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[96.237.52.188]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id e5sm5317173qtg.96.2021.05.21.14.50.31 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Fri, 21 May 2021 14:50:32 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [RFC PATCH 8/9] selinux: add support for the io_uring access controls From: Paul Moore To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, io-uring@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi , Jens Axboe , Alexander Viro Date: Fri, 21 May 2021 17:50:31 -0400 Message-ID: <162163383147.8379.1567341725602837940.stgit@sifl> In-Reply-To: <162163367115.8379.8459012634106035341.stgit@sifl> References: <162163367115.8379.8459012634106035341.stgit@sifl> User-Agent: StGit/1.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org WARNING - This is a work in progress, this patch, including the description, may be incomplete or even incorrect. You have been warned. This patch implements two new io_uring access controls, specifically support for controlling the io_uring "personalities" and IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL. Controlling the sharing of io_urings themselves is handled via the normal file/inode labeling and sharing mechanisms. The io_uring { override_creds } permission restricts which domains the subject domain can use to override it's own credentials. Granting a domain the io_uring { override_creds } permission allows it to impersonate another domain in io_uring operations. The io_uring { sqpoll } permission restricts which domains can create asynchronous io_uring polling threads. This is important from a security perspective as operations queued by this asynchronous thread inherit the credentials of the thread creator by default; if an io_uring is shared across process/domain boundaries this could result in one domain impersonating another. Controlling the creation of sqpoll threads, and the sharing of io_urings across processes, allow policy authors to restrict the ability of one domain to impersonate another via io_uring. As a quick summary, this patch adds a new object class with two permissions: io_uring { override_creds sqpoll } These permissions can be seen in the two simple policy statements below: allow domA_t domB_t : io_uring { override_creds }; allow domA_t self : io_uring { sqpoll }; Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 + 2 files changed, 69 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index eaea837d89d1..696130972e4d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -7115,6 +7115,68 @@ static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING + +#if 1 +/* XXX - dump_creds() is for debugging only, remove before committing */ +static void dump_creds(const struct cred *cred) +{ + u32 secid; + char *ctx = NULL; + unsigned int ctx_len = 0; + + security_cred_getsecid(cred, &secid); + if (secid) + security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &ctx, &ctx_len); + + printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->security is %s\n", (ctx ? : "(error)")); + + if (ctx) + security_release_secctx(ctx, ctx_len); +} +#endif + +/** + * selinux_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override + * @new: the target creds + * + * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials + * to service an io_uring operation. + */ +int selinux_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new) +{ +#if 1 + /* XXX - debug only code, remove before committing */ + pr_err("PMD: selinux_uring_override_creds()\n"); + pr_err("PMD: >>> CURRENT\n"); + dump_creds(current_cred()); + pr_err("PMD: >>> NEW\n"); + dump_creds(new); +#endif + return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), cred_sid(new), + SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__OVERRIDE_CREDS, NULL); +} + +/** + * selinux_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created + * + * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring + * kernel polling thread. + */ +int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void) +{ + int sid = current_sid(); +#if 1 + /* XXX - debug only code, remove before committing */ + pr_err("PMD: selinux_uring_sqpoll()\n"); + pr_err("PMD: >>> CURRENT\n"); + dump_creds(current_cred()); +#endif + return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, + SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ + /* * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order: * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below, @@ -7353,6 +7415,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING + LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll), +#endif + LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, selinux_lockdown), /* diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index 62d19bccf3de..3314ad72279d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -252,6 +252,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { { "integrity", "confidentiality", NULL } }, { "anon_inode", { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } }, + { "io_uring", + { "override_creds", "sqpoll", NULL } }, { NULL } };