diff mbox series

[PATCHv2] bpf: Add deny list of btf ids check for tracing programs

Message ID 20210429114712.43783-1-jolsa@kernel.org (mailing list archive)
State Accepted
Delegated to: BPF
Headers show
Series [PATCHv2] bpf: Add deny list of btf ids check for tracing programs | expand

Checks

Context Check Description
netdev/tree_selection success Not a local patch

Commit Message

Jiri Olsa April 29, 2021, 11:47 a.m. UTC
The recursion check in __bpf_prog_enter and __bpf_prog_exit
leaves some (not inlined) functions unprotected:

In __bpf_prog_enter:
  - migrate_disable is called before prog->active is checked

In __bpf_prog_exit:
  - migrate_enable,rcu_read_unlock_strict are called after
    prog->active is decreased

When attaching trampoline to them we get panic like:

  traps: PANIC: double fault, error_code: 0x0
  double fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
  RIP: 0010:__bpf_prog_enter+0x4/0x50
  ...
  Call Trace:
   <IRQ>
   bpf_trampoline_6442466513_0+0x18/0x1000
   migrate_disable+0x5/0x50
   __bpf_prog_enter+0x9/0x50
   bpf_trampoline_6442466513_0+0x18/0x1000
   migrate_disable+0x5/0x50
   __bpf_prog_enter+0x9/0x50
   bpf_trampoline_6442466513_0+0x18/0x1000
   migrate_disable+0x5/0x50
   __bpf_prog_enter+0x9/0x50
   bpf_trampoline_6442466513_0+0x18/0x1000
   migrate_disable+0x5/0x50
   ...

Fixing this by adding deny list of btf ids for tracing
programs and checking btf id during program verification.
Adding above functions to this list.

Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
---
v2 changes:
  - drop check for EXT programs [Andrii]

 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

Comments

Alexei Starovoitov May 7, 2021, 1:36 a.m. UTC | #1
On Thu, Apr 29, 2021 at 4:47 AM Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> The recursion check in __bpf_prog_enter and __bpf_prog_exit
> leaves some (not inlined) functions unprotected:
>
> In __bpf_prog_enter:
>   - migrate_disable is called before prog->active is checked
>
> In __bpf_prog_exit:
>   - migrate_enable,rcu_read_unlock_strict are called after
>     prog->active is decreased
>
> When attaching trampoline to them we get panic like:
>
>   traps: PANIC: double fault, error_code: 0x0
>   double fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
>   RIP: 0010:__bpf_prog_enter+0x4/0x50
>   ...
>   Call Trace:
>    <IRQ>
>    bpf_trampoline_6442466513_0+0x18/0x1000
>    migrate_disable+0x5/0x50
>    __bpf_prog_enter+0x9/0x50
>    bpf_trampoline_6442466513_0+0x18/0x1000
>    migrate_disable+0x5/0x50
>    __bpf_prog_enter+0x9/0x50
>    bpf_trampoline_6442466513_0+0x18/0x1000
>    migrate_disable+0x5/0x50
>    __bpf_prog_enter+0x9/0x50
>    bpf_trampoline_6442466513_0+0x18/0x1000
>    migrate_disable+0x5/0x50
>    ...
>
> Fixing this by adding deny list of btf ids for tracing
> programs and checking btf id during program verification.
> Adding above functions to this list.
>
> Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
> ---
> v2 changes:
>   - drop check for EXT programs [Andrii]
>
>  kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index 2579f6fbb5c3..42311e51ac71 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> @@ -13112,6 +13112,17 @@ int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
>         return 0;
>  }
>
> +BTF_SET_START(btf_id_deny)
> +BTF_ID_UNUSED
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
> +BTF_ID(func, migrate_disable)
> +BTF_ID(func, migrate_enable)
> +#endif
> +#if !defined CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU && !defined CONFIG_TINY_RCU
> +BTF_ID(func, rcu_read_unlock_strict)
> +#endif
> +BTF_SET_END(btf_id_deny)

I was wondering whether it makes sense to do this on pahole side instead ?
It can do more flexible regex matching and excluding all such functions
from vmlinux btf without the kernel having to do a maze of #ifdef
depending on config.
On one side we will lose BTF info about such functions, but what do we
need it for?
On the other side it will be a tiny reduction in vmlinux btf :)
Thoughts?
Jiri Olsa May 10, 2021, 9:50 a.m. UTC | #2
On Thu, May 06, 2021 at 06:36:38PM -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 29, 2021 at 4:47 AM Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > The recursion check in __bpf_prog_enter and __bpf_prog_exit
> > leaves some (not inlined) functions unprotected:
> >
> > In __bpf_prog_enter:
> >   - migrate_disable is called before prog->active is checked
> >
> > In __bpf_prog_exit:
> >   - migrate_enable,rcu_read_unlock_strict are called after
> >     prog->active is decreased
> >
> > When attaching trampoline to them we get panic like:
> >
> >   traps: PANIC: double fault, error_code: 0x0
> >   double fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
> >   RIP: 0010:__bpf_prog_enter+0x4/0x50
> >   ...
> >   Call Trace:
> >    <IRQ>
> >    bpf_trampoline_6442466513_0+0x18/0x1000
> >    migrate_disable+0x5/0x50
> >    __bpf_prog_enter+0x9/0x50
> >    bpf_trampoline_6442466513_0+0x18/0x1000
> >    migrate_disable+0x5/0x50
> >    __bpf_prog_enter+0x9/0x50
> >    bpf_trampoline_6442466513_0+0x18/0x1000
> >    migrate_disable+0x5/0x50
> >    __bpf_prog_enter+0x9/0x50
> >    bpf_trampoline_6442466513_0+0x18/0x1000
> >    migrate_disable+0x5/0x50
> >    ...
> >
> > Fixing this by adding deny list of btf ids for tracing
> > programs and checking btf id during program verification.
> > Adding above functions to this list.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
> > ---
> > v2 changes:
> >   - drop check for EXT programs [Andrii]
> >
> >  kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
> >  1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> > index 2579f6fbb5c3..42311e51ac71 100644
> > --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> > +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> > @@ -13112,6 +13112,17 @@ int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
> >         return 0;
> >  }
> >
> > +BTF_SET_START(btf_id_deny)
> > +BTF_ID_UNUSED
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
> > +BTF_ID(func, migrate_disable)
> > +BTF_ID(func, migrate_enable)
> > +#endif
> > +#if !defined CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU && !defined CONFIG_TINY_RCU
> > +BTF_ID(func, rcu_read_unlock_strict)
> > +#endif
> > +BTF_SET_END(btf_id_deny)
> 
> I was wondering whether it makes sense to do this on pahole side instead ?
> It can do more flexible regex matching and excluding all such functions
> from vmlinux btf without the kernel having to do a maze of #ifdef
> depending on config.
> On one side we will lose BTF info about such functions, but what do we
> need it for?
> On the other side it will be a tiny reduction in vmlinux btf :)
> Thoughts?

we just removed the ftrace filter so BTF will have 'all' functions

I think the filtering on pahole side could cause problems like
the recent one with cubictcp_state.. it's just 3 functions, but
what if they rename? this way we at least get compilation error ;-)

I'd go with all functions in BTF and restrict attachment for those
that cause problems

jirka
Alexei Starovoitov May 11, 2021, 9:05 p.m. UTC | #3
On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 2:50 AM Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, May 06, 2021 at 06:36:38PM -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> > On Thu, Apr 29, 2021 at 4:47 AM Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > The recursion check in __bpf_prog_enter and __bpf_prog_exit
> > > leaves some (not inlined) functions unprotected:
> > >
> > > In __bpf_prog_enter:
> > >   - migrate_disable is called before prog->active is checked
> > >
> > > In __bpf_prog_exit:
> > >   - migrate_enable,rcu_read_unlock_strict are called after
> > >     prog->active is decreased
> > >
> > > When attaching trampoline to them we get panic like:
> > >
> > >   traps: PANIC: double fault, error_code: 0x0
> > >   double fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
> > >   RIP: 0010:__bpf_prog_enter+0x4/0x50
> > >   ...
> > >   Call Trace:
> > >    <IRQ>
> > >    bpf_trampoline_6442466513_0+0x18/0x1000
> > >    migrate_disable+0x5/0x50
> > >    __bpf_prog_enter+0x9/0x50
> > >    bpf_trampoline_6442466513_0+0x18/0x1000
> > >    migrate_disable+0x5/0x50
> > >    __bpf_prog_enter+0x9/0x50
> > >    bpf_trampoline_6442466513_0+0x18/0x1000
> > >    migrate_disable+0x5/0x50
> > >    __bpf_prog_enter+0x9/0x50
> > >    bpf_trampoline_6442466513_0+0x18/0x1000
> > >    migrate_disable+0x5/0x50
> > >    ...
> > >
> > > Fixing this by adding deny list of btf ids for tracing
> > > programs and checking btf id during program verification.
> > > Adding above functions to this list.
> > >
> > > Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
> > > Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
> > > ---
> > > v2 changes:
> > >   - drop check for EXT programs [Andrii]
> > >
> > >  kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
> > >  1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> > > index 2579f6fbb5c3..42311e51ac71 100644
> > > --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> > > @@ -13112,6 +13112,17 @@ int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
> > >         return 0;
> > >  }
> > >
> > > +BTF_SET_START(btf_id_deny)
> > > +BTF_ID_UNUSED
> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
> > > +BTF_ID(func, migrate_disable)
> > > +BTF_ID(func, migrate_enable)
> > > +#endif
> > > +#if !defined CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU && !defined CONFIG_TINY_RCU
> > > +BTF_ID(func, rcu_read_unlock_strict)
> > > +#endif
> > > +BTF_SET_END(btf_id_deny)
> >
> > I was wondering whether it makes sense to do this on pahole side instead ?
> > It can do more flexible regex matching and excluding all such functions
> > from vmlinux btf without the kernel having to do a maze of #ifdef
> > depending on config.
> > On one side we will lose BTF info about such functions, but what do we
> > need it for?
> > On the other side it will be a tiny reduction in vmlinux btf :)
> > Thoughts?
>
> we just removed the ftrace filter so BTF will have 'all' functions
>
> I think the filtering on pahole side could cause problems like
> the recent one with cubictcp_state.. it's just 3 functions, but
> what if they rename? this way we at least get compilation error ;-)
>
> I'd go with all functions in BTF and restrict attachment for those
> that cause problems

Ok. Let's see how it will work in practice.
Applied to bpf tree.
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 2579f6fbb5c3..42311e51ac71 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -13112,6 +13112,17 @@  int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+BTF_SET_START(btf_id_deny)
+BTF_ID_UNUSED
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+BTF_ID(func, migrate_disable)
+BTF_ID(func, migrate_enable)
+#endif
+#if !defined CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU && !defined CONFIG_TINY_RCU
+BTF_ID(func, rcu_read_unlock_strict)
+#endif
+BTF_SET_END(btf_id_deny)
+
 static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 {
 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
@@ -13171,6 +13182,9 @@  static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		ret = bpf_lsm_verify_prog(&env->log, prog);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			return ret;
+	} else if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
+		   btf_id_set_contains(&btf_id_deny, btf_id)) {
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	key = bpf_trampoline_compute_key(tgt_prog, prog->aux->attach_btf, btf_id);