@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ struct tcp_request_sock {
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AO
u8 ao_keyid;
u8 ao_rcv_next;
- u8 maclen;
+ bool used_tcp_ao;
#endif
};
@@ -180,14 +180,10 @@ static inline struct tcp_request_sock *tcp_rsk(const struct request_sock *req)
static inline bool tcp_rsk_used_ao(const struct request_sock *req)
{
- /* The real length of MAC is saved in the request socket,
- * signing anything with zero-length makes no sense, so here is
- * a little hack..
- */
#ifndef CONFIG_TCP_AO
return false;
#else
- return tcp_rsk(req)->maclen != 0;
+ return tcp_rsk(req)->used_tcp_ao;
#endif
}
@@ -855,7 +855,7 @@ void tcp_ao_syncookie(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct tcp_ao_hdr *aoh;
struct tcp_ao_key *key;
- treq->maclen = 0;
+ treq->used_tcp_ao = false;
if (tcp_parse_auth_options(th, NULL, &aoh) || !aoh)
return;
@@ -867,7 +867,7 @@ void tcp_ao_syncookie(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb,
treq->ao_rcv_next = aoh->keyid;
treq->ao_keyid = aoh->rnext_keyid;
- treq->maclen = tcp_ao_maclen(key);
+ treq->used_tcp_ao = true;
}
static enum skb_drop_reason
@@ -7194,11 +7194,12 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops,
if (tcp_parse_auth_options(tcp_hdr(skb), NULL, &aoh))
goto drop_and_release; /* Invalid TCP options */
if (aoh) {
- tcp_rsk(req)->maclen = aoh->length - sizeof(struct tcp_ao_hdr);
+ tcp_rsk(req)->used_tcp_ao = true;
tcp_rsk(req)->ao_rcv_next = aoh->keyid;
tcp_rsk(req)->ao_keyid = aoh->rnext_keyid;
+
} else {
- tcp_rsk(req)->maclen = 0;
+ tcp_rsk(req)->used_tcp_ao = false;
}
#endif
tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn = isn;
@@ -3720,7 +3720,6 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(const struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,
if (tcp_rsk_used_ao(req)) {
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AO
struct tcp_ao_key *ao_key = NULL;
- u8 maclen = tcp_rsk(req)->maclen;
u8 keyid = tcp_rsk(req)->ao_keyid;
ao_key = tcp_sk(sk)->af_specific->ao_lookup(sk, req_to_sk(req),
@@ -3730,13 +3729,11 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(const struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,
* for another peer-matching key, but the peer has requested
* ao_keyid (RFC5925 RNextKeyID), so let's keep it simple here.
*/
- if (unlikely(!ao_key || tcp_ao_maclen(ao_key) != maclen)) {
- u8 key_maclen = ao_key ? tcp_ao_maclen(ao_key) : 0;
-
+ if (unlikely(!ao_key)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
kfree_skb(skb);
- net_warn_ratelimited("TCP-AO: the keyid %u with maclen %u|%u from SYN packet is not present - not sending SYNACK\n",
- keyid, maclen, key_maclen);
+ net_warn_ratelimited("TCP-AO: the keyid %u from SYN packet is not present - not sending SYNACK\n",
+ keyid);
return NULL;
}
key.ao_key = ao_key;
This extra check doesn't work for a handshake when SYN segment has (current_key.maclen != rnext_key.maclen). It could be amended to preserve rnext_key.maclen instead of current_key.maclen, but that requires a lookup on listen socket. Originally, this extra maclen check was introduced just because it was cheap. Drop it and convert tcp_request_sock::maclen into boolean tcp_request_sock::used_tcp_ao. Fixes: 06b22ef29591 ("net/tcp: Wire TCP-AO to request sockets") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> --- include/linux/tcp.h | 8 ++------ net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 5 +++-- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 9 +++------ 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)