diff mbox series

[bpf-next,v5,1/2] bpf: allow rewriting to ports under ip_unprivileged_port_start

Message ID 20210127193140.3170382-1-sdf@google.com (mailing list archive)
State Accepted
Commit 772412176fb98493158929b220fe250127f611af
Delegated to: BPF
Headers show
Series [bpf-next,v5,1/2] bpf: allow rewriting to ports under ip_unprivileged_port_start | expand

Checks

Context Check Description
netdev/cover_letter success Link
netdev/fixes_present success Link
netdev/patch_count success Link
netdev/tree_selection success Clearly marked for bpf-next
netdev/subject_prefix success Link
netdev/cc_maintainers warning 8 maintainers not CCed: songliubraving@fb.com andrii@kernel.org yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org kpsingh@kernel.org davem@davemloft.net john.fastabend@gmail.com kuba@kernel.org yhs@fb.com
netdev/source_inline success Was 0 now: 0
netdev/verify_signedoff success Link
netdev/module_param success Was 0 now: 0
netdev/build_32bit success Errors and warnings before: 12175 this patch: 12175
netdev/kdoc success Errors and warnings before: 3 this patch: 3
netdev/verify_fixes success Link
netdev/checkpatch warning CHECK: Macro argument 'bind_flags' may be better as '(bind_flags)' to avoid precedence issues CHECK: Prefer using the BIT macro WARNING: line length of 81 exceeds 80 columns
netdev/build_allmodconfig_warn success Errors and warnings before: 12823 this patch: 12823
netdev/header_inline success Link
netdev/stable success Stable not CCed

Commit Message

Stanislav Fomichev Jan. 27, 2021, 7:31 p.m. UTC 
At the moment, BPF_CGROUP_INET{4,6}_BIND hooks can rewrite user_port
to the privileged ones (< ip_unprivileged_port_start), but it will
be rejected later on in the __inet_bind or __inet6_bind.

Let's add another return value to indicate that CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
check should be ignored. Use the same idea as we currently use
in cgroup/egress where bit #1 indicates CN. Instead, for
cgroup/bind{4,6}, bit #1 indicates that CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE should
be bypassed.

v5:
- rename flags to be less confusing (Andrey Ignatov)
- rework BPF_PROG_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS_RUN_ARRAY to work on flags
  and accept BPF_RET_SET_CN (no behavioral changes)

v4:
- Add missing IPv6 support (Martin KaFai Lau)

v3:
- Update description (Martin KaFai Lau)
- Fix capability restore in selftest (Martin KaFai Lau)

v2:
- Switch to explicit return code (Martin KaFai Lau)

Acked-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
---
 include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
 include/linux/bpf.h        | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 include/net/inet_common.h  |  2 ++
 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c        |  8 ++++--
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c      |  3 +++
 net/ipv4/af_inet.c         |  9 ++++---
 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c        |  9 ++++---
 7 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)

Comments

Andrey Ignatov Jan. 28, 2021, 1:59 a.m. UTC | #1 
Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> [Wed, 2021-01-27 11:32 -0800]:
> At the moment, BPF_CGROUP_INET{4,6}_BIND hooks can rewrite user_port
> to the privileged ones (< ip_unprivileged_port_start), but it will
> be rejected later on in the __inet_bind or __inet6_bind.
> 
> Let's add another return value to indicate that CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
> check should be ignored. Use the same idea as we currently use
> in cgroup/egress where bit #1 indicates CN. Instead, for
> cgroup/bind{4,6}, bit #1 indicates that CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE should
> be bypassed.
> 
> v5:
> - rename flags to be less confusing (Andrey Ignatov)
> - rework BPF_PROG_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS_RUN_ARRAY to work on flags
>   and accept BPF_RET_SET_CN (no behavioral changes)
> 
> v4:
> - Add missing IPv6 support (Martin KaFai Lau)
> 
> v3:
> - Update description (Martin KaFai Lau)
> - Fix capability restore in selftest (Martin KaFai Lau)
> 
> v2:
> - Switch to explicit return code (Martin KaFai Lau)
> 
> Acked-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
> Reviewed-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>

Thanks for cleaning up the flags workflow, incl. BPF_RET_SET_CN. This is
more readable indeed.
patchwork-bot+netdevbpf@kernel.org Jan. 28, 2021, 2:30 a.m. UTC | #2 
Hello:

This series was applied to bpf/bpf-next.git (refs/heads/master):

On Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:31:39 -0800 you wrote:
> At the moment, BPF_CGROUP_INET{4,6}_BIND hooks can rewrite user_port
> to the privileged ones (< ip_unprivileged_port_start), but it will
> be rejected later on in the __inet_bind or __inet6_bind.
> 
> Let's add another return value to indicate that CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
> check should be ignored. Use the same idea as we currently use
> in cgroup/egress where bit #1 indicates CN. Instead, for
> cgroup/bind{4,6}, bit #1 indicates that CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE should
> be bypassed.
> 
> [...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - [bpf-next,v5,1/2] bpf: allow rewriting to ports under ip_unprivileged_port_start
    https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/772412176fb9
  - [bpf-next,v5,2/2] selftests/bpf: verify that rebinding to port < 1024 from BPF works
    https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/8259fdeb3032

You are awesome, thank you!
--
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot.
https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h b/include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h
index 0748fd87969e..c42e02b4d84b 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h
@@ -125,7 +125,8 @@  int __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sk(struct sock *sk,
 int __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr(struct sock *sk,
 				      struct sockaddr *uaddr,
 				      enum bpf_attach_type type,
-				      void *t_ctx);
+				      void *t_ctx,
+				      u32 *flags);
 
 int __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_ops(struct sock *sk,
 				     struct bpf_sock_ops_kern *sock_ops,
@@ -231,30 +232,48 @@  int bpf_percpu_cgroup_storage_update(struct bpf_map *map, void *key,
 
 #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG(sk, uaddr, type)				       \
 ({									       \
+	u32 __unused_flags;						       \
 	int __ret = 0;							       \
 	if (cgroup_bpf_enabled(type))					       \
 		__ret = __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr(sk, uaddr, type,     \
-							  NULL);	       \
+							  NULL,		       \
+							  &__unused_flags);    \
 	__ret;								       \
 })
 
 #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG_LOCK(sk, uaddr, type, t_ctx)		       \
 ({									       \
+	u32 __unused_flags;						       \
 	int __ret = 0;							       \
 	if (cgroup_bpf_enabled(type))	{				       \
 		lock_sock(sk);						       \
 		__ret = __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr(sk, uaddr, type,     \
-							  t_ctx);	       \
+							  t_ctx,	       \
+							  &__unused_flags);    \
 		release_sock(sk);					       \
 	}								       \
 	__ret;								       \
 })
 
-#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr)			       \
-	BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG_LOCK(sk, uaddr, BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND, NULL)
-
-#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr)			       \
-	BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG_LOCK(sk, uaddr, BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND, NULL)
+/* BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND and BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND can return extra flags
+ * via upper bits of return code. The only flag that is supported
+ * (at bit position 0) is to indicate CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE capability check
+ * should be bypassed (BPF_RET_BIND_NO_CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE).
+ */
+#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr, type, bind_flags)	       \
+({									       \
+	u32 __flags = 0;						       \
+	int __ret = 0;							       \
+	if (cgroup_bpf_enabled(type))	{				       \
+		lock_sock(sk);						       \
+		__ret = __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr(sk, uaddr, type,     \
+							  NULL, &__flags);     \
+		release_sock(sk);					       \
+		if (__flags & BPF_RET_BIND_NO_CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)	       \
+			*bind_flags |= BIND_NO_CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE;	       \
+	}								       \
+	__ret;								       \
+})
 
 #define BPF_CGROUP_PRE_CONNECT_ENABLED(sk)				       \
 	((cgroup_bpf_enabled(BPF_CGROUP_INET4_CONNECT) ||		       \
@@ -453,8 +472,7 @@  static inline int bpf_percpu_cgroup_storage_update(struct bpf_map *map,
 #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_EGRESS(sk,skb) ({ 0; })
 #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_SOCK(sk) ({ 0; })
 #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_SOCK_RELEASE(sk) ({ 0; })
-#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr) ({ 0; })
-#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr) ({ 0; })
+#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr, type, flags) ({ 0; })
 #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_POST_BIND(sk) ({ 0; })
 #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_POST_BIND(sk) ({ 0; })
 #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_CONNECT(sk, uaddr) ({ 0; })
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index 1aac2af12fed..321966fc35db 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -1073,6 +1073,34 @@  int bpf_prog_array_copy(struct bpf_prog_array *old_array,
 			struct bpf_prog *include_prog,
 			struct bpf_prog_array **new_array);
 
+/* BPF program asks to bypass CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE in bind. */
+#define BPF_RET_BIND_NO_CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE			(1 << 0)
+/* BPF program asks to set CN on the packet. */
+#define BPF_RET_SET_CN						(1 << 0)
+
+#define BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY_FLAGS(array, ctx, func, ret_flags)		\
+	({								\
+		struct bpf_prog_array_item *_item;			\
+		struct bpf_prog *_prog;					\
+		struct bpf_prog_array *_array;				\
+		u32 _ret = 1;						\
+		u32 func_ret;						\
+		migrate_disable();					\
+		rcu_read_lock();					\
+		_array = rcu_dereference(array);			\
+		_item = &_array->items[0];				\
+		while ((_prog = READ_ONCE(_item->prog))) {		\
+			bpf_cgroup_storage_set(_item->cgroup_storage);	\
+			func_ret = func(_prog, ctx);			\
+			_ret &= (func_ret & 1);				\
+			*(ret_flags) |= (func_ret >> 1);			\
+			_item++;					\
+		}							\
+		rcu_read_unlock();					\
+		migrate_enable();					\
+		_ret;							\
+	 })
+
 #define __BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY(array, ctx, func, check_non_null)	\
 	({						\
 		struct bpf_prog_array_item *_item;	\
@@ -1120,25 +1148,11 @@  _out:							\
  */
 #define BPF_PROG_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS_RUN_ARRAY(array, ctx, func)		\
 	({						\
-		struct bpf_prog_array_item *_item;	\
-		struct bpf_prog *_prog;			\
-		struct bpf_prog_array *_array;		\
-		u32 ret;				\
-		u32 _ret = 1;				\
-		u32 _cn = 0;				\
-		migrate_disable();			\
-		rcu_read_lock();			\
-		_array = rcu_dereference(array);	\
-		_item = &_array->items[0];		\
-		while ((_prog = READ_ONCE(_item->prog))) {		\
-			bpf_cgroup_storage_set(_item->cgroup_storage);	\
-			ret = func(_prog, ctx);		\
-			_ret &= (ret & 1);		\
-			_cn |= (ret & 2);		\
-			_item++;			\
-		}					\
-		rcu_read_unlock();			\
-		migrate_enable();			\
+		u32 _flags = 0;				\
+		bool _cn;				\
+		u32 _ret;				\
+		_ret = BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY_FLAGS(array, ctx, func, &_flags); \
+		_cn = _flags & BPF_RET_SET_CN;		\
 		if (_ret)				\
 			_ret = (_cn ? NET_XMIT_CN : NET_XMIT_SUCCESS);	\
 		else					\
diff --git a/include/net/inet_common.h b/include/net/inet_common.h
index cb2818862919..cad2a611efde 100644
--- a/include/net/inet_common.h
+++ b/include/net/inet_common.h
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@  int inet_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len);
 #define BIND_WITH_LOCK			(1 << 1)
 /* Called from BPF program. */
 #define BIND_FROM_BPF			(1 << 2)
+/* Skip CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE check. */
+#define BIND_NO_CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE	(1 << 3)
 int __inet_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len,
 		u32 flags);
 int inet_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
index da649f20d6b2..cdf3c7e611d9 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
@@ -1055,6 +1055,8 @@  EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sk);
  * @uaddr: sockaddr struct provided by user
  * @type: The type of program to be exectuted
  * @t_ctx: Pointer to attach type specific context
+ * @flags: Pointer to u32 which contains higher bits of BPF program
+ *         return value (OR'ed together).
  *
  * socket is expected to be of type INET or INET6.
  *
@@ -1064,7 +1066,8 @@  EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sk);
 int __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr(struct sock *sk,
 				      struct sockaddr *uaddr,
 				      enum bpf_attach_type type,
-				      void *t_ctx)
+				      void *t_ctx,
+				      u32 *flags)
 {
 	struct bpf_sock_addr_kern ctx = {
 		.sk = sk,
@@ -1087,7 +1090,8 @@  int __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr(struct sock *sk,
 	}
 
 	cgrp = sock_cgroup_ptr(&sk->sk_cgrp_data);
-	ret = BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY(cgrp->bpf.effective[type], &ctx, BPF_PROG_RUN);
+	ret = BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY_FLAGS(cgrp->bpf.effective[type], &ctx,
+				       BPF_PROG_RUN, flags);
 
 	return ret == 1 ? 0 : -EPERM;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index d0eae51b31e4..972fc38eb62d 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -7986,6 +7986,9 @@  static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		    env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETSOCKNAME ||
 		    env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETSOCKNAME)
 			range = tnum_range(1, 1);
+		if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND ||
+		    env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND)
+			range = tnum_range(0, 3);
 		break;
 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB:
 		if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS) {
diff --git a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
index 6ba2930ff49b..aaa94bea19c3 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
@@ -438,6 +438,7 @@  EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_release);
 int inet_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+	u32 flags = BIND_WITH_LOCK;
 	int err;
 
 	/* If the socket has its own bind function then use it. (RAW) */
@@ -450,11 +451,12 @@  int inet_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
 	/* BPF prog is run before any checks are done so that if the prog
 	 * changes context in a wrong way it will be caught.
 	 */
-	err = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr);
+	err = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr,
+						 BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND, &flags);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	return __inet_bind(sk, uaddr, addr_len, BIND_WITH_LOCK);
+	return __inet_bind(sk, uaddr, addr_len, flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_bind);
 
@@ -499,7 +501,8 @@  int __inet_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len,
 
 	snum = ntohs(addr->sin_port);
 	err = -EACCES;
-	if (snum && inet_port_requires_bind_service(net, snum) &&
+	if (!(flags & BIND_NO_CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE) &&
+	    snum && inet_port_requires_bind_service(net, snum) &&
 	    !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
 		goto out;
 
diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
index b9c654836b72..f091fe9b4da5 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
@@ -295,7 +295,8 @@  static int __inet6_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	snum = ntohs(addr->sin6_port);
-	if (snum && inet_port_requires_bind_service(net, snum) &&
+	if (!(flags & BIND_NO_CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE) &&
+	    snum && inet_port_requires_bind_service(net, snum) &&
 	    !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
 		return -EACCES;
 
@@ -439,6 +440,7 @@  static int __inet6_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len,
 int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+	u32 flags = BIND_WITH_LOCK;
 	int err = 0;
 
 	/* If the socket has its own bind function then use it. */
@@ -451,11 +453,12 @@  int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
 	/* BPF prog is run before any checks are done so that if the prog
 	 * changes context in a wrong way it will be caught.
 	 */
-	err = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr);
+	err = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr,
+						 BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND, &flags);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	return __inet6_bind(sk, uaddr, addr_len, BIND_WITH_LOCK);
+	return __inet6_bind(sk, uaddr, addr_len, flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet6_bind);