| Message ID | 20220502084614.24123-8-w@1wt.eu (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Accepted |
| Commit | e8161345ddbb66e449abde10d2fdce93f867eba9 |
| Delegated to: | Netdev Maintainers |
| Headers | show |
| Series | insufficient TCP source port randomness | expand |
diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c index cc5f66328b47..a5d57fa679ca 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c @@ -778,7 +778,7 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row, net_get_random_once(table_perturb, INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE * sizeof(*table_perturb)); - index = hash_32(port_offset, INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT); + index = port_offset & (INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE - 1); offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + (port_offset >> 32); offset %= remaining;
In commit 190cc82489f4 ("tcp: change source port randomizarion at connect() time"), the table_perturb[] array was introduced and an index was taken from the port_offset via hash_32(). But it turns out that hash_32() performs a multiplication while the input here comes from the output of SipHash in secure_seq, that is well distributed enough to avoid the need for yet another hash. Suggested-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> --- net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)