From patchwork Sun May 7 09:11:31 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ding Hui X-Patchwork-Id: 13233710 X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (lindbergh.monkeyblade.net [23.128.96.19]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CC72C7C for ; Sun, 7 May 2023 09:18:43 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: delayed 381 seconds by postgrey-1.37 at lindbergh.monkeyblade.net; Sun, 07 May 2023 02:18:40 PDT Received: from mail-m127104.qiye.163.com (mail-m127104.qiye.163.com [115.236.127.104]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id ABA0A100E8; Sun, 7 May 2023 02:18:40 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [IPV6:240e:3b7:3277:3e50:d9d7:3dc:49c3:c0bf]) by mail-m127104.qiye.163.com (Hmail) with ESMTPA id 36F23A4010E; Sun, 7 May 2023 17:12:14 +0800 (CST) From: Ding Hui To: chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com, anna@kernel.org Cc: davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com, kuba@kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com, bfields@redhat.com, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dinghui@sangfor.com.cn Subject: [RFC PATCH] SUNRPC: Fix UAF in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready() Date: Sun, 7 May 2023 17:11:31 +0800 Message-Id: <20230507091131.23540-1-dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 X-HM-Spam-Status: e1kfGhgUHx5ZQUpXWQgPGg8OCBgUHx5ZQUlOS1dZFg8aDwILHllBWSg2Ly tZV1koWUFITzdXWS1ZQUlXWQ8JGhUIEh9ZQVlDSB5LVh1MHkNLSE0aSx9PT1UTARMWGhIXJBQOD1 lXWRgSC1lBWUlPSx5BSBlMQUhJTExBSB5OS0EfQh9MQUgfGEFPQhhIQRhLGR1ZV1kWGg8SFR0UWU FZT0tIVUpKS0hKTFVKS0tVS1kG X-HM-Tid: 0a87f57ba7f5b282kuuu36f23a4010e X-HM-MType: 1 X-HM-Sender-Digest: e1kMHhlZQR0aFwgeV1kSHx4VD1lBWUc6PQg6HAw*DD0KCTErOhU*OAwu LDJPCwxVSlVKTUNIT05LTEhOS0xCVTMWGhIXVR8SFRwTDhI7CBoVHB0UCVUYFBZVGBVFWVdZEgtZ QVlJT0seQUgZTEFISUxMQUgeTktBH0IfTEFIHxhBT0IYSEEYSxkdWVdZCAFZQU1LTEM3Bg++ X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org X-Patchwork-State: RFC After the listener svc_sock freed, and before invoking svc_tcp_accept() for the established child sock, there is a window that the newsock retaining a freed listener svc_sock in sk_user_data which cloning from parent. In the race windows if data is received on the newsock, we will observe use-after-free report in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready(). Reproduce by two tasks: 1. while :; do rpc.nfsd 0 ; rpc.nfsd; done 2. while :; do echo "" | ncat -4 127.0.0.1 2049 ; done KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready+0x1cf/0x1f0 [sunrpc] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888139d96228 by task nc/102553 CPU: 7 PID: 102553 Comm: nc Not tainted 6.3.0+ #18 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x50 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x27/0x310 print_report+0x3e/0x70 kasan_report+0xae/0xe0 svc_tcp_listen_data_ready+0x1cf/0x1f0 [sunrpc] tcp_data_queue+0x9f4/0x20e0 tcp_rcv_established+0x666/0x1f60 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x51c/0x850 tcp_v4_rcv+0x23fc/0x2e80 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x62/0x300 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x267/0x350 ip_local_deliver+0x18b/0x2d0 ip_rcv+0x2fb/0x370 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x166/0x1b0 process_backlog+0x24c/0x5e0 __napi_poll+0xa2/0x500 net_rx_action+0x854/0xc90 __do_softirq+0x1bb/0x5de do_softirq+0xcb/0x100 ... Allocated by task 102371: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7b/0x90 svc_setup_socket+0x52/0x4f0 [sunrpc] svc_addsock+0x20d/0x400 [sunrpc] __write_ports_addfd+0x209/0x390 [nfsd] write_ports+0x239/0x2c0 [nfsd] nfsctl_transaction_write+0xac/0x110 [nfsd] vfs_write+0x1c3/0xae0 ksys_write+0xed/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Freed by task 102551: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x2a/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x190 __kmem_cache_free+0x133/0x270 svc_xprt_free+0x1e2/0x350 [sunrpc] svc_xprt_destroy_all+0x25a/0x440 [sunrpc] nfsd_put+0x125/0x240 [nfsd] nfsd_svc+0x2cb/0x3c0 [nfsd] write_threads+0x1ac/0x2a0 [nfsd] nfsctl_transaction_write+0xac/0x110 [nfsd] vfs_write+0x1c3/0xae0 ksys_write+0xed/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc In this RFC patch, I try to fix the UAF by skipping dereferencing svsk for all child socket in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready(), it is easy to backport for stable. However I'm not sure if there are other potential risks in the race window, so I thought another fix which depends on SK_USER_DATA_NOCOPY introduced in commit f1ff5ce2cd5e ("net, sk_msg: Clear sk_user_data pointer on clone if tagged"). Saving svsk into sk_user_data with SK_USER_DATA_NOCOPY tag in svc_setup_socket() like this: __rcu_assign_sk_user_data_with_flags(inet, svsk, SK_USER_DATA_NOCOPY); Obtaining svsk in callbacks like this: struct svc_sock *svsk = rcu_dereference_sk_user_data(sk); This will avoid copying sk_user_data for sunrpc svc_sock in sk_clone_lock(), so the sk_user_data of child sock before accepted will be NULL. Appreciate any comment and suggestion, thanks. Fixes: fa9251afc33c ("SUNRPC: Call the default socket callbacks instead of open coding") Signed-off-by: Ding Hui --- net/sunrpc/svcsock.c | 23 +++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c b/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c index a51c9b989d58..9aca6e1e78e4 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c @@ -825,12 +825,6 @@ static void svc_tcp_listen_data_ready(struct sock *sk) trace_sk_data_ready(sk); - if (svsk) { - /* Refer to svc_setup_socket() for details. */ - rmb(); - svsk->sk_odata(sk); - } - /* * This callback may called twice when a new connection * is established as a child socket inherits everything @@ -839,13 +833,18 @@ static void svc_tcp_listen_data_ready(struct sock *sk) * when one of child sockets become ESTABLISHED. * 2) data_ready method of the child socket may be called * when it receives data before the socket is accepted. - * In case of 2, we should ignore it silently. + * In case of 2, we should ignore it silently and DO NOT + * dereference svsk. */ - if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) { - if (svsk) { - set_bit(XPT_CONN, &svsk->sk_xprt.xpt_flags); - svc_xprt_enqueue(&svsk->sk_xprt); - } + if (sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN) + return; + + if (svsk) { + /* Refer to svc_setup_socket() for details. */ + rmb(); + svsk->sk_odata(sk); + set_bit(XPT_CONN, &svsk->sk_xprt.xpt_flags); + svc_xprt_enqueue(&svsk->sk_xprt); } }