From patchwork Mon Feb 8 06:07:30 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Gibson X-Patchwork-Id: 12075185 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.6 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 163FAC433DB for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:50:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7F0B664E60 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:50:45 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 7F0B664E60 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=gibson.dropbear.id.au Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Received: from localhost ([::1]:38720 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1l9540-0003Hx-BZ for qemu-devel@archiver.kernel.org; Mon, 08 Feb 2021 06:50:44 -0500 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:59086) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1l8ziE-0002O1-7L; Mon, 08 Feb 2021 01:07:54 -0500 Received: from bilbo.ozlabs.org ([203.11.71.1]:54259 helo=ozlabs.org) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1l8ziA-0006si-Rm; Mon, 08 Feb 2021 01:07:53 -0500 Received: by ozlabs.org (Postfix, from userid 1007) id 4DYwY61sVXz9sWC; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 17:07:38 +1100 (AEDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gibson.dropbear.id.au; s=201602; t=1612764458; bh=V5VNS17scGWqP+jxJEkReu2iTvfK03mqfFhy2/XwomQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=ayD1nURf7e0Pt+qTDMMMsZ+1Zh/k1OXDKOnLkQerpCEx9r2ceUQFy04FJHs8P5Jby H+RvOHAfkpKDjzHgD4oPcIdMxo2WhxBZ6LPdmw9nEhQM+4cFZVfCRG7h6NZWrGEy98 18TmY7VQHcout3GQpxH3fxkp7NpYh7LFvgTkcKFQ= From: David Gibson To: pair@us.ibm.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, peter.maydell@linaro.org, dgilbert@redhat.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com Subject: [PULL v9 08/13] confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 17:07:30 +1100 Message-Id: <20210208060735.39838-9-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: <20210208060735.39838-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> References: <20210208060735.39838-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> MIME-Version: 1.0 Received-SPF: pass client-ip=203.11.71.1; envelope-from=dgibson@ozlabs.org; helo=ozlabs.org X-Spam_score_int: -17 X-Spam_score: -1.8 X-Spam_bar: - X-Spam_report: (-1.8 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=0.248, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, Thomas Huth , cohuck@redhat.com, berrange@redhat.com, ehabkost@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, david@redhat.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com, mtosatti@redhat.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Greg Kurz , borntraeger@de.ibm.com, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, frankja@linux.ibm.com, mst@redhat.com, pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, andi.kleen@intel.com, Paolo Bonzini , David Gibson Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" While we've abstracted some (potential) differences between mechanisms for securing guest memory, the initialization is still specific to SEV. Given that, move it into x86's kvm_arch_init() code, rather than the generic kvm_init() code. Signed-off-by: David Gibson Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz --- accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 14 -------------- accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 4 ++-- target/i386/kvm/kvm.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ target/i386/sev.c | 7 ++++++- 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c index 226e1556f9..e72a19aaf8 100644 --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c @@ -2180,20 +2180,6 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms) kvm_state = s; - /* - * if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the memory - * encryption context. - */ - if (ms->cgs) { - Error *local_err = NULL; - /* FIXME handle mechanisms other than SEV */ - ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs, &local_err); - if (ret < 0) { - error_report_err(local_err); - goto err; - } - } - ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s); if (ret < 0) { goto err; diff --git a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c index 512e205f7f..9587d1b2a3 100644 --- a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c +++ b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c @@ -17,6 +17,6 @@ int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) { - /* SEV can't be selected if it's not compiled */ - g_assert_not_reached(); + /* If we get here, cgs must be some non-SEV thing */ + return 0; } diff --git a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c index 6dc1ee052d..4788139128 100644 --- a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c +++ b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ #include "hw/i386/intel_iommu.h" #include "hw/i386/x86-iommu.h" #include "hw/i386/e820_memory_layout.h" +#include "sysemu/sev.h" #include "hw/pci/pci.h" #include "hw/pci/msi.h" @@ -2135,6 +2136,25 @@ int kvm_arch_init(MachineState *ms, KVMState *s) uint64_t shadow_mem; int ret; struct utsname utsname; + Error *local_err = NULL; + + /* + * Initialize SEV context, if required + * + * If no memory encryption is requested (ms->cgs == NULL) this is + * a no-op. + * + * It's also a no-op if a non-SEV confidential guest support + * mechanism is selected. SEV is the only mechanism available to + * select on x86 at present, so this doesn't arise, but if new + * mechanisms are supported in future (e.g. TDX), they'll need + * their own initialization either here or elsewhere. + */ + ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs, &local_err); + if (ret < 0) { + error_report_err(local_err); + return ret; + } if (!kvm_check_extension(s, KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING)) { error_report("kvm: KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING not supported by KVM"); diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c index f9e9b5d8ae..11c9a3cc21 100644 --- a/target/i386/sev.c +++ b/target/i386/sev.c @@ -664,13 +664,18 @@ sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state) int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) { - SevGuestState *sev = SEV_GUEST(cgs); + SevGuestState *sev + = (SevGuestState *)object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(cgs), TYPE_SEV_GUEST); char *devname; int ret, fw_error; uint32_t ebx; uint32_t host_cbitpos; struct sev_user_data_status status = {}; + if (!sev) { + return 0; + } + ret = ram_block_discard_disable(true); if (ret) { error_report("%s: cannot disable RAM discard", __func__);