From patchwork Thu Nov 18 22:04:58 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Eric W. Biederman" X-Patchwork-Id: 12627783 X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8C8B1C433FE for ; Thu, 18 Nov 2021 22:05:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6FAC661108 for ; Thu, 18 Nov 2021 22:05:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231377AbhKRWIJ (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Nov 2021 17:08:09 -0500 Received: from out01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.231]:53614 "EHLO out01.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229457AbhKRWIJ (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Nov 2021 17:08:09 -0500 Received: from in02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.52]:33116) by out01.mta.xmission.com with esmtps (TLS1.3) tls TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (Exim 4.93) (envelope-from ) id 1mnpWl-00Duya-6Y; Thu, 18 Nov 2021 15:05:07 -0700 Received: from ip68-227-160-95.om.om.cox.net ([68.227.160.95]:52894 helo=email.froward.int.ebiederm.org.xmission.com) by in02.mta.xmission.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.3) tls TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (Exim 4.93) (envelope-from ) id 1mnpWj-00Auvb-Ue; Thu, 18 Nov 2021 15:05:06 -0700 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Cc: Kyle Huey , Linus Torvalds , Andrea Righi , Shuah Khan , Alexei Starovoitov , Andy Lutomirski , Will Drewry , "open list\:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK" , bpf , linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, Robert O'Callahan , Kees Cook , Oliver Sang , lkp@lists.01.org, lkp@intel.com References: <202111171049.3F9C5F1@keescook> <87k0h6334w.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org> <202111171341.41053845C3@keescook> <202111171728.D85A4E2571@keescook> <87h7c9qg7p.fsf_-_@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org> Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 16:04:58 -0600 In-Reply-To: <87h7c9qg7p.fsf_-_@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org> (Eric W. Biederman's message of "Thu, 18 Nov 2021 15:58:02 -0600") Message-ID: <877dd5qfw5.fsf_-_@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/26.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-XM-SPF: eid=1mnpWj-00Auvb-Ue;;;mid=<877dd5qfw5.fsf_-_@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org>;;;hst=in02.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=68.227.160.95;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1/G8oOihSXjjRKLIib4SU0fG4hFBG0x2jw= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 68.227.160.95 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com Subject: [PATCH 1/2] signal: Don't always set SA_IMMUTABLE for forced signals X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Sat, 08 Feb 2020 21:53:50 +0000) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: bpf@vger.kernel.org Recently to prevent issues with SECCOMP_RET_KILL and similar signals being changed before they are delivered SA_IMMUTABLE was added. Unfortunately this broke debuggers[1][2] which reasonably expect to be able to trap synchronous SIGTRAP and SIGSEGV even when the target process is not configured to handle those signals. Update force_sig_to_task to support both the case when we can allow the debugger to intercept and possibly ignore the signal and the case when it is not safe to let userspace known about the signal until the process has exited. Reported-by: Kyle Huey Reported-by: kernel test robot Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAP045AoMY4xf8aC_4QU_-j7obuEPYgTcnQQP3Yxk=2X90jtpjw@mail.gmail.com [2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211117150258.GB5403@xsang-OptiPlex-902 Fixes: 00b06da29cf9 ("signal: Add SA_IMMUTABLE to ensure forced siganls do not get changed") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Tested-by: Kees Cook --- kernel/signal.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c index 7c4b7ae714d4..02058c983bd6 100644 --- a/kernel/signal.c +++ b/kernel/signal.c @@ -1298,6 +1298,12 @@ int do_send_sig_info(int sig, struct kernel_siginfo *info, struct task_struct *p return ret; } +enum sig_handler { + HANDLER_CURRENT, /* If reachable use the current handler */ + HANDLER_SIG_DFL, /* Always use SIG_DFL handler semantics */ + HANDLER_EXIT, /* Only visible as the proces exit code */ +}; + /* * Force a signal that the process can't ignore: if necessary * we unblock the signal and change any SIG_IGN to SIG_DFL. @@ -1310,7 +1316,8 @@ int do_send_sig_info(int sig, struct kernel_siginfo *info, struct task_struct *p * that is why we also clear SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE. */ static int -force_sig_info_to_task(struct kernel_siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t, bool sigdfl) +force_sig_info_to_task(struct kernel_siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t, + enum sig_handler handler) { unsigned long int flags; int ret, blocked, ignored; @@ -1321,9 +1328,10 @@ force_sig_info_to_task(struct kernel_siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t, bool action = &t->sighand->action[sig-1]; ignored = action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_IGN; blocked = sigismember(&t->blocked, sig); - if (blocked || ignored || sigdfl) { + if (blocked || ignored || (handler != HANDLER_CURRENT)) { action->sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL; - action->sa.sa_flags |= SA_IMMUTABLE; + if (handler == HANDLER_EXIT) + action->sa.sa_flags |= SA_IMMUTABLE; if (blocked) { sigdelset(&t->blocked, sig); recalc_sigpending_and_wake(t); @@ -1343,7 +1351,7 @@ force_sig_info_to_task(struct kernel_siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t, bool int force_sig_info(struct kernel_siginfo *info) { - return force_sig_info_to_task(info, current, false); + return force_sig_info_to_task(info, current, HANDLER_CURRENT); } /* @@ -1660,7 +1668,7 @@ void force_fatal_sig(int sig) info.si_code = SI_KERNEL; info.si_pid = 0; info.si_uid = 0; - force_sig_info_to_task(&info, current, true); + force_sig_info_to_task(&info, current, HANDLER_SIG_DFL); } /* @@ -1693,7 +1701,7 @@ int force_sig_fault_to_task(int sig, int code, void __user *addr info.si_flags = flags; info.si_isr = isr; #endif - return force_sig_info_to_task(&info, t, false); + return force_sig_info_to_task(&info, t, HANDLER_CURRENT); } int force_sig_fault(int sig, int code, void __user *addr @@ -1813,7 +1821,8 @@ int force_sig_seccomp(int syscall, int reason, bool force_coredump) info.si_errno = reason; info.si_arch = syscall_get_arch(current); info.si_syscall = syscall; - return force_sig_info_to_task(&info, current, force_coredump); + return force_sig_info_to_task(&info, current, + force_coredump ? HANDLER_EXIT : HANDLER_CURRENT); } /* For the crazy architectures that include trap information in