@@ -770,6 +770,15 @@
*(.scommon) \
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_RTIC
+#define RTIC_BSS \
+ . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); \
+ KEEP(*(.bss.rtic)) \
+ . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+#else
+#define RTIC_BSS
+#endif
+
/*
* Allow archectures to redefine BSS_FIRST_SECTIONS to add extra
* sections to the front of bss.
@@ -782,6 +791,7 @@
. = ALIGN(bss_align); \
.bss : AT(ADDR(.bss) - LOAD_OFFSET) { \
BSS_FIRST_SECTIONS \
+ RTIC_BSS \
. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); \
*(.bss..page_aligned) \
. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); \
@@ -300,6 +300,10 @@ void __init parse_early_options(char *cmdline);
/* Data marked not to be saved by software suspend */
#define __nosavedata __section(".data..nosave")
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_RTIC
+#define __rticdata __section(".bss.rtic")
+#endif
+
#ifdef MODULE
#define __exit_p(x) x
#else
@@ -291,5 +291,15 @@ config LSM
source "security/Kconfig.hardening"
+config SECURITY_RTIC
+ bool "RunTime Integrity Check feature"
+ help
+ RTIC(RunTime Integrity Check) feature is to protect Linux kernel
+ at runtime. This relocates some of the security sensitive kernel
+ structures to a separate page aligned special section.
+
+ This is to enable monitoring and protection of these kernel assets
+ from a higher exception level(EL) against any unauthorized changes.
+
endmenu
@@ -104,7 +104,11 @@
#include "audit.h"
#include "avc_ss.h"
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_RTIC
+struct selinux_state selinux_state __rticdata;
+#else
struct selinux_state selinux_state;
+#endif
/* SECMARK reference count */
static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
The changes introduce a new security feature, RunTime Integrity Check (RTIC), designed to protect Linux Kernel at runtime. The motivation behind these changes is: 1. The system protection offered by SE for Android relies on the assumption of kernel integrity. If the kernel itself is compromised (by a perhaps as yet unknown future vulnerability), SE for Android security mechanisms could potentially be disabled and rendered ineffective. 2. Qualcomm Snapdragon devices use Secure Boot, which adds cryptographic checks to each stage of the boot-up process, to assert the authenticity of all secure software images that the device executes. However, due to various vulnerabilities in SW modules, the integrity of the system can be compromised at any time after device boot-up, leading to un-authorized SW executing. The feature's idea is to move some sensitive kernel structures to a separate page and monitor further any unauthorized changes to these, from higher Exception Levels using stage 2 MMU. Moving these to a different page will help avoid getting page faults from un-related data. Using this mechanism, some sensitive variables of the kernel which are initialized after init or are updated rarely can also be protected from simple overwrites and attacks trying to modify these. Currently, the change moves selinux_state structure to a separate page. In future we plan to move more security-related kernel assets to this page to enhance protection. We want to seek your suggestions and comments on the idea and the changes in the patch. Signed-off-by: Preeti Nagar <pnagar@codeaurora.org> --- include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 10 ++++++++++ include/linux/init.h | 4 ++++ security/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+)