diff mbox series

[v3] evm: Correct inode_init_security hooks behaviors

Message ID Y1fu4jofqLHVDprT@archlinux (mailing list archive)
State Superseded
Delegated to: Paul Moore
Headers show
Series [v3] evm: Correct inode_init_security hooks behaviors | expand

Commit Message

Nicolas Bouchinet Oct. 25, 2022, 2:12 p.m. UTC 
From: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>

Fixes a NULL pointer dereference occurring in the
`evm_protected_xattr_common` function of the EVM LSM. The bug is
triggered if a `inode_init_security` hook returns 0 without initializing
the given `struct xattr` fields (which is the case of BPF) and if no
other LSM overrides thoses fields after. This also leads to memory
leaks.

The `call_int_hook_xattr` macro has been inlined into the
`security_inode_init_security` hook in order to check hooks return
values and skip ones who doesn't init `xattrs`.

Modify `evm_init_hmac` function to init the EVM hmac using every
entry of the given xattr array.

The `MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR` value is now based on the security modules
compiled in, which gives room for SMACK, SELinux, Apparmor, BPF and
IMA/EVM security attributes.

Changes the default return value of the `inode_init_security` hook
definition to `-EOPNOTSUPP`.

Changes the hook documentation to match the behavior of the LSMs using
it (only xattr->value is initialised with kmalloc and thus is the only
one that should be kfreed by the caller).

Cc: roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
---
Changes since v2:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1K3bf+dtNnVe7DG@archlinux/

* The `evm_init_hmacs` has been merged with `evm_init_hmac`
  (as suggested by Mimi Zohar).
* The commit message has been updated to match the patch changes.
---
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h       |  2 +-
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h           |  4 ++--
 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 11 ++++++++--
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c   |  7 ++++---
 security/security.c                 | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 5 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

Comments

kernel test robot Oct. 25, 2022, 4:07 p.m. UTC | #1 
Hi Nicolas,

Thank you for the patch! Perhaps something to improve:

[auto build test WARNING on zohar-integrity/next-integrity]
[also build test WARNING on linus/master v6.1-rc2 next-20221025]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Nicolas-Bouchinet/evm-Correct-inode_init_security-hooks-behaviors/20221025-221337
base:   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git next-integrity
patch link:    https://lore.kernel.org/r/Y1fu4jofqLHVDprT%40archlinux
patch subject: [PATCH v3] evm: Correct inode_init_security hooks behaviors
config: m68k-allyesconfig (attached as .config)
compiler: m68k-linux-gcc (GCC) 12.1.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
        wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
        chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
        # https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commit/acbbdcb851ed7cd1894efad182f0325db04b9e5a
        git remote add linux-review https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux
        git fetch --no-tags linux-review Nicolas-Bouchinet/evm-Correct-inode_init_security-hooks-behaviors/20221025-221337
        git checkout acbbdcb851ed7cd1894efad182f0325db04b9e5a
        # save the config file
        mkdir build_dir && cp config build_dir/.config
        COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-12.1.0 make.cross W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=m68k SHELL=/bin/bash security/integrity/

If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag where applicable
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>

All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):

>> security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c:310:5: warning: no previous prototype for 'evm_protected_xattr' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
     310 | int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
         |     ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~


vim +/evm_protected_xattr +310 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c

   309	
 > 310	int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
   311	{
   312		return evm_protected_xattr_common(req_xattr_name, false);
   313	}
   314
kernel test robot Oct. 26, 2022, 1:51 a.m. UTC | #2 
Hi Nicolas,

Thank you for the patch! Perhaps something to improve:

[auto build test WARNING on zohar-integrity/next-integrity]
[also build test WARNING on linus/master v6.1-rc2 next-20221025]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Nicolas-Bouchinet/evm-Correct-inode_init_security-hooks-behaviors/20221025-221337
base:   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git next-integrity
patch link:    https://lore.kernel.org/r/Y1fu4jofqLHVDprT%40archlinux
patch subject: [PATCH v3] evm: Correct inode_init_security hooks behaviors
config: hexagon-randconfig-r002-20221023 (attached as .config)
compiler: clang version 16.0.0 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 791a7ae1ba3efd6bca96338e10ffde557ba83920)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
        wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
        chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
        # https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commit/acbbdcb851ed7cd1894efad182f0325db04b9e5a
        git remote add linux-review https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux
        git fetch --no-tags linux-review Nicolas-Bouchinet/evm-Correct-inode_init_security-hooks-behaviors/20221025-221337
        git checkout acbbdcb851ed7cd1894efad182f0325db04b9e5a
        # save the config file
        mkdir build_dir && cp config build_dir/.config
        COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=clang make.cross W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=hexagon SHELL=/bin/bash security/integrity/evm/

If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag where applicable
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>

All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):

>> security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c:310:5: warning: no previous prototype for function 'evm_protected_xattr' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
   int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
       ^
   security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c:310:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
   int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
   ^
   static 
   1 warning generated.


vim +/evm_protected_xattr +310 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c

   309	
 > 310	int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
   311	{
   312		return evm_protected_xattr_common(req_xattr_name, false);
   313	}
   314
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 806448173033..e5dd0c0f6345 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_notify, const struct path *path, u64 mask,
 	 unsigned int obj_type)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_alloc_security, struct inode *inode)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_free_security, struct inode *inode)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security, struct inode *inode,
+LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode_init_security, struct inode *inode,
 	 struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
 	 void **value, size_t *len)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security_anon, struct inode *inode,
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 84a0d7e02176..95aff9383de1 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -229,8 +229,8 @@ 
  *	This hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation
  *	transaction and provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike
  *	the post_create/mkdir/... hooks called by the VFS.  The hook function
- *	is expected to allocate the name and value via kmalloc, with the caller
- *	being responsible for calling kfree after using them.
+ *	is expected to allocate the value via kmalloc, with the caller
+ *	being responsible for calling kfree after using it.
  *	If the security module does not use security attributes or does
  *	not wish to put a security attribute on this particular inode,
  *	then it should return -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing.
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 708de9656bbd..c82f271cfd19 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -385,7 +385,9 @@  int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
+int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name);
+
+int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattrs,
 		  char *hmac_val)
 {
 	struct shash_desc *desc;
@@ -396,7 +398,12 @@  int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
 		return PTR_ERR(desc);
 	}
 
-	crypto_shash_update(desc, lsm_xattr->value, lsm_xattr->value_len);
+	for (int i = 0; lsm_xattrs[i].value != NULL; i++) {
+		if (evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattrs[i].name))
+			crypto_shash_update(desc,
+					    lsm_xattrs[i].value,
+					    lsm_xattrs[i].value_len);
+	}
 	hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, hmac_val);
 	kfree(desc);
 	return 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 2e6fb6e2ffd2..0420453a80e8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -284,6 +284,8 @@  static int evm_protected_xattr_common(const char *req_xattr_name,
 	int found = 0;
 	struct xattr_list *xattr;
 
+	if (!req_xattr_name)
+		return found;
 	namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name);
 	list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
 		if (!all_xattrs && !xattr->enabled)
@@ -305,7 +307,7 @@  static int evm_protected_xattr_common(const char *req_xattr_name,
 	return found;
 }
 
-static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
+int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
 {
 	return evm_protected_xattr_common(req_xattr_name, false);
 }
@@ -841,8 +843,7 @@  int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
 	struct evm_xattr *xattr_data;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) ||
-	    !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
+	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
 		return 0;
 
 	xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 14d30fec8a00..79524f8734f1 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -30,7 +30,11 @@ 
 #include <linux/msg.h>
 #include <net/flow.h>
 
-#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR	2
+#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR                                \
+	((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM) ? 1 : 0) +              \
+	 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
+	 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) +   \
+	 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0))
 
 /* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */
 #define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info)
@@ -1091,9 +1095,11 @@  int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 				 const struct qstr *qstr,
 				 const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data)
 {
+	int i = 0;
+	int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1];
 	struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr;
-	int ret;
+	struct security_hook_list *hook_ptr;
 
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return 0;
@@ -1103,15 +1109,26 @@  int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 				     dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL);
 	memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs));
 	lsm_xattr = new_xattrs;
-	ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr,
-						&lsm_xattr->name,
-						&lsm_xattr->value,
-						&lsm_xattr->value_len);
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hook_ptr, &security_hook_heads.inode_init_security,
+			     list) {
+		ret = hook_ptr->hook.inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr,
+				&lsm_xattr->name,
+				&lsm_xattr->value,
+				&lsm_xattr->value_len);
+		if (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+			continue;
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(i >= MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR))
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+		if (ret != 0)
+			break;
+		lsm_xattr++;
+		i++;
+	}
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
 	evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1;
-	ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr);
+	ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs, evm_xattr);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 	ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);