From patchwork Mon Nov 30 13:49:07 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Prasad Pandit X-Patchwork-Id: 11940607 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.6 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 786CCC64E7B for ; Mon, 30 Nov 2020 14:00:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9B3982076E for ; Mon, 30 Nov 2020 14:00:02 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b="KTVC8zwo" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 9B3982076E Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Received: from localhost ([::1]:38182 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1kjjij-0000MG-8L for qemu-devel@archiver.kernel.org; Mon, 30 Nov 2020 09:00:01 -0500 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:40686) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1kjjag-0000ZM-O7 for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Mon, 30 Nov 2020 08:51:43 -0500 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([63.128.21.124]:24818) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1kjjae-00047H-GV for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Mon, 30 Nov 2020 08:51:42 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1606744299; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=Xe23pyjBnxP5qi5PNWAJdpj3ZH4E6KWCpfLBqnHspd0=; b=KTVC8zwoaAVL7DZNlz4bGKDT5MYG/SQWl+hszWdSBXHjnUidhLaWV2+jCl55tP3FXuUlQS EeXs4EI0748ZYWOnFF1DkJqQPki0OJQEy7ebsz/xipFJv0bsU41BZgFDKYfzpipXrT4ecU 6vG40T1LC4FFQCyzGAJ2jevnI+004Q8= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-222-iEgj2FLcPqaBxSesTocc4Q-1; Mon, 30 Nov 2020 08:51:32 -0500 X-MC-Unique: iEgj2FLcPqaBxSesTocc4Q-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx03.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.13]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A54708905FD; Mon, 30 Nov 2020 13:51:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost.localdomain (ovpn-116-182.sin2.redhat.com [10.67.116.182]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0B3EE60867; Mon, 30 Nov 2020 13:51:21 +0000 (UTC) From: P J P To: Stefan Hajnoczi Subject: [PATCH v1 1/1] security-process: update process information Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2020 19:19:07 +0530 Message-Id: <20201130134907.348505-2-ppandit@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20201130134907.348505-1-ppandit@redhat.com> References: <20201130134907.348505-1-ppandit@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.13 Authentication-Results: relay.mimecast.com; auth=pass smtp.auth=CUSA124A263 smtp.mailfrom=ppandit@redhat.com X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Received-SPF: pass client-ip=63.128.21.124; envelope-from=ppandit@redhat.com; helo=us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com X-Spam_score_int: -15 X-Spam_score: -1.6 X-Spam_bar: - X-Spam_report: (-1.6 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-1.496, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H4=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URI_DOTEDU=1.997 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: peter.maydell@linaro.org, Stefano Stabellini , Petr Matousek , Prasad J Pandit , "Michael S . Tsirkin" , Michael Roth , Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , QEMU Developers , Darren Kenny , =?utf-8?q?Daniel_P_=2E_Berrang?= =?utf-8?q?=C3=A9?= Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" From: Prasad J Pandit We are about to introduce a qemu-security mailing list to report and triage QEMU security issues. Update the QEMU security process web page with new mailing list and triage details. Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk --- contribute/security-process.md | 134 ++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 80 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) Update v1: incorporate feedback from review to include more details -> https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2020-11/msg06234.html diff --git a/contribute/security-process.md b/contribute/security-process.md index 1239967..fe1bc8b 100644 --- a/contribute/security-process.md +++ b/contribute/security-process.md @@ -3,43 +3,70 @@ title: Security Process permalink: /contribute/security-process/ --- -QEMU takes security very seriously, and we aim to take immediate action to -address serious security-related problems that involve our product. - -Please report any suspected security vulnerability in QEMU to the following -addresses. You can use GPG keys for respective receipients to communicate with -us securely. If you do, please upload your GPG public key or supply it to us -in some other way, so that we can communicate to you in a secure way, too! -Please include the tag **\[QEMU-SECURITY\]** on the subject line to help us -identify your message as security-related. - -## QEMU Security Contact List - -Please copy everyone on this list: - - Contact Person(s) | Contact Address | Company | GPG Key | GPG key fingerprint -:-----------------------|:------------------------------|:--------------|:---------:|:-------------------- - Michael S. Tsirkin | mst@redhat.com | Red Hat Inc. | [🔑](https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0xC3503912AFBE8E67) | 0270 606B 6F3C DF3D 0B17 0970 C350 3912 AFBE 8E67 - Petr Matousek | pmatouse@redhat.com | Red Hat Inc. | [🔑](https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x3E786F42C44977CA) | 8107 AF16 A416 F9AF 18F3 D874 3E78 6F42 C449 77CA - Stefano Stabellini | sstabellini@kernel.org | Independent | [🔑](https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x894F8F4870E1AE90) | D04E 33AB A51F 67BA 07D3 0AEA 894F 8F48 70E1 AE90 - Security Response Team | secalert@redhat.com | Red Hat Inc. | [🔑](https://access.redhat.com/site/security/team/contact/#contact) | - Michael Roth | michael.roth@amd.com | AMD | [🔑](https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x3353C9CEF108B584) | CEAC C9E1 5534 EBAB B82D 3FA0 3353 C9CE F108 B584 - Prasad J Pandit | pjp@redhat.com | Red Hat Inc. | [🔑](http://pool.sks-keyservers.net/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0xE2858B5AF050DE8D) | 8685 545E B54C 486B C6EB 271E E285 8B5A F050 DE8D - -## How to Contact Us Securely - -We use GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG or GPG) keys to secure communications. Mail -sent to members of the list can be encrypted with public keys of all members -of the list. We expect to change some of the keys we use from time to time. -Should a key change, the previous one will be revoked. - -## How we respond - -Maintainers listed on the security reporting list operate a policy of -responsible disclosure. As such they agree that any information you share with -them about security issues that are not public knowledge is kept confidential -within respective affiliated companies. It is not passed on to any third-party, -including Xen Security Project, without your permission. +Please report any suspected security issue in QEMU to the security mailing +list at: + +* [\](https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-security/) + +To report an issue via [GPG](https://gnupg.org/) encrypted email, please send +it to the Red Hat Product Security team at: + +* [\](https://access.redhat.com/security/team/contact/#contact) + +**Note:** after the triage, encrypted issue details shall be sent to the upstream +'qemu-security' mailing list for archival purposes. + +## How to report an issue: + +* Please include as many details as possible in the issue report. + Ex: + - QEMU version, upstream commit/tag + - Host & Guest architecture x86/Arm/PPC, 32/64 bit etc. + - Affected code area/snippets + - Stack traces, crash details + - Malicious inputs/reproducer steps etc. + - Any configurations/settings required to trigger the issue. + +* Please share the QEMU command line used to invoke a guest VM. + +* Please specify whom to acknowledge for reporting this issue. + +## How we respond: + +* Process of handling security issues can be divided in two halves. + + 1) **Triage:** + - Examine the issue details and confirm whether the issue is genuine + - Validate if it can be misused for malicious purposes + - Determine its worst case impact and severity + [Low/Moderate/Important/Critical] + + 2) **Response:** + - Negotiate embargo timeline (if required, depending on severity) + - Request a CVE and open an upstream + [bug](https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/) + or a [GitLab](https://gitlab.com/groups/qemu-project/-/issues) issue + - Create an upstream fix patch + +* Above security lists are operated by select analysts, maintainers and/or + representatives from downstream communities. + +* List members follow a **responsible disclosure** policy. Any non-public + information you share about security issues, is kept confidential within the + respective affiliated companies. Such information shall not be passed on to + any third parties, including Xen Security Project, without your prior + permission. + +* We aim to process security issues within maximum of **60 days**. That is not + to say that issues will remain private for 60 days, nope. After the triaging + step above + - If issue is found to be less severe, an upstream public bug (or an + issue) will be created immediately. + - If issue is found to be severe, an embargo process below is followed, + and public bug (or an issue) will be opened at the end of the set + embargo period. + + This will allow upstream contributors to create, test and track fix patch(es). Email sent to us is read and acknowledged with a non-automated response. For issues that are complicated and require significant attention, we will open an @@ -48,27 +75,31 @@ of the following steps: ### Publication embargo -If a security issue is reported that is not already publicly disclosed, an -embargo date may be assigned and communicated to the reporter. Embargo -periods will be negotiated by mutual agreement between members of the security -team and other relevant parties to the problem. Members of the security contact -list agree not to publicly disclose any details of the security issue until -the embargo date expires. +* If a security issue is reported that is not already public and is severe + enough, an embargo date may be assigned and communicated to the + reporter(s). + +* Embargo periods will be negotiated by mutual agreement between reporter(s), + members of the security list and other relevant parties to the problem. + Such embargo period is generally upto [2 weeks](https://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros). + +* Members of the security list agree not to publicly disclose any details of + an embargoed security issue until its embargo date expires. ### CVE allocation -An security issue is assigned with a CVE number. The CVE numbers will usually -be allocated by one of the vendor security engineers on the security contact -list. +Each security issue is assigned a [CVE](https://cveform.mitre.org/) number. +The CVE number is allocated by one of the vendor security engineers on the +security list. -## When to contact the QEMU Security Contact List +## When to contact the QEMU Security List -You should contact the Security Contact List if: +You should contact the Security List if: * You think there may be a security vulnerability in QEMU. * You are unsure about how a known vulnerability affects QEMU. * You can contact us in English. We are unable to respond in other languages. -## When *not* to contact the QEMU Security Contact List +## When *not* to contact the QEMU Security List * You need assistance in a language other than English. * You require technical assistance (for example, "how do I configure QEMU?"). * You need help upgrading QEMU due to security alerts. @@ -122,8 +153,3 @@ used to write programs for the SoC device. In such developer environments, it is generally assumed that the guest is trusted. And thus, this buffer overflow turned out to be a security non-issue. - -## What to Send to the QEMU Security Contact List - -Please provide as much information about your system and the issue as possible -when contacting the list.