From patchwork Mon Oct 11 10:02:36 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ahmad Fatoum X-Patchwork-Id: 12549607 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9794FC433FE for ; Mon, 11 Oct 2021 10:03:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7E79060F43 for ; Mon, 11 Oct 2021 10:03:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S235751AbhJKKFQ (ORCPT ); Mon, 11 Oct 2021 06:05:16 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:39196 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S235759AbhJKKFP (ORCPT ); Mon, 11 Oct 2021 06:05:15 -0400 Received: from metis.ext.pengutronix.de (metis.ext.pengutronix.de [IPv6:2001:67c:670:201:290:27ff:fe1d:cc33]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7B778C061762 for ; Mon, 11 Oct 2021 03:03:15 -0700 (PDT) Received: from dude.hi.pengutronix.de ([2001:67c:670:100:1d::7]) by metis.ext.pengutronix.de with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1mZs8v-0006Sl-Gx; Mon, 11 Oct 2021 12:02:49 +0200 Received: from afa by dude.hi.pengutronix.de with local (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1mZs8r-0002cs-UL; Mon, 11 Oct 2021 12:02:45 +0200 From: Ahmad Fatoum To: James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , Mimi Zohar , David Howells Cc: kernel@pengutronix.de, Sumit Garg , David Gstir , Tim Harvey , Ahmad Fatoum , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , =?utf-8?q?Horia_Geant=C4=83?= , Aymen Sghaier , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Udit Agarwal , Eric Biggers , Jan Luebbe , Richard Weinberger , Franck LENORMAND , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v4 3/5] KEYS: trusted: allow trust sources to use kernel RNG for key material Date: Mon, 11 Oct 2021 12:02:36 +0200 Message-Id: <9431f31594f9ea693b201cfbfa9e7b221e500e6a.1633946449.git-series.a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 2001:67c:670:100:1d::7 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: afa@pengutronix.de X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on metis.ext.pengutronix.de); SAEximRunCond expanded to false X-PTX-Original-Recipient: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: The two existing trusted key sources don't make use of the kernel RNG, but instead let the hardware that does the sealing/unsealing also generate the random key material. While a previous change offers users the choice to use the kernel RNG instead for both, new trust sources may want to unconditionally use the kernel RNG for generating key material, like it's done elsewhere in the kernel. This is especially prudent for hardware that has proven-in-production HWRNG drivers implemented, as otherwise code would have to be duplicated only to arrive at a possibly worse result. Make this possible by turning struct trusted_key_ops::get_random into an optional member. If a driver leaves it NULL, kernel RNG will be used instead. Acked-by: Sumit Garg Reviewed-by: David Gstir Tested-By: Tim Harvey Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum --- To: James Bottomley To: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Mimi Zohar To: David Howells Cc: James Morris Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: "Horia Geantă" Cc: Aymen Sghaier Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: Udit Agarwal Cc: Eric Biggers Cc: Jan Luebbe Cc: David Gstir Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: Franck LENORMAND Cc: Sumit Garg Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org --- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 2 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index d89fa2579ac0..4eb64548a74f 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ struct trusted_key_ops { /* Unseal a key. */ int (*unseal)(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob); - /* Get a randomized key. */ + /* Optional: Get a randomized key. */ int (*get_random)(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len); /* Exit key interface. */ diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c index 569af9af8df0..d2b7626cde8b 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c @@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void) continue; get_random = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->get_random; - if (trusted_kernel_rng) + if (trusted_kernel_rng || !get_random) get_random = kernel_get_random; static_call_update(trusted_key_init,