[bpf-next,1/2] bpf: fixes typos in comments

Commit Message

Rafael Passos April 17, 2024, 6:49 p.m. UTC

I found the following typos in the comments, and fixed them:
s/unpriviledged/unprivileged/
s/reponsible/responsible/
s/possiblities/possibilities/
s/Divison/Division/
s/precsion/precision/
s/havea/have a/
s/reponsible/responsible/
s/responsibile/responsible/
s/tigher/tighter/
s/respecitve/respective/

Signed-off-by: Rafael Passos <[e-mail]>
---
 kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c |  2 +-
 kernel/bpf/core.c              |  2 +-
 kernel/bpf/hashtab.c           |  2 +-
 kernel/bpf/helpers.c           |  2 +-
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c          | 12 ++++++------
 5 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

Comments

[e-mail] April 22, 2024, 4 p.m. UTC | #1

Hello:

This patch was applied to bpf/bpf-next.git (master)
by Daniel Borkmann <[e-mail]>:

On Wed, 17 Apr 2024 15:49:14 -0300 you wrote:
> I found the following typos in the comments, and fixed them:
> s/unpriviledged/unprivileged/
> s/reponsible/responsible/
> s/possiblities/possibilities/
> s/Divison/Division/
> s/precsion/precision/
> s/havea/have a/
> s/reponsible/responsible/
> s/responsibile/responsible/
> s/tigher/tighter/
> s/respecitve/respective/
> 
> [...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - [bpf-next,1/2] bpf: fixes typos in comments
    https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/a7de265cb2d8

You are awesome, thank you!

Patch

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c
index bdea1a459153..976cb258a0ed 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@  static bool check_storage_bpf_ma(struct bpf_local_storage *local_storage,
 	 *
 	 * If the local_storage->list is already empty, the caller will not
 	 * care about the bpf_ma value also because the caller is not
-	 * responsibile to free the local_storage.
+	 * responsible to free the local_storage.
 	 */
 
 	if (storage_smap)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index a41718eaeefe..95c7fd093e55 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -2814,7 +2814,7 @@  void bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_prog_free);
 
-/* RNG for unpriviledged user space with separated state from prandom_u32(). */
+/* RNG for unprivileged user space with separated state from prandom_u32(). */
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, bpf_user_rnd_state);
 
 void bpf_user_rnd_init_once(void)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
index 83a9a74260e9..c3e79a0b9361 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
@@ -1539,7 +1539,7 @@  static void htab_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
 	 */
 
 	/* htab no longer uses call_rcu() directly. bpf_mem_alloc does it
-	 * underneath and is reponsible for waiting for callbacks to finish
+	 * underneath and is responsible for waiting for callbacks to finish
 	 * during bpf_mem_alloc_destroy().
 	 */
 	if (!htab_is_prealloc(htab)) {
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
index 8cde717137bd..61126180d398 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
@@ -2412,7 +2412,7 @@  __bpf_kfunc void *bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr(const struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr, u32 o
 	/* bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr is the same logic as bpf_dynptr_slice.
 	 *
 	 * For skb-type dynptrs, it is safe to write into the returned pointer
-	 * if the bpf program allows skb data writes. There are two possiblities
+	 * if the bpf program allows skb data writes. There are two possibilities
 	 * that may occur when calling bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr:
 	 *
 	 * 1) The requested slice is in the head of the skb. In this case, the
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 68cfd6fc6ad4..537cdccb8363 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@  static bool bpf_global_percpu_ma_set;
 
 /* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */
 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem {
-	/* verifer state is 'st'
+	/* verifier state is 'st'
 	 * before processing instruction 'insn_idx'
 	 * and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx'
 	 */
@@ -2131,7 +2131,7 @@  static void __reg64_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
 static void __reg_deduce_mixed_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
 {
 	/* Try to tighten 64-bit bounds from 32-bit knowledge, using 32-bit
-	 * values on both sides of 64-bit range in hope to have tigher range.
+	 * values on both sides of 64-bit range in hope to have tighter range.
 	 * E.g., if r1 is [0x1'00000000, 0x3'80000000], and we learn from
 	 * 32-bit signed > 0 operation that s32 bounds are now [1; 0x7fffffff].
 	 * With this, we can substitute 1 as low 32-bits of _low_ 64-bit bound
@@ -2139,7 +2139,7 @@  static void __reg_deduce_mixed_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
 	 * _high_ 64-bit bound (0x380000000 -> 0x37fffffff) and arrive at a
 	 * better overall bounds for r1 as [0x1'000000001; 0x3'7fffffff].
 	 * We just need to make sure that derived bounds we are intersecting
-	 * with are well-formed ranges in respecitve s64 or u64 domain, just
+	 * with are well-formed ranges in respective s64 or u64 domain, just
 	 * like we do with similar kinds of 32-to-64 or 64-to-32 adjustments.
 	 */
 	__u64 new_umin, new_umax;
@@ -14714,7 +14714,7 @@  static void regs_refine_cond_op(struct bpf_reg_state *reg1, struct bpf_reg_state
 
 /* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg and
  * src_reg are both SCALAR_VALUE registers (or we are simply doing a BPF_K
- * check, in which case we havea fake SCALAR_VALUE representing insn->imm).
+ * check, in which case we have a fake SCALAR_VALUE representing insn->imm).
  * Technically we can do similar adjustments for pointers to the same object,
  * but we don't support that right now.
  */
@@ -17352,7 +17352,7 @@  static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
 			err = propagate_liveness(env, &sl->state, cur);
 
 			/* if previous state reached the exit with precision and
-			 * current state is equivalent to it (except precsion marks)
+			 * current state is equivalent to it (except precision marks)
 			 * the precision needs to be propagated back in
 			 * the current state.
 			 */
@@ -20209,7 +20209,7 @@  static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 			 * divide-by-3 through multiplication, followed by further
 			 * division by 8 through 3-bit right shift.
 			 * Refer to book "Hacker's Delight, 2nd ed." by Henry S. Warren, Jr.,
-			 * p. 227, chapter "Unsigned Divison by 3" for details and proofs.
+			 * p. 227, chapter "Unsigned Division by 3" for details and proofs.
 			 *
 			 * N / 3 <=> M * N / 2^33, where M = (2^33 + 1) / 3 = 0xaaaaaaab.
 			 */