize_rcu returns early > | kfree(entry) | | > | | entry = entry->next| > ==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything). > | | entry->action | > ==> Accessing entry might cause panic. > > To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within > RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC. > > Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> Looks fine from the Smack perspective. Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > --- > > v3: > ima_lsm_copy_rule takes a GFP flag as input as well. > v2: > Changed the audit_rule_init security hook to accept a new GFP flag, as > per Stephen's suggestion. > > --- > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +- > include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- > kernel/auditfilter.c | 5 +++-- > security/apparmor/audit.c | 6 +++--- > security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +- > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 15 +++++++++------ > security/security.c | 6 ++++-- > security/selinux/include/audit.h | 4 +++- > security/selinux/ss/services.c | 5 +++-- > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 ++- > 10 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > index 334e00efbde4..7e539f6f8c67 100644 > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > @@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, key_post_create_or_update, struct key *keyring, > > #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_init, u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, > - void **lsmrule) > + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_known, struct audit_krule *krule) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_match, u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) > LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, audit_rule_free, void *lsmrule) > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index 41a8f667bdfa..5122e3ad83b1 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -2048,7 +2048,8 @@ static inline void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, > > #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT > #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY > -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); > +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule, > + gfp_t gfp); > int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); > int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule); > void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule); > @@ -2056,7 +2057,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule); > #else > > static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, > - void **lsmrule) > + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) > { > return 0; > } > diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c > index be8c680121e4..d6ef4f4f9cba 100644 > --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c > +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c > @@ -529,7 +529,8 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, > entry->rule.buflen += f_val; > f->lsm_str = str; > err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str, > - (void **)&f->lsm_rule); > + (void **)&f->lsm_rule, > + GFP_KERNEL); > /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they > * become valid after a policy reload. */ > if (err == -EINVAL) { > @@ -799,7 +800,7 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df, > > /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */ > ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str, > - (void **)&df->lsm_rule); > + (void **)&df->lsm_rule, GFP_KERNEL); > /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they > * become valid after a policy reload. */ > if (ret == -EINVAL) { > diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c > index 45beb1c5f747..6b5181c668b5 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c > +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c > @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) > } > } > > -int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) > +int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp) > { > struct aa_audit_rule *rule; > > @@ -230,14 +230,14 @@ int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) > return -EINVAL; > } > > - rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL); > + rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), gfp); > > if (!rule) > return -ENOMEM; > > /* Currently rules are treated as coming from the root ns */ > rule->label = aa_label_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, rulestr, > - GFP_KERNEL, true, false); > + gfp, true, false); > if (IS_ERR(rule->label)) { > int err = PTR_ERR(rule->label); > aa_audit_rule_free(rule); > diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h > index acbb03b9bd25..0c8cc86b417b 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h > +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h > @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error) > } > > void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule); > -int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule); > +int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp); > int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule); > int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule); > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > index c0556907c2e6..09da8e639239 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > @@ -401,7 +401,8 @@ static void ima_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) > kfree(entry); > } > > -static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) > +static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, > + gfp_t gfp) > { > struct ima_rule_entry *nentry; > int i; > @@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) > * Immutable elements are copied over as pointers and data; only > * lsm rules can change > */ > - nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), GFP_KERNEL); > + nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), gfp); > if (!nentry) > return NULL; > > @@ -425,7 +426,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) > > ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, > nentry->lsm[i].args_p, > - &nentry->lsm[i].rule); > + &nentry->lsm[i].rule, > + gfp); > if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule) > pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n", > nentry->lsm[i].args_p); > @@ -438,7 +440,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) > int i; > struct ima_rule_entry *nentry; > > - nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry); > + nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry, GFP_KERNEL); > if (!nentry) > return -ENOMEM; > > @@ -664,7 +666,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, > } > > if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized) { > - lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule); > + lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule, GFP_ATOMIC); > if (lsm_rule) { > rule_reinitialized = true; > goto retry; > @@ -1140,7 +1142,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, > entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type; > result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal, > entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p, > - &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); > + &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule, > + GFP_KERNEL); > if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) { > pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n", > entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p); > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 0a9a0ac3f266..4fd3c839353e 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -5331,15 +5331,17 @@ void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, > * @op: rule operator > * @rulestr: rule context > * @lsmrule: receive buffer for audit rule struct > + * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc > * > * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure. > * > * Return: Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, -EINVAL in case of > * an invalid rule. > */ > -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) > +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule, > + gfp_t gfp) > { > - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); > + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule, gfp); > } > > /** > diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h > index 52aca71210b4..29c7d4c86f6d 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h > +++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h > @@ -21,12 +21,14 @@ > * @op: the operator the rule uses > * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule > * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this > + * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc > * > * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure > * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with > * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use. > */ > -int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule); > +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule, > + gfp_t gfp); > > /** > * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure. > diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c > index e88b1b6c4adb..ded250e525e9 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c > +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c > @@ -3508,7 +3508,8 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) > } > } > > -int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) > +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, > + gfp_t gfp) > { > struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; > struct selinux_policy *policy; > @@ -3549,7 +3550,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) > return -EINVAL; > } > > - tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL); > + tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), gfp); > if (!tmprule) > return -ENOMEM; > context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt); > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index 146667937811..a4943628d75a 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -4696,7 +4696,8 @@ static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, > * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true. > * The label to be audited is created if necessay. > */ > -static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) > +static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, > + gfp_t gfp) > { > struct smack_known *skp; > char **rule = (char **)vrule;
On Fri, 2024-05-10 at 09:03 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote: > On 5/6/2024 6:25 PM, GUO Zihua wrote: > > A panic happens in ima_match_policy: > > > > BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 > > PGD 42f873067 P4D 0 > > Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI > > CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P > > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 > > RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450 > > Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f > > RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207 > > RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200 > > RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000 > > RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739 > > R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970 > > R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001 > > FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > > CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0 > > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > > Call Trace: > > ima_get_action+0x22/0x30 > > process_measurement+0xb0/0x830 > > ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170 > > ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0 > > ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140 > > ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0 > > ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0 > > ima_file_check+0x64/0x90 > > path_openat+0x571/0x1720 > > do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 > > ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0 > > ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60 > > ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250 > > ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 > > do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 > > do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca > > > > Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by > > ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a > > RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL. > > This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side > > critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems. > > > > Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause > > synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a > > UAF to happen. > > > > The root cause of this issue could be described as follows: > > > Thread A | Thread B | > > > |ima_match_policy | > > > | rcu_read_lock | > > > ima_lsm_update_rule | | > > > synchronize_rcu | | > > > | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)| > > > | sleep | > > ==> synchronize_rcu returns early > > > kfree(entry) | | > > > | entry = entry->next| > > ==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything). > > > | entry->action | > > ==> Accessing entry might cause panic. > > > > To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within > > RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC. > > > > Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > > Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> > > Looks fine from the Smack perspective. > Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Thanks, Casey. JJ? Paul?
On 5/6/24 18:25, GUO Zihua wrote: > A panic happens in ima_match_policy: > > BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 > PGD 42f873067 P4D 0 > Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI > CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 > RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450 > Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f > RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207 > RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200 > RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000 > RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739 > R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970 > R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001 > FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0 > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > Call Trace: > ima_get_action+0x22/0x30 > process_measurement+0xb0/0x830 > ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170 > ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0 > ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140 > ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0 > ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0 > ima_file_check+0x64/0x90 > path_openat+0x571/0x1720 > do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 > ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0 > ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60 > ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250 > ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 > do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 > do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca > > Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by > ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a > RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL. > This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side > critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems. > > Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause > synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a > UAF to happen. > > The root cause of this issue could be described as follows: > | Thread A | Thread B | > | |ima_match_policy | > | | rcu_read_lock | > |ima_lsm_update_rule | | > | synchronize_rcu | | > | | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)| > | | sleep | > ==> synchronize_rcu returns early > | kfree(entry) | | > | | entry = entry->next| > ==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything). > | | entry->action | > ==> Accessing entry might cause panic. > > To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within > RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC. > > Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> this looks fine Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> > --- > > v3: > ima_lsm_copy_rule takes a GFP flag as input as well. > v2: > Changed the audit_rule_init security hook to accept a new GFP flag, as > per Stephen's suggestion. > > --- > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +- > include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- > kernel/auditfilter.c | 5 +++-- > security/apparmor/audit.c | 6 +++--- > security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +- > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 15 +++++++++------ > security/security.c | 6 ++++-- > security/selinux/include/audit.h | 4 +++- > security/selinux/ss/services.c | 5 +++-- > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 ++- > 10 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > index 334e00efbde4..7e539f6f8c67 100644 > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > @@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, key_post_create_or_update, struct key *keyring, > > #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_init, u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, > - void **lsmrule) > + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_known, struct audit_krule *krule) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_match, u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) > LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, audit_rule_free, void *lsmrule) > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index 41a8f667bdfa..5122e3ad83b1 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -2048,7 +2048,8 @@ static inline void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, > > #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT > #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY > -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); > +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule, > + gfp_t gfp); > int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); > int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule); > void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule); > @@ -2056,7 +2057,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule); > #else > > static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, > - void **lsmrule) > + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) > { > return 0; > } > diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c > index be8c680121e4..d6ef4f4f9cba 100644 > --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c > +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c > @@ -529,7 +529,8 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, > entry->rule.buflen += f_val; > f->lsm_str = str; > err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str, > - (void **)&f->lsm_rule); > + (void **)&f->lsm_rule, > + GFP_KERNEL); > /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they > * become valid after a policy reload. */ > if (err == -EINVAL) { > @@ -799,7 +800,7 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df, > > /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */ > ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str, > - (void **)&df->lsm_rule); > + (void **)&df->lsm_rule, GFP_KERNEL); > /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they > * become valid after a policy reload. */ > if (ret == -EINVAL) { > diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c > index 45beb1c5f747..6b5181c668b5 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c > +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c > @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) > } > } > > -int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) > +int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp) > { > struct aa_audit_rule *rule; > > @@ -230,14 +230,14 @@ int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) > return -EINVAL; > } > > - rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL); > + rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), gfp); > > if (!rule) > return -ENOMEM; > > /* Currently rules are treated as coming from the root ns */ > rule->label = aa_label_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, rulestr, > - GFP_KERNEL, true, false); > + gfp, true, false); > if (IS_ERR(rule->label)) { > int err = PTR_ERR(rule->label); > aa_audit_rule_free(rule); > diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h > index acbb03b9bd25..0c8cc86b417b 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h > +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h > @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error) > } > > void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule); > -int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule); > +int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp); > int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule); > int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule); > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > index c0556907c2e6..09da8e639239 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > @@ -401,7 +401,8 @@ static void ima_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) > kfree(entry); > } > > -static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) > +static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, > + gfp_t gfp) > { > struct ima_rule_entry *nentry; > int i; > @@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) > * Immutable elements are copied over as pointers and data; only > * lsm rules can change > */ > - nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), GFP_KERNEL); > + nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), gfp); > if (!nentry) > return NULL; > > @@ -425,7 +426,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) > > ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, > nentry->lsm[i].args_p, > - &nentry->lsm[i].rule); > + &nentry->lsm[i].rule, > + gfp); > if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule) > pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n", > nentry->lsm[i].args_p); > @@ -438,7 +440,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) > int i; > struct ima_rule_entry *nentry; > > - nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry); > + nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry, GFP_KERNEL); > if (!nentry) > return -ENOMEM; > > @@ -664,7 +666,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, > } > > if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized) { > - lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule); > + lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule, GFP_ATOMIC); > if (lsm_rule) { > rule_reinitialized = true; > goto retry; > @@ -1140,7 +1142,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, > entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type; > result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal, > entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p, > - &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); > + &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule, > + GFP_KERNEL); > if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) { > pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n", > entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p); > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 0a9a0ac3f266..4fd3c839353e 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -5331,15 +5331,17 @@ void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, > * @op: rule operator > * @rulestr: rule context > * @lsmrule: receive buffer for audit rule struct > + * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc > * > * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure. > * > * Return: Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, -EINVAL in case of > * an invalid rule. > */ > -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) > +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule, > + gfp_t gfp) > { > - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); > + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule, gfp); > } > > /** > diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h > index 52aca71210b4..29c7d4c86f6d 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h > +++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h > @@ -21,12 +21,14 @@ > * @op: the operator the rule uses > * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule > * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this > + * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc > * > * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure > * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with > * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use. > */ > -int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule); > +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule, > + gfp_t gfp); > > /** > * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure. > diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c > index e88b1b6c4adb..ded250e525e9 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c > +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c > @@ -3508,7 +3508,8 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) > } > } > > -int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) > +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, > + gfp_t gfp) > { > struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; > struct selinux_policy *policy; > @@ -3549,7 +3550,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) > return -EINVAL; > } > > - tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL); > + tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), gfp); > if (!tmprule) > return -ENOMEM; > context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt); > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index 146667937811..a4943628d75a 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -4696,7 +4696,8 @@ static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, > * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true. > * The label to be audited is created if necessay. > */ > -static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) > +static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, > + gfp_t gfp) > { > struct smack_known *skp; > char **rule = (char **)vrule;
On May 6, 2024 GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> wrote: > > A panic happens in ima_match_policy: > > BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 > PGD 42f873067 P4D 0 > Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI > CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 > RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450 > Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f > RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207 > RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200 > RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000 > RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739 > R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970 > R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001 > FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0 > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > Call Trace: > ima_get_action+0x22/0x30 > process_measurement+0xb0/0x830 > ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170 > ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0 > ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140 > ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0 > ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0 > ima_file_check+0x64/0x90 > path_openat+0x571/0x1720 > do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 > ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0 > ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60 > ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250 > ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 > do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 > do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca > > Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by > ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a > RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL. > This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side > critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems. > > Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause > synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a > UAF to happen. > > The root cause of this issue could be described as follows: > | Thread A | Thread B | > | |ima_match_policy | > | | rcu_read_lock | > |ima_lsm_update_rule | | > | synchronize_rcu | | > | | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)| > | | sleep | > ==> synchronize_rcu returns early > | kfree(entry) | | > | | entry = entry->next| > ==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything). > | | entry->action | > ==> Accessing entry might cause panic. > > To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within > RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC. > > Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> > Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> > Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> > Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > --- > v3: > ima_lsm_copy_rule takes a GFP flag as input as well. > v2: > Changed the audit_rule_init security hook to accept a new GFP flag, as > per Stephen's suggestion. > > --- > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +- > include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- > kernel/auditfilter.c | 5 +++-- > security/apparmor/audit.c | 6 +++--- > security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +- > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 15 +++++++++------ > security/security.c | 6 ++++-- > security/selinux/include/audit.h | 4 +++- > security/selinux/ss/services.c | 5 +++-- > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 ++- > 10 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) With the exception of one small gotcha (see below), this looks okay to me. At Mimi's request I'm going to merge this into the LSM tree, via lsm/stable-6.10, where I'll give it a few days in linux-next before sending it up to Linus. Thanks everyone :) > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index 146667937811..a4943628d75a 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -4696,7 +4696,8 @@ static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, > * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true. > * The label to be audited is created if necessay. > */ > -static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) > +static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, > + gfp_t gfp) You forgot to add the new @gfp parameter to the function's header comment block. I'm going to add the following as the text is used in other Smack functions, if anyone has any objections please let me know. " * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation" > { > struct smack_known *skp; > char **rule = (char **)vrule; -- paul-moore.com
On Wed, Jun 12, 2024 at 5:43 PM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote: > On May 6, 2024 GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> wrote: > > > > A panic happens in ima_match_policy: > > > > BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 > > PGD 42f873067 P4D 0 > > Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI > > CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P > > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 > > RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450 > > Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f > > RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207 > > RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200 > > RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000 > > RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739 > > R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970 > > R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001 > > FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > > CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0 > > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > > Call Trace: > > ima_get_action+0x22/0x30 > > process_measurement+0xb0/0x830 > > ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170 > > ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0 > > ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140 > > ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0 > > ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0 > > ima_file_check+0x64/0x90 > > path_openat+0x571/0x1720 > > do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 > > ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0 > > ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60 > > ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250 > > ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 > > do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 > > do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca > > > > Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by > > ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a > > RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL. > > This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side > > critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems. > > > > Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause > > synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a > > UAF to happen. > > > > The root cause of this issue could be described as follows: > > | Thread A | Thread B | > > | |ima_match_policy | > > | | rcu_read_lock | > > |ima_lsm_update_rule | | > > | synchronize_rcu | | > > | | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)| > > | | sleep | > > ==> synchronize_rcu returns early > > | kfree(entry) | | > > | | entry = entry->next| > > ==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything). > > | | entry->action | > > ==> Accessing entry might cause panic. > > > > To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within > > RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC. > > > > Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > > Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> > > Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> > > Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> > > Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > > --- > > v3: > > ima_lsm_copy_rule takes a GFP flag as input as well. > > v2: > > Changed the audit_rule_init security hook to accept a new GFP flag, as > > per Stephen's suggestion. > > > > --- > > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +- > > include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- > > kernel/auditfilter.c | 5 +++-- > > security/apparmor/audit.c | 6 +++--- > > security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +- > > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 15 +++++++++------ > > security/security.c | 6 ++++-- > > security/selinux/include/audit.h | 4 +++- > > security/selinux/ss/services.c | 5 +++-- > > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 ++- > > 10 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) > > With the exception of one small gotcha (see below), this looks okay to > me. At Mimi's request I'm going to merge this into the LSM tree, via > lsm/stable-6.10, where I'll give it a few days in linux-next before > sending it up to Linus. I also had to apply the following fix to this patch to resolve the !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES ca se ... grrrrr. diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 3e568126cd48..c51e24d24d1e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig) #else static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) { return -EINVAL; } > > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > > index 146667937811..a4943628d75a 100644 > > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > > @@ -4696,7 +4696,8 @@ static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, > > * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true. > > * The label to be audited is created if necessay. > > */ > > -static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) > > +static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, > > + gfp_t gfp) > > You forgot to add the new @gfp parameter to the function's header > comment block. I'm going to add the following as the text is used in > other Smack functions, if anyone has any objections please let me know. > > " * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation" > > > { > > struct smack_known *skp; > > char **rule = (char **)vrule;
On Thu, 2024-06-13 at 14:26 -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > On Wed, Jun 12, 2024 at 5:43 PM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote: > > On May 6, 2024 GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> wrote: > > > > > > A panic happens in ima_match_policy: > > > > > > BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 > > > PGD 42f873067 P4D 0 > > > Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI > > > CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P > > > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 > > > RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450 > > > Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f > > > RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207 > > > RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200 > > > RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000 > > > RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739 > > > R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970 > > > R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001 > > > FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > > > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > > > CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0 > > > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > > > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > > > Call Trace: > > > ima_get_action+0x22/0x30 > > > process_measurement+0xb0/0x830 > > > ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170 > > > ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0 > > > ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140 > > > ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0 > > > ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0 > > > ima_file_check+0x64/0x90 > > > path_openat+0x571/0x1720 > > > do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 > > > ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0 > > > ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60 > > > ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250 > > > ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 > > > do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 > > > do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 > > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca > > > > > > Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by > > > ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a > > > RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL. > > > This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side > > > critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems. > > > > > > Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause > > > synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a > > > UAF to happen. > > > > > > The root cause of this issue could be described as follows: > > > > Thread A | Thread B | > > > > |ima_match_policy | > > > > | rcu_read_lock | > > > > ima_lsm_update_rule | | > > > > synchronize_rcu | | > > > > | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)| > > > > | sleep | > > > ==> synchronize_rcu returns early > > > > kfree(entry) | | > > > > | entry = entry->next| > > > ==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything). > > > > | entry->action | > > > ==> Accessing entry might cause panic. > > > > > > To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within > > > RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC. > > > > > > Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") > > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > > > Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> > > > Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> > > > Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> > > > Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > > > --- > > > v3: > > > ima_lsm_copy_rule takes a GFP flag as input as well. > > > v2: > > > Changed the audit_rule_init security hook to accept a new GFP flag, as > > > per Stephen's suggestion. > > > > > > --- > > > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +- > > > include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- > > > kernel/auditfilter.c | 5 +++-- > > > security/apparmor/audit.c | 6 +++--- > > > security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +- > > > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 15 +++++++++------ > > > security/security.c | 6 ++++-- > > > security/selinux/include/audit.h | 4 +++- > > > security/selinux/ss/services.c | 5 +++-- > > > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 ++- > > > 10 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) > > > > With the exception of one small gotcha (see below), this looks okay to > > me. At Mimi's request I'm going to merge this into the LSM tree, via > > lsm/stable-6.10, where I'll give it a few days in linux-next before > > sending it up to Linus. > > I also had to apply the following fix to this patch to resolve the > !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES ca > se ... grrrrr. Argh, sorry... Thanks Paul! Roberto > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > index 3e568126cd48..c51e24d24d1e 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > @@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig) > #else > > static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, > - void **lsmrule) > + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) > { > return -EINVAL; > } > > > > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > > > index 146667937811..a4943628d75a 100644 > > > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > > > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > > > @@ -4696,7 +4696,8 @@ static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, > > > * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true. > > > * The label to be audited is created if necessay. > > > */ > > > -static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) > > > +static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, > > > + gfp_t gfp) > > > > You forgot to add the new @gfp parameter to the function's header > > comment block. I'm going to add the following as the text is used in > > other Smack functions, if anyone has any objections please let me know. > > > > " * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation" > > > > > { > > > struct smack_known *skp; > > > char **rule = (char **)vrule; >
On Fri, Jun 14, 2024 at 5:50 AM Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> wrote: > On Thu, 2024-06-13 at 14:26 -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Wed, Jun 12, 2024 at 5:43 PM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote: > > > On May 6, 2024 GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > A panic happens in ima_match_policy: > > > > > > > > BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 > > > > PGD 42f873067 P4D 0 > > > > Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI > > > > CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P > > > > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 > > > > RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450 > > > > Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f > > > > RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207 > > > > RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200 > > > > RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000 > > > > RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739 > > > > R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970 > > > > R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001 > > > > FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > > > > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > > > > CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0 > > > > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > > > > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > > > > Call Trace: > > > > ima_get_action+0x22/0x30 > > > > process_measurement+0xb0/0x830 > > > > ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170 > > > > ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0 > > > > ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140 > > > > ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0 > > > > ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0 > > > > ima_file_check+0x64/0x90 > > > > path_openat+0x571/0x1720 > > > > do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 > > > > ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0 > > > > ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60 > > > > ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250 > > > > ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 > > > > do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 > > > > do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 > > > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca > > > > > > > > Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by > > > > ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a > > > > RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL. > > > > This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side > > > > critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems. > > > > > > > > Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause > > > > synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a > > > > UAF to happen. > > > > > > > > The root cause of this issue could be described as follows: > > > > > Thread A | Thread B | > > > > > |ima_match_policy | > > > > > | rcu_read_lock | > > > > > ima_lsm_update_rule | | > > > > > synchronize_rcu | | > > > > > | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)| > > > > > | sleep | > > > > ==> synchronize_rcu returns early > > > > > kfree(entry) | | > > > > > | entry = entry->next| > > > > ==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything). > > > > > | entry->action | > > > > ==> Accessing entry might cause panic. > > > > > > > > To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within > > > > RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC. > > > > > > > > Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") > > > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > > > > Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> > > > > Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> > > > > Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> > > > > Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > > > > --- > > > > v3: > > > > ima_lsm_copy_rule takes a GFP flag as input as well. > > > > v2: > > > > Changed the audit_rule_init security hook to accept a new GFP flag, as > > > > per Stephen's suggestion. > > > > > > > > --- > > > > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +- > > > > include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- > > > > kernel/auditfilter.c | 5 +++-- > > > > security/apparmor/audit.c | 6 +++--- > > > > security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +- > > > > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 15 +++++++++------ > > > > security/security.c | 6 ++++-- > > > > security/selinux/include/audit.h | 4 +++- > > > > security/selinux/ss/services.c | 5 +++-- > > > > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 ++- > > > > 10 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) > > > > > > With the exception of one small gotcha (see below), this looks okay to > > > me. At Mimi's request I'm going to merge this into the LSM tree, via > > > lsm/stable-6.10, where I'll give it a few days in linux-next before > > > sending it up to Linus. > > > > I also had to apply the following fix to this patch to resolve the > > !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES ca > > se ... grrrrr. > > Argh, sorry... Not fun, but it happens. Anyway, I was going to send this to Linus today but I think I'm going to hold off until Monday as we likely lost a day of linux-next testing due to the compilation bug.
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 334e00efbde4..7e539f6f8c67 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, key_post_create_or_update, struct key *keyring, #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_init, u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_known, struct audit_krule *krule) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_match, u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, audit_rule_free, void *lsmrule) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 41a8f667bdfa..5122e3ad83b1 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -2048,7 +2048,8 @@ static inline void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule, + gfp_t gfp); int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule); void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule); @@ -2056,7 +2057,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule); #else static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) { return 0; } diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index be8c680121e4..d6ef4f4f9cba 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -529,7 +529,8 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, entry->rule.buflen += f_val; f->lsm_str = str; err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str, - (void **)&f->lsm_rule); + (void **)&f->lsm_rule, + GFP_KERNEL); /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (err == -EINVAL) { @@ -799,7 +800,7 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df, /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */ ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str, - (void **)&df->lsm_rule); + (void **)&df->lsm_rule, GFP_KERNEL); /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (ret == -EINVAL) { diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c index 45beb1c5f747..6b5181c668b5 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) } } -int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) +int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp) { struct aa_audit_rule *rule; @@ -230,14 +230,14 @@ int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) return -EINVAL; } - rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL); + rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), gfp); if (!rule) return -ENOMEM; /* Currently rules are treated as coming from the root ns */ rule->label = aa_label_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, rulestr, - GFP_KERNEL, true, false); + gfp, true, false); if (IS_ERR(rule->label)) { int err = PTR_ERR(rule->label); aa_audit_rule_free(rule); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h index acbb03b9bd25..0c8cc86b417b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error) } void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule); -int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule); +int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp); int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule); int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index c0556907c2e6..09da8e639239 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -401,7 +401,8 @@ static void ima_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) kfree(entry); } -static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) +static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, + gfp_t gfp) { struct ima_rule_entry *nentry; int i; @@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) * Immutable elements are copied over as pointers and data; only * lsm rules can change */ - nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), GFP_KERNEL); + nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), gfp); if (!nentry) return NULL; @@ -425,7 +426,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, nentry->lsm[i].args_p, - &nentry->lsm[i].rule); + &nentry->lsm[i].rule, + gfp); if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule) pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n", nentry->lsm[i].args_p); @@ -438,7 +440,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) int i; struct ima_rule_entry *nentry; - nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry); + nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry, GFP_KERNEL); if (!nentry) return -ENOMEM; @@ -664,7 +666,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, } if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized) { - lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule); + lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule, GFP_ATOMIC); if (lsm_rule) { rule_reinitialized = true; goto retry; @@ -1140,7 +1142,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type; result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal, entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p, - &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); + &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule, + GFP_KERNEL); if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) { pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n", entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 0a9a0ac3f266..4fd3c839353e 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -5331,15 +5331,17 @@ void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, * @op: rule operator * @rulestr: rule context * @lsmrule: receive buffer for audit rule struct + * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc * * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure. * * Return: Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, -EINVAL in case of * an invalid rule. */ -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule, + gfp_t gfp) { - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule, gfp); } /** diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h index 52aca71210b4..29c7d4c86f6d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h @@ -21,12 +21,14 @@ * @op: the operator the rule uses * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this + * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc * * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use. */ -int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule); +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule, + gfp_t gfp); /** * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure. diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index e88b1b6c4adb..ded250e525e9 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -3508,7 +3508,8 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) } } -int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, + gfp_t gfp) { struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; struct selinux_policy *policy; @@ -3549,7 +3550,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) return -EINVAL; } - tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL); + tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), gfp); if (!tmprule) return -ENOMEM; context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt); diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 146667937811..a4943628d75a 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -4696,7 +4696,8 @@ static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true. * The label to be audited is created if necessay. */ -static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) +static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, + gfp_t gfp) { struct smack_known *skp; char **rule = (char **)vrule;
A panic happens in ima_match_policy: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 PGD 42f873067 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450 Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200 RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739 R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970 R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ima_get_action+0x22/0x30 process_measurement+0xb0/0x830 ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170 ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0 ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140 ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0 ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0 ima_file_check+0x64/0x90 path_openat+0x571/0x1720 do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0 ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60 ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250 ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL. This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems. Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a UAF to happen. The root cause of this issue could be described as follows: | Thread A | Thread B | | |ima_match_policy | | | rcu_read_lock | |ima_lsm_update_rule | | | synchronize_rcu | | | | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)| | | sleep | ==> synchronize_rcu returns early | kfree(entry) | | | | entry = entry->next| ==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything). | | entry->action | ==> Accessing entry might cause panic. To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC. Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> --- v3: ima_lsm_copy_rule takes a GFP flag as input as well. v2: Changed the audit_rule_init security hook to accept a new GFP flag, as per Stephen's suggestion. --- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- kernel/auditfilter.c | 5 +++-- security/apparmor/audit.c | 6 +++--- security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 15 +++++++++------ security/security.c | 6 ++++-- security/selinux/include/audit.h | 4 +++- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 5 +++-- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 ++- 10 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)