[bpf-next,v2,04/25] bpf: Fix slot type check in check_stack_write_var_off

Commit Message

Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi Oct. 13, 2022, 6:22 a.m. UTC

For the case where allow_ptr_leaks is false, code is checking whether
slot type is STACK_INVALID and STACK_SPILL and rejecting other cases.
This is a consequence of incorrectly checking for register type instead
of the slot type (NOT_INIT and SCALAR_VALUE respectively). Fix the
check.

Fixes: 01f810ace9ed ("bpf: Allow variable-offset stack access")
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <[e-mail]>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 19 +++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

Patch

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 48a10d79f1bf..bbbd44b0fd6f 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -3181,14 +3181,17 @@  static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE];
 		mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);
 
-		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks
-				&& *stype != NOT_INIT
-				&& *stype != SCALAR_VALUE) {
-			/* Reject the write if there's are spilled pointers in
-			 * range. If we didn't reject here, the ptr status
-			 * would be erased below (even though not all slots are
-			 * actually overwritten), possibly opening the door to
-			 * leaks.
+		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && *stype != STACK_MISC && *stype != STACK_ZERO) {
+			/* Reject the write if range we may write to has not
+			 * been initialized beforehand. If we didn't reject
+			 * here, the ptr status would be erased below (even
+			 * though not all slots are actually overwritten),
+			 * possibly opening the door to leaks.
+			 *
+			 * We do however catch STACK_INVALID case below, and
+			 * only allow reading possibly uninitialized memory
+			 * later for CAP_PERFMON, as the write may not happen to
+			 * that slot.
 			 */
 			verbose(env, "spilled ptr in range of var-offset stack write; insn %d, ptr off: %d",
 				insn_idx, i);