From patchwork Thu May 21 03:42:46 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Gibson X-Patchwork-Id: 11562225 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A5998138A for ; Thu, 21 May 2020 03:50:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7C1F320721 for ; Thu, 21 May 2020 03:50:41 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=gibson.dropbear.id.au header.i=@gibson.dropbear.id.au header.b="qJ8yxNE6" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 7C1F320721 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=gibson.dropbear.id.au Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=qemu-devel-bounces+patchwork-qemu-devel=patchwork.kernel.org@nongnu.org Received: from localhost ([::1]:46494 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jbcEC-0007Qb-Mm for patchwork-qemu-devel@patchwork.kernel.org; Wed, 20 May 2020 23:50:40 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:53264) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jbc7F-0002tf-25; Wed, 20 May 2020 23:43:29 -0400 Received: from ozlabs.org ([2401:3900:2:1::2]:47103) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jbc7C-0003Tm-JI; Wed, 20 May 2020 23:43:28 -0400 Received: by ozlabs.org (Postfix, from userid 1007) id 49SFnr2hwtz9sT8; Thu, 21 May 2020 13:43:12 +1000 (AEST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gibson.dropbear.id.au; s=201602; t=1590032592; bh=JOC3I9CAO1gQokfZDDYIv1xerDCdFlfSPYuz9CpkVxs=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:From; b=qJ8yxNE6f8YCYFwiyEHO0m+5ZcldYuz3Yy6SWwKSMVH/7lYKGxCFkdPpd5Vjt5sQf iV4zdJmIgzgl7zVJcVNRlRD6uR0UOaljqzbJUXitmnUdEGEKnY3/3e/7WeC1wajSom Tj6pDUL/3gxd/QqPZUQcug5qXVBPTgNBrTAn7gDQ= From: David Gibson To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, pair@us.ibm.com Subject: [RFC v2 00/18] Refactor configuration of guest memory protection Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 13:42:46 +1000 Message-Id: <20200521034304.340040-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 Received-SPF: pass client-ip=2401:3900:2:1::2; envelope-from=dgibson@ozlabs.org; helo=ozlabs.org X-detected-operating-system: by eggs.gnu.org: No matching host in p0f cache. That's all we know. X-Spam_score_int: -17 X-Spam_score: -1.8 X-Spam_bar: - X-Spam_report: (-1.8 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=0.249, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001 autolearn=_AUTOLEARN X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Eduardo Habkost , kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" , cohuck@redhat.com, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, Paolo Bonzini , Richard Henderson , David Gibson Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+patchwork-qemu-devel=patchwork.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor. AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechanism to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected execution environment. The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't seem ideal for users, or particularly for management layers. AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option "machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other than SEV. This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's "memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a "guest-memory-protection" property pointing to a platform specific object which configures and manages the specific details. For now this series covers just AMD SEV and POWER PEF. I'm hoping it can be extended to cover the Intel and s390 mechanisms as well, though. Note: I'm using the term "guest memory protection" throughout to refer to mechanisms like this. I don't particular like the term, it's both long and not really precise. If someone can think of a succinct way of saying "a means of protecting guest memory from a possibly compromised hypervisor", I'd be grateful for the suggestion. Changes since v1: * Rebased * Fixed some errors pointed out by Dave Gilbert David Gibson (18): target/i386: sev: Remove unused QSevGuestInfoClass target/i386: sev: Move local structure definitions into .c file target/i386: sev: Rename QSevGuestInfo target/i386: sev: Embed SEVState in SevGuestState target/i386: sev: Partial cleanup to sev_state global target/i386: sev: Remove redundant cbitpos and reduced_phys_bits fields target/i386: sev: Remove redundant policy field target/i386: sev: Remove redundant handle field target/i386: sev: Unify SEVState and SevGuestState guest memory protection: Add guest memory protection interface guest memory protection: Handle memory encrption via interface guest memory protection: Perform KVM init via interface guest memory protection: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() guest memory protection: Rework the "memory-encryption" property guest memory protection: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM guest memory protection: Add Error ** to GuestMemoryProtection::kvm_init spapr: Added PEF based guest memory protection guest memory protection: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 40 +-- accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 5 - accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c | 10 - backends/Makefile.objs | 2 + backends/guest-memory-protection.c | 29 ++ hw/core/machine.c | 61 ++++- hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c | 6 +- include/exec/guest-memory-protection.h | 77 ++++++ include/hw/boards.h | 4 +- include/sysemu/kvm.h | 17 -- include/sysemu/sev.h | 6 +- target/i386/sev.c | 351 +++++++++++++------------ target/i386/sev_i386.h | 49 ---- target/ppc/Makefile.objs | 2 +- target/ppc/pef.c | 81 ++++++ 15 files changed, 441 insertions(+), 299 deletions(-) create mode 100644 backends/guest-memory-protection.c create mode 100644 include/exec/guest-memory-protection.h create mode 100644 target/ppc/pef.c Tested-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann