diff mbox series

[v10,1/2] net/bnx2x: Prevent access to a freed page in page_pool

Message ID f6b3a268be868e9a528f2549392bf2bdf16e285d.1707848297.git.thinhtr@linux.vnet.ibm.com (mailing list archive)
State Changes Requested
Delegated to: Netdev Maintainers
Headers show
Series bnx2x: Fix error recovering in switch configuration | expand

Checks

Context Check Description
netdev/series_format warning Target tree name not specified in the subject
netdev/tree_selection success Guessed tree name to be net-next
netdev/ynl success Generated files up to date; no warnings/errors; no diff in generated;
netdev/fixes_present success Fixes tag not required for -next series
netdev/header_inline success No static functions without inline keyword in header files
netdev/build_32bit success Errors and warnings before: 997 this patch: 997
netdev/build_tools success No tools touched, skip
netdev/cc_maintainers fail 1 blamed authors not CCed: LinoSanfilippo@gmx.de; 2 maintainers not CCed: aelior@marvell.com LinoSanfilippo@gmx.de
netdev/build_clang success Errors and warnings before: 1008 this patch: 1008
netdev/verify_signedoff success Signed-off-by tag matches author and committer
netdev/deprecated_api success None detected
netdev/check_selftest success No net selftest shell script
netdev/verify_fixes fail Problems with Fixes tag: 1
netdev/build_allmodconfig_warn success Errors and warnings before: 1014 this patch: 1014
netdev/checkpatch success total: 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 checks, 18 lines checked
netdev/build_clang_rust success No Rust files in patch. Skipping build
netdev/kdoc success Errors and warnings before: 9 this patch: 9
netdev/source_inline success Was 0 now: 0
netdev/contest success net-next-2024-02-15--00-00 (tests: 1443)

Commit Message

Thinh Tran Feb. 13, 2024, 6:32 p.m. UTC
Fix race condition leading to system crash during EEH error handling

During EEH error recovery, the bnx2x driver's transmit timeout logic
could cause a race condition when handling reset tasks. The
bnx2x_tx_timeout() schedules reset tasks via bnx2x_sp_rtnl_task(),
which ultimately leads to bnx2x_nic_unload(). In bnx2x_nic_unload()
SGEs are freed using bnx2x_free_rx_sge_range(). However, this could
overlap with the EEH driver's attempt to reset the device using
bnx2x_io_slot_reset(), which also frees SGEs. This race condition can
result in system crashes due to accessing freed memory locations.

[  793.003930] EEH: Beginning: 'slot_reset'
[  793.003937] PCI 0011:01:00.0#10000: EEH: Invoking bnx2x->slot_reset()
[  793.003939] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14228(eth1)]IO slot reset initializing...
[  793.004037] bnx2x 0011:01:00.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0142)
[  793.008839] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14244(eth1)]IO slot reset --> driver unload
[  793.122134] Kernel attempted to read user page (0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
[  793.122143] BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000
[  793.122147] Faulting instruction address: 0xc0080000025065fc
[  793.122152] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
.....
[  793.122315] Call Trace:
[  793.122318] [c000000003c67a20] [c00800000250658c] bnx2x_io_slot_reset+0x204/0x610 [bnx2x] (unreliable)
[  793.122331] [c000000003c67af0] [c0000000000518a8] eeh_report_reset+0xb8/0xf0
[  793.122338] [c000000003c67b60] [c000000000052130] eeh_pe_report+0x180/0x550
[  793.122342] [c000000003c67c70] [c00000000005318c] eeh_handle_normal_event+0x84c/0xa60
[  793.122347] [c000000003c67d50] [c000000000053a84] eeh_event_handler+0xf4/0x170
[  793.122352] [c000000003c67da0] [c000000000194c58] kthread+0x1c8/0x1d0
[  793.122356] [c000000003c67e10] [c00000000000cf64] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64

To solve this issue, we need to verify page pool allocations before
freeing.

Fixes: 4cace675d687 ("bnx2x: Alloc 4k fragment for each rx ring buffer element")

Signed-off-by: Thinh Tran <thinhtr@linux.vnet.ibm.com>


---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

Comments

Jacob Keller Feb. 14, 2024, 8:47 p.m. UTC | #1
On 2/13/2024 10:32 AM, Thinh Tran wrote:
> Fix race condition leading to system crash during EEH error handling
> 
> During EEH error recovery, the bnx2x driver's transmit timeout logic
> could cause a race condition when handling reset tasks. The
> bnx2x_tx_timeout() schedules reset tasks via bnx2x_sp_rtnl_task(),
> which ultimately leads to bnx2x_nic_unload(). In bnx2x_nic_unload()
> SGEs are freed using bnx2x_free_rx_sge_range(). However, this could
> overlap with the EEH driver's attempt to reset the device using
> bnx2x_io_slot_reset(), which also frees SGEs. This race condition can
> result in system crashes due to accessing freed memory locations.
> 
> [  793.003930] EEH: Beginning: 'slot_reset'
> [  793.003937] PCI 0011:01:00.0#10000: EEH: Invoking bnx2x->slot_reset()
> [  793.003939] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14228(eth1)]IO slot reset initializing...
> [  793.004037] bnx2x 0011:01:00.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0142)
> [  793.008839] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14244(eth1)]IO slot reset --> driver unload
> [  793.122134] Kernel attempted to read user page (0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
> [  793.122143] BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000
> [  793.122147] Faulting instruction address: 0xc0080000025065fc
> [  793.122152] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
> .....
> [  793.122315] Call Trace:
> [  793.122318] [c000000003c67a20] [c00800000250658c] bnx2x_io_slot_reset+0x204/0x610 [bnx2x] (unreliable)
> [  793.122331] [c000000003c67af0] [c0000000000518a8] eeh_report_reset+0xb8/0xf0
> [  793.122338] [c000000003c67b60] [c000000000052130] eeh_pe_report+0x180/0x550
> [  793.122342] [c000000003c67c70] [c00000000005318c] eeh_handle_normal_event+0x84c/0xa60
> [  793.122347] [c000000003c67d50] [c000000000053a84] eeh_event_handler+0xf4/0x170
> [  793.122352] [c000000003c67da0] [c000000000194c58] kthread+0x1c8/0x1d0
> [  793.122356] [c000000003c67e10] [c00000000000cf64] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64
> 
> To solve this issue, we need to verify page pool allocations before
> freeing.
> 
> Fixes: 4cace675d687 ("bnx2x: Alloc 4k fragment for each rx ring buffer element")
> 
> Signed-off-by: Thinh Tran <thinhtr@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> 
> 
> ---
>  drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h | 6 +++---
>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h
> index d8b1824c334d..0bc1367fd649 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h
> +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h
> @@ -1002,9 +1002,6 @@ static inline void bnx2x_set_fw_mac_addr(__le16 *fw_hi, __le16 *fw_mid,
>  static inline void bnx2x_free_rx_mem_pool(struct bnx2x *bp,
>  					  struct bnx2x_alloc_pool *pool)
>  {
> -	if (!pool->page)
> -		return;
> -
>  	put_page(pool->page);
>  
>  	pool->page = NULL;
> @@ -1015,6 +1012,9 @@ static inline void bnx2x_free_rx_sge_range(struct bnx2x *bp,
>  {
>  	int i;
>  
> +	if (!fp->page_pool.page)
> +		return;
> +

Doesn't this still leave a race window where put_page was already called
but page hasn't yet been set NULL? I think you either need to assign
NULL first (and possibly WRITE_ONCE or a barrier depending on platform?)
or some other serialization mechanism to ensure only one thread runs here?

I guess the issue you're seeing is that bnx2x_free_rx_sge_range calls
bnx2x_free_rx_sge even if the page was already removed? Does that mean
you already have some other serialization ensuring that you can't have
both threads call put_page simultaneously?

>  	if (fp->mode == TPA_MODE_DISABLED)
>  		return;
>
Thinh Tran March 6, 2024, 9:13 p.m. UTC | #2
Apologies for the delayed response. I did not receive this email and 
some others in my mailbox.


> Doesn't this still leave a race window where put_page was already called
> but page hasn't yet been set NULL? I think you either need to assign
> NULL first (and possibly WRITE_ONCE or a barrier depending on platform?)
> or some other serialization mechanism to ensure only one thread runs here?
 >
> I guess the issue you're seeing is that bnx2x_free_rx_sge_range calls
> bnx2x_free_rx_sge even if the page was already removed? Does that mean

yes

> you already have some other serialization ensuring that you can't have
> both threads call put_page simultaneously?

The callers to bnx2x_free_rx_sge_range() are under rtnl_lock(), which 
should handle the serialization.

The crash occurs in the bnx2x_free_rx_sge() function due to accessing a 
NULL pointer.

799  static inline void bnx2x_free_rx_sge(struct bnx2x *bp,
800				struct bnx2x_fastpath *fp, u16 index)
801  {
802	struct sw_rx_page *sw_buf = &fp->rx_page_ring[index];
803     struct page *page = sw_buf->page;
804	struct eth_rx_sge *sge = &fp->rx_sge_ring[index];
.....
810	/* Since many fragments can share the same page, make sure to
811	 * only unmap and free the page once.
812	 */
813	dma_unmap_page(&bp->pdev->dev, dma_unmap_addr(sw_buf, mapping),
814		       SGE_PAGE_SIZE, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
815
816	put_page(page);
...
}

This happens because sw_buf was set to NULL after the call to 
dma_unmap_page(), called by the preceding thread.
The patch checking if that page in the pool is already freed, there is 
nothing else to do.

Thinh Tran
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h
index d8b1824c334d..0bc1367fd649 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h
@@ -1002,9 +1002,6 @@  static inline void bnx2x_set_fw_mac_addr(__le16 *fw_hi, __le16 *fw_mid,
 static inline void bnx2x_free_rx_mem_pool(struct bnx2x *bp,
 					  struct bnx2x_alloc_pool *pool)
 {
-	if (!pool->page)
-		return;
-
 	put_page(pool->page);
 
 	pool->page = NULL;
@@ -1015,6 +1012,9 @@  static inline void bnx2x_free_rx_sge_range(struct bnx2x *bp,
 {
 	int i;
 
+	if (!fp->page_pool.page)
+		return;
+
 	if (fp->mode == TPA_MODE_DISABLED)
 		return;