@@ -919,29 +919,31 @@ do_check_protect_pse36:
!((env->cr[4] & CR4_SMEP_MASK) && (ptep & PG_USER_MASK)))) {
prot |= PAGE_EXEC;
}
-
- if ((prot & (1 << is_write1)) == 0) {
- goto do_fault_protect;
- }
-
if ((env->cr[4] & CR4_PKE_MASK) && (env->hflags & HF_LMA_MASK) &&
(ptep & PG_USER_MASK) && env->pkru) {
uint32_t pk = (pte & PG_PKRU_MASK) >> PG_PKRU_BIT;
uint32_t pkru_ad = (env->pkru >> pk * 2) & 1;
uint32_t pkru_wd = (env->pkru >> pk * 2) & 2;
+ uint32_t pkru_prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC;
if (pkru_ad) {
- prot &= ~(PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE);
+ pkru_prot &= ~(PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE);
} else if (pkru_wd && (is_user || env->cr[0] & CR0_WP_MASK)) {
- prot &= ~PAGE_WRITE;
+ pkru_prot &= ~PAGE_WRITE;
}
- if ((prot & (1 << is_write1)) == 0) {
+
+ prot &= pkru_prot;
+ if ((pkru_prot & (1 << is_write1)) == 0) {
assert(is_write1 != 2);
error_code |= PG_ERROR_PK_MASK;
goto do_fault_protect;
}
}
+ if ((prot & (1 << is_write1)) == 0) {
+ goto do_fault_protect;
+ }
+
/* yes, it can! */
is_dirty = is_write && !(pte & PG_DIRTY_MASK);
if (!(pte & PG_ACCESSED_MASK) || is_dirty) {
Xiao Guangrong ran kvm-unit-tests on an actual machine with PKU and found that it fails: test pte.p pte.user pde.p pde.user pde.a pde.pse pkru.wd pkey=1 user write efer.nx cr4.pke: FAIL: error code 27 expected 7 Dump mapping: address: 0x123400000000 ------L4: 2ebe007 ------L3: 2ebf007 ------L2: 8000000020000a5 (All failures are combinations of "pde.user pde.p pkru.wd pkey=1", plus either "pde.pse" or "pte.p pte.user", plus one of "user cr0.wp", "cr0.wp" or "user", plus unimportant bits such as accessed/dirty or efer.nx). So PFEC.PKEY is set even if the ordinary check failed (which it did because pde.w is zero). Adjust QEMU to match behavior of silicon. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> --- target-i386/helper.c | 18 ++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)