@@ -891,14 +891,8 @@ tls_device_reencrypt(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
struct strp_msg *rxm;
char *orig_buf, *buf;
- switch (tls_ctx->crypto_recv.info.cipher_type) {
- case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128:
- case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256:
- break;
- default:
- return -EINVAL;
- }
cipher_desc = get_cipher_desc(tls_ctx->crypto_recv.info.cipher_type);
+ DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(!cipher_desc || !cipher_desc->offloadable);
rxm = strp_msg(tls_strp_msg(sw_ctx));
orig_buf = kmalloc(rxm->full_len + TLS_HEADER_SIZE + cipher_desc->iv,
@@ -62,14 +62,8 @@ static int tls_enc_record(struct aead_request *aead_req,
u16 len;
int rc;
- switch (prot->cipher_type) {
- case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128:
- case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256:
- break;
- default:
- return -EINVAL;
- }
cipher_desc = get_cipher_desc(prot->cipher_type);
+ DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(!cipher_desc || !cipher_desc->offloadable);
buf_size = TLS_HEADER_SIZE + cipher_desc->iv;
len = min_t(int, *in_len, buf_size);
@@ -338,14 +332,9 @@ static struct sk_buff *tls_enc_skb(struct tls_context *tls_ctx,
if (!aead_req)
return NULL;
- switch (tls_ctx->crypto_send.info.cipher_type) {
- case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128:
- case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256:
- break;
- default:
- goto free_req;
- }
cipher_desc = get_cipher_desc(tls_ctx->crypto_send.info.cipher_type);
+ DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(!cipher_desc || !cipher_desc->offloadable);
+
buf_len = cipher_desc->salt + cipher_desc->iv + TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE +
sync_size + cipher_desc->tag;
buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
We should never reach tls_device_reencrypt, tls_enc_record, or tls_enc_skb with a cipher_type that can't be offloaded. Replace those checks with a DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE, and use cipher_desc instead of hard-coding offloadable cipher types. Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> --- net/tls/tls_device.c | 8 +------- net/tls/tls_device_fallback.c | 17 +++-------------- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)