diff mbox series

[PULL,31/45] i386/sev: Set CPU state to protected once SNP guest payload is finalized

Message ID 20240604064409.957105-32-pbonzini@redhat.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series [PULL,01/45] virtio-blk: remove SCSI passthrough functionality | expand

Commit Message

Paolo Bonzini June 4, 2024, 6:43 a.m. UTC 
From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>

Once KVM_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH is called the vCPU state is copied into the
vCPU's VMSA page and measured/encrypted. Any attempt to read/write CPU
state afterward will only be acting on the initial data and so are
effectively no-ops.

Set the vCPU state to protected at this point so that QEMU don't
continue trying to re-sync vCPU data during guest runtime.

Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-18-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 target/i386/sev.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index ef2e592ca76..e84e4395a53 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -997,6 +997,7 @@  sev_snp_launch_finish(SevCommonState *sev_common)
         exit(1);
     }
 
+    kvm_mark_guest_state_protected();
     sev_set_guest_state(sev_common, SEV_STATE_RUNNING);
 
     /* add migration blocker */