From patchwork Tue Jul 26 06:15:11 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 12928652 X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 43906CCA48C for ; Tue, 26 Jul 2022 06:18:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S237667AbiGZGSB (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 Jul 2022 02:18:01 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:58856 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237645AbiGZGQk (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 Jul 2022 02:16:40 -0400 Received: from mail-ej1-x62c.google.com (mail-ej1-x62c.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::62c]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BBB1FE0A9; Mon, 25 Jul 2022 23:15:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ej1-x62c.google.com with SMTP id os14so24369050ejb.4; Mon, 25 Jul 2022 23:15:56 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=zWoY1tKjziLLzREsRQcCMg+U8AhnKimCFkkoZeADXQM=; b=VlflCJZ+UBOaH4mZHo9tmB8rixbR2d0+IopSB0CRSFQD7Kf3aS66ZRyQLPdDs7zMSL wYKCB8Ie9J4E5yVvlnqNYvrnH/rYHYbunigkD3tQmhN9jZMGIX63oU5X7Deg5iQLa3Fq 6NDGTB6hhgdxio8f41EAGctNkqxEbQ2BOQhipn4bUN9Piqs+AUTqDiOel1FyC9NFBbUw VTM9FGTymUdWRuacwTVNTxzW05uVVtgyVv8kHuQhbELm7J1JcHK5hQxLdZq+Av/iyDHy qa9Hxbq52Ahktt4H3gXKP2Kr5308WRkA3iSu6Q98UNM1pGoDJbVQVeMY5TITuOaxV8wB X86g== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=zWoY1tKjziLLzREsRQcCMg+U8AhnKimCFkkoZeADXQM=; b=EXttNb8s82Dqa79XrncwKRGGgSM7l+UjWQ+8feaPcZ0LxU1KFUTz64uEbbw9w4jVd9 5KpoLWAZPiFLkhVb4PaSt6OEnVtS7F0qkp15BbX73s2NQ3brPkfTrtn9D1rDZ4cLxVt/ Ytw1VZxSbzjuzorh+vlgX5F3CtAsro3BHWyAhYnmV2edlFrW8MnPgp1FtVIwMS7y14Se YAXN2jWmwZAXAsNcWJI1vqlv641HWN+J8tlKfdOWSeLJ4Bm3yAnY0CTXYlHxbeUSP9Ok s1AOUCFYTqFik/fEfW97EsAdpw2zofr09vSXuefNxQMTX7FH3zneNe803SCb1Q7dOwYD Qybw== X-Gm-Message-State: AJIora9vTUlvb53GrHXh7Ycogp4lGwIVv4cG09MeWvArukBX0hZ/PStJ hdQBwR8s7u5MWSBs+KJ/pSs= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGRyM1uJI22/Gd0cewr/xevAsZ/6aBbYAud1zoXdK9DLzRj45+QhSNOqjH9S/4/YeEAPX/SSUyam8w== X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:d54b:b0:72e:ece1:2956 with SMTP id cr11-20020a170906d54b00b0072eece12956mr12939988ejc.156.1658816154973; Mon, 25 Jul 2022 23:15:54 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([2a04:241e:502:a080:2b68:36a:5a94:4ba1]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id l23-20020a056402345700b0043ba7df7a42sm8133067edc.26.2022.07.25.23.15.53 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 25 Jul 2022 23:15:54 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 09/26] tcp: authopt: Disable via sysctl by default Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2022 09:15:11 +0300 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org This is mainly intended to protect against local privilege escalations through a rarely used feature so it is deliberately not namespaced. Enforcement is only at the setsockopt level, this should be enough to ensure that the tcp_authopt_needed static key never turns on. No effort is made to handle disabling when the feature is already in use. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst | 6 ++++ include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 1 + net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 71 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst index 5879ef3bc2cb..377a89cfb464 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst @@ -1025,10 +1025,16 @@ tcp_limit_output_bytes - INTEGER tcp_challenge_ack_limit - INTEGER Limits number of Challenge ACK sent per second, as recommended in RFC 5961 (Improving TCP's Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks) Default: 1000 +tcp_authopt - BOOLEAN + Enable the TCP Authentication Option (RFC5925), a replacement for TCP + MD5 Signatures (RFC2835). + + Default: 0 + UDP variables ============= udp_l3mdev_accept - BOOLEAN Enabling this option allows a "global" bound socket to work diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index 7ad34a6987ec..1f5020b790dd 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -80,10 +80,11 @@ struct tcphdr_authopt { }; #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(tcp_authopt_needed_key); #define tcp_authopt_needed (static_branch_unlikely(&tcp_authopt_needed_key)) +extern int sysctl_tcp_authopt; void tcp_authopt_free(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt_info *info); void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk); int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen); int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *key); int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen); diff --git a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c index 5490c285668b..908a3ef15b47 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c @@ -17,10 +17,11 @@ #include #include #include #include #include +#include static int tcp_retr1_max = 255; static int ip_local_port_range_min[] = { 1, 1 }; static int ip_local_port_range_max[] = { 65535, 65535 }; static int tcp_adv_win_scale_min = -31; @@ -413,10 +414,37 @@ static int proc_fib_multipath_hash_fields(struct ctl_table *table, int write, return ret; } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +static int proc_tcp_authopt(struct ctl_table *ctl, + int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, + loff_t *ppos) +{ + int val = sysctl_tcp_authopt; + struct ctl_table tmp = { + .data = &val, + .mode = ctl->mode, + .maxlen = sizeof(val), + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, + }; + int err; + + err = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); + if (err) + return err; + if (sysctl_tcp_authopt && !val) { + net_warn_ratelimited("Enabling TCP Authentication Option is permanent\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + sysctl_tcp_authopt = val; + return 0; +} +#endif + static struct ctl_table ipv4_table[] = { { .procname = "tcp_max_orphans", .data = &sysctl_tcp_max_orphans, .maxlen = sizeof(int), @@ -524,10 +552,21 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_table[] = { .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax, .extra1 = &sysctl_fib_sync_mem_min, .extra2 = &sysctl_fib_sync_mem_max, }, +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + { + .procname = "tcp_authopt", + .data = &sysctl_tcp_authopt, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_tcp_authopt, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, + }, +#endif { } }; static struct ctl_table ipv4_net_table[] = { /* tcp_max_tw_buckets must be first in this table. */ diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 9215a8377e4d..c470fce52f78 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -4,10 +4,15 @@ #include #include #include #include +/* This is mainly intended to protect against local privilege escalations through + * a rarely used feature so it is deliberately not namespaced. + */ +int sysctl_tcp_authopt; + /* This is enabled when first struct tcp_authopt_info is allocated and never released */ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(tcp_authopt_needed_key); EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_authopt_needed_key); /* All current algorithms have a mac length of 12 but crypto API digestsize can be larger */ @@ -441,17 +446,30 @@ static int _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant(u8 *dst, memset(dst + srclen, 0, dstlen - srclen); return err; } +static int check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(void) +{ + if (!sysctl_tcp_authopt) { + net_warn_ratelimited("TCP Authentication Option disabled by sysctl.\n"); + return -EPERM; + } + + return 0; +} + int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { struct tcp_authopt opt; struct tcp_authopt_info *info; int err; sock_owned_by_me(sk); + err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); + if (err) + return err; err = _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant((u8 *)&opt, sizeof(opt), optval, optlen); if (err) return err; @@ -469,13 +487,17 @@ int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + int err; memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt)); sock_owned_by_me(sk); + err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); + if (err) + return err; info = rcu_dereference_check(tp->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); if (!info) return -ENOENT; @@ -497,10 +519,13 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = sock_net_tcp_authopt(sk); struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; int err; sock_owned_by_me(sk); + err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); + if (err) + return err; if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; err = _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant((u8 *)&opt, sizeof(opt), optval, optlen); if (err)