| Message ID | 136de038e69235a64a7331465951f0751d4d83bd.1624904195.git.marcelo.leitner@gmail.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Accepted |
| Commit | b6ffe7671b24689c09faa5675dd58f93758a97ae |
| Delegated to: | Netdev Maintainers |
| Headers | show |
| Series | sctp: add some size validations | expand |
| Context | Check | Description |
|---|---|---|
| netdev/cover_letter | success | Link |
| netdev/fixes_present | fail | Series targets non-next tree, but doesn't contain any Fixes tags |
| netdev/patch_count | success | Link |
| netdev/tree_selection | success | Clearly marked for net |
| netdev/subject_prefix | success | Link |
| netdev/cc_maintainers | warning | 2 maintainers not CCed: davem@davemloft.net kuba@kernel.org |
| netdev/source_inline | success | Was 0 now: 0 |
| netdev/verify_signedoff | success | Link |
| netdev/module_param | success | Was 0 now: 0 |
| netdev/build_32bit | success | Errors and warnings before: 2 this patch: 2 |
| netdev/kdoc | success | Errors and warnings before: 0 this patch: 0 |
| netdev/verify_fixes | success | Link |
| netdev/checkpatch | success | total: 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 checks, 9 lines checked |
| netdev/build_allmodconfig_warn | success | Errors and warnings before: 2 this patch: 2 |
| netdev/header_inline | success | Link |
diff --git a/net/sctp/input.c b/net/sctp/input.c index f72bff93745c44be0dbfa29e754f2872a7d874c2..96dea8097dbeb4e29d537292d31dde5f02188389 100644 --- a/net/sctp/input.c +++ b/net/sctp/input.c @@ -1168,6 +1168,9 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup( union sctp_addr_param *param; union sctp_addr paddr; + if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(*asconf) + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) + return NULL; + /* Skip over the ADDIP header and find the Address parameter */ param = (union sctp_addr_param *)(asconf + 1);
In one of the fallbacks that SCTP has for identifying an association for an incoming packet, it looks for AddIp chunk (from ASCONF) and take a peek. Thing is, at this stage nothing was validating that the chunk actually had enough content for that, allowing the peek to happen over uninitialized memory. Similar check already exists in actual asconf handling in sctp_verify_asconf(). Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> --- net/sctp/input.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)