diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
index 7f9aa1cd2912..7ea3d1adb8c3 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
@@ -287,15 +287,25 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {
  *   receive datagrams from (if you create a client-specific socket for a
  *   client-specific process, e.g. using the established-over-unconnected
  *   method)
- *
- * Note that ``bind(0)`` means binding to an ephemeral kernel-assigned port,
- * in the range configured in ``/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range``
- * globally (or on a per-socket basis with ``setsockopt(IP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE)``).
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_RECVMSG_UDP: receive datagrams on the given local port
+ *   (this is a distinct right from %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP, because you
+ *   may want to allow a process to set its datagrams source port using bind()
+ *   but not be able to receive datagrams)
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP: send datagrams to the given remote port
+ *   (this is a distinct right from %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_UDP, because
+ *   you may want to allow a process to set which client it wants to receive
+ *   datagrams from using connect(), and not be able to send datagrams)
+ *
+ * Note that ``bind(0)`` has special semantics, meaning bind on any port in the
+ * range configured in ``/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range`` globally (or
+ * on a per-socket basis with ``setsockopt(IP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE)``).
  */
 /* clang-format off */
 #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP			(1ULL << 0)
 #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP			(1ULL << 1)
 #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP			(1ULL << 2)
 #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_UDP			(1ULL << 3)
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_RECVMSG_UDP			(1ULL << 4)
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP			(1ULL << 5)
 /* clang-format on */
 #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h
index 182b6a8d2976..e2697348310c 100644
--- a/security/landlock/limits.h
+++ b/security/landlock/limits.h
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 #define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS		((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1)
 #define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS		__const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)
 
-#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_UDP
+#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP
 #define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET	((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET << 1) - 1)
 #define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET		__const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET)
 
diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
index becc62c02cc9..9a3c44ad3f26 100644
--- a/security/landlock/net.c
+++ b/security/landlock/net.c
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
 #include <linux/net.h>
 #include <linux/socket.h>
 #include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include <net/transp_v6.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
 
 #include "common.h"
 #include "cred.h"
@@ -61,6 +63,45 @@ static const struct landlock_ruleset *get_current_net_domain(void)
 	return dom;
 }
 
+static int get_addr_port(const struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen,
+			 bool in_udpv6_sendmsg_ctx, __be16 *port)
+{
+	/* Checks for minimal header length to safely read sa_family. */
+	if (addrlen < offsetofend(typeof(*address), sa_family))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	switch (address->sa_family) {
+	case AF_UNSPEC:
+		/*
+		 * Backward compatibility games: AF_UNSPEC is mapped to AF_INET
+		 * by `bind` (v4+v6), `connect` (v4) and `sendmsg` (v4), but
+		 * interpreted as "no address" by `sendmsg` (v6). In that case
+		 * this call must succeed (even if `address` is shorter than a
+		 * `struct sockaddr_in`), and caller must check for this
+		 * condition.
+		 */
+		if (in_udpv6_sendmsg_ctx) {
+			*port = 0;
+			return 0;
+		}
+		fallthrough;
+	case AF_INET:
+		if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		*port = ((struct sockaddr_in *)address)->sin_port;
+		return 0;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	case AF_INET6:
+		if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		*port = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)address)->sin6_port;
+		return 0;
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */
+	}
+
+	return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+}
+
 static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
 				       struct sockaddr *const address,
 				       const int addrlen,
@@ -73,39 +114,18 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
 		.type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
 	};
 	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_net_domain();
+	int err;
 
 	if (!dom)
 		return 0;
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dom->num_layers < 1))
 		return -EACCES;
 
-	/* Checks if it's a (potential) UDP or TCP socket. */
-	if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM && sock->type != SOCK_DGRAM)
-		return 0;
-
-	/* Checks for minimal header length to safely read sa_family. */
-	if (addrlen < offsetofend(typeof(*address), sa_family))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	switch (address->sa_family) {
-	case AF_UNSPEC:
-	case AF_INET:
-		if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
-			return -EINVAL;
-		port = ((struct sockaddr_in *)address)->sin_port;
-		break;
-
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
-	case AF_INET6:
-		if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
-			return -EINVAL;
-		port = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)address)->sin6_port;
-		break;
-#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */
-
-	default:
-		return 0;
-	}
+	err = get_addr_port(address, addrlen, false, &port);
+	if (err == -EAFNOSUPPORT)
+		return 0; // restrictions are not applicable to this socket family
+	else if (err != 0)
+		return err;
 
 	/* Specific AF_UNSPEC handling. */
 	if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) {
@@ -174,6 +194,27 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
+static int check_access_port(const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom,
+			     access_mask_t access_request, __be16 port)
+{
+	layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
+	const struct landlock_rule *rule;
+	const struct landlock_id id = {
+		.key.data = (__force uintptr_t)port,
+		.type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
+	};
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
+
+	rule = landlock_find_rule(dom, id);
+	access_request = landlock_init_layer_masks(
+		dom, access_request, &layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
+	if (landlock_unmask_layers(rule, access_request, &layer_masks,
+				   ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks)))
+		return 0;
+
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
 static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *const sock,
 			    struct sockaddr *const address, const int addrlen)
 {
@@ -215,9 +256,119 @@ static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *const sock,
 					   access_request);
 }
 
+static int hook_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *const sock,
+			       struct msghdr *const msg, const int size)
+{
+	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_net_domain();
+	const struct sockaddr *address = (const struct sockaddr *)msg->msg_name;
+	int err;
+	__be16 port;
+
+	if (sock->type != SOCK_DGRAM)
+		return 0;
+	if (sock->sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP)
+		return 0;
+	if (!dom)
+		return 0;
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dom->num_layers < 1))
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't mimic all checks udp_sendmsg() and udpv6_sendmsg() do. Just
+	 * read what we need for access control, and fail if we can't (e.g.
+	 * because the input buffer is too short) with the same error codes as
+	 * they do. Selftests enforce that these error codes do not diverge
+	 * with the actual implementation's ones.
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * If there is a more specific address in the message, it will take
+	 * precedence over any connect()ed address. Base our access check on it.
+	 */
+	if (address) {
+		const bool in_udpv6_sendmsg =
+			(sock->sk->sk_prot == &udpv6_prot);
+
+		err = get_addr_port(address, msg->msg_namelen, in_udpv6_sendmsg,
+				    &port);
+		if (err != 0)
+			return err;
+
+		/*
+		 * In `udpv6_sendmsg`, AF_UNSPEC is interpreted as "no address".
+		 * In that case, the call above will succeed but without
+		 * returning a port.
+		 */
+		if (in_udpv6_sendmsg && address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
+			address = NULL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Without a message-specific destination address, the socket must be
+	 * connect()ed to an address, base our access check on that one.
+	 */
+	if (!address) {
+		/*
+		 * We could let this through and count on `udp_sendmsg` and
+		 * `udpv6_sendmsg` to error out, but they could change in the
+		 * future and open a hole here without knowing. Enforce an
+		 * error, and enforce in selftests that we don't diverge in
+		 * behaviours compared to them.
+		 */
+		if (sock->sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
+			return -EDESTADDRREQ;
+
+		port = inet_sk(sock->sk)->inet_dport;
+	}
+
+	return check_access_port(dom, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_SENDMSG_UDP, port);
+}
+
+static int hook_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *const sock,
+			       struct msghdr *const msg, const int size,
+			       const int flags)
+{
+	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_net_domain();
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+	int err;
+	__be16 port_bigendian;
+	int ephemeral_low;
+	int ephemeral_high;
+	__u16 port_hostendian;
+
+	if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP)
+		return 0;
+	if (!dom)
+		return 0;
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dom->num_layers < 1))
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	/* "fast" path: socket is bound to an explicitly allowed port */
+	port_bigendian = inet_sk(sk)->inet_sport;
+	err = check_access_port(dom, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_RECVMSG_UDP,
+				port_bigendian);
+	if (err != -EACCES)
+		return err;
+
+	/*
+	 * Slow path: socket is bound to an ephemeral port. Need a second check
+	 * on port 0 with different semantics ("any ephemeral port").
+	 */
+	inet_sk_get_local_port_range(sk, &ephemeral_low, &ephemeral_high);
+	port_hostendian = ntohs(port_bigendian);
+	if (ephemeral_low <= port_hostendian &&
+	    port_hostendian <= ephemeral_high)
+		return check_access_port(dom, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_RECVMSG_UDP,
+					 0);
+
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
 static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, hook_socket_bind),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, hook_socket_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, hook_socket_sendmsg),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, hook_socket_recvmsg),
 };
 
 __init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void)
