From patchwork Tue Jul 26 06:15:24 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 12928695 X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0DEFCC43334 for ; Tue, 26 Jul 2022 06:21:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238007AbiGZGVI (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 Jul 2022 02:21:08 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:58370 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237876AbiGZGTC (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 Jul 2022 02:19:02 -0400 Received: from mail-ej1-x62a.google.com (mail-ej1-x62a.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::62a]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 80BD52AC6C; Mon, 25 Jul 2022 23:16:33 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ej1-x62a.google.com with SMTP id bp15so24335242ejb.6; Mon, 25 Jul 2022 23:16:33 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=S4DUuYpKzwf7eBOnbcUPrzqVk85dVnPEW6r8J1HvlEo=; b=Jw0bdMaoBc1WkLLthUFvU4M0Y0S8hE/OvPlwnsOo3XqqE7bFkxVwTWcCvtC1LrpiAN 6U7uv+FiAhuef9bIIKnaBou1Zl0V+R0ge1QPzzQqhxY6Cyz0Ck7dgEjdbFr3GL7pKqNw KcYnLVOylMxMPbOChwOAZG6nQiFBX4BwKjDzeFBjqhKGDkOuoBcSiIL1/MOrxT0wcLNb 9X9O4mYvsacdj0+/IGBBdvHa9dneyL2xDlCsthgK2oARvnSEp5EmiPXwzOU1Z+PjDRtg f2LnPB/tnh8fzH7rW0rOz2QnuJ+Ub7ydsj1XQrhGUx82mpc3PmUKebD0oowpsT6qTa1q vMPA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=S4DUuYpKzwf7eBOnbcUPrzqVk85dVnPEW6r8J1HvlEo=; b=7WvD9UI24XuqCABzMYGAgVuJE5xfzw8jPAZQGTUBgk4u6zFclGZPDDrC6ZEArJQ3El WX9bhG07UXveAiSNbY06YxQ5ZnqI8K1sZ3aOLF4ajJSdp4f3Xgtbw8LLd6XsB4s7cOi9 6T3zh2PrsVvI0gTBali8Wq1ymr9jwCbHjtYGErzUhtZAgDH3QWqVpLz8Fekg/nW7z9VU jdzWlDsa8L99vN2muhhIYQccnL34O4Cfw38SUw7ohbjsm46DV2p5QvVxpkIMV4+POxeN NhAUI4QhQgkal7Rg5q7qIRH1O3XimsH9fQYKAw5M7XggkB4YIbQW3eTXg5yfRj3JcXNh usjg== X-Gm-Message-State: AJIora9xLjFM+PGPtLovKWZG1kz3leoRkzD16x1wnSVmPT7LGc2USZs6 39bxjmfVACxr9bkvEivhxSM= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGRyM1ttmapPLFQMDOmqfXGj5RL6D9LSHB1WCPEOK0dZAi1Er4/fJMRIU4FO10Y8RY7+TfzLCvpyNA== X-Received: by 2002:a17:907:a06e:b0:72b:2cba:da35 with SMTP id ia14-20020a170907a06e00b0072b2cbada35mr12843379ejc.358.1658816179949; Mon, 25 Jul 2022 23:16:19 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([2a04:241e:502:a080:2b68:36a:5a94:4ba1]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id l23-20020a056402345700b0043ba7df7a42sm8133067edc.26.2022.07.25.23.16.18 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 25 Jul 2022 23:16:19 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 22/26] tcp: authopt: Try to respect rnextkeyid from SYN on SYNACK Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2022 09:15:24 +0300 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org According to the RFC we should use the key that the peer suggests via rnextkeyid. This is currently done by storing recv_rnextkeyid in tcp_authopt_info but this does not work for the SYNACK case because the tcp_request_sock does not hold an info pointer for reasons of memory usage. Handle this by storing recv_rnextkeyid inside tcp_request_sock. This doesn't increase the memory usage because there are unused bytes at the end. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/linux/tcp.h | 6 ++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/tcp.h b/include/linux/tcp.h index 551942883f06..6a4ff0ed55c6 100644 --- a/include/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/linux/tcp.h @@ -125,10 +125,13 @@ struct tcp_options_received { u8 saw_unknown:1, /* Received unknown option */ unused:7; u8 num_sacks; /* Number of SACK blocks */ u16 user_mss; /* mss requested by user in ioctl */ u16 mss_clamp; /* Maximal mss, negotiated at connection setup */ +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) + u8 rnextkeyid; +#endif }; static inline void tcp_clear_options(struct tcp_options_received *rx_opt) { rx_opt->tstamp_ok = rx_opt->sack_ok = 0; @@ -163,10 +166,13 @@ struct tcp_request_sock { u32 rcv_nxt; /* the ack # by SYNACK. For * FastOpen it's the seq# * after data-in-SYN. */ u8 syn_tos; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) + u8 recv_rnextkeyid; +#endif }; static inline struct tcp_request_sock *tcp_rsk(const struct request_sock *req) { return (struct tcp_request_sock *)req; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 00d749aa1025..3596fc1fb770 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -1,7 +1,9 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +#include "linux/tcp.h" +#include "net/tcp_states.h" #include #include #include #include #include @@ -435,21 +437,33 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key(const struct sock *sk, { struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, *new_key = NULL; struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = sock_net_tcp_authopt(sk); /* Listen sockets don't refer to any specific connection so we don't try - * to keep using the same key and ignore any received keyids. + * to keep using the same key. + * The rnextkeyid is stored in tcp_request_sock */ if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) { - int send_keyid = -1; - + int send_id = -1; + struct tcp_request_sock *rsk; + + if (WARN_ONCE(addr_sk->sk_state != TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV, "bad socket state")) + return NULL; + rsk = tcp_rsk((struct request_sock *)addr_sk); + /* Forcing a specific send_keyid on a listen socket forces it for + * all clients so is unlikely to be useful. + */ if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID) - send_keyid = info->send_keyid; - key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, send_keyid); + send_id = info->send_keyid; + else + send_id = rsk->recv_rnextkeyid; + key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, send_id); + /* If no key found with specific send_id try anything else. */ + if (!key) + key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, -1); if (key) *rnextkeyid = key->recv_id; - return key; } if (locked) { sock_owned_by_me(sk); diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index c09d42614b2b..6f2af45f4271 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -4105,10 +4105,18 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net, /* * The MD5 Hash has already been * checked (see tcp_v{4,6}_do_rcv()). */ break; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + case TCPOPT_AUTHOPT: + /* Hash has already been checked. + * We parse rnextkeyid here so we can match it on synack + */ + opt_rx->rnextkeyid = ptr[1]; + break; #endif case TCPOPT_FASTOPEN: tcp_parse_fastopen_option( opsize - TCPOLEN_FASTOPEN_BASE, ptr, th->syn, foc, false); @@ -6958,10 +6966,14 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops, tcp_clear_options(&tmp_opt); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMC) && want_cookie) tmp_opt.smc_ok = 0; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) + tcp_rsk(req)->recv_rnextkeyid = tmp_opt.rnextkeyid; +#endif + tmp_opt.tstamp_ok = tmp_opt.saw_tstamp; tcp_openreq_init(req, &tmp_opt, skb, sk); inet_rsk(req)->no_srccheck = inet_sk(sk)->transparent; /* Note: tcp_v6_init_req() might override ir_iif for link locals */