Show patches with: Series = security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM       |   12 patches
Patch Series A/R/T S/W/F Date Submitter Delegate State
[RFC,v4,01/12] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - 0 0 0 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson Superseded
[RFC,v4,02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - 0 0 0 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson Superseded
[RFC,v4,03/12] selftests: x86/sgx: Mark the enclave loader as not needing an exec stack security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - 0 0 0 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson Superseded
[RFC,v4,04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - 0 0 0 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson Superseded
[RFC,v4,05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - 0 0 0 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson Superseded
[RFC,v4,06/12] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - 0 0 0 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson Superseded
[RFC,v4,07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - 0 0 0 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson Superseded
[RFC,v4,08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - 0 0 0 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson Superseded
[RFC,v4,09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - 0 0 0 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson Superseded
[RFC,v4,10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - 0 0 0 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson Superseded
[RFC,v4,11/12] security/apparmor: Add enclave_load() implementation security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - 0 0 0 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson Superseded
[RFC,v4,12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - 0 0 0 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson Superseded