From patchwork Mon Jan 24 12:13:06 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 12721957 X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4D94DC433F5 for ; Mon, 24 Jan 2022 12:16:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239357AbiAXMQi (ORCPT ); Mon, 24 Jan 2022 07:16:38 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:60976 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S241071AbiAXMOU (ORCPT ); Mon, 24 Jan 2022 07:14:20 -0500 Received: from mail-ej1-x62a.google.com (mail-ej1-x62a.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::62a]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6BF56C06177D; Mon, 24 Jan 2022 04:13:59 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ej1-x62a.google.com with SMTP id o12so20805143eju.13; Mon, 24 Jan 2022 04:13:59 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=mn408lO+pZH3mrHKxY73LKhzz0Csceev4QSmOp495H8=; b=aTuPbaSPKZvv8buEAdEPUME0jG8i3UrWZJoUxY6IPj93uSUn6UtEUOBlvoZBW+OUdc p6SCCOligO3SDhy7BfB8OYrfByZSLinZ60r97reiTtylpCGU6gCgHFaUAFjKL/b++EIc xMKeOpM0SXTiZsLGy/5o+jDD1kEuc3k1gSsj4ZA1jW0j7VjaAr8l5kYSE+bXWPEbCBWc Mm3AlEURQLP+0M5hZQBpZoT05fL7laggDV0cS5UiQt1SOawxzyQzbcPLmoIQ0WXitZ4D f5Cq2oWVqGoeXgl/WcqnkFVkO66FV9JiqPfH1TtJVSl9b8dN1xFZ41cpYFvvyRFX79w3 Jl3A== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=mn408lO+pZH3mrHKxY73LKhzz0Csceev4QSmOp495H8=; b=PcR7Qspm4ajm5bTw93CRZySVUw/Inb9uGj5X3B1jIbuRrS7DkeBeJ/MWj5i4D0Mn3B xkxD+vqri7FfRIG6D/oQ+QicIAYsz2bcVLLqQlPy7KnFz1/jKbrLpJDfaAPqza4wGNx1 zXNNOYqVmddR+TD6dwxaQUqr6maSOETNOAzE4c9+rfmEy12ydvoPPS1nHOuKTI86Xwan oHFxLqvWQJxlhJBtjh0sdoxMWK80eQ57Y1/d9oq04exj8i1vCLqSBUJHtvIt89is/kqa XMdq7Sw/QSQ/NCpvnP8Q9Ui5EUJt7bETsswjYVS7r7T0QYGAx5B29dC1sh54RZbEaxNS yz5Q== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM533WLy2O8o5V1g53IljYpqYcJ73HcGquv9Uwih1Y+styoV+vJmmP ftnUoJYCUFgusYslhC8jWvQ= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxZi/muDBSqalbc/t15r0dAPfU8smxQUbiMsQO1VRfwYeSMOp3AieK07BdoumjDMGt90sg9pw== X-Received: by 2002:a17:907:3e96:: with SMTP id hs22mr3640399ejc.640.1643026438039; Mon, 24 Jan 2022 04:13:58 -0800 (PST) Received: from ponky.lan ([2a04:241e:502:a09c:a21f:7a9f:9158:4a40]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id b16sm4847517eja.211.2022.01.24.04.13.56 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 24 Jan 2022 04:13:57 -0800 (PST) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com> Cc: Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v5 20/20] tcp: authopt: Try to respect rnextkeyid from SYN on SYNACK Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 14:13:06 +0200 Message-Id: <2008e2c33acc60883ff41adc33158b63ec2d3acb.1643026076.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org According to the RFC we should use the key that the peer suggests via rnextkeyid. This is currently done by storing recv_rnextkeyid in tcp_authopt_info but this does not work for the SYNACK case because the tcp_request_sock does not hold an info pointer for reasons of memory usage. Handle this by storing recv_rnextkeyid inside tcp_request_sock. This doesn't increase the memory usage because there are unused bytes at the end. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/linux/tcp.h | 6 ++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/tcp.h b/include/linux/tcp.h index 497604176119..0c346c2c2145 100644 --- a/include/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/linux/tcp.h @@ -95,10 +95,13 @@ struct tcp_options_received { u8 saw_unknown:1, /* Received unknown option */ unused:7; u8 num_sacks; /* Number of SACK blocks */ u16 user_mss; /* mss requested by user in ioctl */ u16 mss_clamp; /* Maximal mss, negotiated at connection setup */ +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) + u8 rnextkeyid; +#endif }; static inline void tcp_clear_options(struct tcp_options_received *rx_opt) { rx_opt->tstamp_ok = rx_opt->sack_ok = 0; @@ -133,10 +136,13 @@ struct tcp_request_sock { u32 rcv_nxt; /* the ack # by SYNACK. For * FastOpen it's the seq# * after data-in-SYN. */ u8 syn_tos; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) + u8 recv_rnextkeyid; +#endif }; static inline struct tcp_request_sock *tcp_rsk(const struct request_sock *req) { return (struct tcp_request_sock *)req; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 5ea93eb495f1..4b316488c805 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -1,7 +1,9 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +#include "linux/tcp.h" +#include "net/tcp_states.h" #include #include #include #include #include @@ -424,21 +426,33 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key(const struct sock *sk, { struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, *new_key = NULL; struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = sock_net_tcp_authopt(sk); /* Listen sockets don't refer to any specific connection so we don't try - * to keep using the same key and ignore any received keyids. + * to keep using the same key. + * The rnextkeyid is stored in tcp_request_sock */ if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) { - int send_keyid = -1; - + int send_id = -1; + struct tcp_request_sock *rsk; + + if (WARN_ONCE(addr_sk->sk_state != TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV, "bad socket state")) + return NULL; + rsk = tcp_rsk((struct request_sock *)addr_sk); + /* Forcing a specific send_keyid on a listen socket forces it for + * all clients so is unlikely to be useful. + */ if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID) - send_keyid = info->send_keyid; - key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, send_keyid); + send_id = info->send_keyid; + else + send_id = rsk->recv_rnextkeyid; + key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, send_id); + /* If no key found with specific send_id try anything else. */ + if (!key) + key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, -1); if (key) *rnextkeyid = key->recv_id; - return key; } if (locked) { sock_owned_by_me(sk); diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 91f1b04c1933..667da79df4ae 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -4094,10 +4094,18 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net, /* * The MD5 Hash has already been * checked (see tcp_v{4,6}_do_rcv()). */ break; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + case TCPOPT_AUTHOPT: + /* Hash has already been checked. + * We parse rnextkeyid here so we can match it on synack + */ + opt_rx->rnextkeyid = ptr[1]; + break; #endif case TCPOPT_FASTOPEN: tcp_parse_fastopen_option( opsize - TCPOLEN_FASTOPEN_BASE, ptr, th->syn, foc, false); @@ -6891,10 +6899,14 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops, tcp_clear_options(&tmp_opt); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMC) && want_cookie) tmp_opt.smc_ok = 0; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) + tcp_rsk(req)->recv_rnextkeyid = tmp_opt.rnextkeyid; +#endif + tmp_opt.tstamp_ok = tmp_opt.saw_tstamp; tcp_openreq_init(req, &tmp_opt, skb, sk); inet_rsk(req)->no_srccheck = inet_sk(sk)->transparent; /* Note: tcp_v6_init_req() might override ir_iif for link locals */