@@ -140,10 +140,12 @@ struct tcp_request_sock {
static inline struct tcp_request_sock *tcp_rsk(const struct request_sock *req)
{
return (struct tcp_request_sock *)req;
}
+struct tcp_authopt_info;
+
struct tcp_sock {
/* inet_connection_sock has to be the first member of tcp_sock */
struct inet_connection_sock inet_conn;
u16 tcp_header_len; /* Bytes of tcp header to send */
u16 gso_segs; /* Max number of segs per GSO packet */
@@ -403,10 +405,14 @@ struct tcp_sock {
/* TCP MD5 Signature Option information */
struct tcp_md5sig_info __rcu *md5sig_info;
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT
+ struct tcp_authopt_info __rcu *authopt_info;
+#endif
+
/* TCP fastopen related information */
struct tcp_fastopen_request *fastopen_req;
/* fastopen_rsk points to request_sock that resulted in this big
* socket. Used to retransmit SYNACKs etc.
*/
@@ -453,10 +459,13 @@ struct tcp_timewait_sock {
int tw_ts_recent_stamp;
u32 tw_tx_delay;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
struct tcp_md5sig_key *tw_md5_key;
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT
+ struct tcp_authopt_info *tw_authopt_info;
+#endif
};
static inline struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcp_twsk(const struct sock *sk)
{
return (struct tcp_timewait_sock *)sk;
@@ -32,10 +32,11 @@
#include <net/netns/can.h>
#include <net/netns/xdp.h>
#include <net/netns/smc.h>
#include <net/netns/bpf.h>
#include <net/netns/mctp.h>
+#include <net/netns/tcp_authopt.h>
#include <net/net_trackers.h>
#include <linux/ns_common.h>
#include <linux/idr.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/notifier.h>
@@ -176,10 +177,13 @@ struct net {
#endif
struct sock *diag_nlsk;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMC)
struct netns_smc smc;
#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT)
+ struct netns_tcp_authopt tcp_authopt;
+#endif
} __randomize_layout;
#include <linux/seq_file_net.h>
/* Init's network namespace */
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __NETNS_TCP_AUTHOPT_H__
+#define __NETNS_TCP_AUTHOPT_H__
+
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+
+struct netns_tcp_authopt {
+ struct hlist_head head;
+ struct mutex mutex;
+};
+
+#endif /* __NETNS_TCP_AUTHOPT_H__ */
@@ -184,10 +184,11 @@ void tcp_time_wait(struct sock *sk, int state, int timeo);
#define TCPOPT_WINDOW 3 /* Window scaling */
#define TCPOPT_SACK_PERM 4 /* SACK Permitted */
#define TCPOPT_SACK 5 /* SACK Block */
#define TCPOPT_TIMESTAMP 8 /* Better RTT estimations/PAWS */
#define TCPOPT_MD5SIG 19 /* MD5 Signature (RFC2385) */
+#define TCPOPT_AUTHOPT 29 /* Auth Option (RFC5925) */
#define TCPOPT_MPTCP 30 /* Multipath TCP (RFC6824) */
#define TCPOPT_FASTOPEN 34 /* Fast open (RFC7413) */
#define TCPOPT_EXP 254 /* Experimental */
/* Magic number to be after the option value for sharing TCP
* experimental options. See draft-ietf-tcpm-experimental-options-00.txt
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+#ifndef _LINUX_TCP_AUTHOPT_H
+#define _LINUX_TCP_AUTHOPT_H
+
+#include <uapi/linux/tcp.h>
+#include <net/netns/tcp_authopt.h>
+#include <linux/tcp.h>
+
+/**
+ * struct tcp_authopt_key_info - Representation of a Master Key Tuple as per RFC5925
+ *
+ * Key structure lifetime is protected by RCU so send/recv code needs to hold a
+ * single rcu_read_lock until they're done with the key.
+ *
+ * Global keys can be cached in sockets, this requires increasing kref.
+ */
+struct tcp_authopt_key_info {
+ /** @node: node in &netns_tcp_authopt.head list */
+ struct hlist_node node;
+ /** @rcu: for kfree_rcu */
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+ /** @ref: for kref_put */
+ struct kref ref;
+ /** @flags: Combination of &enum tcp_authopt_key_flag */
+ u32 flags;
+ /** @send_id: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.send_id */
+ u8 send_id;
+ /** @recv_id: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.recv_id */
+ u8 recv_id;
+ /** @alg_id: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.alg */
+ u8 alg_id;
+ /** @keylen: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.keylen */
+ u8 keylen;
+ /** @key: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.key */
+ u8 key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN];
+ /** @addr: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.addr */
+ struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct tcp_authopt_info - Per-socket information regarding tcp_authopt
+ *
+ * This is lazy-initialized in order to avoid increasing memory usage for
+ * regular TCP sockets. Once created it is only destroyed on socket close.
+ */
+struct tcp_authopt_info {
+ /** @rcu: for kfree_rcu */
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+ /** @flags: Combination of &enum tcp_authopt_key_flag */
+ u32 flags;
+ /** @src_isn: Local Initial Sequence Number */
+ u32 src_isn;
+ /** @dst_isn: Remote Initial Sequence Number */
+ u32 dst_isn;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT
+void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk);
+int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen);
+int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *key);
+int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen);
+#else
+static inline int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen)
+{
+ return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+}
+static inline int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *key)
+{
+ return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+}
+static inline void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk)
+{
+}
+static inline int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen)
+{
+ return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_TCP_AUTHOPT_H */
@@ -126,10 +126,12 @@ enum {
#define TCP_INQ 36 /* Notify bytes available to read as a cmsg on read */
#define TCP_CM_INQ TCP_INQ
#define TCP_TX_DELAY 37 /* delay outgoing packets by XX usec */
+#define TCP_AUTHOPT 38 /* TCP Authentication Option (RFC5925) */
+#define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY 39 /* TCP Authentication Option Key (RFC5925) */
#define TCP_REPAIR_ON 1
#define TCP_REPAIR_OFF 0
#define TCP_REPAIR_OFF_NO_WP -1 /* Turn off without window probes */
@@ -340,10 +342,89 @@ struct tcp_diag_md5sig {
__u16 tcpm_keylen;
__be32 tcpm_addr[4];
__u8 tcpm_key[TCP_MD5SIG_MAXKEYLEN];
};
+/**
+ * enum tcp_authopt_flag - flags for `tcp_authopt.flags`
+ */
+enum tcp_authopt_flag {
+ /**
+ * @TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED:
+ * Configure behavior of segments with TCP-AO coming from hosts for which no
+ * key is configured. The default recommended by RFC is to silently accept
+ * such connections.
+ */
+ TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED = (1 << 2),
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct tcp_authopt - Per-socket options related to TCP Authentication Option
+ */
+struct tcp_authopt {
+ /** @flags: Combination of &enum tcp_authopt_flag */
+ __u32 flags;
+};
+
+/**
+ * enum tcp_authopt_key_flag - flags for `tcp_authopt.flags`
+ *
+ * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL: Delete the key and ignore non-id fields
+ * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS: Exclude TCP options from signature
+ * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.addr`
+ */
+enum tcp_authopt_key_flag {
+ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL = (1 << 0),
+ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS = (1 << 1),
+ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND = (1 << 2),
+};
+
+/**
+ * enum tcp_authopt_alg - Algorithms for TCP Authentication Option
+ */
+enum tcp_authopt_alg {
+ /** @TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_HMAC_SHA_1_96: HMAC-SHA-1-96 as described in RFC5926 */
+ TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_HMAC_SHA_1_96 = 1,
+ /** @TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_AES_128_CMAC_96: AES-128-CMAC-96 as described in RFC5926 */
+ TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_AES_128_CMAC_96 = 2,
+};
+
+/* for TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY socket option */
+#define TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN 80
+
+/**
+ * struct tcp_authopt_key - TCP Authentication KEY
+ *
+ * Key are identified by the combination of:
+ * - send_id
+ * - recv_id
+ * - addr (iff TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND)
+ *
+ * RFC5925 requires that key ids must not overlap for the same TCP connection.
+ * This is not enforced by linux.
+ */
+struct tcp_authopt_key {
+ /** @flags: Combination of &enum tcp_authopt_key_flag */
+ __u32 flags;
+ /** @send_id: keyid value for send */
+ __u8 send_id;
+ /** @recv_id: keyid value for receive */
+ __u8 recv_id;
+ /** @alg: One of &enum tcp_authopt_alg */
+ __u8 alg;
+ /** @keylen: Length of the key buffer */
+ __u8 keylen;
+ /** @key: Secret key */
+ __u8 key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN];
+ /**
+ * @addr: Key is only valid for this address
+ *
+ * Ignored unless TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND flag is set
+ */
+ struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage addr;
+};
+
/* setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE, ...) */
#define TCP_RECEIVE_ZEROCOPY_FLAG_TLB_CLEAN_HINT 0x1
struct tcp_zerocopy_receive {
__u64 address; /* in: address of mapping */
@@ -740,5 +740,19 @@ config TCP_MD5SIG
RFC2385 specifies a method of giving MD5 protection to TCP sessions.
Its main (only?) use is to protect BGP sessions between core routers
on the Internet.
If unsure, say N.
+
+config TCP_AUTHOPT
+ bool "TCP: Authentication Option support (RFC5925)"
+ select CRYPTO
+ select CRYPTO_SHA1
+ select CRYPTO_HMAC
+ select CRYPTO_AES
+ select CRYPTO_CMAC
+ help
+ RFC5925 specifies a new method of giving protection to TCP sessions.
+ Its intended use is to protect BGP sessions between core routers
+ on the Internet. It obsoletes TCP MD5 (RFC2385) but is incompatible.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
@@ -59,10 +59,11 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_NV) += tcp_nv.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_VENO) += tcp_veno.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_SCALABLE) += tcp_scalable.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_LP) += tcp_lp.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_YEAH) += tcp_yeah.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_ILLINOIS) += tcp_illinois.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) += tcp_authopt.o
obj-$(CONFIG_NET_SOCK_MSG) += tcp_bpf.o
obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += udp_bpf.o
obj-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += cipso_ipv4.o
obj-$(CONFIG_XFRM) += xfrm4_policy.o xfrm4_state.o xfrm4_input.o \
@@ -270,10 +270,11 @@
#include <net/icmp.h>
#include <net/inet_common.h>
#include <net/tcp.h>
#include <net/mptcp.h>
+#include <net/tcp_authopt.h>
#include <net/xfrm.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -3602,10 +3603,16 @@ static int do_tcp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
case TCP_MD5SIG:
case TCP_MD5SIG_EXT:
err = tp->af_specific->md5_parse(sk, optname, optval, optlen);
break;
#endif
+ case TCP_AUTHOPT:
+ err = tcp_set_authopt(sk, optval, optlen);
+ break;
+ case TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY:
+ err = tcp_set_authopt_key(sk, optval, optlen);
+ break;
case TCP_USER_TIMEOUT:
/* Cap the max time in ms TCP will retry or probe the window
* before giving up and aborting (ETIMEDOUT) a connection.
*/
if (val < 0)
@@ -4251,10 +4258,33 @@ static int do_tcp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level,
if (!err && copy_to_user(optval, &zc, len))
err = -EFAULT;
return err;
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT
+ case TCP_AUTHOPT: {
+ struct tcp_authopt info;
+ int err;
+
+ if (get_user(len, optlen))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ lock_sock(sk);
+ err = tcp_get_authopt_val(sk, &info);
+ release_sock(sk);
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(info));
+ if (put_user(len, optlen))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_to_user(optval, &info, len))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
if (put_user(len, optlen))
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+
+#include <net/tcp_authopt.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include <net/tcp.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
+
+static inline struct netns_tcp_authopt *sock_net_tcp_authopt(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+ return &sock_net(sk)->tcp_authopt;
+}
+
+static void tcp_authopt_key_release_kref(struct kref *ref)
+{
+ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key = container_of(ref, struct tcp_authopt_key_info, ref);
+
+ kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
+}
+
+static void tcp_authopt_key_put(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key)
+{
+ if (key)
+ kref_put(&key->ref, tcp_authopt_key_release_kref);
+}
+
+static void tcp_authopt_key_del(struct netns_tcp_authopt *net,
+ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key)
+{
+ lockdep_assert_held(&net->mutex);
+ hlist_del_rcu(&key->node);
+ key->flags |= TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL;
+ kref_put(&key->ref, tcp_authopt_key_release_kref);
+}
+
+/* Free info and keys.
+ * Don't touch tp->authopt_info, it might not even be assigned yes.
+ */
+void tcp_authopt_free(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt_info *info)
+{
+ kfree_rcu(info, rcu);
+}
+
+/* Free everything and clear tcp_sock.authopt_info to NULL */
+void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct tcp_authopt_info *info;
+
+ info = rcu_dereference_protected(tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk));
+ if (info) {
+ tcp_authopt_free(sk, info);
+ tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/* checks that ipv4 or ipv6 addr matches. */
+static bool ipvx_addr_match(struct sockaddr_storage *a1,
+ struct sockaddr_storage *a2)
+{
+ if (a1->ss_family != a2->ss_family)
+ return false;
+ if (a1->ss_family == AF_INET &&
+ (((struct sockaddr_in *)a1)->sin_addr.s_addr !=
+ ((struct sockaddr_in *)a2)->sin_addr.s_addr))
+ return false;
+ if (a1->ss_family == AF_INET6 &&
+ !ipv6_addr_equal(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)a1)->sin6_addr,
+ &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)a2)->sin6_addr))
+ return false;
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_exact(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *info,
+ struct tcp_authopt_key *key)
+{
+ if (info->send_id != key->send_id)
+ return false;
+ if (info->recv_id != key->recv_id)
+ return false;
+ if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND))
+ return false;
+ if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND)
+ if (!ipvx_addr_match(&info->addr, &key->addr))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_key_lookup_exact(const struct sock *sk,
+ struct netns_tcp_authopt *net,
+ struct tcp_authopt_key *ukey)
+{
+ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key_info, &net->head, node, lockdep_is_held(&net->mutex))
+ if (tcp_authopt_key_match_exact(key_info, ukey))
+ return key_info;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct tcp_authopt_info *__tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
+ struct tcp_authopt_info *info;
+
+ info = rcu_dereference_check(tp->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk));
+ if (info)
+ return info;
+
+ info = kzalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!info)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ sk_gso_disable(sk);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(tp->authopt_info, info);
+
+ return info;
+}
+
+#define TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \
+ TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED)
+
+/* Like copy_from_sockopt except tolerate different optlen for compatibility reasons
+ *
+ * If the src is shorter then it's from an old userspace and the rest of dst is
+ * filled with zeros.
+ *
+ * If the dst is shorter then src is from a newer userspace and we only accept
+ * if the rest of the option is all zeros.
+ *
+ * This allows sockopts to grow as long as for new fields zeros has no effect.
+ */
+static int _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant(u8 *dst,
+ unsigned int dstlen,
+ sockptr_t src,
+ unsigned int srclen)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ /* If userspace optlen is too short fill the rest with zeros */
+ if (srclen > dstlen) {
+ if (sockptr_is_kernel(src))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ err = check_zeroed_user(src.user + dstlen, srclen - dstlen);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+ if (err == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ err = copy_from_sockptr(dst, src, min(srclen, dstlen));
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (srclen < dstlen)
+ memset(dst + srclen, 0, dstlen - srclen);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen)
+{
+ struct tcp_authopt opt;
+ struct tcp_authopt_info *info;
+ int err;
+
+ sock_owned_by_me(sk);
+
+ err = _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant((u8 *)&opt, sizeof(opt), optval, optlen);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (opt.flags & ~TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ info = __tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(sk);
+ if (IS_ERR(info))
+ return PTR_ERR(info);
+
+ info->flags = opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt)
+{
+ struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
+ struct tcp_authopt_info *info;
+
+ sock_owned_by_me(sk);
+
+ memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt));
+ info = rcu_dereference_check(tp->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk));
+ if (!info)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ opt->flags = info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \
+ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL | \
+ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS | \
+ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND)
+
+int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen)
+{
+ struct tcp_authopt_key opt;
+ struct tcp_authopt_info *info;
+ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info, *old_key_info;
+ struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = sock_net_tcp_authopt(sk);
+ int err;
+
+ sock_owned_by_me(sk);
+ if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ err = _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant((u8 *)&opt, sizeof(opt), optval, optlen);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (opt.flags & ~TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (opt.keylen > TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Delete is a special case: */
+ if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL) {
+ mutex_lock(&net->mutex);
+ key_info = tcp_authopt_key_lookup_exact(sk, net, &opt);
+ if (key_info) {
+ tcp_authopt_key_del(net, key_info);
+ err = 0;
+ } else {
+ err = -ENOENT;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&net->mutex);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* check key family */
+ if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) {
+ if (sk->sk_family != opt.addr.ss_family)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize tcp_authopt_info if not already set */
+ info = __tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(sk);
+ if (IS_ERR(info))
+ return PTR_ERR(info);
+
+ key_info = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*key_info), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+ if (!key_info)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ mutex_lock(&net->mutex);
+ kref_init(&key_info->ref);
+ /* If an old key exists with exact ID then remove and replace.
+ * RCU-protected readers might observe both and pick any.
+ */
+ old_key_info = tcp_authopt_key_lookup_exact(sk, net, &opt);
+ if (old_key_info)
+ tcp_authopt_key_del(net, old_key_info);
+ key_info->flags = opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS;
+ key_info->send_id = opt.send_id;
+ key_info->recv_id = opt.recv_id;
+ key_info->alg_id = opt.alg;
+ key_info->keylen = opt.keylen;
+ memcpy(key_info->key, opt.key, opt.keylen);
+ memcpy(&key_info->addr, &opt.addr, sizeof(key_info->addr));
+ hlist_add_head_rcu(&key_info->node, &net->head);
+ mutex_unlock(&net->mutex);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tcp_authopt_init_net(struct net *full_net)
+{
+ struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &full_net->tcp_authopt;
+
+ mutex_init(&net->mutex);
+ INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&net->head);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void tcp_authopt_exit_net(struct net *full_net)
+{
+ struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &full_net->tcp_authopt;
+ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key;
+ struct hlist_node *n;
+
+ mutex_lock(&net->mutex);
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry_safe(key, n, &net->head, node) {
+ hlist_del_rcu(&key->node);
+ tcp_authopt_key_put(key);
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&net->mutex);
+}
+
+static struct pernet_operations net_ops = {
+ .init = tcp_authopt_init_net,
+ .exit = tcp_authopt_exit_net,
+};
+
+static int __init tcp_authopt_init(void)
+{
+ return register_pernet_subsys(&net_ops);
+}
+late_initcall(tcp_authopt_init);
@@ -60,10 +60,11 @@
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include <net/icmp.h>
#include <net/inet_hashtables.h>
#include <net/tcp.h>
+#include <net/tcp_authopt.h>
#include <net/transp_v6.h>
#include <net/ipv6.h>
#include <net/inet_common.h>
#include <net/timewait_sock.h>
#include <net/xfrm.h>
@@ -2276,10 +2277,11 @@ void tcp_v4_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
tcp_clear_md5_list(sk);
kfree_rcu(rcu_dereference_protected(tp->md5sig_info, 1), rcu);
tp->md5sig_info = NULL;
}
#endif
+ tcp_authopt_clear(sk);
/* Clean up a referenced TCP bind bucket. */
if (inet_csk(sk)->icsk_bind_hash)
inet_put_port(sk);
This commit adds support to add and remove keys but does not use them further. Similar to tcp md5 a single pointer to a struct tcp_authopt_info* struct is added to struct tcp_sock, this avoids increasing memory usage. The data structures related to tcp_authopt are initialized on setsockopt and only freed on socket close. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez <cdleonard@gmail.com> --- include/linux/tcp.h | 9 + include/net/net_namespace.h | 4 + include/net/netns/tcp_authopt.h | 12 ++ include/net/tcp.h | 1 + include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 80 ++++++++ include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 81 +++++++++ net/ipv4/Kconfig | 14 ++ net/ipv4/Makefile | 1 + net/ipv4/tcp.c | 30 +++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 311 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 2 + 11 files changed, 545 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/net/netns/tcp_authopt.h create mode 100644 include/net/tcp_authopt.h create mode 100644 net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c