From patchwork Thu Apr 28 12:40:00 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Willy Tarreau X-Patchwork-Id: 12830626 X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 016EBC433FE for ; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 12:41:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1346405AbiD1MoZ (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Apr 2022 08:44:25 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:46454 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1346478AbiD1MoT (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Apr 2022 08:44:19 -0400 Received: from 1wt.eu (wtarreau.pck.nerim.net [62.212.114.60]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id E908E1409A; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 05:41:04 -0700 (PDT) Received: (from willy@localhost) by pcw.home.local (8.15.2/8.15.2/Submit) id 23SCeF74007485; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 14:40:15 +0200 From: Willy Tarreau To: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: David Miller , Jakub Kicinski , Eric Dumazet , Moshe Kol , Yossi Gilad , Amit Klein , "Jason A . Donenfeld" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Willy Tarreau Subject: [PATCH v2 net 6/7] tcp: increase source port perturb table to 2^16 Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2022 14:40:00 +0200 Message-Id: <20220428124001.7428-7-w@1wt.eu> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.5 In-Reply-To: <20220428124001.7428-1-w@1wt.eu> References: <20220428124001.7428-1-w@1wt.eu> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org Moshe Kol, Amit Klein, and Yossi Gilad reported being able to accurately identify a client by forcing it to emit only 40 times more connections than there are entries in the table_perturb[] table. The previous two improvements consisting in resalting the secret every 10s and adding randomness to each port selection only slightly improved the situation, and the current value of 2^8 was too small as it's not very difficult to make a client emit 10k connections in less than 10 seconds. Thus we're increasing the perturb table from 2^8 to 2^16 so that the the same precision now requires 2.6M connections, which is more difficult in this time frame and harder to hide as a background activity. The impact is that the table now uses 256 kB instead of 1 kB, which could mostly affect devices making frequent outgoing connections. However such components usually target a small set of destinations (load balancers, database clients, perf assessment tools), and in practice only a few entries will be visited, like before. A live test at 1 million connections per second showed no performance difference from the previous value. Reported-by: Moshe Kol Reported-by: Yossi Gilad Reported-by: Amit Klein Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau --- net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c index 48ca07853068..cc5f66328b47 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c @@ -726,11 +726,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_unhash); * Note that we use 32bit integers (vs RFC 'short integers') * because 2^16 is not a multiple of num_ephemeral and this * property might be used by clever attacker. - * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement, - * we use 256 instead to really give more isolation and - * privacy, this only consumes 1 KB of kernel memory. + * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement, though + * attacks were since demonstrated, thus we use 65536 instead to really + * give more isolation and privacy, at the expense of 256kB of kernel + * memory. */ -#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 8 +#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 16 #define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE (1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT) static u32 *table_perturb;