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Signed-off-by: Tahera Fahimi --- v11: - Documentation cases where i) a connected datagram UNIX socket send(2)/ sendto(2) data, but it is denied when the socket is not connected, and ii) a scoped process cannot connect by an inherited socket's file descriptor. v10: - Update date. v8: - Improving documentation by specifying differences between scoped and non-scoped domains. - Adding review notes of version 7. - Update date. v7: - Add "LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET" explanation to IPC scoping section and updating ABI to version 6. - Adding "scoped" attribute to the Access rights section. - In current limitation, unnamed sockets are specified as sockets that are not restricted. - Update date. --- Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst index 37dafce8038b..c3b87755e98d 100644 --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock: unprivileged access control ===================================== :Author: Mickaël Salaün -:Date: July 2024 +:Date: August 2024 The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global filesystem or network access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock @@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights. .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP, + .scoped = + LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET, }; Because we may not know on which kernel version an application will be @@ -119,6 +121,9 @@ version, and only use the available subset of access rights: case 4: /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV for ABI < 5 */ ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV; + case 5: + /* Removes LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET for ABI < 6 */ + ruleset_attr.scoped &= ~LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET; } This enables to create an inclusive ruleset that will contain our rules. @@ -306,6 +311,35 @@ To be allowed to use :manpage:`ptrace(2)` and related syscalls on a target process, a sandboxed process should have a subset of the target process rules, which means the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer. +IPC Scoping +----------- + +Similar to the implicit `Ptrace restrictions`_, we may want to further +restrict interactions between sandboxes. Each Landlock domain can be +explicitly scoped for a set of actions by specifying it on a ruleset. +For example, if a sandboxed process should not be able to +:manpage:`connect(2)` to a non-sandboxed process through abstract +:manpage:`unix(7)` sockets, we can specify such restriction with +``LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET``. + +A sandboxed process can connect to a non-sandboxed process when its +domain is not scoped. If a process's domain is scoped, it can only +connect to sockets created by processes in the same scoped domain. + +A connected datagram socket behaves like a stream socket when its domain +is scoped, meaning if the domain is scoped after the socket is connected +, it can still :manpage:`send(2)` data just like a stream socket. +However, in the same scenario, a non-connected datagram socket cannot +send data (with :manpage:`sendto(2)`) outside its scoped domain. + +A process with a scoped domain can inherit a socket created by a +non-scoped process. The process cannot connect to this socket since it +has a scoped domain. + +IPC scoping does not support Landlock rules, so if a domain is scoped, +no rules can be added to allow access to a resource outside of the +scoped domain. + Truncating files ---------------- @@ -404,7 +438,7 @@ Access rights ------------- .. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h - :identifiers: fs_access net_access + :identifiers: fs_access net_access scope Creating a new ruleset ---------------------- @@ -541,6 +575,13 @@ earlier ABI. Starting with the Landlock ABI version 5, it is possible to restrict the use of :manpage:`ioctl(2)` using the new ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV`` right. +Abstract UNIX sockets Restriction (ABI < 6) +-------------------------------------------- + +With ABI version 6, it is possible to restrict connection to an abstract +Unix socket through ``LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET``, thanks to +the ``scoped`` ruleset attribute. + .. _kernel_support: Kernel support