diff mbox

[RFC,3/5] sctp: Add LSM hooks

Message ID 20171017135833.4292-1-richard_c_haines@btinternet.com (mailing list archive)
State Superseded
Headers show

Commit Message

Richard Haines Oct. 17, 2017, 1:58 p.m. UTC
Add security hooks to allow security modules to exercise access control
over SCTP.

Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
---
 include/net/sctp/structs.h | 10 ++++++++
 include/uapi/linux/sctp.h  |  1 +
 net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c   | 12 +++++++++
 net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c    | 14 ++++++++++-
 net/sctp/socket.c          | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 5 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Comments

Xin Long Oct. 18, 2017, 3:05 p.m. UTC | #1
On Tue, Oct 17, 2017 at 9:58 PM, Richard Haines
<richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> wrote:
> Add security hooks to allow security modules to exercise access control
> over SCTP.
>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
> ---
>  include/net/sctp/structs.h | 10 ++++++++
>  include/uapi/linux/sctp.h  |  1 +
>  net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c   | 12 +++++++++
>  net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c    | 14 ++++++++++-
>  net/sctp/socket.c          | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  5 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/net/sctp/structs.h b/include/net/sctp/structs.h
> index 7767577..6e72e3e 100644
> --- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h
> +++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h
> @@ -1270,6 +1270,16 @@ struct sctp_endpoint {
>               reconf_enable:1;
>
>         __u8  strreset_enable;
> +
> +       /* Security identifiers from incoming (INIT). These are set by
> +        * security_sctp_assoc_request(). These will only be used by
> +        * SCTP TCP type sockets and peeled off connections as they
> +        * cause a new socket to be generated. security_sctp_sk_clone()
> +        * will then plug these into the new socket.
> +        */
> +
> +       u32 secid;
> +       u32 peer_secid;
>  };
>
>  /* Recover the outter endpoint structure. */
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
> index 6217ff8..c04812f 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
> @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ typedef __s32 sctp_assoc_t;
>  #define SCTP_RESET_ASSOC       120
>  #define SCTP_ADD_STREAMS       121
>  #define SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF_FLAGS 122
> +#define SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT   123
>
>  /* PR-SCTP policies */
>  #define SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE      0x0000
> diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
> index 6110447..ca4705b 100644
> --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
> +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
> @@ -3059,6 +3059,12 @@ static __be16 sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
>                 if (af->is_any(&addr))
>                         memcpy(&addr, &asconf->source, sizeof(addr));
>
> +               if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep->base.sk,
> +                                              SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP,
> +                                              (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
> +                                              af->sockaddr_len))
> +                       return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED;
> +
>                 /* ADDIP 4.3 D9) If an endpoint receives an ADD IP address
>                  * request and does not have the local resources to add this
>                  * new address to the association, it MUST return an Error
> @@ -3125,6 +3131,12 @@ static __be16 sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
>                 if (af->is_any(&addr))
>                         memcpy(&addr.v4, sctp_source(asconf), sizeof(addr));
>
> +               if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep->base.sk,
> +                                              SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY,
> +                                              (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
> +                                              af->sockaddr_len))
> +                       return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED;
> +
>                 peer = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &addr);
>                 if (!peer)
>                         return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
> diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
> index b2a74c3..4ba5805 100644
> --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
> +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
> @@ -314,6 +314,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net,
>         sctp_unrecognized_param_t *unk_param;
>         int len;
>
> +       /* Update socket peer label if first association. */
> +       if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint *)ep,
> +                                       chunk->skb, SCTP_CID_INIT))
> +               return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
> +
>         /* 6.10 Bundling
>          * An endpoint MUST NOT bundle INIT, INIT ACK or
>          * SHUTDOWN COMPLETE with any other chunks.
> @@ -446,7 +451,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net,
>         }
>
>         sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC, SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc));
> -
>         sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(repl));
>
>         /*
> @@ -507,6 +511,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net,
>         struct sctp_chunk *err_chunk;
>         struct sctp_packet *packet;
>
> +       /* Update socket peer label if first association. */
> +       if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint *)ep,
> +                                       chunk->skb, SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK))
> +               return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
> +
Just thinking security_sctp_assoc_request hook should also be in
sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook() ?
Neil Horman Oct. 20, 2017, 11:16 a.m. UTC | #2
On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 11:05:09PM +0800, Xin Long wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 17, 2017 at 9:58 PM, Richard Haines
> <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> wrote:
> > Add security hooks to allow security modules to exercise access control
> > over SCTP.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
> > ---
> >  include/net/sctp/structs.h | 10 ++++++++
> >  include/uapi/linux/sctp.h  |  1 +
> >  net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c   | 12 +++++++++
> >  net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c    | 14 ++++++++++-
> >  net/sctp/socket.c          | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> >  5 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/net/sctp/structs.h b/include/net/sctp/structs.h
> > index 7767577..6e72e3e 100644
> > --- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h
> > +++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h
> > @@ -1270,6 +1270,16 @@ struct sctp_endpoint {
> >               reconf_enable:1;
> >
> >         __u8  strreset_enable;
> > +
> > +       /* Security identifiers from incoming (INIT). These are set by
> > +        * security_sctp_assoc_request(). These will only be used by
> > +        * SCTP TCP type sockets and peeled off connections as they
> > +        * cause a new socket to be generated. security_sctp_sk_clone()
> > +        * will then plug these into the new socket.
> > +        */
> > +
> > +       u32 secid;
> > +       u32 peer_secid;
> >  };
> >
> >  /* Recover the outter endpoint structure. */
> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
> > index 6217ff8..c04812f 100644
> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
> > @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ typedef __s32 sctp_assoc_t;
> >  #define SCTP_RESET_ASSOC       120
> >  #define SCTP_ADD_STREAMS       121
> >  #define SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF_FLAGS 122
> > +#define SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT   123
> >
> >  /* PR-SCTP policies */
> >  #define SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE      0x0000
> > diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
> > index 6110447..ca4705b 100644
> > --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
> > +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
> > @@ -3059,6 +3059,12 @@ static __be16 sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
> >                 if (af->is_any(&addr))
> >                         memcpy(&addr, &asconf->source, sizeof(addr));
> >
> > +               if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep->base.sk,
> > +                                              SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP,
> > +                                              (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
> > +                                              af->sockaddr_len))
> > +                       return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED;
> > +
> >                 /* ADDIP 4.3 D9) If an endpoint receives an ADD IP address
> >                  * request and does not have the local resources to add this
> >                  * new address to the association, it MUST return an Error
> > @@ -3125,6 +3131,12 @@ static __be16 sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
> >                 if (af->is_any(&addr))
> >                         memcpy(&addr.v4, sctp_source(asconf), sizeof(addr));
> >
> > +               if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep->base.sk,
> > +                                              SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY,
> > +                                              (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
> > +                                              af->sockaddr_len))
> > +                       return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED;
> > +
> >                 peer = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &addr);
> >                 if (!peer)
> >                         return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
> > diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
> > index b2a74c3..4ba5805 100644
> > --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
> > +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
> > @@ -314,6 +314,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net,
> >         sctp_unrecognized_param_t *unk_param;
> >         int len;
> >
> > +       /* Update socket peer label if first association. */
> > +       if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint *)ep,
> > +                                       chunk->skb, SCTP_CID_INIT))
> > +               return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
> > +
> >         /* 6.10 Bundling
> >          * An endpoint MUST NOT bundle INIT, INIT ACK or
> >          * SHUTDOWN COMPLETE with any other chunks.
> > @@ -446,7 +451,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net,
> >         }
> >
> >         sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC, SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc));
> > -
> >         sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(repl));
> >
> >         /*
> > @@ -507,6 +511,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net,
> >         struct sctp_chunk *err_chunk;
> >         struct sctp_packet *packet;
> >
> > +       /* Update socket peer label if first association. */
> > +       if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint *)ep,
> > +                                       chunk->skb, SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK))
> > +               return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
> > +
> Just thinking security_sctp_assoc_request hook should also be in
> sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook() ?
I agree, i think if this hook is gating on the creation of a new association,
they should be in all the locations where that happens
Neil

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> More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
>
Richard Haines Oct. 20, 2017, 12:04 p.m. UTC | #3
On Fri, 2017-10-20 at 07:16 -0400, Neil Horman wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 11:05:09PM +0800, Xin Long wrote:
> > On Tue, Oct 17, 2017 at 9:58 PM, Richard Haines
> > <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> wrote:
> > > Add security hooks to allow security modules to exercise access
> > > control
> > > over SCTP.
> > > 
> > > Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
> > > ---
> > >  include/net/sctp/structs.h | 10 ++++++++
> > >  include/uapi/linux/sctp.h  |  1 +
> > >  net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c   | 12 +++++++++
> > >  net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c    | 14 ++++++++++-
> > >  net/sctp/socket.c          | 61
> > > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > >  5 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> > > 
> > > diff --git a/include/net/sctp/structs.h
> > > b/include/net/sctp/structs.h
> > > index 7767577..6e72e3e 100644
> > > --- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h
> > > +++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h
> > > @@ -1270,6 +1270,16 @@ struct sctp_endpoint {
> > >               reconf_enable:1;
> > > 
> > >         __u8  strreset_enable;
> > > +
> > > +       /* Security identifiers from incoming (INIT). These are
> > > set by
> > > +        * security_sctp_assoc_request(). These will only be used
> > > by
> > > +        * SCTP TCP type sockets and peeled off connections as
> > > they
> > > +        * cause a new socket to be generated.
> > > security_sctp_sk_clone()
> > > +        * will then plug these into the new socket.
> > > +        */
> > > +
> > > +       u32 secid;
> > > +       u32 peer_secid;
> > >  };
> > > 
> > >  /* Recover the outter endpoint structure. */
> > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
> > > b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
> > > index 6217ff8..c04812f 100644
> > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
> > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
> > > @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ typedef __s32 sctp_assoc_t;
> > >  #define SCTP_RESET_ASSOC       120
> > >  #define SCTP_ADD_STREAMS       121
> > >  #define SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF_FLAGS 122
> > > +#define SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT   123
> > > 
> > >  /* PR-SCTP policies */
> > >  #define SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE      0x0000
> > > diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
> > > index 6110447..ca4705b 100644
> > > --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
> > > +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
> > > @@ -3059,6 +3059,12 @@ static __be16
> > > sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
> > >                 if (af->is_any(&addr))
> > >                         memcpy(&addr, &asconf->source,
> > > sizeof(addr));
> > > 
> > > +               if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep->base.sk,
> > > +                                              SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP,
> > > +                                              (struct sockaddr
> > > *)&addr,
> > > +                                              af->sockaddr_len))
> > > +                       return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED;
> > > +
> > >                 /* ADDIP 4.3 D9) If an endpoint receives an ADD
> > > IP address
> > >                  * request and does not have the local resources
> > > to add this
> > >                  * new address to the association, it MUST return
> > > an Error
> > > @@ -3125,6 +3131,12 @@ static __be16
> > > sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
> > >                 if (af->is_any(&addr))
> > >                         memcpy(&addr.v4, sctp_source(asconf),
> > > sizeof(addr));
> > > 
> > > +               if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep->base.sk,
> > > +                                              SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRI
> > > MARY,
> > > +                                              (struct sockaddr
> > > *)&addr,
> > > +                                              af->sockaddr_len))
> > > +                       return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED;
> > > +
> > >                 peer = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &addr);
> > >                 if (!peer)
> > >                         return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
> > > diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
> > > index b2a74c3..4ba5805 100644
> > > --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
> > > +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
> > > @@ -314,6 +314,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t
> > > sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net,
> > >         sctp_unrecognized_param_t *unk_param;
> > >         int len;
> > > 
> > > +       /* Update socket peer label if first association. */
> > > +       if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint
> > > *)ep,
> > > +                                       chunk->skb,
> > > SCTP_CID_INIT))
> > > +               return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
> > > commands);
> > > +
> > >         /* 6.10 Bundling
> > >          * An endpoint MUST NOT bundle INIT, INIT ACK or
> > >          * SHUTDOWN COMPLETE with any other chunks.
> > > @@ -446,7 +451,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t
> > > sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net,
> > >         }
> > > 
> > >         sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC,
> > > SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc));
> > > -
> > >         sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY,
> > > SCTP_CHUNK(repl));
> > > 
> > >         /*
> > > @@ -507,6 +511,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t
> > > sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net,
> > >         struct sctp_chunk *err_chunk;
> > >         struct sctp_packet *packet;
> > > 
> > > +       /* Update socket peer label if first association. */
> > > +       if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint
> > > *)ep,
> > > +                                       chunk->skb,
> > > SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK))
> > > +               return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
> > > commands);
> > > +
> > 
> > Just thinking security_sctp_assoc_request hook should also be in
> > sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook() ?
> 
> I agree, i think if this hook is gating on the creation of a new
> association,
> they should be in all the locations where that happens
> Neil

Thanks for the comments. I've just added the hook as requested for my
next update, however I have not managed to trigger these areas using
the lksctp-tools tests. Can you suggest any suitable tools for testing
these scenarios.

Thanks
Richard
> 
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> > sctp" in
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> > 
> 
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Xin Long Oct. 20, 2017, 1:14 p.m. UTC | #4
On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 8:04 PM, Richard Haines
<richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> wrote:
> On Fri, 2017-10-20 at 07:16 -0400, Neil Horman wrote:
>> On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 11:05:09PM +0800, Xin Long wrote:
>> > On Tue, Oct 17, 2017 at 9:58 PM, Richard Haines
>> > <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> wrote:
>> > > Add security hooks to allow security modules to exercise access
>> > > control
>> > > over SCTP.
>> > >
>> > > Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
>> > > ---
>> > >  include/net/sctp/structs.h | 10 ++++++++
>> > >  include/uapi/linux/sctp.h  |  1 +
>> > >  net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c   | 12 +++++++++
>> > >  net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c    | 14 ++++++++++-
>> > >  net/sctp/socket.c          | 61
>> > > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>> > >  5 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>> > >
>> > > diff --git a/include/net/sctp/structs.h
>> > > b/include/net/sctp/structs.h
>> > > index 7767577..6e72e3e 100644
>> > > --- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h
>> > > +++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h
>> > > @@ -1270,6 +1270,16 @@ struct sctp_endpoint {
>> > >               reconf_enable:1;
>> > >
>> > >         __u8  strreset_enable;
>> > > +
>> > > +       /* Security identifiers from incoming (INIT). These are
>> > > set by
>> > > +        * security_sctp_assoc_request(). These will only be used
>> > > by
>> > > +        * SCTP TCP type sockets and peeled off connections as
>> > > they
>> > > +        * cause a new socket to be generated.
>> > > security_sctp_sk_clone()
>> > > +        * will then plug these into the new socket.
>> > > +        */
>> > > +
>> > > +       u32 secid;
>> > > +       u32 peer_secid;
>> > >  };
>> > >
>> > >  /* Recover the outter endpoint structure. */
>> > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
>> > > b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
>> > > index 6217ff8..c04812f 100644
>> > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
>> > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
>> > > @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ typedef __s32 sctp_assoc_t;
>> > >  #define SCTP_RESET_ASSOC       120
>> > >  #define SCTP_ADD_STREAMS       121
>> > >  #define SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF_FLAGS 122
>> > > +#define SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT   123
>> > >
>> > >  /* PR-SCTP policies */
>> > >  #define SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE      0x0000
>> > > diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
>> > > index 6110447..ca4705b 100644
>> > > --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
>> > > +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
>> > > @@ -3059,6 +3059,12 @@ static __be16
>> > > sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
>> > >                 if (af->is_any(&addr))
>> > >                         memcpy(&addr, &asconf->source,
>> > > sizeof(addr));
>> > >
>> > > +               if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep->base.sk,
>> > > +                                              SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP,
>> > > +                                              (struct sockaddr
>> > > *)&addr,
>> > > +                                              af->sockaddr_len))
>> > > +                       return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED;
>> > > +
>> > >                 /* ADDIP 4.3 D9) If an endpoint receives an ADD
>> > > IP address
>> > >                  * request and does not have the local resources
>> > > to add this
>> > >                  * new address to the association, it MUST return
>> > > an Error
>> > > @@ -3125,6 +3131,12 @@ static __be16
>> > > sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
>> > >                 if (af->is_any(&addr))
>> > >                         memcpy(&addr.v4, sctp_source(asconf),
>> > > sizeof(addr));
>> > >
>> > > +               if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep->base.sk,
>> > > +                                              SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRI
>> > > MARY,
>> > > +                                              (struct sockaddr
>> > > *)&addr,
>> > > +                                              af->sockaddr_len))
>> > > +                       return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED;
>> > > +
>> > >                 peer = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &addr);
>> > >                 if (!peer)
>> > >                         return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
>> > > diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
>> > > index b2a74c3..4ba5805 100644
>> > > --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
>> > > +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
>> > > @@ -314,6 +314,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t
>> > > sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net,
>> > >         sctp_unrecognized_param_t *unk_param;
>> > >         int len;
>> > >
>> > > +       /* Update socket peer label if first association. */
>> > > +       if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint
>> > > *)ep,
>> > > +                                       chunk->skb,
>> > > SCTP_CID_INIT))
>> > > +               return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
>> > > commands);
>> > > +
>> > >         /* 6.10 Bundling
>> > >          * An endpoint MUST NOT bundle INIT, INIT ACK or
>> > >          * SHUTDOWN COMPLETE with any other chunks.
>> > > @@ -446,7 +451,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t
>> > > sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net,
>> > >         }
>> > >
>> > >         sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC,
>> > > SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc));
>> > > -
>> > >         sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY,
>> > > SCTP_CHUNK(repl));
>> > >
>> > >         /*
>> > > @@ -507,6 +511,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t
>> > > sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net,
>> > >         struct sctp_chunk *err_chunk;
>> > >         struct sctp_packet *packet;
>> > >
>> > > +       /* Update socket peer label if first association. */
>> > > +       if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint
>> > > *)ep,
>> > > +                                       chunk->skb,
>> > > SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK))
>> > > +               return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
>> > > commands);
>> > > +
>> >
>> > Just thinking security_sctp_assoc_request hook should also be in
>> > sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook() ?
>>
>> I agree, i think if this hook is gating on the creation of a new
>> association,
>> they should be in all the locations where that happens
>> Neil
>
> Thanks for the comments. I've just added the hook as requested for my
> next update, however I have not managed to trigger these areas using
> the lksctp-tools tests. Can you suggest any suitable tools for testing
> these scenarios.
It's all a matter of timing:

sctp_sf_do_5_2_2_dupinit():
Case A:

  Endpoint A                           Endpoint B                ULP
  (CLOSED)                             (CLOSED)

  INIT          ----------------->

                <-----------------      INIT-ACK

  COOKIE-ECHO   ----------------->

                <-----------------      COOKIE-ACK
                                         Communication Up ---------->
  INIT          ----------------->
  (Different INIT-TAG)
                <-----------------      INIT-ACK

  COOKIE-ECHO   ----------------->

                <-----------------      COOKIE-ACK

  DATA          ----------------->

                <-----------------      SACK


sctp_sf_do_5_2_1_siminit():
 Case B:

  Endpoint A                           Endpoint B                ULP
  (CLOSED)                             (CLOSED)

                                                   <-----    Associate
                <-----------------      INIT

  INIT          ----------------->

                <-----------------      INIT-ACK

  COOKIE-ECHO   ----------------->

                <-----------------      COOKIE-ACK
                                         Communication Up ---------->


sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook():
Case D:

  Endpoint A                           Endpoint B                ULP
  (CLOSED)                             (CLOSED)

                                                   <-----    Associate
  INIT          ----------------->

                <-----------------      INIT-ACK

  COOKIE-ECHO   ----------------->

                <-----------------      COOKIE-ACK
                                         Communication Up ---------->
  COOKIE-ECHO   ----------------->

                <-----------------      COOKIE-ACK

I think scapy could help with 4-shake stuff:
# iptables -A OUTPUT -p sctp -d 192.0.0.2 --chunk-type only abort -o
eth1 -j DROP
and
something like:
        def start_assoc(self, target, local):
                target_host, target_port = target
                local_host,  local_port  = local

                # init snd
                self._tsn = 2017
                self._cnt = 15

                SCTP_HEADER = (IP(dst=target_host, flags="DF") /
SCTP(sport=local_port, dport=target_port, tag=0))
                INIT = (SCTP_HEADER / SCTPChunkInit(init_tag=1,
a_rwnd=106496, n_out_streams=self._cnt, n_in_streams=self._cnt,
init_tsn=self._tsn,

params=[SCTPParamSupport(types=[64])]))
                INIT_ACK = sr1(INIT, timeout=3, verbose=0)
                if INIT_ACK == None or not INIT_ACK.haslayer(SCTPChunkInitAck):
                        return False

                # cookie echo snd
                SCTP_HEADER[SCTP].tag = INIT_ACK[SCTPChunkInitAck].init_tag
                COOKIE_ECHO = (SCTP_HEADER /
SCTPChunkCookieEcho(cookie=INIT_ACK[SCTPChunkParamStateCookie].cookie))
                COOKIE_ACK = sr1(COOKIE_ECHO, timeout=3, verbose=0)
                if COOKIE_ACK == None or not
COOKIE_ACK.haslayer(SCTPChunkCookieAck):
                        return False
Richard Haines Oct. 24, 2017, 8:27 p.m. UTC | #5
On Fri, 2017-10-20 at 21:14 +0800, Xin Long wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 8:04 PM, Richard Haines
> <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> wrote:
> > On Fri, 2017-10-20 at 07:16 -0400, Neil Horman wrote:
> > > On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 11:05:09PM +0800, Xin Long wrote:
> > > > On Tue, Oct 17, 2017 at 9:58 PM, Richard Haines
> > > > <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> wrote:
> > > > > Add security hooks to allow security modules to exercise
> > > > > access
> > > > > control
> > > > > over SCTP.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.co
> > > > > m>
> > > > > ---
> > > > >  include/net/sctp/structs.h | 10 ++++++++
> > > > >  include/uapi/linux/sctp.h  |  1 +
> > > > >  net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c   | 12 +++++++++
> > > > >  net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c    | 14 ++++++++++-
> > > > >  net/sctp/socket.c          | 61
> > > > > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > > > >  5 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> > > > > 
> > > > > diff --git a/include/net/sctp/structs.h
> > > > > b/include/net/sctp/structs.h
> > > > > index 7767577..6e72e3e 100644
> > > > > --- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h
> > > > > +++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h
> > > > > @@ -1270,6 +1270,16 @@ struct sctp_endpoint {
> > > > >               reconf_enable:1;
> > > > > 
> > > > >         __u8  strreset_enable;
> > > > > +
> > > > > +       /* Security identifiers from incoming (INIT). These
> > > > > are
> > > > > set by
> > > > > +        * security_sctp_assoc_request(). These will only be
> > > > > used
> > > > > by
> > > > > +        * SCTP TCP type sockets and peeled off connections
> > > > > as
> > > > > they
> > > > > +        * cause a new socket to be generated.
> > > > > security_sctp_sk_clone()
> > > > > +        * will then plug these into the new socket.
> > > > > +        */
> > > > > +
> > > > > +       u32 secid;
> > > > > +       u32 peer_secid;
> > > > >  };
> > > > > 
> > > > >  /* Recover the outter endpoint structure. */
> > > > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
> > > > > b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
> > > > > index 6217ff8..c04812f 100644
> > > > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
> > > > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
> > > > > @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ typedef __s32 sctp_assoc_t;
> > > > >  #define SCTP_RESET_ASSOC       120
> > > > >  #define SCTP_ADD_STREAMS       121
> > > > >  #define SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF_FLAGS 122
> > > > > +#define SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT   123
> > > > > 
> > > > >  /* PR-SCTP policies */
> > > > >  #define SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE      0x0000
> > > > > diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
> > > > > b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
> > > > > index 6110447..ca4705b 100644
> > > > > --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
> > > > > +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
> > > > > @@ -3059,6 +3059,12 @@ static __be16
> > > > > sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
> > > > >                 if (af->is_any(&addr))
> > > > >                         memcpy(&addr, &asconf->source,
> > > > > sizeof(addr));
> > > > > 
> > > > > +               if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep-
> > > > > >base.sk,
> > > > > +                                              SCTP_PARAM_ADD
> > > > > _IP,
> > > > > +                                              (struct
> > > > > sockaddr
> > > > > *)&addr,
> > > > > +                                              af-
> > > > > >sockaddr_len))
> > > > > +                       return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED;
> > > > > +
> > > > >                 /* ADDIP 4.3 D9) If an endpoint receives an
> > > > > ADD
> > > > > IP address
> > > > >                  * request and does not have the local
> > > > > resources
> > > > > to add this
> > > > >                  * new address to the association, it MUST
> > > > > return
> > > > > an Error
> > > > > @@ -3125,6 +3131,12 @@ static __be16
> > > > > sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
> > > > >                 if (af->is_any(&addr))
> > > > >                         memcpy(&addr.v4, sctp_source(asconf),
> > > > > sizeof(addr));
> > > > > 
> > > > > +               if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep-
> > > > > >base.sk,
> > > > > +                                              SCTP_PARAM_SET
> > > > > _PRI
> > > > > MARY,
> > > > > +                                              (struct
> > > > > sockaddr
> > > > > *)&addr,
> > > > > +                                              af-
> > > > > >sockaddr_len))
> > > > > +                       return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED;
> > > > > +
> > > > >                 peer = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &addr);
> > > > >                 if (!peer)
> > > > >                         return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
> > > > > diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
> > > > > b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
> > > > > index b2a74c3..4ba5805 100644
> > > > > --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
> > > > > +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
> > > > > @@ -314,6 +314,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t
> > > > > sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net,
> > > > >         sctp_unrecognized_param_t *unk_param;
> > > > >         int len;
> > > > > 
> > > > > +       /* Update socket peer label if first association. */
> > > > > +       if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint
> > > > > *)ep,
> > > > > +                                       chunk->skb,
> > > > > SCTP_CID_INIT))
> > > > > +               return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type,
> > > > > arg,
> > > > > commands);
> > > > > +
> > > > >         /* 6.10 Bundling
> > > > >          * An endpoint MUST NOT bundle INIT, INIT ACK or
> > > > >          * SHUTDOWN COMPLETE with any other chunks.
> > > > > @@ -446,7 +451,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t
> > > > > sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net,
> > > > >         }
> > > > > 
> > > > >         sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC,
> > > > > SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc));
> > > > > -
> > > > >         sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY,
> > > > > SCTP_CHUNK(repl));
> > > > > 
> > > > >         /*
> > > > > @@ -507,6 +511,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t
> > > > > sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net,
> > > > >         struct sctp_chunk *err_chunk;
> > > > >         struct sctp_packet *packet;
> > > > > 
> > > > > +       /* Update socket peer label if first association. */
> > > > > +       if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint
> > > > > *)ep,
> > > > > +                                       chunk->skb,
> > > > > SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK))
> > > > > +               return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type,
> > > > > arg,
> > > > > commands);
> > > > > +
> > > > 
> > > > Just thinking security_sctp_assoc_request hook should also be
> > > > in
> > > > sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook() ?
> > > 
> > > I agree, i think if this hook is gating on the creation of a new
> > > association,
> > > they should be in all the locations where that happens
> > > Neil
> > 
> > Thanks for the comments. I've just added the hook as requested for
> > my
> > next update, however I have not managed to trigger these areas
> > using
> > the lksctp-tools tests. Can you suggest any suitable tools for
> > testing
> > these scenarios.
> 
> It's all a matter of timing:
> 
> sctp_sf_do_5_2_2_dupinit():
> Case A:
> 
>   Endpoint A                           Endpoint B                ULP
>   (CLOSED)                             (CLOSED)
> 
>   INIT          ----------------->
> 
>                 <-----------------      INIT-ACK
> 
>   COOKIE-ECHO   ----------------->
> 
>                 <-----------------      COOKIE-ACK
>                                          Communication Up ---------->
>   INIT          ----------------->
>   (Different INIT-TAG)
>                 <-----------------      INIT-ACK
> 
>   COOKIE-ECHO   ----------------->
> 
>                 <-----------------      COOKIE-ACK
> 
>   DATA          ----------------->
> 
>                 <-----------------      SACK
> 
> 
> sctp_sf_do_5_2_1_siminit():
>  Case B:
> 
>   Endpoint A                           Endpoint B                ULP
>   (CLOSED)                             (CLOSED)
> 
>                                                    <--
> ---    Associate
>                 <-----------------      INIT
> 
>   INIT          ----------------->
> 
>                 <-----------------      INIT-ACK
> 
>   COOKIE-ECHO   ----------------->
> 
>                 <-----------------      COOKIE-ACK
>                                          Communication Up ---------->
> 
> 
> sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook():
> Case D:
> 
>   Endpoint A                           Endpoint B                ULP
>   (CLOSED)                             (CLOSED)
> 
>                                                    <--
> ---    Associate
>   INIT          ----------------->
> 
>                 <-----------------      INIT-ACK
> 
>   COOKIE-ECHO   ----------------->
> 
>                 <-----------------      COOKIE-ACK
>                                          Communication Up ---------->
>   COOKIE-ECHO   ----------------->
> 
>                 <-----------------      COOKIE-ACK
> 
> I think scapy could help with 4-shake stuff:
> # iptables -A OUTPUT -p sctp -d 192.0.0.2 --chunk-type only abort -o
> eth1 -j DROP
> and
> something like:
>         def start_assoc(self, target, local):
>                 target_host, target_port = target
>                 local_host,  local_port  = local
> 
>                 # init snd
>                 self._tsn = 2017
>                 self._cnt = 15
> 
>                 SCTP_HEADER = (IP(dst=target_host, flags="DF") /
> SCTP(sport=local_port, dport=target_port, tag=0))
>                 INIT = (SCTP_HEADER / SCTPChunkInit(init_tag=1,
> a_rwnd=106496, n_out_streams=self._cnt, n_in_streams=self._cnt,
> init_tsn=self._tsn,
> 
> params=[SCTPParamSupport(types=[64])]))
>                 INIT_ACK = sr1(INIT, timeout=3, verbose=0)
>                 if INIT_ACK == None or not
> INIT_ACK.haslayer(SCTPChunkInitAck):
>                         return False
> 
>                 # cookie echo snd
>                 SCTP_HEADER[SCTP].tag =
> INIT_ACK[SCTPChunkInitAck].init_tag
>                 COOKIE_ECHO = (SCTP_HEADER /
> SCTPChunkCookieEcho(cookie=INIT_ACK[SCTPChunkParamStateCookie].cookie
> ))
>                 COOKIE_ACK = sr1(COOKIE_ECHO, timeout=3, verbose=0)
>                 if COOKIE_ACK == None or not
> COOKIE_ACK.haslayer(SCTPChunkCookieAck):
>                         return False

That looks a bit complicated for me so I found some SCTP Conformance
Test Tools at: https://github.com/nplab

I added the required hooks as suggested above and then built and ran
"ETSI-SCTP-Conformance-Testsuite" and "sctp-tests" with the following
specific tests for the above scenarios according to RFC2960 sections
5.2.2 and 5.2.4:
sctp-dm-o-4-8
sctp-as-o-1-9-1
sctp-as-o-1-9-2
sctp-dm-o-4-2-1

They all passed except when running:
"sctp-tests" runsctptest sctp-as-o-1-9-2 - TIMEOUT
This is because the SUT needs to reply with a new IP address that
required a modified test server (I just used a simple sctp server),
however the ETSI-SCTP-Conformance-Testsuite did pass as I guess that
provided the required IP address.

Are these tests okay ??
Does anyone on the list use these conformance tools ???

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diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/include/net/sctp/structs.h b/include/net/sctp/structs.h
index 7767577..6e72e3e 100644
--- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h
+++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h
@@ -1270,6 +1270,16 @@  struct sctp_endpoint {
 	      reconf_enable:1;
 
 	__u8  strreset_enable;
+
+	/* Security identifiers from incoming (INIT). These are set by
+	 * security_sctp_assoc_request(). These will only be used by
+	 * SCTP TCP type sockets and peeled off connections as they
+	 * cause a new socket to be generated. security_sctp_sk_clone()
+	 * will then plug these into the new socket.
+	 */
+
+	u32 secid;
+	u32 peer_secid;
 };
 
 /* Recover the outter endpoint structure. */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
index 6217ff8..c04812f 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@  typedef __s32 sctp_assoc_t;
 #define SCTP_RESET_ASSOC	120
 #define SCTP_ADD_STREAMS	121
 #define SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF_FLAGS 122
+#define SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT	123
 
 /* PR-SCTP policies */
 #define SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE	0x0000
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index 6110447..ca4705b 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -3059,6 +3059,12 @@  static __be16 sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
 		if (af->is_any(&addr))
 			memcpy(&addr, &asconf->source, sizeof(addr));
 
+		if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep->base.sk,
+					       SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP,
+					       (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
+					       af->sockaddr_len))
+			return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED;
+
 		/* ADDIP 4.3 D9) If an endpoint receives an ADD IP address
 		 * request and does not have the local resources to add this
 		 * new address to the association, it MUST return an Error
@@ -3125,6 +3131,12 @@  static __be16 sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
 		if (af->is_any(&addr))
 			memcpy(&addr.v4, sctp_source(asconf), sizeof(addr));
 
+		if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep->base.sk,
+					       SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY,
+					       (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
+					       af->sockaddr_len))
+			return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED;
+
 		peer = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &addr);
 		if (!peer)
 			return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index b2a74c3..4ba5805 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -314,6 +314,11 @@  sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net,
 	sctp_unrecognized_param_t *unk_param;
 	int len;
 
+	/* Update socket peer label if first association. */
+	if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint *)ep,
+					chunk->skb, SCTP_CID_INIT))
+		return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
 	/* 6.10 Bundling
 	 * An endpoint MUST NOT bundle INIT, INIT ACK or
 	 * SHUTDOWN COMPLETE with any other chunks.
@@ -446,7 +451,6 @@  sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net,
 	}
 
 	sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC, SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc));
-
 	sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(repl));
 
 	/*
@@ -507,6 +511,11 @@  sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net,
 	struct sctp_chunk *err_chunk;
 	struct sctp_packet *packet;
 
+	/* Update socket peer label if first association. */
+	if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint *)ep,
+					chunk->skb, SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK))
+		return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
 	if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc))
 		return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
 
@@ -899,6 +908,9 @@  sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(struct net *net,
 	 */
 	sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_INIT_COUNTER_RESET, SCTP_NULL());
 
+	/* Set peer label for connection. */
+	security_inet_conn_established(ep->base.sk, chunk->skb);
+
 	/* RFC 2960 5.1 Normal Establishment of an Association
 	 *
 	 * E) Upon reception of the COOKIE ACK, endpoint "A" will move
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index 70355a0..e948163 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -1014,6 +1014,12 @@  static int sctp_setsockopt_bindx(struct sock *sk,
 	/* Do the work. */
 	switch (op) {
 	case SCTP_BINDX_ADD_ADDR:
+		/* Allow security module to validate bindx addresses. */
+		err = security_sctp_bind_connect(sk, SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD,
+						 (struct sockaddr *)kaddrs,
+						 addrs_size);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
 		err = sctp_bindx_add(sk, kaddrs, addrcnt);
 		if (err)
 			goto out;
@@ -1223,6 +1229,7 @@  static int __sctp_connect(struct sock *sk,
 
 	if (assoc_id)
 		*assoc_id = asoc->assoc_id;
+
 	err = sctp_wait_for_connect(asoc, &timeo);
 	/* Note: the asoc may be freed after the return of
 	 * sctp_wait_for_connect.
@@ -1336,9 +1343,17 @@  static int __sctp_setsockopt_connectx(struct sock *sk,
 	if (__copy_from_user(kaddrs, addrs, addrs_size)) {
 		err = -EFAULT;
 	} else {
+		/* Allow security module to validate connectx addresses. */
+		err = security_sctp_bind_connect(sk, SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX,
+						 (struct sockaddr *)kaddrs,
+						  addrs_size);
+		if (err)
+			goto out_free;
+
 		err = __sctp_connect(sk, kaddrs, addrs_size, assoc_id);
 	}
 
+out_free:
 	kfree(kaddrs);
 
 	return err;
@@ -1604,6 +1619,7 @@  static int sctp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t msg_len)
 	struct sctp_transport *transport, *chunk_tp;
 	struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
 	union sctp_addr to;
+	struct sctp_af *af;
 	struct sockaddr *msg_name = NULL;
 	struct sctp_sndrcvinfo default_sinfo;
 	struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *sinfo;
@@ -1833,6 +1849,24 @@  static int sctp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t msg_len)
 		}
 
 		scope = sctp_scope(&to);
+
+		/* Label connection socket for first association 1-to-many
+		 * style for client sequence socket()->sendmsg(). This
+		 * needs to be done before sctp_assoc_add_peer() as that will
+		 * set up the initial packet that needs to account for any
+		 * security ip options (CIPSO/CALIPSO) added to the packet.
+		 */
+		af = sctp_get_af_specific(to.sa.sa_family);
+		if (!af) {
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+		err = security_sctp_bind_connect(sk, SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT,
+						 (struct sockaddr *)&to,
+						 af->sockaddr_len);
+		if (err < 0)
+			goto out_unlock;
+
 		new_asoc = sctp_association_new(ep, sk, scope, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!new_asoc) {
 			err = -ENOMEM;
@@ -2865,6 +2899,8 @@  static int sctp_setsockopt_primary_addr(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval,
 {
 	struct sctp_prim prim;
 	struct sctp_transport *trans;
+	struct sctp_af *af;
+	int err;
 
 	if (optlen != sizeof(struct sctp_prim))
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -2872,6 +2908,17 @@  static int sctp_setsockopt_primary_addr(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval,
 	if (copy_from_user(&prim, optval, sizeof(struct sctp_prim)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
+	/* Allow security module to validate address but need address len. */
+	af = sctp_get_af_specific(prim.ssp_addr.ss_family);
+	if (!af)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	err = security_sctp_bind_connect(sk, SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR,
+					 (struct sockaddr *)&prim.ssp_addr,
+					 af->sockaddr_len);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	trans = sctp_addr_id2transport(sk, &prim.ssp_addr, prim.ssp_assoc_id);
 	if (!trans)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -3192,6 +3239,13 @@  static int sctp_setsockopt_peer_primary_addr(struct sock *sk, char __user *optva
 	if (!sctp_assoc_lookup_laddr(asoc, (union sctp_addr *)&prim.sspp_addr))
 		return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
 
+	/* Allow security module to validate address. */
+	err = security_sctp_bind_connect(sk, SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR,
+					 (struct sockaddr *)&prim.sspp_addr,
+					 af->sockaddr_len);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	/* Create an ASCONF chunk with SET_PRIMARY parameter	*/
 	chunk = sctp_make_asconf_set_prim(asoc,
 					  (union sctp_addr *)&prim.sspp_addr);
@@ -8024,6 +8078,8 @@  void sctp_copy_sock(struct sock *newsk, struct sock *sk,
 {
 	struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
 	struct inet_sock *newinet;
+	struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
+	struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sp->ep;
 
 	newsk->sk_type = sk->sk_type;
 	newsk->sk_bound_dev_if = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
@@ -8066,7 +8122,10 @@  void sctp_copy_sock(struct sock *newsk, struct sock *sk,
 	if (newsk->sk_flags & SK_FLAGS_TIMESTAMP)
 		net_enable_timestamp();
 
-	security_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
+	/* Set newsk security attributes from orginal sk and connection
+	 * security attribute from ep.
+	 */
+	security_sctp_sk_clone(ep, sk, newsk);
 }
 
 static inline void sctp_copy_descendant(struct sock *sk_to,