From patchwork Thu May 30 23:36:15 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jakub Kicinski X-Patchwork-Id: 13680954 X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EBCD218397C; Thu, 30 May 2024 23:36:25 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1717112186; cv=none; b=YClGm+uPIsGiVVf1/JLGfn046LoS/DwPpu5tdjLAiUeB1oZajuZ6romB15VaYYbuZmAqEmBVXb2kB0Pw0gBH5ecpdLVzx+rYnRB/ZbLUsr8nacZEPjDSb6rglkOBaQfRjkqQhg5rUZvdU8UyGak1L+3rrpOMz/aRf7K1qJlLonY= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1717112186; c=relaxed/simple; bh=Tc3mfR659n1UEdqi4bi378GMou0NHGPpevDsK5F2eK8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=L4dP8afUrKM1m90mQH575wJ01AZpcRCyA8VU7cNf9dnAOe1usGwTV5zU1a+QLUTp1FHGeiQ6aZ0JZpcoYGjJDszGgwLzaOe3Je6SvZ+f8sz2BF0sejbU2glKZ4ZGZCC+jUB1wx7mrMJTCfOrwNFWYQ2PXByqsmx4EiUY0NXl+7U= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=hJapuffz; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="hJapuffz" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 28748C4AF0C; Thu, 30 May 2024 23:36:25 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1717112185; bh=Tc3mfR659n1UEdqi4bi378GMou0NHGPpevDsK5F2eK8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=hJapuffzj+Ah08nz7JesYCuLgG7/6ADXBDTv3ViohtuON8qxHJbSTLm5+M8K5tkWA cop6ZnUrO5EqoQSq4cw0YdUx9bBmKYIH/MJFoMt8aKDvARHu9J5ZSKJSeYh5/Yg4kO 5nC8QF3Kpd8iQhz5BztnXw+KXFBKG9AnNJqJk7Ojf/AAE4k+0MynVOnPEUnoXhXgJk rCMAZV+qoqWX0qrBLjybF+nNRi8YK2TjlgTpTNV9ahv0iU1qgrgEXJLYvZ8MTg0ueb 07SgCM8sPTS2EKmJRMYV7mmrqsl+1rRGbJIhKT4gBPL3HYNuhjBKdFVDp4lPOFQ3Fr y1CbDKreim89Q== From: Jakub Kicinski To: edumazet@google.com, pabeni@redhat.com Cc: davem@davemloft.net, netdev@vger.kernel.org, mptcp@lists.linux.dev, matttbe@kernel.org, martineau@kernel.org, borisp@nvidia.com, willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com, Jakub Kicinski Subject: [PATCH net-next 2/3] tcp: add a helper for setting EOR on tail skb Date: Thu, 30 May 2024 16:36:15 -0700 Message-ID: <20240530233616.85897-3-kuba@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.45.1 In-Reply-To: <20240530233616.85897-1-kuba@kernel.org> References: <20240530233616.85897-1-kuba@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org TLS (and hopefully soon PSP will) use EOR to prevent skbs with different decrypted state from getting merged, without adding new tests to the skb handling. In both cases once the connection switches to an "encrypted" state, all subsequent skbs will be encrypted, so a single "EOR fence" is sufficient to prevent mixing. Add a helper for setting the EOR bit, to make this arrangement more explicit. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn --- include/net/tcp.h | 9 +++++++++ net/tls/tls_device.c | 11 ++--------- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h index 32741856da01..08c3b99501cf 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp.h +++ b/include/net/tcp.h @@ -1066,6 +1066,7 @@ static inline bool tcp_skb_can_collapse_to(const struct sk_buff *skb) static inline bool tcp_skb_can_collapse(const struct sk_buff *to, const struct sk_buff *from) { + /* skb_cmp_decrypted() not needed, use tcp_write_collapse_fence() */ return likely(tcp_skb_can_collapse_to(to) && mptcp_skb_can_collapse(to, from) && skb_pure_zcopy_same(to, from)); @@ -2102,6 +2103,14 @@ static inline void tcp_rtx_queue_unlink_and_free(struct sk_buff *skb, struct soc tcp_wmem_free_skb(sk, skb); } +static inline void tcp_write_collapse_fence(struct sock *sk) +{ + struct sk_buff *skb = tcp_write_queue_tail(sk); + + if (skb) + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->eor = 1; +} + static inline void tcp_push_pending_frames(struct sock *sk) { if (tcp_send_head(sk)) { diff --git a/net/tls/tls_device.c b/net/tls/tls_device.c index ab6e694f7bc2..dc063c2c7950 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_device.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_device.c @@ -231,14 +231,10 @@ static void tls_device_resync_tx(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *tls_ctx, u32 seq) { struct net_device *netdev; - struct sk_buff *skb; int err = 0; u8 *rcd_sn; - skb = tcp_write_queue_tail(sk); - if (skb) - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->eor = 1; - + tcp_write_collapse_fence(sk); rcd_sn = tls_ctx->tx.rec_seq; trace_tls_device_tx_resync_send(sk, seq, rcd_sn); @@ -1067,7 +1063,6 @@ int tls_set_device_offload(struct sock *sk) struct tls_prot_info *prot; struct net_device *netdev; struct tls_context *ctx; - struct sk_buff *skb; char *iv, *rec_seq; int rc; @@ -1138,9 +1133,7 @@ int tls_set_device_offload(struct sock *sk) * SKBs where only part of the payload needs to be encrypted. * So mark the last skb in the write queue as end of record. */ - skb = tcp_write_queue_tail(sk); - if (skb) - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->eor = 1; + tcp_write_collapse_fence(sk); /* Avoid offloading if the device is down * We don't want to offload new flows after