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[96.237.52.188]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id t3sm377604qkg.2.2021.09.15.09.50.02 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 15 Sep 2021 09:50:02 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [PATCH v4 7/8] selinux: add support for the io_uring access controls From: Paul Moore To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, io-uring@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Jens Axboe , Pavel Begunkov , Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi Date: Wed, 15 Sep 2021 12:50:02 -0400 Message-ID: <163172460230.88001.3182498346819815467.stgit@olly> In-Reply-To: <163172413301.88001.16054830862146685573.stgit@olly> References: <163172413301.88001.16054830862146685573.stgit@olly> User-Agent: StGit/1.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org This patch implements two new io_uring access controls, specifically support for controlling the io_uring "personalities" and IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL. Controlling the sharing of io_urings themselves is handled via the normal file/inode labeling and sharing mechanisms. The io_uring { override_creds } permission restricts which domains the subject domain can use to override it's own credentials. Granting a domain the io_uring { override_creds } permission allows it to impersonate another domain in io_uring operations. The io_uring { sqpoll } permission restricts which domains can create asynchronous io_uring polling threads. This is important from a security perspective as operations queued by this asynchronous thread inherit the credentials of the thread creator by default; if an io_uring is shared across process/domain boundaries this could result in one domain impersonating another. Controlling the creation of sqpoll threads, and the sharing of io_urings across processes, allow policy authors to restrict the ability of one domain to impersonate another via io_uring. As a quick summary, this patch adds a new object class with two permissions: io_uring { override_creds sqpoll } These permissions can be seen in the two simple policy statements below: allow domA_t domB_t : io_uring { override_creds }; allow domA_t self : io_uring { sqpoll }; Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- v4: - no change v3: - removed work-in-progress warning from the description v2: - made the selinux_uring_* funcs static - removed the debugging code v1: - initial draft --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 6517f221d52c..012e8504ed9e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -7111,6 +7111,35 @@ static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING +/** + * selinux_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override + * @new: the target creds + * + * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials + * to service an io_uring operation. + */ +static int selinux_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new) +{ + return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), cred_sid(new), + SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__OVERRIDE_CREDS, NULL); +} + +/** + * selinux_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created + * + * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring + * kernel polling thread. + */ +static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void) +{ + int sid = current_sid(); + + return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, + SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ + /* * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order: * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below, @@ -7349,6 +7378,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING + LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll), +#endif + LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, selinux_lockdown), /* diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index 084757ff4390..698ccfdaf82d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -254,6 +254,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { { "integrity", "confidentiality", NULL } }, { "anon_inode", { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } }, + { "io_uring", + { "override_creds", "sqpoll", NULL } }, { NULL } };