| Message ID | 20240916122230.114800-5-matthieu@buffet.re (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Handled Elsewhere |
| Headers | show |
| Series | landlock: Add UDP access control support | expand |
On Mon, Sep 16, 2024 at 02:22:27PM +0200, Matthieu Buffet wrote: > Add support for two UDP access rights, complementing the two previous > LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_UDP and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP: > > - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_RECVMSG_UDP: to prevent a process from receiving I'm wondering what would make the most sense between NET_RECVMSG_UDP and NET_RECVFROM_UDP. Is one more known or understood than the other? Same for sendmsg vs. sendto. > datagrams. Just removing LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP is not enough: > it can just send a first datagram or call connect() and get an > ephemeral port assigned, without ever calling bind(). This access right > allows blocking a process from receiving UDP datagrams, without > preventing them to bind() (which may be required to set source ports); > > - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP: to prevent a process from sending > datagrams. Just removing LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_UDP is not enough: > the process can call sendmsg() with an unconnected socket and an > arbitrary destination address. > > Signed-off-by: Matthieu Buffet <matthieu@buffet.re> > --- > include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 18 ++- > security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +- > security/landlock/net.c | 205 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- > 3 files changed, 193 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h > index 7f9aa1cd2912..7ea3d1adb8c3 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h > @@ -287,15 +287,25 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr { > * receive datagrams from (if you create a client-specific socket for a > * client-specific process, e.g. using the established-over-unconnected > * method) > - * > - * Note that ``bind(0)`` means binding to an ephemeral kernel-assigned port, > - * in the range configured in ``/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range`` > - * globally (or on a per-socket basis with ``setsockopt(IP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE)``). > + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_RECVMSG_UDP: receive datagrams on the given local port > + * (this is a distinct right from %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP, because you > + * may want to allow a process to set its datagrams source port using bind() > + * but not be able to receive datagrams) > + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP: send datagrams to the given remote port > + * (this is a distinct right from %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_UDP, because > + * you may want to allow a process to set which client it wants to receive > + * datagrams from using connect(), and not be able to send datagrams) > + * > + * Note that ``bind(0)`` has special semantics, meaning bind on any port in the > + * range configured in ``/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range`` globally (or > + * on a per-socket basis with ``setsockopt(IP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE)``). > */ > /* clang-format off */ > #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP (1ULL << 0) > #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP (1ULL << 1) > #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP (1ULL << 2) > #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_UDP (1ULL << 3) > +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_RECVMSG_UDP (1ULL << 4) > +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP (1ULL << 5) > /* clang-format on */ > #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */ > diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h > index 182b6a8d2976..e2697348310c 100644 > --- a/security/landlock/limits.h > +++ b/security/landlock/limits.h > @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ > #define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1) > #define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS) > > -#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_UDP > +#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP > #define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET << 1) - 1) > #define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET) > > diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c > index becc62c02cc9..9a3c44ad3f26 100644 > --- a/security/landlock/net.c > +++ b/security/landlock/net.c > @@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ > #include <linux/net.h> > #include <linux/socket.h> > #include <net/ipv6.h> > +#include <net/transp_v6.h> > +#include <net/ip.h> > > #include "common.h" > #include "cred.h" > @@ -61,6 +63,45 @@ static const struct landlock_ruleset *get_current_net_domain(void) > return dom; > } > > +static int get_addr_port(const struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen, > + bool in_udpv6_sendmsg_ctx, __be16 *port) > +{ > + /* Checks for minimal header length to safely read sa_family. */ > + if (addrlen < offsetofend(typeof(*address), sa_family)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + switch (address->sa_family) { > + case AF_UNSPEC: Please create a simple patch refactoring this code, but without any semantic change, and then include the UDP specific part in the patch adding support for UDP control. This helps verify (and test) what is the code refactoring and what is the actual change, and it could also help for backports. Moving this code to a standalone helper should then be the first patch of this series. > + /* > + * Backward compatibility games: AF_UNSPEC is mapped to AF_INET > + * by `bind` (v4+v6), `connect` (v4) and `sendmsg` (v4), but Instead of backticks, just name these syscalls as functions: bind(), connect()... > + * interpreted as "no address" by `sendmsg` (v6). In that case > + * this call must succeed (even if `address` is shorter than a > + * `struct sockaddr_in`), and caller must check for this > + * condition. Weird dance, but good catch. > + */ > + if (in_udpv6_sendmsg_ctx) { > + *port = 0; Why set the port to zero? In udp_sendmsg(), it looks like such a port would return -EINVAL right? And in this case, why ignoring the following addrlen check? Couldn't we just remove this in_udpv6_sendmsg_ctx argument, extract the port as long as we can, and only deal with the in_udpv6_sendmsg case in hook_socket_sendmsg() > + return 0; > + } > + fallthrough; > + case AF_INET: > + if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) > + return -EINVAL; > + *port = ((struct sockaddr_in *)address)->sin_port; > + return 0; > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) > + case AF_INET6: > + if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) > + return -EINVAL; > + *port = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)address)->sin6_port; > + return 0; > +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */ > + } > + > + return -EAFNOSUPPORT; > +} > + > static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock, > struct sockaddr *const address, > const int addrlen, > @@ -73,39 +114,18 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock, > .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT, > }; > const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_net_domain(); > + int err; > > if (!dom) > return 0; > if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dom->num_layers < 1)) > return -EACCES; > > - /* Checks if it's a (potential) UDP or TCP socket. */ > - if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM && sock->type != SOCK_DGRAM) > - return 0; > - > - /* Checks for minimal header length to safely read sa_family. */ > - if (addrlen < offsetofend(typeof(*address), sa_family)) > - return -EINVAL; > - > - switch (address->sa_family) { > - case AF_UNSPEC: > - case AF_INET: > - if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) > - return -EINVAL; > - port = ((struct sockaddr_in *)address)->sin_port; > - break; > - > -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) > - case AF_INET6: > - if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) > - return -EINVAL; > - port = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)address)->sin6_port; > - break; > -#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */ > - > - default: > - return 0; > - } > + err = get_addr_port(address, addrlen, false, &port); > + if (err == -EAFNOSUPPORT) > + return 0; // restrictions are not applicable to this socket family Comments need to be /* Like this and before the commented code. */ See https://docs.kernel.org/process/maintainer-tip.html#comment-style > + else if (err != 0) > + return err; > > /* Specific AF_UNSPEC handling. */ > if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) { > @@ -174,6 +194,27 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock, > return -EACCES; > } > > +static int check_access_port(const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom, > + access_mask_t access_request, __be16 port) > +{ > + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {}; > + const struct landlock_rule *rule; > + const struct landlock_id id = { > + .key.data = (__force uintptr_t)port, > + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT, > + }; > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data)); > + > + rule = landlock_find_rule(dom, id); > + access_request = landlock_init_layer_masks( > + dom, access_request, &layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT); > + if (landlock_unmask_layers(rule, access_request, &layer_masks, > + ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks))) > + return 0; > + > + return -EACCES; > +} > + > static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *const sock, > struct sockaddr *const address, const int addrlen) > { > @@ -215,9 +256,119 @@ static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *const sock, > access_request); > } > > +static int hook_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *const sock, > + struct msghdr *const msg, const int size) We can probably constify these references. > +{ > + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_net_domain(); > + const struct sockaddr *address = (const struct sockaddr *)msg->msg_name; > + int err; > + __be16 port; > + > + if (sock->type != SOCK_DGRAM) > + return 0; > + if (sock->sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP) > + return 0; > + if (!dom) > + return 0; I'd prefer this !dom check to be the first (like for most other hooks) because it makes it clear that Landlock doesn't mess with not sandboxed tasks. Moreover in this case it would avoid two pointer dereferences. > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dom->num_layers < 1)) > + return -EACCES; This num_layers check can stay just after to the dom check though. > + > + /* > + * Don't mimic all checks udp_sendmsg() and udpv6_sendmsg() do. Just > + * read what we need for access control, and fail if we can't (e.g. > + * because the input buffer is too short) with the same error codes as > + * they do. Selftests enforce that these error codes do not diverge > + * with the actual implementation's ones. > + */ > + > + /* > + * If there is a more specific address in the message, it will take > + * precedence over any connect()ed address. Base our access check on it. > + */ > + if (address) { > + const bool in_udpv6_sendmsg = > + (sock->sk->sk_prot == &udpv6_prot); > + > + err = get_addr_port(address, msg->msg_namelen, in_udpv6_sendmsg, > + &port); > + if (err != 0) > + return err; > + > + /* > + * In `udpv6_sendmsg`, AF_UNSPEC is interpreted as "no address". > + * In that case, the call above will succeed but without > + * returning a port. > + */ > + if (in_udpv6_sendmsg && address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) > + address = NULL; > + } > + > + /* > + * Without a message-specific destination address, the socket must be > + * connect()ed to an address, base our access check on that one. > + */ > + if (!address) { If the address is not specified, I think we should just allow the request and let the network stack handle the rest. The advantage of this approach would be that if the socket was previously allowed to be connected, the check is only done once and they will be almost no performance impact when calling sendto/write/recvfrom/read on this "connected" socket. > + /* > + * We could let this through and count on `udp_sendmsg` and > + * `udpv6_sendmsg` to error out, but they could change in the > + * future and open a hole here without knowing. Enforce an > + * error, and enforce in selftests that we don't diverge in > + * behaviours compared to them. This is a good approach for this patch, but if we allow connected sockets to be freely used when the address is not specified, this check should not be required because we would allow such action anyway and the network stack would handle the other error cases. > + */ > + if (sock->sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) > + return -EDESTADDRREQ; > + > + port = inet_sk(sock->sk)->inet_dport; > + } > + > + return check_access_port(dom, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP, port); What about something like this (with the appropriate comments)? if (!address) return 0; if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC && sock->sk->sk_prot == &udpv6_prot) return 0; err = get_addr_port(address, msg->msg_namelen, &port); if (err) return err; return check_access_port(dom, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP, port); > +} > + > +static int hook_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *const sock, > + struct msghdr *const msg, const int size, > + const int flags) > +{ > + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_net_domain(); > + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; > + int err; > + __be16 port_bigendian; > + int ephemeral_low; > + int ephemeral_high; > + __u16 port_hostendian; > + > + if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP) > + return 0; ditto > + if (!dom) > + return 0; > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dom->num_layers < 1)) > + return -EACCES; > + > + /* "fast" path: socket is bound to an explicitly allowed port */ > + port_bigendian = inet_sk(sk)->inet_sport; > + err = check_access_port(dom, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_RECVMSG_UDP, > + port_bigendian); > + if (err != -EACCES) > + return err; We should be able to follow the same policy for "connected" sockets. > + > + /* > + * Slow path: socket is bound to an ephemeral port. Need a second check > + * on port 0 with different semantics ("any ephemeral port"). > + */ > + inet_sk_get_local_port_range(sk, &ephemeral_low, &ephemeral_high); Is it to handle recvmsg(with port 0)? > + port_hostendian = ntohs(port_bigendian); > + if (ephemeral_low <= port_hostendian && > + port_hostendian <= ephemeral_high) > + return check_access_port(dom, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_RECVMSG_UDP, > + 0); > + > + return -EACCES; > +} > + > static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, hook_socket_bind), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, hook_socket_connect), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, hook_socket_sendmsg), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, hook_socket_recvmsg), > }; > > __init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void) > -- > 2.39.5 > >
Hi Mickaël, I've almost finished merging your review (thanks for all the feedback), with the exception of this main point. Just making sure we agree on the limitations before I merge this into a new version. On 9/21/2024 12:23 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: >> + /* >> + * If there is a more specific address in the message, it will take >> + * precedence over any connect()ed address. Base our access check on it. >> + */ >> + if (address) { >> + const bool in_udpv6_sendmsg = >> + (sock->sk->sk_prot == &udpv6_prot); >> + >> + err = get_addr_port(address, msg->msg_namelen, in_udpv6_sendmsg, >> + &port); >> + if (err != 0) >> + return err; >> + >> + /* >> + * In `udpv6_sendmsg`, AF_UNSPEC is interpreted as "no address". >> + * In that case, the call above will succeed but without >> + * returning a port. >> + */ >> + if (in_udpv6_sendmsg && address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) >> + address = NULL; >> + } >> + >> + /* >> + * Without a message-specific destination address, the socket must be >> + * connect()ed to an address, base our access check on that one. >> + */ >> + if (!address) { > > If the address is not specified, I think we should just allow the > request and let the network stack handle the rest. The advantage of > this approach would be that if the socket was previously allowed to be > connected, the check is only done once and they will be almost no > performance impact when calling sendto/write/recvfrom/read on this > "connected" socket. > [...] > What about something like this (with the appropriate comments)? > > if (!address) > return 0; > > if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC && sock->sk->sk_prot == > &udpv6_prot) > return 0; > > err = get_addr_port(address, msg->msg_namelen, &port); > if (err) > return err; > > return check_access_port(dom, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP, port); If I understand correctly, you would like the semantics of LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_UDP to be {connect(), and sendmsg() without explicit address} and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP to be {sendmsg() with explicit address}. This makes it impossible to allow a landlocked server to connect() in order to receive traffic only from a specific client while at the same time preventing it from sending traffic (that is, a receive-only client-specific socket ala Cloudflare's "established-over-unconnected"[1]). >> + err = check_access_port(dom, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_RECVMSG_UDP, >> + port_bigendian); >> + if (err != -EACCES) >> + return err; > > We should be able to follow the same policy for "connected" sockets. Again if I understand correctly, to fully merge semantics of LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_RECVMSG_UDP (since if the access check is performed at bind() time, there is nothing to check in recvmsg() anymore). Similarly, this makes it impossible to allow a send-only program to bind() to set a source port without allowing it to recvmsg() traffic. I do not know of real-life programs that might want to sandbox their network workers *that* precisely, nor how much we want to be future-proof and support it. If not, I can merge your feedback and: - remove LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_RECVMSG_UDP and the recvmsg() hook; - change the doc for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP to mention that it is not required if the app uses connect() and then sendmsg() without explicit addresses; - change the doc for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_UDP to mention that it grants the right to send traffic (and similarly for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP to receive traffic), and the reason (performance, though I haven't managed to get a benchmark); - rename to LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_SENDMSG_UDP, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP, and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_RECVMSG_UDP, what do you think? If merging semantics is a problem, I mentioned socket tagging in [2] to reduce the performance impact (e.g. tag whether it can send traffic at connect() time, and tag whether it can recv at bind() time). So another option could be to keep precise semantics and explore that? >> + /* >> + * Slow path: socket is bound to an ephemeral port. Need a second check >> + * on port 0 with different semantics ("any ephemeral port"). >> + */ >> + inet_sk_get_local_port_range(sk, &ephemeral_low, &ephemeral_high); > > Is it to handle recvmsg(with port 0)? If you mean recvmsg() on a socket that was previously bind(0), yep. This second rule lookup added a different meaning to rules on port 0. Without this, one would not be able to allow "all ephemeral ports", making the feature unusable for servers that bind on ephemeral ports. All this disappears if we remove LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_RECVMSG_UDP. Matthieu [1] https://blog.cloudflare.com/everything-you-ever-wanted-to-know-about-udp-sockets-but-were-afraid-to-ask-part-1/ [2] https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/10#issuecomment-2267871144
On Sat, Oct 19, 2024 at 02:47:48PM +0200, Matthieu Buffet wrote: > Hi Mickaël, > > I've almost finished merging your review (thanks for all the feedback), with > the exception of this main point. Just making sure we agree on the > limitations before I merge this into a new version. > > On 9/21/2024 12:23 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > >> + /* > >> + * If there is a more specific address in the message, it will take > >> + * precedence over any connect()ed address. Base our access check on > it. > >> + */ > >> + if (address) { > >> + const bool in_udpv6_sendmsg = > >> + (sock->sk->sk_prot == &udpv6_prot); > >> + > >> + err = get_addr_port(address, msg->msg_namelen, in_udpv6_sendmsg, > >> + &port); > >> + if (err != 0) > >> + return err; > >> + > >> + /* > >> + * In `udpv6_sendmsg`, AF_UNSPEC is interpreted as "no address". > >> + * In that case, the call above will succeed but without > >> + * returning a port. > >> + */ > >> + if (in_udpv6_sendmsg && address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) > >> + address = NULL; > >> + } > >> + > >> + /* > >> + * Without a message-specific destination address, the socket must be > >> + * connect()ed to an address, base our access check on that one. > >> + */ > >> + if (!address) { > > > > If the address is not specified, I think we should just allow the > > request and let the network stack handle the rest. The advantage of > > this approach would be that if the socket was previously allowed to be > > connected, the check is only done once and they will be almost no > > performance impact when calling sendto/write/recvfrom/read on this > > "connected" socket. > > [...] > > What about something like this (with the appropriate comments)? > > > > if (!address) > > return 0; > > > > if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC && sock->sk->sk_prot == > > &udpv6_prot) > > return 0; > > > > err = get_addr_port(address, msg->msg_namelen, &port); > > if (err) > > return err; > > > > return check_access_port(dom, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP, port); > > If I understand correctly, you would like the semantics of > LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_UDP to be {connect(), and sendmsg() without > explicit address} and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP to be {sendmsg() with > explicit address}. Not exactly, here is the rewording with my thinking: ...the semantics of LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_UDP to be {connect()} and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP to be {sendmsg() with explicit address}. sendmsg() without explicit address should always be allowed, whatever the Landlock policy (similarly as write(2) on a write-opened file descriptor). In a nutshell, sendmsg(2) without explicit address should be handled the same as a write(2) call on a connected socket (I guess the kernel handles such action on connected datagram sockets the same as on connected stream sockets). I think it is more important to first have a simple model that enables developers to initialize a socket with connect(2) and then sandbox the process to only be able to use this socket to communicate with the configured peer, similar to what can be enforced with TCP sockets. sendmsg(2) can do two different thinks: (optionally) configure a peer/port and write data. recvmsg(2) only reads data. We should first start by controlling exchange from/to peers, and maybe later controlling data flow. An alternative approach would be to not add a sendmsg specific access right but only LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_UDP because connect should be a superset of sendmsg. This would make it impossible to specifically deny (shared) socket's configuration change though. I think it's better to stick to the kernel semantic with 3 dedicated access rights, and it should make more sense for users too. What do you think? > This makes it impossible to allow a landlocked server to > connect() in order to receive traffic only from a specific client while at > the same time preventing it from sending traffic (that is, a receive-only > client-specific socket ala Cloudflare's "established-over-unconnected"[1]). My proposal would indeed makes this use case impossible to enforce only with the proposed access rights, and we would need to restrict write(2) too BTW. However, I think it would make sense to add complementary access rights to restrict reading or writing to a socket. I guess this semantic would be useful for non-UDP protocols too with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_{READ,WRITE}_{TCP,UDP} access rights set at socket-creation time and stored in the socket object (instead of looking at a Landlock domain for each read/write call, similarly to the truncate and ioctl_dev access rights). What do you think? I wonder what happens if we call recvmsg(2) on a newly created (and then unconfigured) socket. Without prior call to bind(2) I would guess that the recvmsg(2) call fail but I'm not so sure with a datagram socket. We should check that. > > >> + err = check_access_port(dom, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_RECVMSG_UDP, > >> + port_bigendian); > >> + if (err != -EACCES) > >> + return err; > > > > We should be able to follow the same policy for "connected" sockets. > > Again if I understand correctly, to fully merge semantics of > LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_RECVMSG_UDP (since if > the access check is performed at bind() time, there is nothing to check in > recvmsg() anymore). Correct (I was a bit confused with recvmsg, but it doesn't set the receiving address/port). > Similarly, this makes it impossible to allow a send-only > program to bind() to set a source port without allowing it to recvmsg() > traffic. Correct with the current access rights. We would need a LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_READ_UDP. > > I do not know of real-life programs that might want to sandbox their network > workers *that* precisely, nor how much we want to be future-proof and > support it. If not, I can merge your feedback and: > - remove LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_RECVMSG_UDP and the recvmsg() hook; Yes > - change the doc for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP to mention that it is > not required if the app uses connect() and then sendmsg() without explicit > addresses; Yes > - change the doc for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_UDP to mention that it > grants the right to send traffic (and similarly for > LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP to receive traffic), and the reason The documentation should highlight that these flags grants the right to configure a socket, but indeed, no restrictions are enforced on reading or writing on sockets. > (performance, though I haven't managed to get a benchmark); > - rename to LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_SENDMSG_UDP, > LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP, and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_RECVMSG_UDP, > what do you think? The first and third rights are confusing. I prefer simple names such as LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_UDP and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP. Moreover, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_UDP would not impact sendmsg(2) calls at all. > > If merging semantics is a problem, I mentioned socket tagging in [2] to > reduce the performance impact (e.g. tag whether it can send traffic at > connect() time, and tag whether it can recv at bind() time). So another > option could be to keep precise semantics and explore that? This tagging mechanism looks like a good idea to implement LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_{READ,WRITE}_{TCP,UDP}, but that should be a future separate patch series. > > >> + /* > >> + * Slow path: socket is bound to an ephemeral port. Need a second check > >> + * on port 0 with different semantics ("any ephemeral port"). > >> + */ > >> + inet_sk_get_local_port_range(sk, &ephemeral_low, &ephemeral_high); > > > > Is it to handle recvmsg(with port 0)? > > If you mean recvmsg() on a socket that was previously bind(0), yep. This > second rule lookup added a different meaning to rules on port 0. Without > this, one would not be able to allow "all ephemeral ports", making the > feature unusable for servers that bind on ephemeral ports. All this > disappears if we remove LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_RECVMSG_UDP. OK > > Matthieu > > [1] https://blog.cloudflare.com/everything-you-ever-wanted-to-know-about-udp-sockets-but-were-afraid-to-ask-part-1/ > [2] https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/10#issuecomment-2267871144 >
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h index 7f9aa1cd2912..7ea3d1adb8c3 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h @@ -287,15 +287,25 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr { * receive datagrams from (if you create a client-specific socket for a * client-specific process, e.g. using the established-over-unconnected * method) - * - * Note that ``bind(0)`` means binding to an ephemeral kernel-assigned port, - * in the range configured in ``/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range`` - * globally (or on a per-socket basis with ``setsockopt(IP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE)``). + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_RECVMSG_UDP: receive datagrams on the given local port + * (this is a distinct right from %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP, because you + * may want to allow a process to set its datagrams source port using bind() + * but not be able to receive datagrams) + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP: send datagrams to the given remote port + * (this is a distinct right from %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_UDP, because + * you may want to allow a process to set which client it wants to receive + * datagrams from using connect(), and not be able to send datagrams) + * + * Note that ``bind(0)`` has special semantics, meaning bind on any port in the + * range configured in ``/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range`` globally (or + * on a per-socket basis with ``setsockopt(IP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE)``). */ /* clang-format off */ #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP (1ULL << 0) #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP (1ULL << 1) #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP (1ULL << 2) #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_UDP (1ULL << 3) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_RECVMSG_UDP (1ULL << 4) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP (1ULL << 5) /* clang-format on */ #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */ diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h index 182b6a8d2976..e2697348310c 100644 --- a/security/landlock/limits.h +++ b/security/landlock/limits.h @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ #define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1) #define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS) -#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_UDP +#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP #define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET << 1) - 1) #define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET) diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c index becc62c02cc9..9a3c44ad3f26 100644 --- a/security/landlock/net.c +++ b/security/landlock/net.c @@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ #include <linux/net.h> #include <linux/socket.h> #include <net/ipv6.h> +#include <net/transp_v6.h> +#include <net/ip.h> #include "common.h" #include "cred.h" @@ -61,6 +63,45 @@ static const struct landlock_ruleset *get_current_net_domain(void) return dom; } +static int get_addr_port(const struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen, + bool in_udpv6_sendmsg_ctx, __be16 *port) +{ + /* Checks for minimal header length to safely read sa_family. */ + if (addrlen < offsetofend(typeof(*address), sa_family)) + return -EINVAL; + + switch (address->sa_family) { + case AF_UNSPEC: + /* + * Backward compatibility games: AF_UNSPEC is mapped to AF_INET + * by `bind` (v4+v6), `connect` (v4) and `sendmsg` (v4), but + * interpreted as "no address" by `sendmsg` (v6). In that case + * this call must succeed (even if `address` is shorter than a + * `struct sockaddr_in`), and caller must check for this + * condition. + */ + if (in_udpv6_sendmsg_ctx) { + *port = 0; + return 0; + } + fallthrough; + case AF_INET: + if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) + return -EINVAL; + *port = ((struct sockaddr_in *)address)->sin_port; + return 0; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + case AF_INET6: + if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) + return -EINVAL; + *port = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)address)->sin6_port; + return 0; +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */ + } + + return -EAFNOSUPPORT; +} + static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock, struct sockaddr *const address, const int addrlen, @@ -73,39 +114,18 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock, .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT, }; const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_net_domain(); + int err; if (!dom) return 0; if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dom->num_layers < 1)) return -EACCES; - /* Checks if it's a (potential) UDP or TCP socket. */ - if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM && sock->type != SOCK_DGRAM) - return 0; - - /* Checks for minimal header length to safely read sa_family. */ - if (addrlen < offsetofend(typeof(*address), sa_family)) - return -EINVAL; - - switch (address->sa_family) { - case AF_UNSPEC: - case AF_INET: - if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) - return -EINVAL; - port = ((struct sockaddr_in *)address)->sin_port; - break; - -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) - case AF_INET6: - if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) - return -EINVAL; - port = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)address)->sin6_port; - break; -#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */ - - default: - return 0; - } + err = get_addr_port(address, addrlen, false, &port); + if (err == -EAFNOSUPPORT) + return 0; // restrictions are not applicable to this socket family + else if (err != 0) + return err; /* Specific AF_UNSPEC handling. */ if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) { @@ -174,6 +194,27 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock, return -EACCES; } +static int check_access_port(const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom, + access_mask_t access_request, __be16 port) +{ + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {}; + const struct landlock_rule *rule; + const struct landlock_id id = { + .key.data = (__force uintptr_t)port, + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT, + }; + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data)); + + rule = landlock_find_rule(dom, id); + access_request = landlock_init_layer_masks( + dom, access_request, &layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT); + if (landlock_unmask_layers(rule, access_request, &layer_masks, + ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks))) + return 0; + + return -EACCES; +} + static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *const sock, struct sockaddr *const address, const int addrlen) { @@ -215,9 +256,119 @@ static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *const sock, access_request); } +static int hook_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *const sock, + struct msghdr *const msg, const int size) +{ + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_net_domain(); + const struct sockaddr *address = (const struct sockaddr *)msg->msg_name; + int err; + __be16 port; + + if (sock->type != SOCK_DGRAM) + return 0; + if (sock->sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP) + return 0; + if (!dom) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dom->num_layers < 1)) + return -EACCES; + + /* + * Don't mimic all checks udp_sendmsg() and udpv6_sendmsg() do. Just + * read what we need for access control, and fail if we can't (e.g. + * because the input buffer is too short) with the same error codes as + * they do. Selftests enforce that these error codes do not diverge + * with the actual implementation's ones. + */ + + /* + * If there is a more specific address in the message, it will take + * precedence over any connect()ed address. Base our access check on it. + */ + if (address) { + const bool in_udpv6_sendmsg = + (sock->sk->sk_prot == &udpv6_prot); + + err = get_addr_port(address, msg->msg_namelen, in_udpv6_sendmsg, + &port); + if (err != 0) + return err; + + /* + * In `udpv6_sendmsg`, AF_UNSPEC is interpreted as "no address". + * In that case, the call above will succeed but without + * returning a port. + */ + if (in_udpv6_sendmsg && address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) + address = NULL; + } + + /* + * Without a message-specific destination address, the socket must be + * connect()ed to an address, base our access check on that one. + */ + if (!address) { + /* + * We could let this through and count on `udp_sendmsg` and + * `udpv6_sendmsg` to error out, but they could change in the + * future and open a hole here without knowing. Enforce an + * error, and enforce in selftests that we don't diverge in + * behaviours compared to them. + */ + if (sock->sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) + return -EDESTADDRREQ; + + port = inet_sk(sock->sk)->inet_dport; + } + + return check_access_port(dom, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP, port); +} + +static int hook_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *const sock, + struct msghdr *const msg, const int size, + const int flags) +{ + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_net_domain(); + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; + int err; + __be16 port_bigendian; + int ephemeral_low; + int ephemeral_high; + __u16 port_hostendian; + + if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP) + return 0; + if (!dom) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dom->num_layers < 1)) + return -EACCES; + + /* "fast" path: socket is bound to an explicitly allowed port */ + port_bigendian = inet_sk(sk)->inet_sport; + err = check_access_port(dom, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_RECVMSG_UDP, + port_bigendian); + if (err != -EACCES) + return err; + + /* + * Slow path: socket is bound to an ephemeral port. Need a second check + * on port 0 with different semantics ("any ephemeral port"). + */ + inet_sk_get_local_port_range(sk, &ephemeral_low, &ephemeral_high); + port_hostendian = ntohs(port_bigendian); + if (ephemeral_low <= port_hostendian && + port_hostendian <= ephemeral_high) + return check_access_port(dom, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_RECVMSG_UDP, + 0); + + return -EACCES; +} + static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, hook_socket_bind), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, hook_socket_connect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, hook_socket_sendmsg), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, hook_socket_recvmsg), }; __init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void)
Add support for two UDP access rights, complementing the two previous LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_UDP and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP: - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_RECVMSG_UDP: to prevent a process from receiving datagrams. Just removing LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP is not enough: it can just send a first datagram or call connect() and get an ephemeral port assigned, without ever calling bind(). This access right allows blocking a process from receiving UDP datagrams, without preventing them to bind() (which may be required to set source ports); - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP: to prevent a process from sending datagrams. Just removing LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_UDP is not enough: the process can call sendmsg() with an unconnected socket and an arbitrary destination address. Signed-off-by: Matthieu Buffet <matthieu@buffet.re> --- include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 18 ++- security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +- security/landlock/net.c | 205 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 193 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)