From patchwork Mon Jun 5 18:22:49 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Ertman, David M" X-Patchwork-Id: 13267859 X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (lindbergh.monkeyblade.net [23.128.96.19]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A46CEAD2E for ; Mon, 5 Jun 2023 18:21:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mga09.intel.com (mga09.intel.com [134.134.136.24]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 30B9DD3 for ; Mon, 5 Jun 2023 11:21:19 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1685989279; x=1717525279; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=3HEfb0+Du9CKPz7B2iEe9q9csLd2CcxkbnPCXgyv8I0=; b=WLy5foIr8QWRgFW7jCtmbv/K4VWG0UyjSUxkbhXgXZwnKEMtUmbxfuOp 7lLZzeeVNvVbO8gy3ySXekJooMUqDGdq+/4U06xLk89KvbKfmVbi0h6TC bNEa3Uc8swNBEzfXQIVM18uemlq+t7L5yHAXqIiQvp8t643z4znKdHMVv IlPYy3NQKaxz8g4kfekqGX2/XsH4Wop05LirQTOzfwGn73Vegrqwdtn9y Km0NJgCcOAWnHJjkZPs5UQLFrX4UJaDpVIlrEUuRpAJCGbhMokNuIF1Ln ByJQ6IV6oZi1ur/PTHEHTGlwr92EvSa9AzR3vmbAxArq+oFOGICx8YHlT A==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6600,9927,10732"; a="358896806" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.00,218,1681196400"; d="scan'208";a="358896806" Received: from fmsmga005.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.32]) by orsmga102.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 05 Jun 2023 11:21:16 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6600,9927,10732"; a="1038863363" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.00,218,1681196400"; d="scan'208";a="1038863363" Received: from dmert-dev.jf.intel.com ([10.166.241.14]) by fmsmga005-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 05 Jun 2023 11:21:15 -0700 From: Dave Ertman To: intel-wired-lan@lists.osuosl.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, Jacob Keller Subject: [PATCH net v2 01/10] ice: Correctly initialize queue context values Date: Mon, 5 Jun 2023 11:22:49 -0700 Message-Id: <20230605182258.557933-2-david.m.ertman@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.40.1 In-Reply-To: <20230605182258.557933-1-david.m.ertman@intel.com> References: <20230605182258.557933-1-david.m.ertman@intel.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.4 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3,RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_NONE, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org From: Jacob Keller The ice_alloc_lan_q_ctx function allocates the queue context array for a given traffic class. This function uses devm_kcalloc which will zero-allocate the structure. Thus, prior to any queue being setup by ice_ena_vsi_txq, the q_ctx structure will have a q_handle of 0 and a q_teid of 0. These are potentially valid values. Modify the ice_alloc_lan_q_ctx function to initialize every member of the q_ctx array to have invalid values. Modify ice_dis_vsi_txq to ensure that it assigns q_teid to an invalid value when it assigns q_handle to the invalid value as well. This will allow other code to check whether the queue context is currently valid before operating on it. Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller Signed-off-by: Dave Ertman Reviewed-by: Daniel Machon --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_common.c | 1 + drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sched.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_common.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_common.c index a9f2e6bff806..23a9f169bc71 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_common.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_common.c @@ -4708,6 +4708,7 @@ ice_dis_vsi_txq(struct ice_port_info *pi, u16 vsi_handle, u8 tc, u8 num_queues, break; ice_free_sched_node(pi, node); q_ctx->q_handle = ICE_INVAL_Q_HANDLE; + q_ctx->q_teid = ICE_INVAL_TEID; } mutex_unlock(&pi->sched_lock); kfree(qg_list); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sched.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sched.c index 824bac5ce003..0db9eb8fd402 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sched.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sched.c @@ -572,18 +572,24 @@ ice_alloc_lan_q_ctx(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vsi_handle, u8 tc, u16 new_numqs) { struct ice_vsi_ctx *vsi_ctx; struct ice_q_ctx *q_ctx; + u16 idx; vsi_ctx = ice_get_vsi_ctx(hw, vsi_handle); if (!vsi_ctx) return -EINVAL; /* allocate LAN queue contexts */ if (!vsi_ctx->lan_q_ctx[tc]) { - vsi_ctx->lan_q_ctx[tc] = devm_kcalloc(ice_hw_to_dev(hw), - new_numqs, - sizeof(*q_ctx), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!vsi_ctx->lan_q_ctx[tc]) + q_ctx = devm_kcalloc(ice_hw_to_dev(hw), new_numqs, + sizeof(*q_ctx), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!q_ctx) return -ENOMEM; + + for (idx = 0; idx < new_numqs; idx++) { + q_ctx[idx].q_handle = ICE_INVAL_Q_HANDLE; + q_ctx[idx].q_teid = ICE_INVAL_TEID; + } + + vsi_ctx->lan_q_ctx[tc] = q_ctx; vsi_ctx->num_lan_q_entries[tc] = new_numqs; return 0; } @@ -595,9 +601,16 @@ ice_alloc_lan_q_ctx(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vsi_handle, u8 tc, u16 new_numqs) sizeof(*q_ctx), GFP_KERNEL); if (!q_ctx) return -ENOMEM; + memcpy(q_ctx, vsi_ctx->lan_q_ctx[tc], prev_num * sizeof(*q_ctx)); devm_kfree(ice_hw_to_dev(hw), vsi_ctx->lan_q_ctx[tc]); + + for (idx = prev_num; idx < new_numqs; idx++) { + q_ctx[idx].q_handle = ICE_INVAL_Q_HANDLE; + q_ctx[idx].q_teid = ICE_INVAL_TEID; + } + vsi_ctx->lan_q_ctx[tc] = q_ctx; vsi_ctx->num_lan_q_entries[tc] = new_numqs; }