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[0/3] virtio: restore elem->in/out_sg after iov_discard_front/back()

Message ID 20200812104918.107116-1-stefanha@redhat.com (mailing list archive)
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Series virtio: restore elem->in/out_sg after iov_discard_front/back() | expand

Message

Stefan Hajnoczi Aug. 12, 2020, 10:49 a.m. UTC
Both virtio-blk and virtio-crypto use destructive iov_discard_front/back()
operations on elem->in/out_sg. virtqueue_push() calls dma_memory_unmap() on t=
he
modified iovec arrays. The memory addresses may not match those originally
mapped with dma_memory_map().

This raises several issues:
1. MemoryRegion references can be leaked.
2. Dirty memory may not be tracked.
3. The non-RAM bounce buffer can be leaked.

This patch series solves the issue in two ways:
1. virtio-blk uses a new iov_discard_undo() API to restore iovec arrays.
2. virtio-crypto uses g_memdup() to avoid modifying the original iovec arrays.

The g_memdup() approach is slower than iov_discard_undo() but less
complex/fragile. I am less familiar with the virtio-crypto code and it uses
more complex sequences of iov_discard_front/back() calls than virtio-blk. If
anyone feels like optimizing virtio-crypto, please go ahead.

The virtio-blk bug was found by Alexander Bulekov's fuzzing effort. I found t=
he
virtio-crypto bug through code inspection.

Stefan Hajnoczi (3):
  util/iov: add iov_discard_undo()
  virtio-blk: undo destructive iov_discard_*() operations
  virtio-crypto: don't modify elem->in/out_sg

 include/hw/virtio/virtio-blk.h |   2 +
 include/qemu/iov.h             |  23 +++++
 hw/block/virtio-blk.c          |   9 +-
 hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c      |  17 +++-
 tests/test-iov.c               | 165 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 util/iov.c                     |  50 +++++++++-
 6 files changed, 257 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

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2.26.2