| Message ID | 20210517095513.850-5-xieyongji@bytedance.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Not Applicable |
| Delegated to: | Netdev Maintainers |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Introduce VDUSE - vDPA Device in Userspace | expand |
| Context | Check | Description |
|---|---|---|
| netdev/tree_selection | success | Not a local patch |
On Mon, May 17, 2021 at 5:56 PM Xie Yongji <xieyongji@bytedance.com> wrote: > > This ensures that we will not use an invalid block size > in config space (might come from an untrusted device). > > Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji <xieyongji@bytedance.com> > --- > drivers/block/virtio_blk.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c b/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c > index ebb4d3fe803f..c848aa36d49b 100644 > --- a/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c > +++ b/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c > @@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ static int virtblk_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) > err = virtio_cread_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_BLK_F_BLK_SIZE, > struct virtio_blk_config, blk_size, > &blk_size); > - if (!err) > + if (!err && blk_size > 0 && blk_size <= max_size) The check here is incorrect. I will use PAGE_SIZE as the maximum boundary in the new version. Thanks, Yongji
On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 09:39:20PM +0800, Yongji Xie wrote: > On Mon, May 17, 2021 at 5:56 PM Xie Yongji <xieyongji@bytedance.com> wrote: > > > > This ensures that we will not use an invalid block size > > in config space (might come from an untrusted device). I looked at if I should add this as an untrusted function so that Smatch could find these sorts of bugs but this is reading data from the host so there has to be some level of trust... I should add some more untrusted data kvm functions to Smatch. Right now I only have kvm_register_read() and I've added kvm_read_guest_virt() just now. > > > > Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji <xieyongji@bytedance.com> > > --- > > drivers/block/virtio_blk.c | 2 +- > > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > diff --git a/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c b/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c > > index ebb4d3fe803f..c848aa36d49b 100644 > > --- a/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c > > +++ b/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c > > @@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ static int virtblk_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) > > err = virtio_cread_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_BLK_F_BLK_SIZE, > > struct virtio_blk_config, blk_size, > > &blk_size); > > - if (!err) > > + if (!err && blk_size > 0 && blk_size <= max_size) > > The check here is incorrect. I will use PAGE_SIZE as the maximum > boundary in the new version. What does this bug look like to the user? A minimum block size of 1 seems pretty crazy. Surely the minimum should be higher? regards, dan carpenter
On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 10:42 PM Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> wrote: > > On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 09:39:20PM +0800, Yongji Xie wrote: > > On Mon, May 17, 2021 at 5:56 PM Xie Yongji <xieyongji@bytedance.com> wrote: > > > > > > This ensures that we will not use an invalid block size > > > in config space (might come from an untrusted device). > > I looked at if I should add this as an untrusted function so that Smatch > could find these sorts of bugs but this is reading data from the host so > there has to be some level of trust... > It would be great if Smatch could detect this case if possible. The data might be trusted in traditional VM cases. But now the data can be read from a userspace daemon when VDUSE is enabled. > I should add some more untrusted data kvm functions to Smatch. Right > now I only have kvm_register_read() and I've added kvm_read_guest_virt() > just now. > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji <xieyongji@bytedance.com> > > > --- > > > drivers/block/virtio_blk.c | 2 +- > > > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c b/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c > > > index ebb4d3fe803f..c848aa36d49b 100644 > > > --- a/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c > > > +++ b/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c > > > @@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ static int virtblk_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) > > > err = virtio_cread_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_BLK_F_BLK_SIZE, > > > struct virtio_blk_config, blk_size, > > > &blk_size); > > > - if (!err) > > > + if (!err && blk_size > 0 && blk_size <= max_size) > > > > The check here is incorrect. I will use PAGE_SIZE as the maximum > > boundary in the new version. > > What does this bug look like to the user? The kernel will panic if the block size is larger than PAGE_SIZE. > A minimum block size of 1 seems pretty crazy. Surely the minimum should be > higher? > Yes, 512 is better here. Thanks, Yongji
On Thu, May 20, 2021 at 01:25:16PM +0800, Yongji Xie wrote: > On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 10:42 PM Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> wrote: > > > > On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 09:39:20PM +0800, Yongji Xie wrote: > > > On Mon, May 17, 2021 at 5:56 PM Xie Yongji <xieyongji@bytedance.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > This ensures that we will not use an invalid block size > > > > in config space (might come from an untrusted device). > > > > I looked at if I should add this as an untrusted function so that Smatch > > could find these sorts of bugs but this is reading data from the host so > > there has to be some level of trust... > > > > It would be great if Smatch could detect this case if possible. The > data might be trusted in traditional VM cases. But now the data can be > read from a userspace daemon when VDUSE is enabled. > > > I should add some more untrusted data kvm functions to Smatch. Right > > now I only have kvm_register_read() and I've added kvm_read_guest_virt() > > just now. > > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji <xieyongji@bytedance.com> > > > > --- > > > > drivers/block/virtio_blk.c | 2 +- > > > > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > > > > > diff --git a/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c b/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c > > > > index ebb4d3fe803f..c848aa36d49b 100644 > > > > --- a/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c > > > > +++ b/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c > > > > @@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ static int virtblk_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) > > > > err = virtio_cread_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_BLK_F_BLK_SIZE, > > > > struct virtio_blk_config, blk_size, > > > > &blk_size); > > > > - if (!err) > > > > + if (!err && blk_size > 0 && blk_size <= max_size) > > > > > > The check here is incorrect. I will use PAGE_SIZE as the maximum > > > boundary in the new version. > > > > What does this bug look like to the user? > > The kernel will panic if the block size is larger than PAGE_SIZE. Kernel panic at this point is par for the course IMHO. Let's focus on eliminating data corruption for starters. > > A minimum block size of 1 seems pretty crazy. Surely the minimum should be > higher? > > > > Yes, 512 is better here. > > Thanks, > Yongji
On Thu, May 20, 2021 at 1:43 PM Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> wrote: > > On Thu, May 20, 2021 at 01:25:16PM +0800, Yongji Xie wrote: > > On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 10:42 PM Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> wrote: > > > > > > On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 09:39:20PM +0800, Yongji Xie wrote: > > > > On Mon, May 17, 2021 at 5:56 PM Xie Yongji <xieyongji@bytedance.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > This ensures that we will not use an invalid block size > > > > > in config space (might come from an untrusted device). > > > > > > I looked at if I should add this as an untrusted function so that Smatch > > > could find these sorts of bugs but this is reading data from the host so > > > there has to be some level of trust... > > > > > > > It would be great if Smatch could detect this case if possible. The > > data might be trusted in traditional VM cases. But now the data can be > > read from a userspace daemon when VDUSE is enabled. > > > > > I should add some more untrusted data kvm functions to Smatch. Right > > > now I only have kvm_register_read() and I've added kvm_read_guest_virt() > > > just now. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji <xieyongji@bytedance.com> > > > > > --- > > > > > drivers/block/virtio_blk.c | 2 +- > > > > > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c b/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c > > > > > index ebb4d3fe803f..c848aa36d49b 100644 > > > > > --- a/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c > > > > > +++ b/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c > > > > > @@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ static int virtblk_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) > > > > > err = virtio_cread_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_BLK_F_BLK_SIZE, > > > > > struct virtio_blk_config, blk_size, > > > > > &blk_size); > > > > > - if (!err) > > > > > + if (!err && blk_size > 0 && blk_size <= max_size) > > > > > > > > The check here is incorrect. I will use PAGE_SIZE as the maximum > > > > boundary in the new version. > > > > > > What does this bug look like to the user? > > > > The kernel will panic if the block size is larger than PAGE_SIZE. > > Kernel panic at this point is par for the course IMHO. But it seems better if we can avoid this kind of panic. Because this might also be triggered by a buggy VDUSE daemon. > Let's focus on eliminating data corruption for starters. OK, now the incorrect used length might cause data corruption in virtio-net and virtio-console drivers as I mentioned in another mail. I will send a fix ASAP. Thanks, Yongji
diff --git a/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c b/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c index ebb4d3fe803f..c848aa36d49b 100644 --- a/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c +++ b/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c @@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ static int virtblk_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) err = virtio_cread_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_BLK_F_BLK_SIZE, struct virtio_blk_config, blk_size, &blk_size); - if (!err) + if (!err && blk_size > 0 && blk_size <= max_size) blk_queue_logical_block_size(q, blk_size); else blk_size = queue_logical_block_size(q);
This ensures that we will not use an invalid block size in config space (might come from an untrusted device). Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji <xieyongji@bytedance.com> --- drivers/block/virtio_blk.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)