From patchwork Tue Jul 26 06:15:18 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 12928686 X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5CBDFC43334 for ; Tue, 26 Jul 2022 06:19:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S237795AbiGZGTH (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 Jul 2022 02:19:07 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:33126 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237739AbiGZGSC (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 Jul 2022 02:18:02 -0400 Received: from mail-ed1-x52b.google.com (mail-ed1-x52b.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::52b]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 35E7F28E2E; Mon, 25 Jul 2022 23:16:09 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ed1-x52b.google.com with SMTP id z18so4177452edb.10; Mon, 25 Jul 2022 23:16:09 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=e7myX/ND+nnIiOt3LqG3ckuwVwkBkqrIptHUR/Mrndk=; b=aoUFkzSP9HiIWB67aQOoXj1Rc4axgzCSfputg/q3IJ1fCaTEbGsdSEHOI5OQw7x1hE Ymbl1qZ3WYtrJxKp4A4PVE6J3snFIb4u75Y92r8qCNjMr9kgJni2+D0TamDLQxvmlpUM 02qJs4u0S9OunmfbB0PejlUxIES3gFE/ER4vDRAZBkzsV8iYa334ezXiSnVNIFLOWGk6 Kx1tF1TymeITuGlqQiVdrva0aRZ12JL9H5cMX7Hdnr4RAKBUs4Ivt2SgH7SokaP0H3aB Mi7fvRtGwpok9ZHLQtOR6EZ3oCLdTOH4lYfTZAdRKfwKP86PAdTQ3qZr5Q+gb1qPH5kN gMXA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=e7myX/ND+nnIiOt3LqG3ckuwVwkBkqrIptHUR/Mrndk=; b=yPfcbYKGJvqnRVN4Ew5Glj7PUVqT9RklYfa6cPtImiYxrqbdoahLaaaMHxr/zWsuyT ix+wHsGpCpYFPpDwlBVqGs4XpMUEAd9gJWn9aHFSngQk39Wk6/uIgZxaZ/fCaken5iuZ hQ1UWhA3B4Lq2D0ScEgctvBTI186xgaOqTfbBscALU8+SDR33TdJnecZu8xox7TyhSPa ewAGJYlgWboUokJvCM785BVcsgZIj8sOzQSBtbdqlF2lI0xB82C6f32PzOv6JK2dJHze mT6hcFk9q7EZcubml2ScKqcTA0fmzSrqpJ/qBzyVYjMrEy6E3NyuL+hIA9BZwpmnhc2v Z3XQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AJIora8uHwbke4Sh8dWPbpYYYRLAxY4FaejgWLI51zPpA8EOqVSuwdjn q2Id9WAZAVarMRbU1df/OMg= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGRyM1sOrSpjLQhgvLHw8PGaap7ngpZhAQekO8o3CGoodB+MTsxHdRrzASJ+zzDiNZAOnXXFxMyzqg== X-Received: by 2002:aa7:d994:0:b0:43b:d187:69fd with SMTP id u20-20020aa7d994000000b0043bd18769fdmr16629603eds.201.1658816168761; Mon, 25 Jul 2022 23:16:08 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([2a04:241e:502:a080:2b68:36a:5a94:4ba1]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id l23-20020a056402345700b0043ba7df7a42sm8133067edc.26.2022.07.25.23.16.06 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 25 Jul 2022 23:16:08 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 16/26] tcp: authopt: Add NOSEND/NORECV flags Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2022 09:15:18 +0300 Message-Id: <42a151fcdbae9ccbcfe5916324d40c904f98d9b2.1658815925.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org Add flags to allow marking individual keys and invalid for send or recv. Making keys assymetric this way is not mentioned in RFC5925 but RFC8177 requires that keys inside a keychain have independent "accept" and "send" lifetimes. Flag names are negative so that the default behavior is for keys to be valid for both send and recv. Setting both NOSEND and NORECV for a certain peer address can be used on a listen socket can be used to mean "TCP-AO is required from this peer but no keys are currently valid". Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 4 ++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 9 ++++++++- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h index a7f5f918ed5a..ed27feb93b0e 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h @@ -401,16 +401,20 @@ struct tcp_authopt { * * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL: Delete the key and ignore non-id fields * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS: Exclude TCP options from signature * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.addr` * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.ifindex` + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND: Key invalid for send (expired) + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV: Key invalid for recv (expired) */ enum tcp_authopt_key_flag { TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL = (1 << 0), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS = (1 << 1), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND = (1 << 2), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX = (1 << 3), + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND = (1 << 4), + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV = (1 << 5), }; /** * enum tcp_authopt_alg - Algorithms for TCP Authentication Option */ diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index bb26fb1c8af2..0ead961fcfe0 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -374,10 +374,12 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_send(struct netns_tcp_aut int l3index = -1; hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &net->head, node, 0) { if (send_id >= 0 && key->send_id != send_id) continue; + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND) + continue; if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) if (!tcp_authopt_key_match_sk_addr(key, addr_sk)) continue; if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) { if (l3index < 0) @@ -623,11 +625,13 @@ int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt) #define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND | \ - TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV) int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { struct tcp_authopt_key opt; struct tcp_authopt_info *info; @@ -1534,10 +1538,13 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_recv(struct sock *sk, if (l3index != key->l3index) continue; } *anykey = true; + // If only keys with norecv flag are present still consider that + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV) + continue; if (recv_id >= 0 && key->recv_id != recv_id) continue; if (better_key_match(result, key)) result = key; else if (result)