From patchwork Thu Apr 7 15:33:01 2016 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Alex Bligh X-Patchwork-Id: 8774101 Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-qemu-devel@patchwork.kernel.org Delivered-To: patchwork-parsemail@patchwork2.web.kernel.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.136]) by patchwork2.web.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EE50AC0553 for ; Thu, 7 Apr 2016 15:32:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.kernel.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 57D0B20222 for ; Thu, 7 Apr 2016 15:32:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [208.118.235.17]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9877120145 for ; Thu, 7 Apr 2016 15:32:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost ([::1]:50657 helo=lists.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1aoBvR-0003MC-1P for patchwork-qemu-devel@patchwork.kernel.org; Thu, 07 Apr 2016 11:32:53 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:4830:134:3::10]:49778) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1aoBvG-0003HJ-Pp for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Thu, 07 Apr 2016 11:32:45 -0400 Received: from Debian-exim by eggs.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1aoBvE-0004VK-BT for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Thu, 07 Apr 2016 11:32:42 -0400 Received: from mail.avalus.com ([2001:41c8:10:1dd::10]:42860) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1aoBvE-0004V7-0q for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Thu, 07 Apr 2016 11:32:40 -0400 Received: by mail.avalus.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 09191C560A2; Thu, 7 Apr 2016 16:32:38 +0100 (BST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=alex.org.uk; s=mail; t=1460043158; bh=4jCPS8AGhjNSS8FtXBgSj9PNL+JLpwPV6FegBo2CMJI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date; b=otbJMhYn7xJCFjr/EO/FaG0/zUCusthCG17wQZC+wsuIgFmKGq4ZuHWucF8Wt8JW9 MRBgPKXFtawVETFCBQEie3/pV74VPeCwNUZodQEvYINJDI+vF1crKdduyBkGFmDjRm uPPCifq4MNSMG//TSRCciR6oSrrD8mGtNl5Gt0HE= From: Alex Bligh To: Eric Blake , Wouter Verhelst Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2016 16:33:01 +0100 Message-Id: <1460043181-62255-1-git-send-email-alex@alex.org.uk> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.9.1 X-detected-operating-system: by eggs.gnu.org: GNU/Linux 3.x X-Received-From: 2001:41c8:10:1dd::10 Cc: "nbd-general@lists.sourceforge.net" , "qemu-devel@nongnu.org" , Alex Bligh Subject: [Qemu-devel] [PATCHv2] Improve documentation for TLS X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.14 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+patchwork-qemu-devel=patchwork.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: qemu-devel-bounces+patchwork-qemu-devel=patchwork.kernel.org@nongnu.org X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.8 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI, T_DKIM_INVALID, UNPARSEABLE_RELAY autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on mail.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP * Call out TLS into a separate section * Add details of the TLS protocol itself * Emphasise that actual TLS session initiation (i.e. the TLS handshake) can be initiated from either side (as required by the TLS standard I believe and as actually works in practice) * Clarify what is a requirement on servers, and what is a requirement on clients, separately, specifying their behaviour in a single place in the document. * Document the four possible modes of operation of a server. Signed-off-by: Alex Bligh --- doc/proto.md | 336 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 302 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) Changes from v1: * Add section on 'Security considerations' * Move discussion of TLS versions to 'security considerations' * Add section on protocol downgrade attacks in an attempt to respond to Daniel Berrange's concerns. * Clarify that a client requiring TLS SHOULD upgrade as the first thing it does, and explicitly point out the dangers of not doing so in the body as well as in the security section (re Daniel Berrange's concerns) * Delete para concerned with client discovering server's TLS mode as the whole point is the client does not need to know, and this implied some sort of negotiated mode. * Amend NBD_OPT_LIST so TLS-only exports can be omitted prior to TLS initiation. * If SELECTIVETLS is used by the server, make support of INFO a 'MUST' and not a 'SHOULD' * Lots of nits from Eric Blake. diff --git a/doc/proto.md b/doc/proto.md index f117394..d697787 100644 --- a/doc/proto.md +++ b/doc/proto.md @@ -286,6 +286,289 @@ S: (*length* bytes of data if the request is of type `NBD_CMD_READ`) This reply type MUST NOT be used except as documented by the experimental `STRUCTURED_REPLY` extension; see below. +## TLS support + +The NBD protocol supports TLS via negotiation with the `NBD_OPT_STARTTLS` +option. This is performed as an in-session upgrade. Below the term +'negotiation' is used to refer to the sending and receiving of +NBD commands, and the term 'initiation' of TLS is used to refer to +the actual upgrade to TLS. + +### Certificates, authentication and authorisation + +This standard does not specify what encryption, certification +and signature algorithms are used. This standard does not +specify authentication and authorisation (for instance +whether client and/or server certificates are required and +what they should contain); this is implementation dependent. + +TLS requires fixed newstyle negotiation to have completed. + +### Server-side requirements + +There are four modes of operation for a server. The +server MUST support one of these modes. + +* The server operates entirely without TLS ('NOTLS'); OR + +* The server makes TLS available (for all exports) and + it is available at the option of the client ('OPTIONALTLS'); OR + +* The server insists upon TLS, and forces the client to + upgrade by erroring any NBD options other than `NBD_OPT_STARTTLS` + with `NBD_REP_ERR_TLS_REQD` ('FORCEDTLS'); this in practice means + that all option negotiation (apart from the `NBD_OPT_STARTTLS` + itself) is carried out with TLS; OR + +* The server provides TLS, and it is mandatory on zero or more + exports, and is available at the client's option on all + other exports ('SELECTIVETLS'). The server does not force + the client to upgrade to TLS during option haggling (as + if the client ultimately were to choose a non-TLS-only export, + stopping TLS is not possible). Instead it permits the client + to upgrade as and when it chooses, but unless an upgrade to + TLS has already taken place, the server errors attempts + to enter transmission mode on TLS-only exports, MAY + refuse to provide information about TLS-only exports + via `NBD_OPT_INFO`, MAY refuse to provide information + about non-existent exports via `NBD_OPT_INFO`, and MAY omit + exports that are TLS-only from `NBD_OPT_LIST`. + +The server MAY determine the mode in which it operates +dependent upon the connection (for instance it might be +more liberal with connections made over the loopback +interface) but it MUST be consistent in its mode +of operation across the lifespan of a single TCP connection +to the server. A client MUST NOT assume indications from +a prior TCP session to a given server will be relevant +to a subsequent session. + +The server MUST operate in NOTLS mode unless the server +set flag NBD_FLAG_FIXED_NEWSTYLE and the client replied +with NBD_FLAG_C_FIXED_NEWSTYLE in the fixed newstyle +negotiation. + +These modes of operations are described in detail below. + +#### NOTLS mode + +If the server receives `NBD_OPT_STARTTLS` it MUST respond with +`NBD_REP_ERR_UNSUP`. The server MUST NOT respond to any +command with `NBD_REP_ERR_TLS_REQD`. + +#### OPTIONALTLS mode + +If the server receives `NBD_OPT_STARTTLS` it MUST reply with +`NBD_REP_ACK`. After this reply has been sent, the server MUST +be prepared for a TLS handshake, and all further data MUST +be sent and received over TLS. There is no downgrade to a +non-TLS connection. + +As per the TLS standard, the handshake MAY be initiated either +by the server (having sent the `NBD_REP_ACK`) or by the client. +If the handshake is unsuccessful (for instance the client's +certificate does not match) the server MUST disconnect as +by this stage it is too late to continue without TLS as the +acknowledgement has been sent. + +The server MUST NOT respond to any command with `NBD_REP_ERR_TLS_REQD`, +as TLS is optional. + +#### FORCEDTLS mode + +If the server receives `NBD_OPT_STARTTLS` it MUST reply with +`NBD_REP_ACK` and initiate TLS as set out under 'OPTIONALTLS' +above. + +If the server receives any other option, including `NBD_OPT_INFO`, +and unsupported options, it SHOULD reply with `NBD_REP_ERR_TLS_REQD` +if TLS has not been initiated; `NBD_OPT_INFO` is included as in this +mode, all exports are TLS-only. If the server receives a request to +enter transmission mode via `NBD_OPT_EXPORT_NAME` when TLS has not +been initiated, then as this request cannot error, it MUST +disconnect the connection. If the server receives a request to +enter transmission mode via `NBD_OPT_GO` when TLS has not been +initiated, it MUST error with `NBD_REP_ERR_TLS_REQD`. + +The server MUST NOT send `NBD_REP_ERR_TLS_REQD` in reply to +any command if TLS has already been initiated. + +The FORCEDTLS mode of operation has an implementation problem in +that the client MAY legally simply send a `NBD_OPT_EXPORT_NAME` +to enter transmission mode without previously sending any options. +Therefore, if a server uses FORCEDTLS, it SHOULD implement the +INFO extension. + +#### SELECTIVETLS mode + +If the server receives `NBD_OPT_STARTTLS` it MUST reply with +`NBD_REP_ACK` and initiate TLS as set out under 'OPTIONALTLS' +above. + +If the server receives any other option except `NBD_OPT_INFO`, +it MUST NOT reply with `NBD_REP_ERR_TLS_REQD`. If the +server receives `NBD_OPT_INFO` and TLS has not been +initiated, it MAY reply with `NBD_REP_ERR_TLS_REQD` if that +export is non-existent, and MUST reply with `NBD_REP_ERR_TLS_REQD` +if that export is TLS-only. + +If the server receives a request to enter transmission mode +via `NBD_OPT_EXPORT_NAME` on a TLS-only export when TLS has not +been initiated, then as this request cannot error, it MUST +disconnect the connection. If the server receives a request to +enter transmission mode via `NBD_OPT_GO` when TLS has not been +initiated, it MUST error with `NBD_REP_ERR_TLS_REQD`. + +The server MUST NOT send `NBD_REP_ERR_TLS_REQD` in reply to +any command if TLS has already been neogitated. The server +MUST NOT send `NBD_REP_ERR_TLS_REQD` in response to any +option other than `NBD_OPT_INFO` or `NBD_OPT_GO`, and +only in those cases in respect of a TLS-only or non-existent +export. + +There are two degenerate cases of SELECTIVETLS: where all +exports are TLS-only, and where no exports are TLS-only. +These are permitted to make programming of servers easier. +Where no exports are TLS-only, operation is very similar +to OPTIONALTLS. Where all exports are TLS-only, operation +is a little different from FORCEDTLS, as the client is not +forced to upgrade to TLS prior to any options being processed, +and the server MAY choose to give information on non-existent +exports via NBD_OPT_INFO exports prior to an upgrade to TLS. + +The SELECTIVETLS mode of operation has an implementation problem +in that unless the INFO extension is supported, the client that +does not use TLS may have its access to exports denied without +it being able to ascertain the reason. For instance it may +go into transmission mode using `NBD_OPT_EXPORT_NAME` - which +does not return an error as no options will be denied with +`NBD_REP_ERR_TLS_REQD`. Further there is no way to remotely +determine whether an export requires TLS, and therefore this +must be initiated between client and server out of band. +Therefore, if a server uses SELECTIVETLS, it MUST implement +the INFO extension. + +## Client-side requirements + +If the client supports TLS at all, it MUST be prepared +to deal with servers operating in any of the above modes. +Notwithstanding, a client MAY always disconnect or +refuse to connect to a particular export if TLS is +not available and the user requires TLS. + +The client MUST NOT issue `NBD_OPT_STARTTLS` unless the server +set flag NBD_FLAG_FIXED_NEWSTYLE and the client replied +with NBD_FLAG_C_FIXED_NEWSTYLE in the fixed newstyle +negotiation. + +The client MUST NOT issue `NBD_OPT_STARTTLS` if TLS has already +been initiated. + +Subject to the above two limitations, the client MAY send +`NBD_OPT_STARTTLS` at any time to initiate a TLS session. If the +client receives `NBD_REP_ACK` in response, it MUST immediately +upgrade the connection to TLS. If it receives `NBD_ERR_REP_UNSUP` +in response or any other error, it indicates that the server cannot +or will not upgrade the connection to TLS and therefore MUST either +continue the connection without TLS, or disconnect. + +A client that prefers to use TLS irrespective of whether +the server makes TLS mandatory SHOULD send `NBD_OPT_STARTTLS` +as the first option. This will ensure option haggling is subject +to TLS, and will thus prevent the possibilty of options being +compromised by a MitM attack. Note that the `NBD_OPT_STARTTLS` +itself may be compromised - see 'downgrade attacks' for +more details. For this reasons a client which only wishes +to use TLS SHOULD disconnect if the `NBD_OPT_STARTTLS` +replies with an error. + +If the TLS handshake is unsuccessful (for instance the server's +certificate does not validate) the client MUST disconnect as +by this stage it is too late to continue without TLS. + +If the client receives an `NBD_REP_ERR_TLS_REQD` in response +to any option, it implies that this option cannot be executed +unless a TLS upgrade is performed. If the option is any +option other than `NBD_OPT_INFO` or `NBD_OPT_GO`, this +indicates that no option will succeed unless a TLS upgrade +is performed; the client MAY therefore choose to issue +a `NBD_OPT_STARTTLS`, or MAY disconnect the session (if +for instance it does not support TLS or does not have +appropriate credentials for this server). If the client +receives `NBD_REP_ERR_TLS_REQD` in response to +`NBD_OPT_INFO` or `NBD_OPT_GO` this indicates that the +export referred to within the option is either non-existent +or requires TLS; the client MAY therefore choose to issue +a `NBD_OPT_STARTTLS`, MAY disconnect the session (if +for instance it does not support TLS or does not have +appropriate credentials for this server), or MAY continue +in another manner without TLS, for instance by querying +or using other exports. + +If a client supports TLS, it SHOULD also support the INFO +extension, and SHOULD use `NBD_OPT_GO` if available in place +of `NBD_OPT_EXPORT_NAME`. The reason for this is set out in +the final paragraphs of the sections under 'FORCEDTLS' +and 'SELECTIVETLS': this gives an opportunity for the +server to transmit that an error going into transmission +mode is due to the client's failure to initiate TLS, +and the fact that the client may obtain information about +which exports are TLS-only through `NBD_OPT_INFO`. + +### Security considerations + +#### TLS versions + +NBD implementations supporting TLS MUST support TLS version 1.2, +SHOULD support any later versions, and MAY support older versions. +Older versions SHOULD NOT be used where there is a risk of security +problems with those older versions or of a downgrade attack +against TLS versions. + +#### Protocol downgrade attacks + +A danger inherent in any scheme relying on the negotiation +of whether TLS should be employed is downgrade attacks within +the NBD protocol. + +There are two main dangers: + +* A Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) hijacks a session and impersonates + the server (possibly by proxying it) claiming not to support + TLS. In this manner, the client is confused into operating + in a plain-text manner with the MitM (with the session possibly + being proxied in plain-text to the server using the method + below). + +* The MitM hijacks a session and impersonates the client + (possibly by proxying it) claiming not to support TLS. In + this manner the server is confused into oeprating in a plain-text + manner with the MitM (with the session being possibly + proxied to the server with the method above). + +With regard to the first, any client that does not wish +to be subject to potential downgrade attack SHOULD ensure +that if a TLS endpoint is specified by the client, it +ensures that TLS is negotiated prior to sending or +requesting sensitive data. To recap, yhe client MAY send +`NBD_OPT_STARTTLS` at any point during option haggling, +and MAY disconnect the session if `NBD_REP_ACK` is not +provided. + +With regard to the second, any server that does not wish +to be subject to a potential downgrade attack SHOULD either +used FORCEDTLS mode, or should force TLS on those exports +it is concerned about using SELECTIVE mode and TLS-only +exports. It is not possible to avoid downgrade attacks +on exports which are may be served either via TLS or +in plain text. + +### Status + +This functionality has not yet been implemented by the reference +implementation, but was implemented by qemu and subsequently +by other users, so has been moved out of the "experimental" section. + ## Values This section describes the value and meaning of constants (other than @@ -366,7 +649,7 @@ of the newstyle negotiation. Data: String, name of the export, as free-form text. The length of the name is determined from the option header. If the chosen export does not exist or requirements for the chosen export - are not met (e.g., the client did not negotiate TLS for an export + are not met (e.g., the client did not initiate TLS for an export where the server requires it), the server should close the connection. @@ -391,7 +674,10 @@ of the newstyle negotiation. - `NBD_OPT_LIST` (3) Return a number of `NBD_REP_SERVER` replies, one for each export, - followed by `NBD_REP_ACK`. + followed by `NBD_REP_ACK`. The server MAY omit entries from this + list if TLS has not been negotiated and either the server is + operating in FORCEDTLS mode or the server is operating in + SELECTIVETLS mode and the entry concerned is a TLS-only export. - `NBD_OPT_PEEK_EXPORT` (4) @@ -400,21 +686,13 @@ of the newstyle negotiation. - `NBD_OPT_STARTTLS` (5) - The client wishes to initiate TLS. If the server replies with - `NBD_REP_ACK`, then the client should immediately initiate a TLS - handshake and continue the negotiation in the encrypted channel. If - the server is unwilling to perform TLS, it should reply with - `NBD_REP_ERR_POLICY`. For backwards compatibility, a client should - also be prepared to handle `NBD_REP_ERR_UNSUP`. If the client sent - along any data with the request, the server should send back - `NBD_REP_ERR_INVALID`. The client MUST NOT send this option if - it has already negotiated TLS; if the server receives - `NBD_OPT_STARTTLS` when TLS has already been negotiated, the server - MUST send back `NBD_REP_ERR_INVALID`. - - This functionality has not yet been implemented by the reference - implementation, but was implemented by qemu so has been moved out of - the "experimental" section. + The client wishes to initiate TLS. + + The server MUST either reply with `NBD_REP_ACK` after which + point the connection is upgraded to TLS, or reply with + `NBD_REP_ERR_UNSUP`. + + See the section on TLS above for further details. - `NBD_OPT_INFO` (6) @@ -489,20 +767,10 @@ case that data is an error message string suitable for display to the user. * `NBD_REP_ERR_TLS_REQD` (2^31 + 5) The server is unwilling to continue negotiation unless TLS is - negotiated first. A server MUST NOT send this error if it has one or - more exports that do not require TLS; not even if the client indicated - interest (by way of `NBD_OPT_PEEK_EXPORT`) in an export which requires - TLS. - - If this reply is used, servers SHOULD send it in reply to each and every - unencrypted `NBD_OPT_*` message (apart from `NBD_OPT_STARTTLS`). - - This functionality has not yet been implemented by the reference - implementation, but was implemented by qemu so has been moved out of - the "experimental" section. - - The experimental `INFO` extension makes small but compatible - changes to the semantics of this error message; see below. + initiated first. In the case of `NBD_OPT_INFO` and `NBD_OPT_GO` + this unwillingness MAY (depending on the TLS mode) be limited + to the export in question. See the section on TLS above for + further details. * `NBD_REP_ERR_UNKNOWN` (2^31 + 6) @@ -735,13 +1003,13 @@ Therefore these commands share common documentation. - `NBD_REP_ERR_UNKNOWN`: The chosen export does not exist on this server. - `NBD_REP_ERR_TLS_REQD`: The server does not wish to export this - block device unless the client negotiates TLS first. + block device unless the client initiates TLS first. - `NBD_REP_SERVER`: The server accepts the chosen export. - Additionally, if TLS has not been negotiated, the server MAY reply + Additionally, if TLS has not been initiated, the server MAY reply with `NBD_REP_ERR_TLS_REQD` (instead of `NBD_REP_ERR_UNKNOWN`) to requests for exports that are unknown. This is so that clients - that have not negotiated TLS cannot enumerate exports. + that have not initiated TLS cannot enumerate exports. In the case of `NBD_REP_SERVER`, the message's data takes on a different interpretation than the default (so as to provide additional