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When a constant is passed in like this, it is assumed for the purposes of precision tracking that if the value in the already explored safe state is within the value in current state, it would fine to prune the search. While this holds well for size arguments, arguments where each value may denote a distinct meaning and needs to be verified separately needs more work. Search can only be pruned if both are equivalent values. In all other cases, it would be incorrect to treat those two precise registers as equivalent if the new value satisfies the old one (i.e. old <= cur). Hence, make the register precision marker tri-state. There are now three values that reg->precise takes: NOT_PRECISE, PRECISE, EXACT. Both PRECISE and EXACT are 'true' values. EXACT affects how regsafe decides whether both registers are equivalent for the purposes of verifier state equivalence. When it sees that old state register has reg->precise == EXACT, unless both are equivalent, it will return false. Otherwise, for PRECISE case it falls back to the default check that is present now (i.e. thinking that we're talking about sizes). This is required as a future patch introduces a BPF memory allocator interface, where we take the program BTF's type ID as an argument. Each distinct type ID may result in the returned pointer obtaining a different size, hence precision tracking is needed, and pruning cannot just happen when the old value is within the current value. It must only happen when the type ID is equal. The type ID will always correspond to prog->aux->btf hence actual type match is not required. Finally, change mark_chain_precision precision argument to EXACT for kfuncs constant non-size scalar arguments (tagged with __k suffix). Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi --- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 10 +++- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 111 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 2 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h index f3a601d33fb3..1e246ec2ff37 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h @@ -43,6 +43,12 @@ enum bpf_reg_liveness { REG_LIVE_DONE = 0x8, /* liveness won't be updating this register anymore */ }; +enum bpf_reg_precise { + NOT_PRECISE, + PRECISE, + EXACT, +}; + struct bpf_reg_state { /* Ordering of fields matters. See states_equal() */ enum bpf_reg_type type; @@ -180,7 +186,7 @@ struct bpf_reg_state { s32 subreg_def; enum bpf_reg_liveness live; /* if (!precise && SCALAR_VALUE) min/max/tnum don't affect safety */ - bool precise; + enum bpf_reg_precise precise; }; enum bpf_stack_slot_type { @@ -626,8 +632,6 @@ int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, struct bpf_attach_target_info *tgt_info); void bpf_free_kfunc_btf_tab(struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab); -int mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno); - #define BPF_BASE_TYPE_MASK GENMASK(BPF_BASE_TYPE_BITS - 1, 0) /* extract base type from bpf_{arg, return, reg}_type. */ diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 7515b31d2c40..5bfc151711b9 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -864,7 +864,7 @@ static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, print_liveness(env, reg->live); verbose(env, "="); if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise) - verbose(env, "P"); + verbose(env, reg->precise == EXACT ? "E" : "P"); if ((t == SCALAR_VALUE || t == PTR_TO_STACK) && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { /* reg->off should be 0 for SCALAR_VALUE */ @@ -961,7 +961,7 @@ static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, t = reg->type; verbose(env, "=%s", t == SCALAR_VALUE ? "" : reg_type_str(env, t)); if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise) - verbose(env, "P"); + verbose(env, reg->precise == EXACT ? "E" : "P"); if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); } else { @@ -1695,7 +1695,16 @@ static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; reg->var_off = tnum_unknown; reg->frameno = 0; - reg->precise = !env->bpf_capable; + /* Helpers requiring EXACT for constant arguments cannot be called from + * programs without CAP_BPF. This is because we don't propagate + * precision markers when CAP_BPF is missing. If we allowed calling such + * heleprs in those programs, the default would have to be EXACT for + * them, which would be too aggresive, or we'd have to propagate it. + * + * Currently, only bpf_obj_new kfunc requires EXACT precision for its + * scalar argument, which is a kfunc (and thus behind CAP_BPF). + */ + reg->precise = !env->bpf_capable ? PRECISE : NOT_PRECISE; __mark_reg_unbounded(reg); } @@ -2750,7 +2759,8 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, * For now backtracking falls back into conservative marking. */ static void mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, - struct bpf_verifier_state *st) + struct bpf_verifier_state *st, + enum bpf_reg_precise precise) { struct bpf_func_state *func; struct bpf_reg_state *reg; @@ -2769,7 +2779,7 @@ static void mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, reg = &func->regs[j]; if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) continue; - reg->precise = true; + reg->precise = precise; } for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j])) @@ -2777,7 +2787,7 @@ static void mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) continue; - reg->precise = true; + reg->precise = precise; } } } @@ -2795,7 +2805,7 @@ static void mark_all_scalars_imprecise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_ reg = &func->regs[j]; if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) continue; - reg->precise = false; + reg->precise = NOT_PRECISE; } for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j])) @@ -2803,7 +2813,7 @@ static void mark_all_scalars_imprecise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_ reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) continue; - reg->precise = false; + reg->precise = NOT_PRECISE; } } } @@ -2896,7 +2906,7 @@ static void mark_all_scalars_imprecise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_ * finalized states which help in short circuiting more future states. */ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int regno, - int spi) + int spi, enum bpf_reg_precise precise) { struct bpf_verifier_state *st = env->cur_state; int first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; @@ -2909,8 +2919,11 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int r bool new_marks = false; int i, err; - if (!env->bpf_capable) + if (!env->bpf_capable) { + /* EXACT precision should only be used with CAP_BPF */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(precise == EXACT); return 0; + } /* Do sanity checks against current state of register and/or stack * slot, but don't set precise flag in current state, as precision @@ -2969,7 +2982,7 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int r reg_mask &= ~(1u << i); continue; } - reg->precise = true; + reg->precise = precise; } return 0; } @@ -2988,7 +3001,7 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int r err = backtrack_insn(env, i, ®_mask, &stack_mask); } if (err == -ENOTSUPP) { - mark_all_scalars_precise(env, st); + mark_all_scalars_precise(env, st, precise); return 0; } else if (err) { return err; @@ -3029,7 +3042,7 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int r } if (!reg->precise) new_marks = true; - reg->precise = true; + reg->precise = precise; } bitmap_from_u64(mask, stack_mask); @@ -3048,7 +3061,7 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int r * fp-8 and it's "unallocated" stack space. * In such case fallback to conservative. */ - mark_all_scalars_precise(env, st); + mark_all_scalars_precise(env, st, precise); return 0; } @@ -3063,7 +3076,7 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int r } if (!reg->precise) new_marks = true; - reg->precise = true; + reg->precise = precise; } if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { verbose(env, "parent %s regs=%x stack=%llx marks:", @@ -3083,19 +3096,22 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int r return 0; } -int mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) +static int mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, + enum bpf_reg_precise precise) { - return __mark_chain_precision(env, env->cur_state->curframe, regno, -1); + return __mark_chain_precision(env, env->cur_state->curframe, regno, -1, precise); } -static int mark_chain_precision_frame(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int regno) +static int mark_chain_precision_frame(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int regno, + enum bpf_reg_precise precise) { - return __mark_chain_precision(env, frame, regno, -1); + return __mark_chain_precision(env, frame, regno, -1, precise); } -static int mark_chain_precision_stack_frame(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int spi) +static int mark_chain_precision_stack_frame(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int spi, + enum bpf_reg_precise precise) { - return __mark_chain_precision(env, frame, -1, spi); + return __mark_chain_precision(env, frame, -1, spi, precise); } static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) @@ -3230,7 +3246,7 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, * Backtrack from here and mark all registers as precise * that contributed into 'reg' being a constant. */ - err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); + err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno, PRECISE); if (err) return err; } @@ -3271,7 +3287,7 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, /* when we zero initialize stack slots mark them as such */ if (reg && register_is_null(reg)) { /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */ - err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); + err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno, PRECISE); if (err) return err; type = STACK_ZERO; @@ -3387,7 +3403,7 @@ static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } if (zero_used) { /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */ - err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); + err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno, PRECISE); if (err) return err; } @@ -3436,7 +3452,7 @@ static void mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, * backtracking. Any register that contributed * to const 0 was marked precise before spill. */ - state->regs[dst_regno].precise = true; + state->regs[dst_regno].precise = PRECISE; } else { /* have read misc data from the stack */ mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno); @@ -5503,7 +5519,7 @@ static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, reg->umax_value, zero_size_allowed, meta); if (!err) - err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); + err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno, PRECISE); return err; } @@ -6311,7 +6327,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, return -EACCES; } meta->mem_size = reg->var_off.value; - err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); + err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno, PRECISE); if (err) return err; break; @@ -7303,7 +7319,7 @@ record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, return 0; } - err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_3); + err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_3, PRECISE); if (err) return err; if (bpf_map_key_unseen(aux)) @@ -7403,7 +7419,7 @@ static bool loop_flag_is_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) bool reg_is_null = register_is_null(reg); if (reg_is_null) - mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_4); + mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_4, PRECISE); return reg_is_null; } @@ -8224,7 +8240,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ verbose(env, "R%d must be a known constant\n", regno); return -EINVAL; } - ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); + ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno, EXACT); if (ret < 0) return ret; meta->arg_constant.found = true; @@ -8248,7 +8264,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ } meta->r0_size = reg->var_off.value; - ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); + ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno, PRECISE); if (ret) return ret; } @@ -9929,7 +9945,7 @@ static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, * This is legal, but we have to reverse our * src/dest handling in computing the range */ - err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); + err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg, PRECISE); if (err) return err; return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, @@ -9937,14 +9953,16 @@ static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } } else if (ptr_reg) { /* pointer += scalar */ - err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); + err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg, PRECISE); if (err) return err; return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, src_reg); } else if (dst_reg->precise) { - /* if dst_reg is precise, src_reg should be precise as well */ - err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); + /* If dst_reg is precise, src_reg should be precise as well. + * Propagate EXACT if it is exact, PRECISE if precise. + */ + err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg, dst_reg->precise); if (err) return err; } @@ -10938,10 +10956,10 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, * above is_branch_taken() special cased the 0 comparison. */ if (!__is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg)) - err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); + err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg, PRECISE); if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && !err && !__is_pointer_value(false, src_reg)) - err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); + err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg, PRECISE); if (err) return err; } @@ -12262,9 +12280,18 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, if (rcur->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { if (!rold->precise) return true; - /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ - return range_within(rold, rcur) && - tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); + /* For EXACT, we need values to match exactly, so simply + * return false as the memcmp above failed already, + * otherwise current being within the old value + * suffices. + */ + if (rold->precise == EXACT) { + return false; + } else /* PRECISE */ { + /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ + return range_within(rold, rcur) && + tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); + } } else { /* We're trying to use a pointer in place of a scalar. * Even if the scalar was unbounded, this could lead to @@ -12595,7 +12622,7 @@ static int propagate_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, continue; if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating r%d\n", i, fr); - err = mark_chain_precision_frame(env, fr, i); + err = mark_chain_precision_frame(env, fr, i, state_reg->precise); if (err < 0) return err; } @@ -12610,7 +12637,7 @@ static int propagate_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating fp%d\n", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE, fr); - err = mark_chain_precision_stack_frame(env, fr, i); + err = mark_chain_precision_stack_frame(env, fr, i, state_reg->precise); if (err < 0) return err; }