diff mbox series

[v16,18/22] platform/x86: Intel SGX driver

Message ID 20181106134758.10572-19-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com (mailing list archive)
State Deferred, archived
Headers show
Series Intel SGX1 support | expand

Commit Message

Jarkko Sakkinen Nov. 6, 2018, 1:45 p.m. UTC
Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions that
can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and
data. The code outside the enclave is disallowed to access the memory
inside the enclave by the CPU access control.

SGX driver provides a ioctl API for loading and initializing enclaves.
Address range for enclaves is reserved with mmap() and they are
destroyed with munmap(). Enclave construction, measurement and
initialization is done with the provided the ioctl API.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Serge Ayoun <serge.ayoun@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Shay Katz-zamir <shay.katz-zamir@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge Ayoun <serge.ayoun@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Shay Katz-zamir <shay.katz-zamir@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h            |  59 ++
 drivers/platform/x86/Kconfig               |   2 +
 drivers/platform/x86/Makefile              |   1 +
 drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/Kconfig     |  20 +
 drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/Makefile    |  12 +
 drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx.h       | 180 +++++
 drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_encl.c  | 784 +++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_ioctl.c | 234 ++++++
 drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_main.c  | 267 +++++++
 drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_util.c  |  85 +++
 drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_vma.c   |  43 ++
 11 files changed, 1687 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
 create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/Makefile
 create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx.h
 create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_encl.c
 create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_ioctl.c
 create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_main.c
 create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_util.c
 create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_vma.c

Comments

Sean Christopherson Nov. 6, 2018, 4:40 p.m. UTC | #1
On Tue, 2018-11-06 at 15:45 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions that
> can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and
> data. The code outside the enclave is disallowed to access the memory
> inside the enclave by the CPU access control.

> SGX driver provides a ioctl API for loading and initializing enclaves.
> Address range for enclaves is reserved with mmap() and they are
> destroyed with munmap(). Enclave construction, measurement and
> initialization is done with the provided the ioctl API.

...

> +struct sgx_encl {
> +	unsigned int flags;
> +	uint64_t attributes;
> +	uint64_t xfrm;
> +	unsigned int page_cnt;
> +	unsigned int secs_child_cnt;
> +	struct mutex lock;
> +	struct mm_struct *mm;
> +	struct file *backing;

Is there any particular reason why the kernel manages the backing for
the enclave and the PCMDs?  Could we have userspace provide the backing
either through the ECREATE ioctl() or maybe a completely new ioctl(),
e.g. to give userspace the option to back the enclave with a NVDIMM
instead of RAM?  A separate ioctl() with control flags might give us
some flexibility in the future, e.g. maybe there are use cases where
userspace would prefer to kill enclaves rather than swap EPC.

> +	struct kref refcount;
> +	unsigned long base;
> +	unsigned long size;
> +	unsigned long ssaframesize;
> +	struct radix_tree_root page_tree;
> +	struct list_head add_page_reqs;
> +	struct work_struct add_page_work;
> +	struct sgx_encl_page secs;
> +	struct pid *tgid;
> +	struct mmu_notifier mmu_notifier;
> +	struct notifier_block pm_notifier;
> +};
Dave Hansen Nov. 6, 2018, 4:57 p.m. UTC | #2
On 11/6/18 8:40 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>> +struct sgx_encl {
>> +	unsigned int flags;
>> +	uint64_t attributes;
>> +	uint64_t xfrm;
>> +	unsigned int page_cnt;
>> +	unsigned int secs_child_cnt;
>> +	struct mutex lock;
>> +	struct mm_struct *mm;
>> +	struct file *backing;
> Is there any particular reason why the kernel manages the backing for
> the enclave and the PCMDs?  Could we have userspace provide the backing
> either through the ECREATE ioctl() or maybe a completely new ioctl(),
> e.g. to give userspace the option to back the enclave with a NVDIMM
> instead of RAM?  A separate ioctl() with control flags might give us
> some flexibility in the future, e.g. maybe there are use cases where
> userspace would prefer to kill enclaves rather than swap EPC.

I'll take the blame for this little nugget.  I think it was my idea.  We
have a few of these kernel-internal shmfs files.  But, as you note, it
would be really nice if they were subject to the normal memory APIs and
we could set NUMA policies on them and so forth.

We could just wire the NUMA (and other) APIs up to the SGX VMA.
David Laight Nov. 7, 2018, 10:29 a.m. UTC | #3
From: Jarkko Sakkinen
> Sent: 06 November 2018 13:46
> 
> Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions that
> can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and
> data. The code outside the enclave is disallowed to access the memory
> inside the enclave by the CPU access control.
> 
> SGX driver provides a ioctl API for loading and initializing enclaves.
> Address range for enclaves is reserved with mmap() and they are
> destroyed with munmap(). Enclave construction, measurement and
> initialization is done with the provided the ioctl API.
..
> +struct sgx_encl {
> +	unsigned int flags;
> +	uint64_t attributes;
> +	uint64_t xfrm;
> +	unsigned int page_cnt;
> +	unsigned int secs_child_cnt;
> +	struct mutex lock;
> +	struct mm_struct *mm;
> +	struct file *backing;
> +	struct kref refcount;
> +	unsigned long base;
> +	unsigned long size;
> +	unsigned long ssaframesize;
> +	struct radix_tree_root page_tree;
> +	struct list_head add_page_reqs;
> +	struct work_struct add_page_work;
> +	struct sgx_encl_page secs;
> +	struct pid *tgid;
> +	struct mmu_notifier mmu_notifier;
> +	struct notifier_block pm_notifier;
> +};

It may not really matter (yet) but there is at least one hole in that strcture.

	David

-
Registered Address Lakeside, Bramley Road, Mount Farm, Milton Keynes, MK1 1PT, UK
Registration No: 1397386 (Wales)
Jarkko Sakkinen Nov. 7, 2018, 4:37 p.m. UTC | #4
On Tue, Nov 06, 2018 at 08:40:00AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Tue, 2018-11-06 at 15:45 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions that
> > can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and
> > data. The code outside the enclave is disallowed to access the memory
> > inside the enclave by the CPU access control.
> > 
> > SGX driver provides a ioctl API for loading and initializing enclaves.
> > Address range for enclaves is reserved with mmap() and they are
> > destroyed with munmap(). Enclave construction, measurement and
> > initialization is done with the provided the ioctl API.
> 
> ...
> 
> > +struct sgx_encl {
> > +	unsigned int flags;
> > +	uint64_t attributes;
> > +	uint64_t xfrm;
> > +	unsigned int page_cnt;
> > +	unsigned int secs_child_cnt;
> > +	struct mutex lock;
> > +	struct mm_struct *mm;
> > +	struct file *backing;
> 
> Is there any particular reason why the kernel manages the backing for
> the enclave and the PCMDs?  Could we have userspace provide the backing
> either through the ECREATE ioctl() or maybe a completely new ioctl(),
> e.g. to give userspace the option to back the enclave with a NVDIMM
> instead of RAM?  A separate ioctl() with control flags might give us
> some flexibility in the future, e.g. maybe there are use cases where
> userspace would prefer to kill enclaves rather than swap EPC.

Not really except that no one has complained. The very first swapping
code that I implemented used a VMA as backing storage. I could take
pieces of that code to replace shmem specifics. The difference was that
the driver did vm_mmap(). Now that you suggested the above I wonder how
it did not came to mind back then to provide the VMA as parameter.

A single buffer that can hold both PCMD entries and swapped pages in its
address space would probably be the  best way to do it. I would add that
as a field to struct sgx_enclave_create. If we want the kill-behavior,
you could signal that with a NULL value.

/Jarkko
Sean Christopherson Nov. 7, 2018, 6 p.m. UTC | #5
On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 06:37:57PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 06, 2018 at 08:40:00AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Tue, 2018-11-06 at 15:45 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions that
> > > can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and
> > > data. The code outside the enclave is disallowed to access the memory
> > > inside the enclave by the CPU access control.
> > > 
> > > SGX driver provides a ioctl API for loading and initializing enclaves.
> > > Address range for enclaves is reserved with mmap() and they are
> > > destroyed with munmap(). Enclave construction, measurement and
> > > initialization is done with the provided the ioctl API.
> > 
> > ...
> > 
> > > +struct sgx_encl {
> > > +	unsigned int flags;
> > > +	uint64_t attributes;
> > > +	uint64_t xfrm;
> > > +	unsigned int page_cnt;
> > > +	unsigned int secs_child_cnt;
> > > +	struct mutex lock;
> > > +	struct mm_struct *mm;
> > > +	struct file *backing;
> > 
> > Is there any particular reason why the kernel manages the backing for
> > the enclave and the PCMDs?  Could we have userspace provide the backing
> > either through the ECREATE ioctl() or maybe a completely new ioctl(),
> > e.g. to give userspace the option to back the enclave with a NVDIMM
> > instead of RAM?  A separate ioctl() with control flags might give us
> > some flexibility in the future, e.g. maybe there are use cases where
> > userspace would prefer to kill enclaves rather than swap EPC.
> 
> Not really except that no one has complained. The very first swapping
> code that I implemented used a VMA as backing storage. I could take
> pieces of that code to replace shmem specifics. The difference was that
> the driver did vm_mmap(). Now that you suggested the above I wonder how
> it did not came to mind back then to provide the VMA as parameter.
> 
> A single buffer that can hold both PCMD entries and swapped pages in its
> address space would probably be the  best way to do it. I would add that
> as a field to struct sgx_enclave_create. If we want the kill-behavior,
> you could signal that with a NULL value.

What do we gain by a single buffer vs. separate buffers?  The ioctl()
would be slightly smaller but it seems like the actual code would be
more complex.

The enclave build process also utilizes the backing as temp storage
to avoid having to alloc kernel memory when queueing pages to be added
by the worker thread (which reminds me that I wanted to document why a
worker thread is used).  Keeping this behavior would effectively make
providing backing mandatory.

Are there any potential complications with ENCLS consuming userspace
pointers?  We'd have to wrap them with user_access_{begin,end}() and
probably tweak the fixup, but I assume having the fixup handler means
we're generally ok?
Jarkko Sakkinen Nov. 8, 2018, 2:46 p.m. UTC | #6
On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 10:00:57AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> What do we gain by a single buffer vs. separate buffers?  The ioctl()
> would be slightly smaller but it seems like the actual code would be
> more complex.

I'm fine with either. It was just a suggestion.

> The enclave build process also utilizes the backing as temp storage
> to avoid having to alloc kernel memory when queueing pages to be added
> by the worker thread (which reminds me that I wanted to document why a
> worker thread is used).  Keeping this behavior would effectively make
> providing backing mandatory.

Would it be a problem just allocate those pages with alloc_page() and
free them in the worker thread?

> Are there any potential complications with ENCLS consuming userspace
> pointers?  We'd have to wrap them with user_access_{begin,end}() and
> probably tweak the fixup, but I assume having the fixup handler means
> we're generally ok?

Last time I did it I used get_user_pages() for pinning. I'm not sure
why I should do anything but just re-use that.

/Jarkko
Jarkko Sakkinen Nov. 15, 2018, 8 p.m. UTC | #7
On Thu, Nov 08, 2018 at 04:46:03PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 10:00:57AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > What do we gain by a single buffer vs. separate buffers?  The ioctl()
> > would be slightly smaller but it seems like the actual code would be
> > more complex.
> 
> I'm fine with either. It was just a suggestion.
> 
> > The enclave build process also utilizes the backing as temp storage
> > to avoid having to alloc kernel memory when queueing pages to be added
> > by the worker thread (which reminds me that I wanted to document why a
> > worker thread is used).  Keeping this behavior would effectively make
> > providing backing mandatory.
> 
> Would it be a problem just allocate those pages with alloc_page() and
> free them in the worker thread?
> 
> > Are there any potential complications with ENCLS consuming userspace
> > pointers?  We'd have to wrap them with user_access_{begin,end}() and
> > probably tweak the fixup, but I assume having the fixup handler means
> > we're generally ok?
> 
> Last time I did it I used get_user_pages() for pinning. I'm not sure
> why I should do anything but just re-use that.

What about VA page swapping? Not saying that it'd have to be done right
now but we need to answer whether it is enclave local or a global asset.
If it is local it would also require an argument.

I will most likely won't fix this for v17 because this detail needs
careful consideration.

/Jarkko
Jarkko Sakkinen Nov. 15, 2018, 8:04 p.m. UTC | #8
On Thu, Nov 15, 2018 at 10:00:02PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 08, 2018 at 04:46:03PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 10:00:57AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > What do we gain by a single buffer vs. separate buffers?  The ioctl()
> > > would be slightly smaller but it seems like the actual code would be
> > > more complex.
> > 
> > I'm fine with either. It was just a suggestion.
> > 
> > > The enclave build process also utilizes the backing as temp storage
> > > to avoid having to alloc kernel memory when queueing pages to be added
> > > by the worker thread (which reminds me that I wanted to document why a
> > > worker thread is used).  Keeping this behavior would effectively make
> > > providing backing mandatory.
> > 
> > Would it be a problem just allocate those pages with alloc_page() and
> > free them in the worker thread?
> > 
> > > Are there any potential complications with ENCLS consuming userspace
> > > pointers?  We'd have to wrap them with user_access_{begin,end}() and
> > > probably tweak the fixup, but I assume having the fixup handler means
> > > we're generally ok?
> > 
> > Last time I did it I used get_user_pages() for pinning. I'm not sure
> > why I should do anything but just re-use that.
> 
> What about VA page swapping? Not saying that it'd have to be done right
> now but we need to answer whether it is enclave local or a global asset.
> If it is local it would also require an argument.
> 
> I will most likely won't fix this for v17 because this detail needs
> careful consideration.

I wonder if you can map shmem file to process address space so that you
get it accounted for the process? That would be optimal for us. This way
this won't become an API issue.

Yeah, as I started to implement this I realized these issues with the
API side that will arise. Even doing vm_mmap() in the kernel code would
be better than taking addresses through the ioctl. That is another
option.

/Jarkko
Jarkko Sakkinen Nov. 15, 2018, 8:16 p.m. UTC | #9
On Thu, Nov 15, 2018 at 10:04:06PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 15, 2018 at 10:00:02PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Thu, Nov 08, 2018 at 04:46:03PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 10:00:57AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > > What do we gain by a single buffer vs. separate buffers?  The ioctl()
> > > > would be slightly smaller but it seems like the actual code would be
> > > > more complex.
> > > 
> > > I'm fine with either. It was just a suggestion.
> > > 
> > > > The enclave build process also utilizes the backing as temp storage
> > > > to avoid having to alloc kernel memory when queueing pages to be added
> > > > by the worker thread (which reminds me that I wanted to document why a
> > > > worker thread is used).  Keeping this behavior would effectively make
> > > > providing backing mandatory.
> > > 
> > > Would it be a problem just allocate those pages with alloc_page() and
> > > free them in the worker thread?
> > > 
> > > > Are there any potential complications with ENCLS consuming userspace
> > > > pointers?  We'd have to wrap them with user_access_{begin,end}() and
> > > > probably tweak the fixup, but I assume having the fixup handler means
> > > > we're generally ok?
> > > 
> > > Last time I did it I used get_user_pages() for pinning. I'm not sure
> > > why I should do anything but just re-use that.
> > 
> > What about VA page swapping? Not saying that it'd have to be done right
> > now but we need to answer whether it is enclave local or a global asset.
> > If it is local it would also require an argument.
> > 
> > I will most likely won't fix this for v17 because this detail needs
> > careful consideration.
> 
> I wonder if you can map shmem file to process address space so that you
> get it accounted for the process? That would be optimal for us. This way
> this won't become an API issue.
> 
> Yeah, as I started to implement this I realized these issues with the
> API side that will arise. Even doing vm_mmap() in the kernel code would
> be better than taking addresses through the ioctl. That is another
> option.

This is how strongly think. I can go with VMAs for swapping *but* if
that is the route I would recommend using vm_mmap() instead of taking
pointer from user space. This way the way swapping is done can be always
changed. It will be a huge lock-in to do it otherwise.

/Jarkko
Jarkko Sakkinen Nov. 21, 2018, 11:46 a.m. UTC | #10
On Thu, Nov 15, 2018 at 10:16:25PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> This is how strongly think. I can go with VMAs for swapping *but* if
> that is the route I would recommend using vm_mmap() instead of taking
> pointer from user space. This way the way swapping is done can be always
> changed. It will be a huge lock-in to do it otherwise.

I digged out my old code and it should be easy to replace. Most of the
issues were related to exit_mm(), which have been anyway sorted in the
code base.

I'll do it for v18.

/Jarkko
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..aadf9c76e360
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ 
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) */
+/**
+ * Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation.
+ */
+#ifndef _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H
+#define _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/ioctl.h>
+
+#define SGX_MAGIC 0xA4
+
+#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE \
+	_IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x00, struct sgx_enclave_create)
+#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE \
+	_IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x01, struct sgx_enclave_add_page)
+#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT \
+	_IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x02, struct sgx_enclave_init)
+
+/* IOCTL return values */
+#define SGX_POWER_LOST_ENCLAVE		0x40000000
+
+/**
+ * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
+ *                             %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE ioctl
+ * @src:	address for the SECS page data
+ */
+struct sgx_enclave_create  {
+	__u64	src;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct sgx_enclave_add_page - parameter structure for the
+ *                               %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE ioctl
+ * @addr:	address within the ELRANGE
+ * @src:	address for the page data
+ * @secinfo:	address for the SECINFO data
+ * @mrmask:	bitmask for the measured 256 byte chunks
+ */
+struct sgx_enclave_add_page {
+	__u64	addr;
+	__u64	src;
+	__u64	secinfo;
+	__u16	mrmask;
+} __attribute__((__packed__));
+
+
+/**
+ * struct sgx_enclave_init - parameter structure for the
+ *                           %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT ioctl
+ * @addr:	address within the ELRANGE
+ * @sigstruct:	address for the SIGSTRUCT data
+ */
+struct sgx_enclave_init {
+	__u64	addr;
+	__u64	sigstruct;
+};
+
+#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/Kconfig b/drivers/platform/x86/Kconfig
index 0c1aa6c314f5..66a1ab6235e2 100644
--- a/drivers/platform/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1229,6 +1229,8 @@  config I2C_MULTI_INSTANTIATE
 	  To compile this driver as a module, choose M here: the module
 	  will be called i2c-multi-instantiate.
 
+source "drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/Kconfig"
+
 endif # X86_PLATFORM_DEVICES
 
 config PMC_ATOM
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/Makefile b/drivers/platform/x86/Makefile
index e6d1becf81ce..d0db8c66ed3c 100644
--- a/drivers/platform/x86/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/Makefile
@@ -92,3 +92,4 @@  obj-$(CONFIG_MLX_PLATFORM)	+= mlx-platform.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TURBO_MAX_3) += intel_turbo_max_3.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_CHTDC_TI_PWRBTN)	+= intel_chtdc_ti_pwrbtn.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_I2C_MULTI_INSTANTIATE)	+= i2c-multi-instantiate.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_SGX) += intel_sgx/
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/Kconfig b/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7d22d44acce9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ 
+#
+# Intel SGX
+#
+
+config INTEL_SGX
+	tristate "Intel(R) SGX Driver"
+	depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_INTEL && INTEL_SGX_CORE
+	select MMU_NOTIFIER
+	select CRYPTO
+	select CRYPTO_SHA256
+	help
+	Intel(R) SGX is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by
+	applications to set aside private regions of code and data.  The code
+	outside the enclave is disallowed to access the memory inside the
+	enclave by the CPU access control.
+
+	The firmware uses PRMRR registers to reserve an area of physical memory
+	called Enclave Page Cache (EPC). There is a hardware unit in the
+	processor called Memory Encryption Engine. The MEE encrypts and decrypts
+	the EPC pages as they enter and leave the processor package.
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/Makefile b/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..117e97effeff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ 
+#
+# Intel SGX
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_SGX) += intel_sgx.o
+
+intel_sgx-$(CONFIG_INTEL_SGX) += \
+	sgx_encl.o \
+	sgx_ioctl.o \
+	sgx_main.o \
+	sgx_util.o \
+	sgx_vma.o \
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx.h b/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..67bd8ea1d53d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx.h
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ 
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) */
+/**
+ * Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation.
+ */
+#ifndef __ARCH_INTEL_SGX_H__
+#define __ARCH_INTEL_SGX_H__
+
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
+#include <linux/mmu_notifier.h>
+#include <linux/mmu_notifier.h>
+#include <linux/radix-tree.h>
+#include <linux/radix-tree.h>
+#include <linux/rbtree.h>
+#include <linux/rwsem.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <asm/sgx.h>
+#include <uapi/asm/sgx.h>
+
+#define sgx_pr(level, encl, fmt, ...)				\
+	pr_ ## level("sgx: [%d:0x%p] " fmt, pid_nr((encl)->tgid),	\
+		     (void *)(encl)->base, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define sgx_dbg(encl, fmt, ...) \
+	sgx_pr(debug, encl, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define sgx_info(encl, fmt, ...) \
+	sgx_pr(info, encl, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define sgx_warn(encl, fmt, ...) \
+	sgx_pr(warn, encl, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define sgx_err(encl, fmt, ...) \
+	sgx_pr(err, encl, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define sgx_crit(encl, fmt, ...) \
+	sgx_pr(crit, encl, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+
+#define SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT	20
+#define SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_COUNT	50
+#define SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_TIME	20
+
+/**
+ * enum sgx_encl_page_desc - defines bits for an enclave page's descriptor
+ * %SGX_ENCL_PAGE_TCS:			The page is a TCS page.
+ * %SGX_ENCL_PAGE_LOADED:		The page is not swapped.
+ * %SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR_MASK:		Holds the virtual address of the page.
+ */
+enum sgx_encl_page_desc {
+	SGX_ENCL_PAGE_TCS		= BIT(0),
+	SGX_ENCL_PAGE_LOADED		= BIT(1),
+	/* Bits 11:3 are available when the page is not swapped. */
+	SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR_MASK		= PAGE_MASK,
+};
+
+#define SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR(encl_page) \
+	((encl_page)->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR_MASK)
+#define SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET(encl_page) \
+	((encl_page)->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK)
+
+struct sgx_encl_page {
+	unsigned long desc;
+	union {
+		struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+		struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
+	};
+	struct sgx_encl *encl;
+};
+
+enum sgx_encl_flags {
+	SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED	= BIT(0),
+	SGX_ENCL_DEBUG		= BIT(1),
+	SGX_ENCL_SUSPEND	= BIT(2),
+	SGX_ENCL_DEAD		= BIT(3),
+};
+
+struct sgx_encl {
+	unsigned int flags;
+	uint64_t attributes;
+	uint64_t xfrm;
+	unsigned int page_cnt;
+	unsigned int secs_child_cnt;
+	struct mutex lock;
+	struct mm_struct *mm;
+	struct file *backing;
+	struct kref refcount;
+	unsigned long base;
+	unsigned long size;
+	unsigned long ssaframesize;
+	struct radix_tree_root page_tree;
+	struct list_head add_page_reqs;
+	struct work_struct add_page_work;
+	struct sgx_encl_page secs;
+	struct pid *tgid;
+	struct mmu_notifier mmu_notifier;
+	struct notifier_block pm_notifier;
+};
+
+static inline pgoff_t sgx_encl_page_backing_index(struct sgx_encl_page *page,
+						  struct sgx_encl *encl)
+{
+	/* The backing page for SECS is located after the enclave pages. */
+	if (!PFN_DOWN(page->desc))
+		return PFN_DOWN(encl->size);
+
+	return PFN_DOWN(page->desc - encl->base);
+}
+
+extern struct workqueue_struct *sgx_add_page_wq;
+extern u64 sgx_encl_size_max_32;
+extern u64 sgx_encl_size_max_64;
+extern u64 sgx_xfrm_mask;
+extern u32 sgx_misc_reserved;
+extern u32 sgx_xsave_size_tbl[64];
+extern int sgx_epcm_trapnr;
+
+extern const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops;
+
+int sgx_encl_find(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
+		  struct vm_area_struct **vma);
+void sgx_invalidate(struct sgx_encl *encl, bool flush_cpus);
+
+/**
+ * SGX_INVD - invalidate an enclave on failure, i.e. if ret != 0
+ *
+ * @ret:	a return code to check
+ * @encl:	pointer to an enclave
+ * @fmt:	message for WARN if failure is detected
+ * @...:	optional arguments used by @fmt
+ *
+ * SGX_INVD is used in flows where an error, i.e. @ret is non-zero, is
+ * indicative of a driver bug.  Invalidate @encl if @ret indicates an
+ * error and WARN on error unless the error was due to a fault signaled
+ * by the EPCM.
+ *
+ * Faults from the EPCM occur in normal kernel operation, e.g. due to
+ * misonfigured mprotect() from userspace or because the EPCM invalidated
+ * all EPC pages.  The EPCM invalidates the EPC on transitions to S3 or
+ * lower sleep states, and VMMs emulate loss of EPC when migrating VMs.
+ *
+ * Defined as a macro instead of a function so that WARN can provide a
+ * more precise trace.
+ */
+#define SGX_INVD(ret, encl, fmt, ...)					  \
+do {									  \
+	if (unlikely(ret)) {						  \
+		int trapnr = IS_ENCLS_FAULT(ret) ? ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret) : 0; \
+		WARN(trapnr != sgx_epcm_trapnr, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__);	  \
+		sgx_invalidate(encl, true);				  \
+	}								  \
+} while (0)
+
+struct sgx_encl *sgx_encl_alloc(struct sgx_secs *secs);
+int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs);
+struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_alloc_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+					  unsigned long addr);
+void sgx_encl_free_page(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page);
+int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr, void *data,
+		      struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned int mrmask);
+int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
+		  struct sgx_einittoken *einittoken);
+void sgx_encl_block(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page);
+void sgx_encl_track(struct sgx_encl *encl);
+int sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
+		       struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page);
+void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref);
+
+long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+long sgx_compat_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
+#endif
+
+struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_fault_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+				     unsigned long addr,
+				     bool do_reserve);
+
+int sgx_test_and_clear_young(struct sgx_encl_page *page);
+void sgx_flush_cpus(struct sgx_encl *encl);
+void sgx_set_page_loaded(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
+			 struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page);
+struct page *sgx_get_backing(struct file *file, pgoff_t index);
+void sgx_put_backing(struct page *backing_page, bool write);
+
+#endif /* __ARCH_X86_INTEL_SGX_H__ */
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_encl.c b/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_encl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6bed944c2f92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_encl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,784 @@ 
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)
+// Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation.
+
+#include <asm/mman.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/hashtable.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/suspend.h>
+#include "sgx.h"
+
+struct sgx_add_page_req {
+	struct sgx_encl *encl;
+	struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
+	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+	unsigned long mrmask;
+	struct list_head list;
+};
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_find - find an enclave
+ * @mm:		mm struct of the current process
+ * @addr:	address in the ELRANGE
+ * @vma:	the resulting VMA
+ *
+ * Finds an enclave identified by the given address. Gives back the VMA, that
+ * is part of the enclave, located in that address. The VMA is given back if it
+ * is a proper enclave VMA even if an &sgx_encl instance does not exist
+ * yet (enclave creation has not been performed).
+ *
+ * Return:
+ *   0 on success,
+ *   -EINVAL if an enclave was not found,
+ *   -ENOENT if the enclave has not been created yet
+ */
+int sgx_encl_find(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
+		  struct vm_area_struct **vma)
+{
+	struct vm_area_struct *result;
+	struct sgx_encl *encl;
+
+	result = find_vma(mm, addr);
+	if (!result || result->vm_ops != &sgx_vm_ops || addr < result->vm_start)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	encl = result->vm_private_data;
+	*vma = result;
+
+	return encl ? 0 : -ENOENT;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_invalidate - kill an enclave
+ * @encl:	an &sgx_encl instance
+ * @flush_cpus	Set if there can be active threads inside the enclave.
+ *
+ * Mark the enclave as dead and immediately free its EPC pages (but not
+ * its resources).  For active enclaves, the entry points to the enclave
+ * are destroyed first and hardware threads are kicked out so that the
+ * EPC pages can be safely manipulated.
+ */
+void sgx_invalidate(struct sgx_encl *encl, bool flush_cpus)
+{
+	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+	struct radix_tree_iter iter;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	unsigned long addr;
+	void **slot;
+
+	if (encl->flags & SGX_ENCL_DEAD)
+		return;
+
+	encl->flags |= SGX_ENCL_DEAD;
+	if (flush_cpus && (encl->flags & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED)) {
+		radix_tree_for_each_slot(slot, &encl->page_tree, &iter, 0) {
+			entry = *slot;
+			addr = SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR(entry);
+			if ((entry->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_LOADED) &&
+			    (entry->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_TCS) &&
+			    !sgx_encl_find(encl->mm, addr, &vma))
+				zap_vma_ptes(vma, addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+		}
+		sgx_flush_cpus(encl);
+	}
+	radix_tree_for_each_slot(slot, &encl->page_tree, &iter, 0) {
+		entry = *slot;
+		if (entry->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_LOADED) {
+			if (!__sgx_free_page(entry->epc_page)) {
+				encl->secs_child_cnt--;
+				entry->desc &= ~SGX_ENCL_PAGE_LOADED;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!encl->secs_child_cnt &&
+	    (encl->secs.desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_LOADED)) {
+		encl->secs.desc &= ~SGX_ENCL_PAGE_LOADED;
+		sgx_free_page(encl->secs.epc_page);
+	}
+}
+
+static bool sgx_process_add_page_req(struct sgx_add_page_req *req,
+				     struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page)
+{
+	struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page = req->encl_page;
+	struct sgx_encl *encl = req->encl;
+	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+	struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	pgoff_t backing_index;
+	struct page *backing;
+	unsigned long addr;
+	int ret;
+	int i;
+
+	if (encl->flags & (SGX_ENCL_SUSPEND | SGX_ENCL_DEAD))
+		return false;
+
+	addr = SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR(encl_page);
+	ret = sgx_encl_find(encl->mm, addr, &vma);
+	if (ret)
+		return false;
+
+	backing_index = sgx_encl_page_backing_index(encl_page, encl);
+	backing = sgx_get_backing(encl->backing, backing_index);
+	if (IS_ERR(backing))
+		return false;
+
+	ret = vmf_insert_pfn(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(epc_page->desc));
+	if (ret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) {
+		sgx_put_backing(backing, false);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The SECINFO field must be 64-byte aligned, copy it to a local
+	 * variable that is guaranteed to be aligned as req->secinfo may
+	 * or may not be 64-byte aligned, e.g. req may have been allocated
+	 * via kzalloc which is not aware of __aligned attributes.
+	 */
+	memcpy(&secinfo, &req->secinfo, sizeof(secinfo));
+
+	pginfo.secs = (unsigned long)sgx_epc_addr(encl->secs.epc_page);
+	pginfo.addr = addr;
+	pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)&secinfo;
+	pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(backing);
+	ret = __eadd(&pginfo, sgx_epc_addr(epc_page));
+	kunmap_atomic((void *)(unsigned long)pginfo.contents);
+
+	sgx_put_backing(backing, false);
+	if (ret) {
+		SGX_INVD(ret, encl, "EADD returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret);
+		zap_vma_ptes(vma, addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	for_each_set_bit(i, &req->mrmask, 16) {
+		ret = __eextend(sgx_epc_addr(encl->secs.epc_page),
+				sgx_epc_addr(epc_page) + (i * 0x100));
+		if (ret) {
+			SGX_INVD(ret, encl, "EEXTEND returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret);
+			zap_vma_ptes(vma, addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+			return ret;
+		}
+	}
+
+	encl_page->encl = encl;
+	encl->secs_child_cnt++;
+	sgx_set_page_loaded(encl_page, epc_page);
+	sgx_test_and_clear_young(encl_page);
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void sgx_add_page_worker(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	struct sgx_add_page_req *req;
+	bool skip_rest = false;
+	bool is_empty = false;
+	struct sgx_encl *encl;
+	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+
+	encl = container_of(work, struct sgx_encl, add_page_work);
+
+	do {
+		schedule();
+
+		mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+		if (encl->flags & SGX_ENCL_DEAD)
+			skip_rest = true;
+
+		req = list_first_entry(&encl->add_page_reqs,
+				       struct sgx_add_page_req, list);
+		list_del(&req->list);
+		is_empty = list_empty(&encl->add_page_reqs);
+		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+
+		if (skip_rest)
+			goto next;
+
+		epc_page = sgx_alloc_page();
+		down_read(&encl->mm->mmap_sem);
+		mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+		if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) {
+			sgx_invalidate(encl, false);
+			skip_rest = true;
+		} else	if (!sgx_process_add_page_req(req, epc_page)) {
+			sgx_free_page(epc_page);
+			sgx_invalidate(encl, false);
+			skip_rest = true;
+		}
+
+		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+		up_read(&encl->mm->mmap_sem);
+
+next:
+		kfree(req);
+	} while (!kref_put(&encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release) && !is_empty);
+}
+
+static u32 sgx_calc_ssaframesize(u32 miscselect, u64 xfrm)
+{
+	u32 size_max = PAGE_SIZE;
+	u32 size;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 2; i < 64; i++) {
+		if (!((1 << i) & xfrm))
+			continue;
+
+		size = SGX_SSA_GPRS_SIZE + sgx_xsave_size_tbl[i];
+		if (miscselect & SGX_MISC_EXINFO)
+			size += SGX_SSA_MISC_EXINFO_SIZE;
+
+		if (size > size_max)
+			size_max = size;
+	}
+
+	return PFN_UP(size_max);
+}
+
+static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs,
+			     unsigned long ssaframesize)
+{
+	if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_RESERVED_MASK ||
+	    secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) {
+		if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_64)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		/* On 64-bit architecture allow 32-bit encls only in
+		 * the compatibility mode.
+		 */
+		if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_ADDR32))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_32)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!(secs->xfrm & XFEATURE_MASK_FP) ||
+	    !(secs->xfrm & XFEATURE_MASK_SSE) ||
+	    (((secs->xfrm >> XFEATURE_BNDREGS) & 1) !=
+	     ((secs->xfrm >> XFEATURE_BNDCSR) & 1)) ||
+	    (secs->xfrm & ~sgx_xfrm_mask))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!secs->ssa_frame_size || ssaframesize > secs->ssa_frame_size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (memchr_inv(secs->reserved1, 0, SGX_SECS_RESERVED1_SIZE) ||
+	    memchr_inv(secs->reserved2, 0, SGX_SECS_RESERVED2_SIZE) ||
+	    memchr_inv(secs->reserved3, 0, SGX_SECS_RESERVED3_SIZE) ||
+	    memchr_inv(secs->reserved4, 0, SGX_SECS_RESERVED4_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void sgx_mmu_notifier_release(struct mmu_notifier *mn,
+				     struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	struct sgx_encl *encl =
+		container_of(mn, struct sgx_encl, mmu_notifier);
+
+	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+	encl->flags |= SGX_ENCL_DEAD;
+	mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+}
+
+static const struct mmu_notifier_ops sgx_mmu_notifier_ops = {
+	.release	= sgx_mmu_notifier_release,
+};
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_alloc - allocate memory for an enclave and set attributes
+ *
+ * @secs:	SECS data (must be page aligned)
+ *
+ * Allocates a new &sgx_encl instance. Validates SECS attributes, creates
+ * backing storage for the enclave and sets enclave attributes to sane initial
+ * values.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ *   an &sgx_encl instance,
+ *   -errno otherwise
+ */
+struct sgx_encl *sgx_encl_alloc(struct sgx_secs *secs)
+{
+	unsigned long ssaframesize;
+	struct sgx_encl *encl;
+	struct file *backing;
+
+	ssaframesize = sgx_calc_ssaframesize(secs->miscselect, secs->xfrm);
+	if (sgx_validate_secs(secs, ssaframesize))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	backing = shmem_file_setup("[dev/sgx]", secs->size + PAGE_SIZE,
+				   VM_NORESERVE);
+	if (IS_ERR(backing))
+		return ERR_CAST(backing);
+
+	encl = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!encl) {
+		fput(backing);
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	}
+
+	encl->attributes = secs->attributes;
+	encl->xfrm = secs->xfrm;
+
+	kref_init(&encl->refcount);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&encl->add_page_reqs);
+	INIT_RADIX_TREE(&encl->page_tree, GFP_KERNEL);
+	mutex_init(&encl->lock);
+	INIT_WORK(&encl->add_page_work, sgx_add_page_worker);
+
+	encl->mm = current->mm;
+	encl->base = secs->base;
+	encl->size = secs->size;
+	encl->ssaframesize = secs->ssa_frame_size;
+	encl->backing = backing;
+
+	return encl;
+}
+
+static int sgx_encl_pm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb,
+				unsigned long action, void *data)
+{
+	struct sgx_encl *encl = container_of(nb, struct sgx_encl, pm_notifier);
+
+	if (action != PM_SUSPEND_PREPARE && action != PM_HIBERNATION_PREPARE)
+		return NOTIFY_DONE;
+
+	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+	sgx_invalidate(encl, false);
+	encl->flags |= SGX_ENCL_SUSPEND;
+	mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+	flush_work(&encl->add_page_work);
+	return NOTIFY_DONE;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_create - create an enclave
+ *
+ * @encl:	an enclave
+ * @secs:	page aligned SECS data
+ *
+ * Validates SECS attributes, allocates an EPC page for the SECS and creates
+ * the enclave by performing ECREATE.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ *   0 on success,
+ *   -errno otherwise
+ */
+int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs)
+{
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo;
+	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+	struct sgx_epc_page *secs_epc;
+	long ret;
+
+	secs_epc = sgx_alloc_page();
+	if (IS_ERR(secs_epc)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(secs_epc);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	sgx_set_page_loaded(&encl->secs, secs_epc);
+	encl->secs.encl = encl;
+	encl->tgid = get_pid(task_tgid(current));
+
+	pginfo.addr = 0;
+	pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)secs;
+	pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)&secinfo;
+	pginfo.secs = 0;
+	memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
+	ret = __ecreate((void *)&pginfo, sgx_epc_addr(secs_epc));
+
+	if (ret) {
+		sgx_dbg(encl, "ECREATE returned %ld\n", ret);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_DEBUG)
+		encl->flags |= SGX_ENCL_DEBUG;
+
+	encl->mmu_notifier.ops = &sgx_mmu_notifier_ops;
+	ret = mmu_notifier_register(&encl->mmu_notifier, encl->mm);
+	if (ret) {
+		if (ret == -EINTR)
+			ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+		encl->mmu_notifier.ops = NULL;
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	encl->pm_notifier.notifier_call = &sgx_encl_pm_notifier;
+	ret = register_pm_notifier(&encl->pm_notifier);
+	if (ret) {
+		encl->pm_notifier.notifier_call = NULL;
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+	ret = sgx_encl_find(current->mm, secs->base, &vma);
+	if (ret != -ENOENT) {
+		if (!ret)
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+		up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	if (vma->vm_start != secs->base ||
+	    vma->vm_end != (secs->base + secs->size) ||
+	    vma->vm_pgoff != 0) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	vma->vm_private_data = encl;
+	up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo)
+{
+	u64 page_type = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK;
+	u64 perm = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK;
+	int i;
+
+	if ((secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_RESERVED_MASK) ||
+	    ((perm & SGX_SECINFO_W) && !(perm & SGX_SECINFO_R)) ||
+	    (page_type != SGX_SECINFO_TCS &&
+	     page_type != SGX_SECINFO_REG))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SGX_SECINFO_RESERVED_SIZE; i++)
+		if (secinfo->reserved[i])
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool sgx_validate_offset(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long offset)
+{
+	if (offset & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
+		return false;
+
+	if (offset >= encl->size)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int sgx_validate_tcs(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_tcs *tcs)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (tcs->flags & SGX_TCS_RESERVED_MASK)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (tcs->flags & SGX_TCS_DBGOPTIN)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!sgx_validate_offset(encl, tcs->ssa_offset))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!sgx_validate_offset(encl, tcs->fs_offset))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!sgx_validate_offset(encl, tcs->gs_offset))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if ((tcs->fs_limit & 0xFFF) != 0xFFF)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if ((tcs->gs_limit & 0xFFF) != 0xFFF)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SGX_TCS_RESERVED_SIZE; i++)
+		if (tcs->reserved[i])
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+			       struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
+			       void *data,
+			       struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo,
+			       unsigned int mrmask)
+{
+	u64 page_type = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK;
+	struct sgx_add_page_req *req = NULL;
+	pgoff_t backing_index;
+	struct page *backing;
+	void *backing_ptr;
+	int empty;
+
+	req = kzalloc(sizeof(*req), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	backing_index = sgx_encl_page_backing_index(encl_page, encl);
+	backing = sgx_get_backing(encl->backing, backing_index);
+	if (IS_ERR(backing)) {
+		kfree(req);
+		return PTR_ERR(backing);
+	}
+	backing_ptr = kmap(backing);
+	memcpy(backing_ptr, data, PAGE_SIZE);
+	kunmap(backing);
+	if (page_type == SGX_SECINFO_TCS)
+		encl_page->desc |= SGX_ENCL_PAGE_TCS;
+	memcpy(&req->secinfo, secinfo, sizeof(*secinfo));
+	req->encl = encl;
+	req->encl_page = encl_page;
+	req->mrmask = mrmask;
+	empty = list_empty(&encl->add_page_reqs);
+	kref_get(&encl->refcount);
+	list_add_tail(&req->list, &encl->add_page_reqs);
+	if (empty)
+		queue_work(sgx_add_page_wq, &encl->add_page_work);
+	sgx_put_backing(backing, true /* write */);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_alloc_page - allocate a new enclave page
+ * @encl:	an enclave
+ * @addr:	page address in the ELRANGE
+ *
+ * Return:
+ *   an &sgx_encl_page instance on success,
+ *   -errno otherwise
+ */
+struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_alloc_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+					  unsigned long addr)
+{
+	struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (radix_tree_lookup(&encl->page_tree, PFN_DOWN(addr)))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EEXIST);
+	encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!encl_page)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	encl_page->desc = addr;
+	encl_page->encl = encl;
+	ret = radix_tree_insert(&encl->page_tree, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc),
+				encl_page);
+	if (ret) {
+		kfree(encl_page);
+		return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	}
+	return encl_page;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_free_page - free an enclave page
+ * @encl_page:	an enclave page
+ */
+void sgx_encl_free_page(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page)
+{
+	radix_tree_delete(&encl_page->encl->page_tree,
+			  PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc));
+	if (encl_page->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_LOADED)
+		sgx_free_page(encl_page->epc_page);
+	kfree(encl_page);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_add_page - add a page to the enclave
+ *
+ * @encl:	an enclave
+ * @addr:	page address in the ELRANGE
+ * @data:	page data
+ * @secinfo:	page permissions
+ * @mrmask:	bitmask to select the 256 byte chunks to be measured
+ *
+ * Creates a new enclave page and enqueues an EADD operation that will be
+ * processed by a worker thread later on.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ *   0 on success,
+ *   -errno otherwise
+ */
+int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr, void *data,
+		      struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned int mrmask)
+{
+	u64 page_type = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK;
+	struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (sgx_validate_secinfo(secinfo))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (page_type == SGX_SECINFO_TCS) {
+		ret = sgx_validate_tcs(encl, data);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
+	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+	if (encl->flags & (SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED | SGX_ENCL_DEAD)) {
+		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	encl_page = sgx_encl_alloc_page(encl, addr);
+	if (IS_ERR(encl_page)) {
+		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+		return PTR_ERR(encl_page);
+	}
+	ret = __sgx_encl_add_page(encl, encl_page, data, secinfo, mrmask);
+	if (ret)
+		sgx_encl_free_page(encl_page);
+	mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int __sgx_get_key_hash(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const void *modulus,
+			      void *hash)
+{
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, tfm);
+
+	shash->tfm = tfm;
+	shash->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+
+	return crypto_shash_digest(shash, modulus, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE, hash);
+}
+
+static int sgx_get_key_hash(const void *modulus, void *hash)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	int ret;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+	ret = __sgx_get_key_hash(tfm, modulus, hash);
+
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_init - perform EINIT for the given enclave
+ *
+ * @encl:	an enclave
+ * @sigstruct:	SIGSTRUCT for the enclave
+ * @token:	EINITTOKEN for the enclave
+ *
+ * Retries a few times in order to perform EINIT operation on an enclave
+ * because there could be potentially an interrupt storm.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ *   0 on success,
+ *   SGX error code on EINIT failure,
+ *   -errno otherwise
+ */
+int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
+		  struct sgx_einittoken *token)
+{
+	u64 mrsigner[4];
+	int ret;
+	int i;
+	int j;
+
+	ret = sgx_get_key_hash(sigstruct->modulus, mrsigner);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	flush_work(&encl->add_page_work);
+
+	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+	if (encl->flags & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED) {
+		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (encl->flags & SGX_ENCL_DEAD) {
+		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_COUNT; i++) {
+		for (j = 0; j < SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT; j++) {
+			ret = sgx_einit(sigstruct, token, encl->secs.epc_page,
+					mrsigner);
+			if (ret == SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
+				continue;
+			else
+				break;
+		}
+
+		if (ret != SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
+			break;
+
+		msleep_interruptible(SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_TIME);
+		if (signal_pending(current)) {
+			mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+			return -ERESTARTSYS;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_ENCLS_FAULT(ret)))
+		SGX_INVD(ret, encl, "EINIT returned %d (%x)", ret, ret);
+	else if (ret > 0)
+		sgx_dbg(encl, "EINIT returned %d\n", ret);
+	else if (!ret)
+		encl->flags |= SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED;
+	mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_release - destroy an enclave instance
+ * @kref:	address of a kref inside &sgx_encl
+ *
+ * Used together with kref_put(). Frees all the resources associated with the
+ * enclave and the instance itself.
+ */
+void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref)
+{
+	struct sgx_encl *encl = container_of(ref, struct sgx_encl, refcount);
+	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+	struct radix_tree_iter iter;
+	void **slot;
+
+	if (encl->mmu_notifier.ops)
+		mmu_notifier_unregister(&encl->mmu_notifier, encl->mm);
+
+	if (encl->pm_notifier.notifier_call)
+		unregister_pm_notifier(&encl->pm_notifier);
+
+	radix_tree_for_each_slot(slot, &encl->page_tree, &iter, 0) {
+		entry = *slot;
+		sgx_encl_free_page(entry);
+	}
+
+	if (encl->tgid)
+		put_pid(encl->tgid);
+
+	if (encl->secs.desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_LOADED)
+		sgx_free_page(encl->secs.epc_page);
+
+	if (encl->backing)
+		fput(encl->backing);
+
+	kfree(encl);
+}
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_ioctl.c b/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_ioctl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4edf1cc956b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_ioctl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@ 
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)
+// Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation.
+
+#include <asm/mman.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/hashtable.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "sgx.h"
+
+static int sgx_encl_get(unsigned long addr, struct sgx_encl **encl)
+{
+	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+
+	ret = sgx_encl_find(mm, addr, &vma);
+	if (!ret) {
+		*encl = vma->vm_private_data;
+
+		if ((*encl)->flags & SGX_ENCL_SUSPEND)
+			ret = SGX_POWER_LOST_ENCLAVE;
+		else
+			kref_get(&(*encl)->refcount);
+	}
+
+	up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_create - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE
+ * @filep:	open file to /dev/sgx
+ * @cmd:	the command value
+ * @arg:	pointer to an &sgx_enclave_create instance
+ *
+ * Validates SECS attributes, allocates an EPC page for the SECS and performs
+ * ECREATE.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ *   0 on success,
+ *   -errno otherwise
+ */
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
+				   unsigned long arg)
+{
+	struct sgx_enclave_create *createp = (struct sgx_enclave_create *)arg;
+	struct page *secs_page;
+	struct sgx_secs *secs;
+	struct sgx_encl *encl;
+	int ret;
+
+	secs_page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
+	if (!secs_page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	secs = kmap(secs_page);
+	ret = copy_from_user(secs, (void __user *)createp->src, sizeof(*secs));
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	encl = sgx_encl_alloc(secs);
+	if (IS_ERR(encl)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(encl);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = sgx_encl_create(encl, secs);
+	if (ret)
+		kref_put(&encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release);
+
+out:
+	kunmap(secs_page);
+	__free_page(secs_page);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_add_page - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE
+ *
+ * @filep:	open file to /dev/sgx
+ * @cmd:	the command value
+ * @arg:	pointer to an &sgx_enclave_add_page instance
+ *
+ * Creates a new enclave page and enqueues an EADD operation that will be
+ * processed by a worker thread later on.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ *   0 on success,
+ *   -errno otherwise
+ */
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_page(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
+				     unsigned long arg)
+{
+	struct sgx_enclave_add_page *addp = (void *)arg;
+	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+	struct sgx_encl *encl;
+	struct page *data_page;
+	void *data;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = sgx_encl_get(addp->addr, &encl);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&secinfo, (void __user *)addp->secinfo,
+			   sizeof(secinfo))) {
+		kref_put(&encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release);
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	data_page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
+	if (!data_page) {
+		kref_put(&encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	data = kmap(data_page);
+
+	ret = copy_from_user((void *)data, (void __user *)addp->src, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, addp->addr, data, &secinfo, addp->mrmask);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+out:
+	kref_put(&encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release);
+	kunmap(data_page);
+	__free_page(data_page);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_init - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT
+ *
+ * @filep:	open file to /dev/sgx
+ * @cmd:	the command value
+ * @arg:	pointer to an &sgx_enclave_init instance
+ *
+ * Flushes the remaining enqueued EADD operations and performs EINIT. Does not
+ * allow the EINITTOKENKEY attribute for an enclave.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ *   0 on success,
+ *   SGX error code on EINIT failure,
+ *   -errno otherwise
+ */
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
+				 unsigned long arg)
+{
+	struct sgx_enclave_init *initp = (struct sgx_enclave_init *)arg;
+	struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct;
+	struct sgx_einittoken *einittoken;
+	struct sgx_encl *encl;
+	struct page *initp_page;
+	int ret;
+
+	initp_page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
+	if (!initp_page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	sigstruct = kmap(initp_page);
+	einittoken = (struct sgx_einittoken *)
+		((unsigned long)sigstruct + PAGE_SIZE / 2);
+	memset(einittoken, 0, sizeof(*einittoken));
+
+	ret = copy_from_user(sigstruct, (void __user *)initp->sigstruct,
+			     sizeof(*sigstruct));
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+	if (sigstruct->attributes & SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY) {
+		ret = EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = sgx_encl_get(initp->addr, &encl);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = sgx_encl_init(encl, sigstruct, einittoken);
+
+	kref_put(&encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release);
+
+out:
+	kunmap(initp_page);
+	__free_page(initp_page);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+typedef long (*sgx_ioc_t)(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
+			  unsigned long arg);
+
+long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+	char data[256];
+	sgx_ioc_t handler = NULL;
+	long ret;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE:
+		handler = sgx_ioc_enclave_create;
+		break;
+	case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE:
+		handler = sgx_ioc_enclave_add_page;
+		break;
+	case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT:
+		handler = sgx_ioc_enclave_init;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
+	}
+
+	if (copy_from_user(data, (void __user *)arg, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	ret = handler(filep, cmd, (unsigned long)((void *)data));
+	if (!ret && (cmd & IOC_OUT)) {
+		if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, data, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+	}
+	if (IS_ENCLS_FAULT(ret))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_main.c b/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_main.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4312eab29775
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@ 
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)
+// Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation.
+
+#include <linux/acpi.h>
+#include <linux/cdev.h>
+#include <linux/platform_device.h>
+#include <linux/suspend.h>
+#include <asm/traps.h>
+#include "sgx.h"
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Intel SGX Driver");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>");
+MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL");
+
+struct workqueue_struct *sgx_add_page_wq;
+u64 sgx_encl_size_max_32;
+u64 sgx_encl_size_max_64;
+u64 sgx_xfrm_mask = 0x3;
+u32 sgx_misc_reserved;
+u32 sgx_xsave_size_tbl[64];
+int sgx_epcm_trapnr;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+long sgx_compat_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+	return sgx_ioctl(filep, cmd, arg);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int sgx_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	vma->vm_ops = &sgx_vm_ops;
+	vma->vm_flags |= VM_PFNMAP | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP | VM_IO |
+			 VM_DONTCOPY;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static unsigned long sgx_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file,
+					   unsigned long addr,
+					   unsigned long len,
+					   unsigned long pgoff,
+					   unsigned long flags)
+{
+	if (len < 2 * PAGE_SIZE || (len & (len - 1)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (len > sgx_encl_size_max_64)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (len > sgx_encl_size_max_32 && test_thread_flag(TIF_ADDR32))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	addr = current->mm->get_unmapped_area(file, addr, 2 * len, pgoff,
+					      flags);
+	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
+		return addr;
+
+	addr = (addr + (len - 1)) & ~(len - 1);
+
+	return addr;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sgx_fops = {
+	.owner			= THIS_MODULE,
+	.unlocked_ioctl		= sgx_ioctl,
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+	.compat_ioctl		= sgx_compat_ioctl,
+#endif
+	.mmap			= sgx_mmap,
+	.get_unmapped_area	= sgx_get_unmapped_area,
+};
+
+static struct bus_type sgx_bus_type = {
+	.name	= "sgx",
+};
+
+struct sgx_context {
+	struct device dev;
+	struct cdev cdev;
+};
+
+static dev_t sgx_devt;
+
+static void sgx_dev_release(struct device *dev)
+{
+	struct sgx_context *ctx = container_of(dev, struct sgx_context, dev);
+
+	kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+static struct sgx_context *sgx_ctx_alloc(struct device *parent)
+{
+	struct sgx_context *ctx;
+
+	ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	device_initialize(&ctx->dev);
+
+	ctx->dev.bus = &sgx_bus_type;
+	ctx->dev.parent = parent;
+	ctx->dev.devt = MKDEV(MAJOR(sgx_devt), 0);
+	ctx->dev.release = sgx_dev_release;
+
+	dev_set_name(&ctx->dev, "sgx");
+
+	cdev_init(&ctx->cdev, &sgx_fops);
+	ctx->cdev.owner = THIS_MODULE;
+
+	dev_set_drvdata(parent, ctx);
+
+	return ctx;
+}
+
+static struct sgx_context *sgxm_ctx_alloc(struct device *parent)
+{
+	struct sgx_context *ctx;
+	int rc;
+
+	ctx = sgx_ctx_alloc(parent);
+	if (IS_ERR(ctx))
+		return ctx;
+
+	rc = devm_add_action_or_reset(parent, (void (*)(void *))put_device,
+				      &ctx->dev);
+	if (rc) {
+		kfree(ctx);
+		return ERR_PTR(rc);
+	}
+
+	return ctx;
+}
+
+static int sgx_dev_init(struct device *parent)
+{
+	struct sgx_context *sgx_dev;
+	unsigned int eax;
+	unsigned int ebx;
+	unsigned int ecx;
+	unsigned int edx;
+	int ret;
+	int i;
+
+	sgx_dev = sgxm_ctx_alloc(parent);
+
+	cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+	/* Only allow misc bits supported by the driver. */
+	sgx_misc_reserved = ~ebx | SGX_MISC_RESERVED_MASK;
+	sgx_encl_size_max_64 = 1ULL << ((edx >> 8) & 0xFF);
+	sgx_encl_size_max_32 = 1ULL << (edx & 0xFF);
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE)) {
+		cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, 1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+		sgx_xfrm_mask = (((u64)edx) << 32) + (u64)ecx;
+
+		for (i = 2; i < 64; i++) {
+			cpuid_count(0x0D, i, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+			if ((1 << i) & sgx_xfrm_mask)
+				sgx_xsave_size_tbl[i] = eax + ebx;
+		}
+	}
+
+	sgx_epcm_trapnr = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX2) ? X86_TRAP_PF :
+							   X86_TRAP_GP;
+
+	sgx_add_page_wq = alloc_workqueue("intel_sgx-add-page-wq",
+					  WQ_UNBOUND | WQ_FREEZABLE, 1);
+	if (!sgx_add_page_wq)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ret = cdev_device_add(&sgx_dev->cdev, &sgx_dev->dev);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_workqueue;
+
+	return 0;
+out_workqueue:
+	destroy_workqueue(sgx_add_page_wq);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sgx_drv_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX))
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC)) {
+		pr_warn("sgx: IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASHx MSRs are not writable\n");
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
+	return sgx_dev_init(&pdev->dev);
+}
+
+static int sgx_drv_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
+{
+	struct sgx_context *ctx = dev_get_drvdata(&pdev->dev);
+
+	cdev_device_del(&ctx->cdev, &ctx->dev);
+	destroy_workqueue(sgx_add_page_wq);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
+static struct acpi_device_id sgx_device_ids[] = {
+	{"INT0E0C", 0},
+	{"", 0},
+};
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(acpi, sgx_device_ids);
+#endif
+
+static struct platform_driver sgx_drv = {
+	.probe = sgx_drv_probe,
+	.remove = sgx_drv_remove,
+	.driver = {
+		.name			= "intel_sgx",
+		.acpi_match_table	= ACPI_PTR(sgx_device_ids),
+	},
+};
+
+static int __init sgx_drv_subsys_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = bus_register(&sgx_bus_type);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = alloc_chrdev_region(&sgx_devt, 0, 1, "sgx");
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		bus_unregister(&sgx_bus_type);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void sgx_drv_subsys_exit(void)
+{
+	bus_unregister(&sgx_bus_type);
+	unregister_chrdev_region(sgx_devt, 1);
+}
+
+static int __init sgx_drv_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = sgx_drv_subsys_init();
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = platform_driver_register(&sgx_drv);
+	if (ret)
+		sgx_drv_subsys_exit();
+
+	return ret;
+}
+module_init(sgx_drv_init);
+
+static void __exit sgx_drv_exit(void)
+{
+	platform_driver_unregister(&sgx_drv);
+	sgx_drv_subsys_exit();
+}
+module_exit(sgx_drv_exit);
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_util.c b/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_util.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..cbea4c0e794b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ 
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)
+// Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation.
+
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
+#include "sgx.h"
+
+static int sgx_test_and_clear_young_cb(pte_t *ptep, pgtable_t token,
+				       unsigned long addr, void *data)
+{
+	pte_t pte;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = pte_young(*ptep);
+	if (ret) {
+		pte = pte_mkold(*ptep);
+		set_pte_at((struct mm_struct *)data, addr, ptep, pte);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_test_and_clear_young() - Test and reset the accessed bit
+ * @page:	enclave page to be tested for recent access
+ *
+ * Checks the Access (A) bit from the PTE corresponding to the
+ * enclave page and clears it.  Returns 1 if the page has been
+ * recently accessed and 0 if not.
+ */
+int sgx_test_and_clear_young(struct sgx_encl_page *page)
+{
+	unsigned long addr = SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR(page);
+	struct sgx_encl *encl = page->encl;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = sgx_encl_find(encl->mm, addr, &vma);
+	if (ret)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (encl != vma->vm_private_data)
+		return 0;
+
+	return apply_to_page_range(vma->vm_mm, addr, PAGE_SIZE,
+				   sgx_test_and_clear_young_cb, vma->vm_mm);
+}
+
+static void sgx_ipi_cb(void *info)
+{
+}
+
+void sgx_flush_cpus(struct sgx_encl *encl)
+{
+	on_each_cpu_mask(mm_cpumask(encl->mm), sgx_ipi_cb, NULL, 1);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_set_page_loaded - associate an EPC page with an enclave page
+ * @encl_page:	an enclave page
+ * @epc_page:	the EPC page to attach to @encl_page
+ */
+void sgx_set_page_loaded(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
+			 struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page)
+{
+	encl_page->desc |= SGX_ENCL_PAGE_LOADED;
+	encl_page->epc_page = epc_page;
+}
+
+struct page *sgx_get_backing(struct file *file, pgoff_t index)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+	struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
+	gfp_t gfpmask = mapping_gfp_mask(mapping);
+
+	return shmem_read_mapping_page_gfp(mapping, index, gfpmask);
+}
+
+void sgx_put_backing(struct page *backing_page, bool write)
+{
+	if (write)
+		set_page_dirty(backing_page);
+
+	put_page(backing_page);
+}
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_vma.c b/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_vma.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..17e95a0c734c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_vma.c
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ 
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)
+// Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation.
+
+#include <asm/mman.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/hashtable.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "sgx.h"
+
+static void sgx_vma_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data;
+
+	if (!encl)
+		return;
+
+	/* kref cannot underflow because ECREATE ioctl checks that there is only
+	 * one single VMA for the enclave before proceeding.
+	 */
+	kref_get(&encl->refcount);
+}
+
+static void sgx_vma_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data;
+
+	if (!encl)
+		return;
+
+	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+	sgx_invalidate(encl, true);
+	mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+	kref_put(&encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release);
+}
+
+const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops = {
+	.close = sgx_vma_close,
+	.open = sgx_vma_open,
+};