From patchwork Wed Sep 16 16:35:53 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Vivek Goyal X-Patchwork-Id: 11780131 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 061A9112E for ; Wed, 16 Sep 2020 16:37:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7441C222EA for ; Wed, 16 Sep 2020 16:37:27 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b="EHt6wSQG" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 7441C222EA Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=qemu-devel-bounces+patchwork-qemu-devel=patchwork.kernel.org@nongnu.org Received: from localhost ([::1]:34578 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1kIaQw-0003fq-5S for patchwork-qemu-devel@patchwork.kernel.org; Wed, 16 Sep 2020 12:37:26 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:56724) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1kIaPj-00032v-Qa for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Wed, 16 Sep 2020 12:36:11 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([63.128.21.124]:34536) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1kIaPc-0002d2-Ly for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Wed, 16 Sep 2020 12:36:11 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1600274161; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type; bh=W1ytmFSBleq3Ztl7Z5u0ZaSVzoh6l0BIYX6BqebCjg8=; b=EHt6wSQGYvMrE0YYp58DeQnQea6DwKd53uOuXpeyIV00BlnmlBbLF3/RQ/Qb5AsxsYLpv4 uwj3x3XNu3OOvmIIvAdv9WTFaIeOp0h18VZi/w73ziPVZgPX3dsSR7b/kqbCOoWFOkMwzg owUFpFcEZum0JQTG7tZULM5U9lfOn0o= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-32-FAVoQAjjPP2vj7i5ZxSg4A-1; Wed, 16 Sep 2020 12:35:58 -0400 X-MC-Unique: FAVoQAjjPP2vj7i5ZxSg4A-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx07.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.22]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AAEA418BA285 for ; Wed, 16 Sep 2020 16:35:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: from horse.redhat.com (ovpn-116-139.rdu2.redhat.com [10.10.116.139]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2C3711002D42; Wed, 16 Sep 2020 16:35:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: by horse.redhat.com (Postfix, from userid 10451) id 8AE262209FD; Wed, 16 Sep 2020 12:35:53 -0400 (EDT) Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 12:35:53 -0400 From: Vivek Goyal To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org Subject: [PATCH] virtiofsd: Add support for FUSE_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2 Message-ID: <20200916163553.GA39212@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.5.11.22 Authentication-Results: relay.mimecast.com; auth=pass smtp.auth=CUSA124A263 smtp.mailfrom=vgoyal@redhat.com X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Disposition: inline Received-SPF: pass client-ip=63.128.21.124; envelope-from=vgoyal@redhat.com; helo=us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com X-detected-operating-system: by eggs.gnu.org: First seen = 2020/09/16 02:35:56 X-ACL-Warn: Detected OS = Linux 2.2.x-3.x [generic] [fuzzy] X-Spam_score_int: -50 X-Spam_score: -5.1 X-Spam_bar: ----- X-Spam_report: (-5.1 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-2.999, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H5=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: virtio-fs-list , "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+patchwork-qemu-devel=patchwork.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" This patch adds basic support for FUSE_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2. virtiofsd can enable/disable this by specifying option "-o killpriv_v2/no_killpriv_v2". By default this is enabled as long as client supports it. I have posted corresponding kernel patches here. https://www.redhat.com/archives/virtio-fs/2020-September/msg00054.html Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal --- include/standard-headers/linux/fuse.h | 10 ++- tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h | 10 +++ tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c | 10 ++- tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.h | 1 + tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 5 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/standard-headers/linux/fuse.h b/include/standard-headers/linux/fuse.h index 26e7de1b43..744498bc5a 100644 --- a/include/standard-headers/linux/fuse.h +++ b/include/standard-headers/linux/fuse.h @@ -338,6 +338,7 @@ struct fuse_file_lock { #define FUSE_NO_OPENDIR_SUPPORT (1 << 24) #define FUSE_EXPLICIT_INVAL_DATA (1 << 25) #define FUSE_MAP_ALIGNMENT (1 << 26) +#define FUSE_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2 (1 << 27) /** * CUSE INIT request/reply flags @@ -413,6 +414,13 @@ struct fuse_file_lock { */ #define FUSE_FSYNC_FDATASYNC (1 << 0) +/** + * Open flags + * FUSE_OPEN_KILL_PRIV: Kill suid/sgid/security.capability. sgid is cleared + * only if file has group execute permission. + */ +#define FUSE_OPEN_KILL_PRIV (1 << 0) + enum fuse_opcode { FUSE_LOOKUP = 1, FUSE_FORGET = 2, /* no reply */ @@ -579,7 +587,7 @@ struct fuse_setattr_in { struct fuse_open_in { uint32_t flags; - uint32_t unused; + uint32_t open_flags; }; struct fuse_create_in { diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h index aa7e6ed31a..a8d8217687 100644 --- a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h @@ -352,6 +352,16 @@ struct fuse_file_info { */ #define FUSE_CAP_NO_OPENDIR_SUPPORT (1 << 24) +/** + * Indicates that the filesystem is responsible for unsetting + * setuid and setgid bits when a file is written, truncated, or + * its owner is changed. setuid/setgid is cleared on WRITE/truncate + * only if caller does not have CAP_FSETID. For WRITE requests + * this is communicated through write flag FUSE_WRITE_KILL_PRIV. + * + */ +#define FUSE_CAP_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2 (1 << 27) + /** * Ioctl flags * diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c index a34a611a90..90afffd6de 100644 --- a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c @@ -881,7 +881,7 @@ static void do_setattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, FUSE_SET_ATTR_GID | FUSE_SET_ATTR_SIZE | FUSE_SET_ATTR_ATIME | FUSE_SET_ATTR_MTIME | FUSE_SET_ATTR_ATIME_NOW | FUSE_SET_ATTR_MTIME_NOW | - FUSE_SET_ATTR_CTIME; + FUSE_SET_ATTR_CTIME | FUSE_SET_ATTR_KILL_PRIV; req->se->op.setattr(req, nodeid, &stbuf, arg->valid, fi); } else { @@ -1118,6 +1118,7 @@ static void do_open(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, memset(&fi, 0, sizeof(fi)); fi.flags = arg->flags; + fi.kill_priv = arg->open_flags & FUSE_OPEN_KILL_PRIV; if (req->se->op.open) { req->se->op.open(req, nodeid, &fi); @@ -2081,6 +2082,9 @@ static void do_init(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, bufsize = max_bufsize; } } + if (arg->flags & FUSE_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2) { + se->conn.capable |= FUSE_CAP_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2; + } #ifdef HAVE_SPLICE #ifdef HAVE_VMSPLICE se->conn.capable |= FUSE_CAP_SPLICE_WRITE | FUSE_CAP_SPLICE_MOVE; @@ -2218,6 +2222,10 @@ static void do_init(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, outarg.map_alignment = ffsl(sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE)) - 1; } + if (se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2) { + outarg.flags |= FUSE_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2; + } + fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " INIT: %u.%u\n", outarg.major, outarg.minor); fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " flags=0x%08x\n", outarg.flags); fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " max_readahead=0x%08x\n", outarg.max_readahead); diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.h b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.h index d488b88882..fdc256b5ce 100644 --- a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.h +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.h @@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ struct fuse_forget_data { #define FUSE_SET_ATTR_ATIME_NOW (1 << 7) #define FUSE_SET_ATTR_MTIME_NOW (1 << 8) #define FUSE_SET_ATTR_CTIME (1 << 10) +#define FUSE_SET_ATTR_KILL_PRIV (1 << 14) /* * Request methods and replies diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c index 6514674f04..33f74a1a46 100644 --- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c @@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ struct lo_data { /* An O_PATH file descriptor to /proc/self/fd/ */ int proc_self_fd; + int user_killpriv_v2, killpriv_v2; }; static const struct fuse_opt lo_opts[] = { @@ -192,6 +193,8 @@ static const struct fuse_opt lo_opts[] = { { "no_shared", offsetof(struct lo_data, shared), 0 }, { "readdirplus", offsetof(struct lo_data, readdirplus_set), 1 }, { "no_readdirplus", offsetof(struct lo_data, readdirplus_clear), 1 }, + { "killpriv_v2", offsetof(struct lo_data, user_killpriv_v2), 1 }, + { "no_killpriv_v2", offsetof(struct lo_data, user_killpriv_v2), 0 }, FUSE_OPT_END }; static bool use_syslog = false; @@ -588,6 +591,30 @@ static void lo_init(void *userdata, struct fuse_conn_info *conn) fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "lo_init: disabling readdirplus\n"); conn->want &= ~FUSE_CAP_READDIRPLUS; } + + if (lo->user_killpriv_v2 == 1) { + /* User explicitly asked for this option. Enable it unconditionally. + * If connection does not have this capability, it should fail + * in fuse_lowlevel.c + */ + fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "lo_init: enabling killpriv_v2\n"); + conn->want |= FUSE_CAP_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2; + lo->killpriv_v2 = 1; + } else if (lo->user_killpriv_v2 == -1 && + conn->capable & FUSE_CAP_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2) { + /* User did not specify a value for killpriv_v2. By default enable it + * if connection offers this capability */ + fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "lo_init: enabling killpriv_v2\n"); + conn->want |= FUSE_CAP_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2; + lo->killpriv_v2 = 1; + } else { + /* Either user specified to disable killpriv_v2, or connection does + * not offer this capability. Disable killpriv_v2 in both the cases + */ + fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "lo_init: disabling killpriv_v2\n"); + conn->want &= ~FUSE_CAP_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2; + lo->killpriv_v2 = 0; + } } static int64_t *version_ptr(struct lo_data *lo, struct lo_inode *inode) @@ -686,6 +713,14 @@ static void lo_setattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, struct stat *attr, uid_t uid = (valid & FUSE_SET_ATTR_UID) ? attr->st_uid : (uid_t)-1; gid_t gid = (valid & FUSE_SET_ATTR_GID) ? attr->st_gid : (gid_t)-1; + /* if fc->killpriv_v2 is set, change of ownership should clear + * suid/sgid/caps. + * + * TODO: On ext4/xfs above works with fchownat() call without + * doing anything extra. If there are filesystem where this + * does not work, virtiofsd needs to take care of this. + */ + res = fchownat(ifd, "", uid, gid, AT_EMPTY_PATH | AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW); if (res == -1) { goto out_err; @@ -693,7 +728,18 @@ static void lo_setattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, struct stat *attr, } if (valid & FUSE_SET_ATTR_SIZE) { int truncfd; - + bool kill_priv = lo->killpriv_v2 && (valid & FUSE_SET_ATTR_KILL_PRIV); + bool cap_fsetid_dropped = false; + + /* if fc->killpriv_v2 is set, change of size should clear caps + * always. suid should be cleared if FUSE_SETATTR_KILL_PRIV is + * set. And sgid should be cleared if FUSE_SETATTR_KILL_PRIV is + * set as well as group execute permission is on. + * + * TODO: On ext4/xfs above works with truncate() call without + * doing anything extra. If there are filesystem where this + * does not work, virtiofsd needs to take care of this. + */ if (fi) { truncfd = fd; } else { @@ -704,12 +750,26 @@ static void lo_setattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, struct stat *attr, } } + if (kill_priv) { + res = drop_effective_cap("FSETID", &cap_fsetid_dropped); + if (res != 0) { + lo_inode_put(lo, &inode); + fuse_reply_err(req, res); + } + } res = ftruncate(truncfd, attr->st_size); + saverr = errno; + if (cap_fsetid_dropped) { + res = gain_effective_cap("FSETID"); + if(res) { + fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "Failed to gain CAP_FSETID\n"); + } + } if (!fi) { - saverr = errno; close(truncfd); - errno = saverr; } + + errno = saverr; if (res == -1) { goto out_err; } @@ -1943,20 +2003,45 @@ static void lo_fsyncdir(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, int datasync, static void lo_open(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, struct fuse_file_info *fi) { - int fd; + int fd, ret, saverr; ssize_t fh; char buf[64]; struct lo_data *lo = lo_data(req); + bool cap_fsetid_dropped = false; - fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "lo_open(ino=%" PRIu64 ", flags=%d)\n", ino, - fi->flags); + fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "lo_open(ino=%" PRIu64 ", flags=%d, kill_priv=%d)" + "\n", ino, fi->flags, fi->kill_priv); update_open_flags(lo->writeback, fi); sprintf(buf, "%i", lo_fd(req, ino)); + + /* + * fi->kill_priv is set if file server opted for killpriv_v2 feature + * and client did open(O_TRUNC) and caller did not have CAP_FSETID. + * In that case suid/sgid/security.capability needs to be killed + * according to certain rules. Dropping capability does right thing + * on ext4/xfs already. + */ + if (fi->kill_priv) { + ret = drop_effective_cap("FSETID", &cap_fsetid_dropped); + if (ret != 0) { + fuse_reply_err(req, ret); + return; + } + } + fd = openat(lo->proc_self_fd, buf, fi->flags & ~O_NOFOLLOW); + saverr = errno; + if (cap_fsetid_dropped) { + ret = gain_effective_cap("FSETID"); + if (ret) { + fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "Failed to gain CAP_FSETID\n"); + } + } + if (fd == -1) { - return (void)fuse_reply_err(req, errno); + return (void)fuse_reply_err(req, saverr); } pthread_mutex_lock(&lo->mutex); @@ -2091,8 +2176,20 @@ static void lo_write_buf(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, out_buf.buf[0].pos = off; fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, - "lo_write_buf(ino=%" PRIu64 ", size=%zd, off=%lu)\n", ino, - out_buf.buf[0].size, (unsigned long)off); + "lo_write_buf(ino=%" PRIu64 ", size=%zd, off=%lu kill_priv=%d)\n", + ino, out_buf.buf[0].size, (unsigned long)off, fi->kill_priv); + + /* + * If lo->killpriv_v2 is set, then we are supposed to kill caps + * and also kill suid/sgid if fi->kill_priv is set. Current + * common filesystem ext4/xfs already drop security.capability + * on WRITE. So we don't have to do anything special. + * + * TODO: If we are running on to of a file system which does not + * remove caps on WRITE, then we will have to remove it ourselves + * explicitly. Same is true for removing SUID/SGID if CAP_FSETID + * is not there. + */ /* * If kill_priv is set, drop CAP_FSETID which should lead to kernel @@ -3210,6 +3307,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) .writeback = 0, .posix_lock = 1, .proc_self_fd = -1, + .user_killpriv_v2 = -1, }; struct lo_map_elem *root_elem; int ret = -1;