| Message ID | 147256919246.23038.5243308527146021470.stgit@bahia.lab.toulouse-stg.fr.ibm.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
I forgot to pass --edit-patches to stg mail and some mails managed to get away before I hit ^C :\ Please ignore this thread: <147256918576.23038.4177640830854859642.stgit@bahia.lab.toulouse-stg.fr.ibm.com> and look at this one instead: <147256922286.23141.1863740247797922944.stgit@bahia.lab.toulouse-stg.fr.ibm.com> Sorry for the noise. On Tue, 30 Aug 2016 16:59:52 +0200 Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> wrote: > Empty path components don't make sense for most commands and may cause > undefined behavior, depending on the backend. A notable exception > would be the target of a symbolic link: POSIX requires implementations > to support the empty string for target names. But 9p is only supported > on linux hosts, which don't support empty target names yet, and the > proposal to error out with ENOENT got approved, as indicated here: > > http://austingroupbugs.net/view.php?id=649 > > For the sake of consistency and simplicity, symlink target names will be > treated the same as any other file name argument. > > Also, the walk request described in the 9P spec [1] clearly shows that > the client is supposed to send individual path components: the official > linux client never sends portions of path containing the / character for > example. > > Moreover, the 9P spec [2] also states that a system can decide to restrict > the set of supported characters used in path components, with an explicit > mention "to remove slashes from name components". > > This patch introduces a new name_is_illegal() helper that checks the > names sent by the client are not empty and don't contain unwanted chars. > Since 9pfs is only supported on linux hosts, only the / character is > checked at the moment. When support for other hosts (AKA. win32) is added, > other chars may need to be blacklisted as well. > > If a client sends an illegal path component, the request will fail and > ENOENT is returned to the client. > > [1] http://man.cat-v.org/plan_9/5/walk > [2] http://man.cat-v.org/plan_9/5/intro > > Suggested-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> > Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> > > v3: - fix empty string check in name_is_illegal() > - return ENOENT instead of EINVAL > - added checking of target names for symlinks in create (9P2000.u) > - added some details about symlink target names in the changelog > --- > hw/9pfs/9p.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c > index b6b02b46a9da..fe2d27f12ae1 100644 > --- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c > +++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c > @@ -1256,6 +1256,11 @@ static int v9fs_walk_marshal(V9fsPDU *pdu, uint16_t nwnames, V9fsQID *qids) > return offset; > } > > +static bool name_is_illegal(const char *name) > +{ > + return !*name || strchr(name, '/') != NULL; > +} > + > static void v9fs_walk(void *opaque) > { > int name_idx; > @@ -1289,6 +1294,10 @@ static void v9fs_walk(void *opaque) > if (err < 0) { > goto out_nofid; > } > + if (name_is_illegal(wnames[i].data)) { > + err = -ENOENT; > + goto out_nofid; > + } > offset += err; > } > } else if (nwnames > P9_MAXWELEM) { > @@ -1483,6 +1492,11 @@ static void v9fs_lcreate(void *opaque) > } > trace_v9fs_lcreate(pdu->tag, pdu->id, dfid, flags, mode, gid); > > + if (name_is_illegal(name.data)) { > + err = -ENOENT; > + goto out_nofid; > + } > + > fidp = get_fid(pdu, dfid); > if (fidp == NULL) { > err = -ENOENT; > @@ -2077,6 +2091,11 @@ static void v9fs_create(void *opaque) > } > trace_v9fs_create(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, name.data, perm, mode); > > + if (name_is_illegal(name.data)) { > + err = -ENOENT; > + goto out_nofid; > + } > + > fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid); > if (fidp == NULL) { > err = -EINVAL; > @@ -2099,6 +2118,11 @@ static void v9fs_create(void *opaque) > } > fidp->fid_type = P9_FID_DIR; > } else if (perm & P9_STAT_MODE_SYMLINK) { > + if (name_is_illegal(extension.data)) { > + err = -ENOENT; > + goto out_nofid; > + } > + > err = v9fs_co_symlink(pdu, fidp, &name, > extension.data, -1 , &stbuf); > if (err < 0) { > @@ -2242,6 +2266,11 @@ static void v9fs_symlink(void *opaque) > } > trace_v9fs_symlink(pdu->tag, pdu->id, dfid, name.data, symname.data, gid); > > + if (name_is_illegal(name.data) || name_is_illegal(symname.data)) { > + err = -ENOENT; > + goto out_nofid; > + } > + > dfidp = get_fid(pdu, dfid); > if (dfidp == NULL) { > err = -EINVAL; > @@ -2316,6 +2345,11 @@ static void v9fs_link(void *opaque) > } > trace_v9fs_link(pdu->tag, pdu->id, dfid, oldfid, name.data); > > + if (name_is_illegal(name.data)) { > + err = -ENOENT; > + goto out_nofid; > + } > + > dfidp = get_fid(pdu, dfid); > if (dfidp == NULL) { > err = -ENOENT; > @@ -2398,6 +2432,12 @@ static void v9fs_unlinkat(void *opaque) > if (err < 0) { > goto out_nofid; > } > + > + if (name_is_illegal(name.data)) { > + err = -ENOENT; > + goto out_nofid; > + } > + > dfidp = get_fid(pdu, dfid); > if (dfidp == NULL) { > err = -EINVAL; > @@ -2504,6 +2544,12 @@ static void v9fs_rename(void *opaque) > if (err < 0) { > goto out_nofid; > } > + > + if (name_is_illegal(name.data)) { > + err = -ENOENT; > + goto out_nofid; > + } > + > fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid); > if (fidp == NULL) { > err = -ENOENT; > @@ -2616,6 +2662,11 @@ static void v9fs_renameat(void *opaque) > goto out_err; > } > > + if (name_is_illegal(old_name.data) || name_is_illegal(new_name.data)) { > + err = -ENOENT; > + goto out_err; > + } > + > v9fs_path_write_lock(s); > err = v9fs_complete_renameat(pdu, olddirfid, > &old_name, newdirfid, &new_name); > @@ -2826,6 +2877,11 @@ static void v9fs_mknod(void *opaque) > } > trace_v9fs_mknod(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, mode, major, minor); > > + if (name_is_illegal(name.data)) { > + err = -ENOENT; > + goto out_nofid; > + } > + > fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid); > if (fidp == NULL) { > err = -ENOENT; > @@ -2977,6 +3033,11 @@ static void v9fs_mkdir(void *opaque) > } > trace_v9fs_mkdir(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, name.data, mode, gid); > > + if (name_is_illegal(name.data)) { > + err = -ENOENT; > + goto out_nofid; > + } > + > fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid); > if (fidp == NULL) { > err = -ENOENT; > >
diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c index b6b02b46a9da..fe2d27f12ae1 100644 --- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c +++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c @@ -1256,6 +1256,11 @@ static int v9fs_walk_marshal(V9fsPDU *pdu, uint16_t nwnames, V9fsQID *qids) return offset; } +static bool name_is_illegal(const char *name) +{ + return !*name || strchr(name, '/') != NULL; +} + static void v9fs_walk(void *opaque) { int name_idx; @@ -1289,6 +1294,10 @@ static void v9fs_walk(void *opaque) if (err < 0) { goto out_nofid; } + if (name_is_illegal(wnames[i].data)) { + err = -ENOENT; + goto out_nofid; + } offset += err; } } else if (nwnames > P9_MAXWELEM) { @@ -1483,6 +1492,11 @@ static void v9fs_lcreate(void *opaque) } trace_v9fs_lcreate(pdu->tag, pdu->id, dfid, flags, mode, gid); + if (name_is_illegal(name.data)) { + err = -ENOENT; + goto out_nofid; + } + fidp = get_fid(pdu, dfid); if (fidp == NULL) { err = -ENOENT; @@ -2077,6 +2091,11 @@ static void v9fs_create(void *opaque) } trace_v9fs_create(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, name.data, perm, mode); + if (name_is_illegal(name.data)) { + err = -ENOENT; + goto out_nofid; + } + fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid); if (fidp == NULL) { err = -EINVAL; @@ -2099,6 +2118,11 @@ static void v9fs_create(void *opaque) } fidp->fid_type = P9_FID_DIR; } else if (perm & P9_STAT_MODE_SYMLINK) { + if (name_is_illegal(extension.data)) { + err = -ENOENT; + goto out_nofid; + } + err = v9fs_co_symlink(pdu, fidp, &name, extension.data, -1 , &stbuf); if (err < 0) { @@ -2242,6 +2266,11 @@ static void v9fs_symlink(void *opaque) } trace_v9fs_symlink(pdu->tag, pdu->id, dfid, name.data, symname.data, gid); + if (name_is_illegal(name.data) || name_is_illegal(symname.data)) { + err = -ENOENT; + goto out_nofid; + } + dfidp = get_fid(pdu, dfid); if (dfidp == NULL) { err = -EINVAL; @@ -2316,6 +2345,11 @@ static void v9fs_link(void *opaque) } trace_v9fs_link(pdu->tag, pdu->id, dfid, oldfid, name.data); + if (name_is_illegal(name.data)) { + err = -ENOENT; + goto out_nofid; + } + dfidp = get_fid(pdu, dfid); if (dfidp == NULL) { err = -ENOENT; @@ -2398,6 +2432,12 @@ static void v9fs_unlinkat(void *opaque) if (err < 0) { goto out_nofid; } + + if (name_is_illegal(name.data)) { + err = -ENOENT; + goto out_nofid; + } + dfidp = get_fid(pdu, dfid); if (dfidp == NULL) { err = -EINVAL; @@ -2504,6 +2544,12 @@ static void v9fs_rename(void *opaque) if (err < 0) { goto out_nofid; } + + if (name_is_illegal(name.data)) { + err = -ENOENT; + goto out_nofid; + } + fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid); if (fidp == NULL) { err = -ENOENT; @@ -2616,6 +2662,11 @@ static void v9fs_renameat(void *opaque) goto out_err; } + if (name_is_illegal(old_name.data) || name_is_illegal(new_name.data)) { + err = -ENOENT; + goto out_err; + } + v9fs_path_write_lock(s); err = v9fs_complete_renameat(pdu, olddirfid, &old_name, newdirfid, &new_name); @@ -2826,6 +2877,11 @@ static void v9fs_mknod(void *opaque) } trace_v9fs_mknod(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, mode, major, minor); + if (name_is_illegal(name.data)) { + err = -ENOENT; + goto out_nofid; + } + fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid); if (fidp == NULL) { err = -ENOENT; @@ -2977,6 +3033,11 @@ static void v9fs_mkdir(void *opaque) } trace_v9fs_mkdir(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, name.data, mode, gid); + if (name_is_illegal(name.data)) { + err = -ENOENT; + goto out_nofid; + } + fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid); if (fidp == NULL) { err = -ENOENT;
Empty path components don't make sense for most commands and may cause undefined behavior, depending on the backend. A notable exception would be the target of a symbolic link: POSIX requires implementations to support the empty string for target names. But 9p is only supported on linux hosts, which don't support empty target names yet, and the proposal to error out with ENOENT got approved, as indicated here: http://austingroupbugs.net/view.php?id=649 For the sake of consistency and simplicity, symlink target names will be treated the same as any other file name argument. Also, the walk request described in the 9P spec [1] clearly shows that the client is supposed to send individual path components: the official linux client never sends portions of path containing the / character for example. Moreover, the 9P spec [2] also states that a system can decide to restrict the set of supported characters used in path components, with an explicit mention "to remove slashes from name components". This patch introduces a new name_is_illegal() helper that checks the names sent by the client are not empty and don't contain unwanted chars. Since 9pfs is only supported on linux hosts, only the / character is checked at the moment. When support for other hosts (AKA. win32) is added, other chars may need to be blacklisted as well. If a client sends an illegal path component, the request will fail and ENOENT is returned to the client. [1] http://man.cat-v.org/plan_9/5/walk [2] http://man.cat-v.org/plan_9/5/intro Suggested-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> v3: - fix empty string check in name_is_illegal() - return ENOENT instead of EINVAL - added checking of target names for symlinks in create (9P2000.u) - added some details about symlink target names in the changelog --- hw/9pfs/9p.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+)